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60th congress : : 1st session 

DECEMBER 2, 1907-MAY 30, 1908 



SENATE DOCUMENTS 



IN 36 VOLUMES 



Vol, 32 



WASHINGTON : : GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : : 1908 



CONTENTS 

No. 

297. Report cpnceming certain alleged defects in vessels of Navy. 

298. Statement in refutation of alleged defects of naval vessels. 
308. Superannuation in classified civil service. 

326. Statement relative to district superintendents in Life-Saving Service. 
337. Abstract of laws on publicity of election contributions and exjx^nditures. 
349. Educating children at military posts. 
351. Investigation of conditions in third judicial division of Alaska. 

369. Acreage of lands examined and classified in Montana and Idaho, etc. 

370. Additional estimate.s for War Department. 
375. Trade follows the flag. 

377. Reinstatement of soldiers discharged from Twenty-fifth Infantry. 

378. Memorial remonstrating against construction of four new battle-ships. 
392. Memorial against building of four new battle-ships. 

395. Draft of bill relating to ailministration of Indian affairs. 

400. Memorial for relief from results of enforcement of Sherman anti-trust law. 

401. Thanks of King of Portugal for resolutions of sympathy of Senate. 
415. Additional estimates for pay, etc., of Army, 1909. 

422. Location of water-lme armor belt upon United States battle-ships. 

423. Speech by Henry Cabot liOdge on immigration, Boston, March 20, 1908. 

426. Transmission through mails of anarchistic publications. 

427. Article on hearings on alleged structural defects in United States battle-ships. 
435. Refusal of national banks in New York City to furnish currency. 

437. Receipts of Forest Service. 

438. Veto of bill to extend time for constructing dam in Rainy River. 
443. Swamp lands of the United States, etc. 

450. Railroad discriminations and monopolies in coal and oil. 
•452. Action of War, Navy, & Comm. & l^bor depts. on wireless telegraph convention. 
454. Memorial relative to amending Constitution of United States. 
456. Celebration of three hundredth anniversary of discovery of Lake C'hamplain. 
458. Improvement of valley of Rock Creek from Massachusetts avenue to mouth. 
460. Investigations and tests of fuels and structural materials of United States. 

465. Compliance with commodities clause of act to regulate connnerco. 

466. Letters and papers of Henry Fisher of Delaware. 



203301 



\ 



a. 



60th Congress, ) SENATE. ( Document 

Ist Session. ) I No. 297. 



KEPORT CONCERNING CERTAIN ALLEGED DEFECTS IN 
VESSELS OF NAVY. 



Mr. Hale presented the following 

BEFOBT CONCERNING CERTAIN ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS 
OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY, BY WASHINGTON LEE CAFFS, 
CHIEF CONSTRUCTOR, U. S. NAVY, AND CHIEF OF BUREAU OF 
CONSTRUCTION AND REFAIR. 



February 19, 1908. — Referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs and ordered 
to be printed with illustrations. 



Navy Department, 
Bureau of Construction and Repair, 

Washington. D, C. February H^ 1908. 

Sir : In conformity with the Department's instructions to prepare 
data with respect to height of freeboard, ^n height, water-line aimor 
distribution, and other features of the design of typical battle ships of 
the United States and the most important foreign navies, so far as 
such data might be available, with a view to definitely and con- 
clusively refuting the many misstatements which have recently ap- 
peared in the public press, and especially the misstatements contained 
m a recent magazine article, I beg to submit the following report : 

The preparation of data with respect to vessels of the United States 
Navy is, of course, not difficult, although its presentation in a form 
which would readily meet the needs of the Department required much 
time and labor. The preparation of reasonably accurate data of a 
similar character with respect to foreign battle ships involved much 
greater difficulty ; but the Chief Constructor has fully availed himself 
of the resources of the Department in obtaining such data, and has 
had examined all the most important special reports on such subjects, 
including reports of naval officers who have recently made tours or 
inspection in foreign countries, reports on file in the office of naval in- 
telligence based upon the reports of naval attaches, official. Parlia- 
mentary, and other documents which give statistics of foreign naval 
vessels, and the principal British and French professional publica- 
tions which deal with naval matters ; he has also utilized the personal 
knowledge and professional notes of various members of the corps of 
naval constructors who have been educated at the Royal Naval Col- 
lege, Greenwich, England; the Nicole d'Application du Genie Mari- 



2 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

time, Paris, France, and the University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scot- 
land, these officers having kept more or less in direct touch with pro- 
fessional developments in those countries. Although it can not be 
claimed that the data with respect to foreign battle ships is wholly 
accurate, it can be stated with entire assurance that it is the most 
accurate obtainable without having access to actual official drawings 
and specifications. 

It is noteworthy, however, that in the case of several foreign ships 
unusually reliable official data was available; also that in the case 
of those battle ships of the Japanese fleet which took part in the 
battle of the Sea of Japan there was at hand accurate data which had 
previously been printed in English scientific publications, as well as 
very complete descriptions, with detailed data, prepared by the direc- 
tor of naval construction of the Japanese nvLvy and published in the 
proceedings of a scientific society of Japan, and subsequently trans- 
lated and republished in one of the most important English engineer- 
ing publications. It is therefore evident that comparison between 
American battle ships and such Japanese battle ships as existed at 
the time of the Russo-Japanese war can be made accurately, and that 
comparison with certain other foreign battle ships can also be made 
with an unusual degree of accuracy. 

In order that the Department might have complete information, 
in a convenient form, the following tabular statements and plans have 
been prepared and are made a part of this report : 

I. Tabular statement giving principal characteristics of typical 
foreign battle ships. 

II. Comparative table of gun heights, etc., of typical modern battle 
ships. 

ni. Tabular statement of heights of upper edge of main water- 
line belt armor above trial or designed load water line for typical 
foreign and United States battle ships. 

IvT Length, width, and thickness of water-line armor and upper 
side belt armor for United States battle ships. 

V. Tabular statement of principal characteristics of Russian and 
Japanese ships which took part in the battle of the Straits of Tsu- 
shima, otherwise called '' Battle of Sea of Japan." 

VI. Tabular statement of heights of turret and boardside gun axes 
above designed load water line for United States battle ships and 
armored cruisers. 

VII. Cross sections of typical battle ships of the United States and 
foreign navies, showing breadth and thickness of main water-line 
belt; also depth of submersion of lower edge of main armor lx»lt 
below the designed load water line; also height of top of main armor 
belt above designed load water line; also designed load displacement 
and coal carried on designated load displacement ; also height of free 
board and height of broadside gun axes. 

VIII. Profiles and cross sections of typical battle ships of the 
United States Navy, giving distribution of armor, heights of gun 
axes, etc. (Sheets 1 to 14.) 

IX. Profiles and cross-sections of typical foreign battle ships, giv- 
ing distribution of armor, heights of gun axes, etc. (Sheets 1 to 15.) 

A. Booklet of profiles of United States battle ships, showing de- 
velopment of side-armor protection. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 3 

Among the various foreign publications, special reports, etc., con- 
sulted were the following: 

Parliamentary papers and other published official documents relat- 
ing to foreign ships. 

Special reports. 

Photographs of foreign ships. 

Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects. 

Bulletin de L'Association Technique Maritime. 

Other foreign technical society publications: Engineer (London), 
Engineering (London), Naval and Military Record (London), Xau- 
tical Gazette, Armee et Marine, Le Yacht, Brassev's Naval Annual, 
Naval Pocket Book (Clowes), Jane's All the World's Fighting Ships, 
I.<es Flottes de Combat. 

After reading some of the sensational comments which have re- 
cently been made concerning certain features of battle-ship design 
one would be justified in believing that such features were novelties 
whose consideration had not heretofore been thought of, or else that 
the questions involved were so complex as to have confused and 
misled the responsible designers of the United States Navy as well 
as those of the principal foreign navies. 

It would also appear that ill-informed representatives of a would-be 
new school of design deemed it necessary to invite special attention 
to professional subjects which, as a matter of fact, had already 
received most serious consideration by officei's of thorough pro- 
fessional training and experience as subordinate officers and com- 
manders of naval vessels or fleets. That the large majority of the 
alle^d defects in our naval vessels do not exist in fact will be con- 
clusively shown in the following pages. But before entering upon 
any argument which involves the use of the data contained in the 
previously enumerated plans and tabular statements, and before 
entering upon any categorical refutation of the many misstatements 
of fact contained in the magazine article already alluded to, it is 
deemed necessary to define with accuracy the conventional phrases 
used by. naval designers in distinguishing between " light displace- 
ment," " load displacement," and '' deep-load displacement," for it 
is doubtless the confusion of these terms by the nonexpert that has 
been responsible for so much of the silly and misleading criticism 
which has had such vogue in the secular and semitechnical press, and, 
I regret deeply to add, among some of the less well-informed officers 
of the United States Navy. 

" Liqht displacement " in all navies is a term which describes the 
condition of the ship when complete in all respects, with armor, 
armament, machinery, equipment, etc., on board, but without coal, 
water, ammunition, or stores of any kind, or personnel. 

" Designed load displacement " in the United States Navy, as well 
as in foreign navies, corresponds to our more familiar designation of 
*' trial " or " normal " displacement, and indicates the condition of 
the vessel when it is complete in all respects, as in the " light " con- 
dition, and, in addition, has on board the personnel and all outfit, 
a certain proportion of ammunition and all consumable stores, and 
an arbitrarily determined quantity of coal in the bunkers; also, 
water in boilers at steaming level, and, in the case of battle ships, 
about 100 tons of fresh water in tanks and double bottoms. In tne 



4 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

United States Navy this condition provides for two-thirds of all 
ammunition and consumable stores being on board, and since the 
design of the Kearsarge class (more than twelve years ago) the quan- 
tity of coal in the bunkers on the designed load displacement has been 
from 800 to 1,000 tons, except in the case of the 17-knot battle ships 
Idaho and M i8sissij)pi. An examination of the quantity of coal in 
the bunkers of typical foreign ships, under similar conditions, in- 
dicates that there were from 700 to 950 tons of coal in the bunkers 
on the designed load disvlacement. In this connection it is interest- 
ing to note that the " designed load displacement " of the Dread- 
nought provided for only 900 tons of coal in the bunkers, although 
the bunker capacity was 2,700 tons. The published accounts indicate 
that the actual load draft of that vessel was considerably more than 
1 foot greater with the 900 tons of coal on board than was provided 
for in the design. 

" Deey load displacement " in our own and foreign navies is a term 
which indicates the displacement of the vessel fully completed, ready 
for sea, with all stores, ammunition, coal, etc., on l>oard, and is a con- 
dition which of course only obtains when the vessel has been freshly 
provisioned, coaled, etc. It also includes not only the full supply of 
potable water, but a substantial amount of reserve fresh water for 
the boilers, etc. It is obvious, therefore, that there are many weights 
on board at such a time which could be quickly disposed of and the 
ship lightened to that extent should the necessity therefor arise, even 
though the enemy should be met with shortly after leaving port. 

Inasmuch as some arbitrary plane of reference is absolutely essen- 
tial in determining such important features as water-line protection, 
height of freeboard, etc., the xoater line at dedgned load displacement 
is the arbitrary plane of reference naturally selected. It would be 
obviously improper to consider such important features as " free- 
board," '' water-line annor protection," etc., as being governed by the 
draft of the vessel at '' light *^ displacement. It would be almost 
equally improper to consider that such qualities should be governed 
by the drait or the vessel at " deep load " displacement. By common 
con-ent. therefore, all designers in all countries of which the Chief 
Constructor has knowledge base such essential requirements of the 
vessel as the " freeboard," "' water-line armor distribution," etc., upon 
the draft at the designed load displacement, this displacement being 
one which may reasonably be regarded as representing the minimum 
displacement at which battle ships will begin an engagement. The 
distribution of water-line armor, freeboard, height or gun axes, etc., 
are. however, such that even should a vessel be compelled to engage 
in battle shortly after being provisioned and coaled, the protection of 
the vital portions of the vessel and the ability to fight the guns under 
all ordinary conditions of weather would be as thoroughly assured 
as possible for the particular type of design in question. 

The consideration of freeboard, gun height, water-line armor dis- 
tribution, etc., is now and always has been a matter of the gravest 
concern to naval designers and naval officers who are in any respons- 
ible way connected with naval design. The transactions of scientific 
societies and reports of board of officers of the United States Navy 
and foreign navies afford ample evidence of the truth of the fore- 
going statement, and definite reference will be made to some of the 
moie important of these documents later on in this report. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 5 

It is unquestionably true, and a fact never disputed, so far as I am 
aware, that in many instances in all navies battle ships as completed 
have a somewhat greater draft of water than that provided for in 
the original design, this excess draft being mainly due, not to errors 
of calculation or design, but largely to extra weights involved in 
"changes" and other weights added subsequent to the approval of 
the design, and for which the designers were not responsible. The 
changes are in the large majority of cases desirable, inasmuch as they 
increase the military efficiency of the vessel and, as a rule, are the 
result of unusual developments in ordnance or other naval materiel 
subsequent to the completion of the design of the vessel. Such changes 
are, however, only justifiable when they make a definite addition to 
the military value of the vessel, and those charged with the actual 
responsibility of completing the vessel as nearlj'' as possible in accord- 
ance with tne original design have very great difflculty in limiting 
such changes to those which will give a definite increase to the mili- 
tary efficiency of the vessel when completed. That the excess draft, 
for which the designer is in no sense primarily responsible and which 
he often has great difficulty in controlling within reasonable limits, 
does not often gravely affect the free board of the vessel or effective 
distribution of the water-line armor may be readily understood when 
it is stated that the excess draft in the case of battle ships forming 
the present Atlantic Battle Ship Fleet, amounts to as much as 11 
inches in the case of one ship only^ and in the majority of the vessels 
of the fleet averages 7^ inches and under. To dwell longer upon this 
phase of the question would seem needless. 

While definite knowledge of the meaning of the various terms used 
for indicating the displacement of battle ships would appear to leave 
no possible ground for error in compariujg the qualities of different 
battle ships of different navies, the confusion of such terms is appar- 
ently responsible for the perpetration of many of the extraordinary 
blunders which have beon made by self-satisfied critics in their criti- 
cism of vessels of the United States Navy. In fact, so far as may be 
judged from the statements of such ill-informed writers, it appears 
that the draft, displacement, freeboard, etc., of foreign vessels at de- 
signed load displacement have been compared with similar character- 
istics of United States vessels at deep load displacement. As the vari- 
ation between the " designed load " and " deep load " displacement of 
tlie larger battle ships designed in the last seven or eight years is more 
than 2 feet^ the imfairness and grave error involved in any such com- 
parison should be quite obvious to anyone who has once been advised 
as to the real facts. There appear to be those, however (and I am 
compelled to believe that some of them are officers of the naval service, 
who ought to know better), who either will not or can not appreciate 
the absolute unfairness, to use no harsher expression, of comparing 
vessels of different countries under dissimilar conditions of displace- 
ment. Moreover, in the consideration of all such questions as free- 
board, height of gun axes, distribution of. water-line armor, etc., it 
should be borne clearly in mind that, broadly speaking, there are two 
distinct and radically different " schools of naval design," each of 
which has had, from time to time, a substantial following among 
naval officers and naval designers. What may be termed the Amer- 
ican and British school of designers has held to a moderate freeboard 
and moderate height of main gim axes, thus obtaining a very sub- 



6 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

stantial increase of defensive and offensive powers by reason of the 
saving of weight resulting therefrom. The Japanese have closely fol- 
lowed the American and British school of design. As a matter of 
fact, the Japanese battle ships which took part in the battle of the Sea 
of Japan were built in England, and very closely followed the British 
school of design. On the other hand, the French school has hereto- 
fore inclined, with few exceptions, to high freeboard, great height of 
ffiin axes, and a very considerable water-line armor protection, but has 
been compelled to accept serious sacrifices consequent thereupon. 

A complete exposition of the characteristics and merits of the 
two schools of design would be entirely too involved to present in a 
report of this kind ; but, in brief, it may be stated that the forward 
freeboard and height of main battery in French ships is, in general, 
one deck height greater than the freeboard and height of forward 
main battery on vessels of the British, American, and Japanese ships. 
Such an excessive freeboard and elevation of the forward main bat- 
tery involves serious disadvantages, among them being greatly in- 
creased target area; serious diminution in the armor protection of 
the hull structure supporting the main battery emplacements ; serious 
decrease of stability of the vessel under damaged conditions. 

Of course the desired height of freelx)ard forward on any given 
type of battle ship is necessarily dependent upon the prospective 
maximum speed, the location of the heavy weights with respect to the 
extremities, and the length of the vessel; so that a freeboard which 
would be quite sufficient at moderate speed for a full-lined vessel of 
400 or 450 feet in length, with a normal distribution of weights, 
would be by no means sufficient at high speed for a much longer ves- 
sel with fine water lines and, comparatively speaking, a concentration 
of heavy weights nearer the extremities of the vessel. Conceminff 
this, however, more will appear later on when disposing in detail or 
certain recent very inaccurate allegations concprning naval vessels. 

In considering the general questions of hei«:ht of freeboard, height 
of main gun axes, etc., for battle ships of dimensions, displacement, 
and speed corrCvSponding in a general way to those of battle ships of 
the United States Atlantic Fleet, also the best location of the water- 
line belt and other armor for same, and the very inaccurate and mis- 
leading statements which have appeared in relation thereto, the Chief 
Constructor begs to invite special attention to a most notable discus* 
sion which took place in London about nineteen years ago with 
respect to these very matters. The writer of this report, who was 
then on special duty in London, had the good fortune to attend all 
of the meeting at which this public discussion took place, and to 
this day can vividly recall the impressions made upon him by the 
various speakers. The majority of the gentlemen who participated 
in this discussion were seagoing officers of the British navy and were 
thoroughly representative of the very best elements in that navy. 
They were men whose names were household words in Great Britain, 
and a perusal of some of the comments made by these officers will 
fully convince any impartial judge that all the sea<roing and military 
qualities of the Royal Sovereign class were given the most serious and 
careful consideration by the most experienced seagoing officers of the 
British navy at that time. 

In referrmg at length to the designs and the discussion upon the 
designs of the Royal Sovereign it seems hardly necessary to dwell upon 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 7 

the fact that in Great Britain for many years everything connected 
with the development of the navy has been considered of the most 
vital importance, in view of the popular conviction that the navy is 
the right arm of the national defense and, in time of war, would really 
be responsible for the life of the nation. British naval designs, and 
the opinions of officers of the British navy in relation thereto, are 
therefore entitled to the most serious consideration in determining 
what is the most desirable type of battle ship; and while British 
designers and British naval officers are quite as liable to error as 
those of other countries, the vitally essential character and the size 
of the British navy are such as to entitle it to marked consideration 
in comparing the relative merits of battle ships of foreign navies. 

The meeting and discussion above referred to took place in London 
In April, 1889, at a time when British naval materiel and the action 
of the British Admiralty in relation thereto were being severely criti- 
cised. Designs of battle ships prepared and presented for general 
criticism under such conditions would naturally receive unusual con- 
sideration. Moreover, in order that the situation with respect to 
responsibility for battle-ship designs may be fully appreciated, it 
may be stated that the Board of Admiralty had complete and undis- 
puted responsibility in such matters, and two-thirds of its member- 
ship was composed of specially selected naval officers, the naval mem- 
bership at that time being as follows: 

Admiral Sir Arthur William Acland Hood. 

Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton. 

Rear- Admiral John Ommanney Hopkins. 

Rear- Admiral Charles Frederick Hotham. 

This unusually strong and representative Board of Admiralty, de- 
siring to develop a design of battle ship which would f ullv embody 
the ideas of the seagoing element and effectively dispose of such ad- 
verse criticism as had previously been made concerning battle-ship 
design, instructed the director ot naval construction, Mr. (now Sir) 
WilRam H. White, to prepare tentative designs which would repre- 
sent certain special characteristics which were then in favor among 
different groups of naval officers. These sketch designs when com- 
pleted were thoroughly discussed by the Board of Admiralty, which 
also invited comments from distinguished officers of the British 
navy who had recently returned to shore duty after a period of 
command afloat. After mature deliberation two designs were se- 
lected — one of them being what was then described as a " high-free- 
bcward " barbette vessel and the other a " low-freeboard " turret vessel. 
The high-freeboard barbette vessel was the Royal Sovereign^ and it 
was this type which received the unqualified commendation of the 
Board of Admiralty and its additional advisers of the naval service. 

In view of the extensive criticism which had previously been made, 
the director of naval construction sought and obtained permission 
from the Admiralty to prepare a complete description, with outline 
plans, of the high freeboard barbette battle ships and the compara- 
tively low freeboard turret battle ships for publication in the pro- 
ceedings of the Institution of Naval Architects and for discussion 
at the subsequent meeting of that society. This paper of Sir William 
White's also contained tabular data and outhne plans of certain 
battle ships previously designed for the British Admiralty, also 
comparison with some of the latest foreign designs. Especial atten- 



8 AliLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

tion was invited to the fact that the forward freeboard of the bar- 
bette battle ship of the Royal Sovereign class was very considerably 
higher than that of the Nile and Trafalgar and Camverdown classes, 
which were the immediate predecessors of the Royal Sovereign type 
in the British navy. 

As previously noted, this paper of Sir William White's was dis- 
cussed at the spring meeting of the Institution of Naval Architects 
in 1889, and the discussion was participated in by the most prominent 
British naval oflScers then in London, as well as by prominent naval 
architects, among them being two former directors or naval construc- 
tion, Sir Nathaniel Bamaby and Sir Edward Reed. Among those, 
other than naval architects, who took part in the discussion, and 
extracts from whose remarks will hereafter be given, were Lord Arm- 
strong, founder of the celebrated ^n factory and shipyard near 
Newcastle on Tyne, and the followmg distinguished naval officers: 
Admiral Sir Houston Stewart, who, durin^r a period of ten years, 
was controller of the British navy, an office which had under its 
jurisdiction the entire British naval materiel ; Admiral of the Fleet 
Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, who was at that time principal naval 
aid-de-camp to the Sovereign and an officer of the greatest distinc- 
tion, who had held some of the most important commands in the 
British service, both afloat and ashore: Aamiral (at that time Cap- 
tain) Sir G. H. U. Noel, an officer who has long been recognized as 
an authority in all matters pertaining to the development of the fleet 
and who has only recently returned from command of the British 
Asiatic fleet; Admiral (then Captain) Right Hon. Lord Charles 
Beresford, who is at present in command of one of the most powerful 
fleets of battle ships in the world and whose reputation is too well 
known to reouire further comment; also Admiral Lord Clanwilliam, 
Admiral P. H. Colomb, Captain (afterwards Admiral) Long, and 
other officers of distinction. As previously noted, the Board of Ad- 
miralty, which originally passed upon the various general designs 
prepared by Sir mlliam White and selected that which was subse- 
quently adopted for the Royal Sorereign class, included Admiral Sir 
Arthur William Acland Hood, Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamil- 
ton, Rear-Admiral John Ommanney Hopkins, and Rear-Admiral 
Charles Frederick Hotham, officers of highest professional standing 
and distinction and thoroughly identified with the most experienced 
and best informed element m the British navy. 

Moreover, there were on duty at the Admiralty at this time and 
associated with the naval lords above mentioned many officers who, 
in the higher grades to which they have since been promoted, have 
acquitted themselves with distinction. Among them may be men- 
tioned Capt. John A. Fisher, at that time director of naval ordnance 
and torpedoes and at present admiral of the fleet and first sea lord 
of the British Admiralty ; Rear- Admiral Sir George Tryon, at that 
time admiral superintendent of naval reserves and generally regarded 
as one of the most capable officers in the British navy; Capt. Edward 
Hobart Seymour, at that time assistant to the admiral superintend- 
ent of naval reserves, at present admiral of the fleet and recently in 
command of the China station ; Capt. Cyprian A. G. Bridge, at that 
time director of naval intelligence, subsequently admiral in command 
of the China station ; Capt. Reginald Neville Custance, at that time 
assistant director of naval intelligence, now \'ice-admiral in com- 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 9 

niand of one of the most important divisions of the English fleet, and 
Capt. S. M. Eardley Wilmot, at that time assistant director of naval 
intelligence and a writer of distinction upon professional subjects. 

The enumeration of the names and the duties performed by the 
above-noted officers indicates clearly the professional standing of the 
seagoing element of the British navy which considered the designs 
of the Soydl Sovereign, so that in all the questions which were raised 
and discussed in connection with the general designs of that vessel — 
the height of freeboard^ the height oi gun axes^ and the distribution 
of water-line armor — conspicuous representatives of those who were 
ultimately to command vessels and fleets in the British service had 
ample opportunity to submit their opinions. It will also appear in 
the subsequent comments made by various officers who discussed 
these designs that the designs as approved were entirely satisfactory 
to the seagoing element of the British nsLvy and were many times 
alluded to as being entirely representative of the views of seagoing 
oncers. 

The conmients of those who took part in the discussion of the Royal 
Sovereign design are very explicit, and so aptly and completely ex- 
press the views of the seagoing branch with respect to that particular 
design that I will submit for your information, without further com- 
ment, extracts from the discussion itself, preceding these extracts by 
a few paragraphs from Sir William White's paper, and inviting 
special attention to the fact that the British Institution of Naval 
Architects is the largest and most important body of professional 
naval architects in the world, and has also in its membership a very 
lar^e number of British naval officers as well as officers of foreign 
navies: 

[Extracts from a paper entitled •* On the Designs for the New Battle Ships,'* prepared by 
W. H. White, esq., F. R. S.. assistant controller of the navv and director of naval con- 
struction, read at the thirtieth session of the Institution of Naval Architects, April 10, 
1889.] 

[N. B. — Underscoring not that of author or spealcers.] 

Recognizing the great interest which is now being taken in the desljjns of the 
eight first-class battle shii^s which are proiiosed to be added to the navy, and 
feeling convinced that no equally suitable opportunltj^ could be obtained for 
replying to criticisms of the designs which have ai^peared in the public press, I 
applied for and obtained permission from the first lord of the Admiralty to 
prepare this paper. ♦ ♦ ♦ 

Apart from tiie fact that I am the head of that staff, and apart from any 
question of my personal comjietence. I desire to state that there ne\or has 
been a time during my exi^erience with the Admiralty Ofllce — ati exi^erience 
extending over twenty-two years — when the nionibers of that staff included so 
many thoroughly educated, capable, and qualified naval architects and marine 
engineers as are now serving there. ♦ ♦ ♦ 

If with such a staff, with all our recorded data and experience, with our 
grand experimental establishment at Haslar, so ably conducted by my friend, 
Mr. Fronde, and with all the valuable assistance and suggestions coming to us 
from the naval service and our professional colleagues in the dockyards, as 
well as the constant benefits we derive from a full knowledge of the work 
done by private shipbuilders and foreign comi^etitors, we do not, in the " White- 
hall office," succeed in producing " the best iK)ssible ships " consistent with 
the instructions of the Board of Admiralty, then there can be no excuse. But 
I contend that the allegations made against the professional officers of the 
Admiralty have been loosely made, and are proved to be unfounded, as regards 
the designs of the new battle ships, by the facts which have been adduced. 

On this question I shall not be expected to give an opinion. It Involves an 
inquiry into the competency of the Board of Admiralty and our system of naval 
administration. But at the risk of repeating statements already made, I must 



10 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

say that there have never been designs more deliberately and carefully con- 
sidered. The selection was made from among a large number of alternative 
designs, after a careful review of what is being done abroad, and with reference 
to various proposals not yet embodied in actual ships. Fortunately, it could be 
based upon a great mass of new experimental data, obtained by actual trials 
against the Resistance and elsewhere, and giving the latest and best informa- 
tion in relation to guns, projectiles, explosives, and armor. Moreover, the 
Board of Admiralty has availed itself of the advice and assistance of a number 
of distinguished officers before coming to a decision. 

Obviously there is room for differences of opinion, since actual experience 
in naval warfare under modem conditions is almost entirely wanting. The 
matter, therefore, resolves itself into one of relative authority and experimental 
information. Under these circumstances the naval service and the country will 
probably prefer to accept the conclusions of a responsible and well-informed 
body like the Board of Admiralty, rather than those of any individual, 

[Discussion on Sir William White's paper "On the designs for the new battle ships."] 

Lord Abm STRONG. With regard to the question of armor, it certainly appears 
to me, from all that we have heard both from Mr. White and from Sir Edward 
Reed, and from all that we can gather from these numerous diagrams, that we 
may come to this conclusion, that if we render a ship absolutely safe from 
being sunk by modem artillery we shall simply eliminate its power of sinking 
anything else. It is clear to me we must have a compromise between defensive 
power and offensive power, and as far as I can judge from a hasty inspection 
of these diagrams and from listening to all that has been said uiK)n the subject 
it does appear to me that the compromise which is presented by these latest 
designs, especially by the battle ship of barbette stamp, that we have in that 
ship the best compromise between defensive power and offensive power that 
has yet been submitted to the public. 

- Capt. Lord Charles Beresford. I think that Lord Armstrong hit the right 
nail on the head in this great controversy as to what is the best platform that 
you can build to send your men and guns to sea to fight an action with. The 
controversy is between the armor and the armament; and Lord Armstrong, in 
my humble opinion, hit the right nail on the head when he said, if you build 
a ship with the capabilities which Sir Edward Reed demands, and justly de- 
mands, from his point of view, you would have nothing offensive to hit your 
enemy with. That is the real point as I look at it. A ship is always a com- 
promise. ♦ ♦ ♦ 

I say distinctly as a seaman, and I hope one of my brother officers will get up 
and contradict me if he does not agree with me, that what we want in a ship 
is the offensive part. We are very glad to have as much defensive as we can, 
but we do not want to sacrifice in any particular whatever the offensive power 
which we possess of knocking the enemy into a cocked hat. ♦ ♦ ♦ 

I do not brUrrc they could have made a better ship than these new ones, 
although Sir Edward Reed docs not agree with it. I hope he will produce his 
ship. I think he will be the first to agree with me that, in a fair argument, 
theory is of no use to any man, and theoretical argument should be practically 
demonstrated. Mr. White and the Board of Admiralitj^ have produced their 
ships, and I dare say I could find fault with those ships, but taking the com- 
promise I tliink they are the best class of battle ship you can make for the 
present day, having regard to the new high explosives. ♦ ♦ ♦ On our navy 
deiiends our existence, and we must not run the chance, with our want of 
knowledge of actual warfare, of foreign nations getting something other than 
we have got which might win them the action if we came to hostility. ♦ ♦ • 
Those new ships now have, in my humble opinion, for the first time been pro- 
posed to be built in a businesslike way, and in the way In which any mercantile 
firm would build their own ships or a man-of-war if they had to build one. 
They have got the seamen together (by the seamen I mean the engineers and 
the artillerymen, and the men who have got to fight the ships), and they have 
stated what they wanted to have, both in regard to capability of offense and 
defense, draft, and speed. ♦ ♦ .* You must have a ruling power; somebody 
has got to lay down your ships, and this somebody, whoever he has been, has 
been put to do it in a businesslike way for the first time, and, therefore, I 
should take the or»inion c»f my brother officers against my own, who have been 
asked first of all. What do you want to fight with? ♦ ♦ ♦ 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 11 

It was put very well the other day by Mr. White In his pai)er: we keep on 
arguing as to what damage the ship will receive, and we quite forget the 
oflFensive power that we possess, that we are going to give the enemy the 
benefit of. 

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby. — I^ord Ravensworth, 
my lords, and gentlemen : I have come here following an officer (Lord Charles 
Beresford) whom, I am sorry to say, I must call a younger officer. In al- 
most everything he has said with reference to the service at large I entirely 
agree, and I thinlc that he expresses the feeling of the greater part of the naval 
profession. ♦ ♦ ♦ 

All I wish to point out is this, that I feel with reference to these ships as a 
naval officer and as one who has served on board ironclads, that I should be 
glad indeed to serve in such ships as these which are now shown us, because 
they seem to me to embody the idea which Lord Charles Beresford has so 
strongly put forward, and what I believe is the idea of every naval officer, that 
they are ships of very great offensive power. They have great speed, which I 
consider is the highest quality that any ship can have; and, mind you, I do not 
want to put my opinion forward, I go upon the opinion of our highest authority, 
that of Lord Nelson. • ♦ ♦ why I approve particularly of these ships is 
that I think, as Lord Charles Beresford said, that hitherto our ships have never 
been built in the right way ; that is to say, you have never asked the man who is 
going to inhabit the house what sort of house he would like to have, but have 
disregarded the opinions that those gentlemen have given, the requirements that 
those gentlemen have laid down. But now these requirements have been carried 
out, very much to the satisfaction of those who are particularly concerned ; that 
Is, the officers who have to command your fleets. The names of the officers to 
whom these plans have been referred, and who have approved of them, are those 
of officers who have just left active service. Only one name has been omitted, 
viz, that of Admiral Tryon, and that is in consequence of his having been laid 
up by an accident, but otherwise you have the opinion of the officer commanding 
the Channel fieet, the officer lately in command of the China fleet, and the officer 
lately commanding the India fleet. / say myself you have got vrcry name bar- 
ring one which could guarantee the propriety of these ships, and for my part I 
feel on their opinions much more strongly than I do upon my own that these 
ships are good, and will be serviceable ships, and such as any admiral will be 
fortunate to command. , 

Rear-Admiral P. H. Colomb. My lord and gentlemen, I think two distinct 
points must be apparent to the meeting from the discussions which have gone on. 
First of all that you have got a number of naval officers in perfect agreement^ 
which is not common ; and secondly, that the difficulties which the naval archi- 
tect has to deal with in building battle ships are the difficulties of opinion : that 
is to say, the naval architect has to go by the opinion of the day when he builds; 
and sometimes after he has built opinion turns somewhat against him. ♦ ♦ * 

I should like to say, speaking as a naval officer about these designs, that 
this thing has not been done in a corner: that is to say, the navy has been 
taken into the confidence of the constructors and the Board of Admiralty, in a 
way that it never was before, and I think the result must be this, that never 
in this theater will naval officers be able to get up and denounce those ships if 
they turn out differently from what they expect, but that the constructors will 
he able to turn round upon us and say, ''They are your ships; they are not ours.'* 
I think the navy is quite prepared to accept the responsibility for these ships, 
for, taking them all in all, we are agreed generally that they are as good as the 
opinion of the day will allow us to have them. ♦ * ♦ But I want to say, 
finally, that I believe the feeling of the service is entirely clear on the designs 
of these new battle ships ; that taking what the service asks for all round they 
are the fairest, the most open, and the most complete attempt to meet the naval 
opinion of the day. 

Admiral Lord Clanwilliam. I will not detain the meeting two minutes. I 
only wish to add my testimony as a naval officer to the general opinion through- 
out the service that these vessels are of the right sort, and that we have every 
confidence in the ability of the officers who gave the instructions to Mr. White 
to design them. 

Captain S. Long. The only other point upon which I would take up the time of 
the meeting is with regard to the high freeboard forward of the new ships, 
which is an interesting question. I notice in Plate IX that the lower part of 
the freeboard forward is divided up into small spaces. I was very sorry to see 
that, but I would remark that the height of freeboard [any excess over what is 



12 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 

necessary is most objectionable owing to the increased weight and size of target 
involved in it] which is necessary, is a very important question, and one upon 
which, I think, experience might throw a good deal of light, 

CJapt. G. H. U. Noel. Being the third naval officer who has spoken in succes- 
sion, I am afraid you will be tired of hearing what the navy has got to say ; but 
I won't be very long. In the few remarks I have to make I hope that Sir 
Nathaniel Barnaby and the gentlemen present will excuse my dwelling not so 
much on to-day's paper as on yesterday's. I would like to express my entire 
confidence in the exceptional ability of the chief constructor of the navy, Mr. 
White, and to thank him for his admirable paper of yesterday. I believe that 
he came back to the Admiralty fully intending that what he did there he would 
do in concert with the naval authorities, and it was in consequence of his carry- 
ing out that intention that ice got this new type of ship, which was so greatly 
approved of in the discussion yesterday. • ♦ ♦ 

We want to have some offensive power as well as being, to some extent, 
protected. On this question, speaking of the Admiral class, I stated in a 
paper read at this institution In 1885 that with an addition of about 150 tons 
of 3-inch steel plating, sufficient to give the CoUingicood a 6-foot water-line 
belt at her unarmored ends, I thought that she would be as capable and effective 
a vessel as any afloat at that time. I still adhere to that opinion. 

[The freeboard of the Colling wood forward was about 7 feet less than that 
of the Royal Sovereign, and about 8 feet less than that of the Connecticut.] 

Admiral Sir W. Houston Stjiwart. — During the ten years that I was at the 
Admiralty, the Admiralty of the day, one administration after another, used 
the utmost endeavors to obtain the views, opinions, and criticisms of naval 
officers in regard to the designs proposed, and I confirm what I said yesterday 
when that noble lord, gallant naval officer, popular orator, and efficient mem- 
ber of Parliament was speaking, that during the time I was comptroller of the 
navy no design went forth from the Admiralty that was not stamped with the 
Board's seal in the presence of the Board of Admiralty, and signed by the 
responsible naval officers of the day. Sir Edward Reed paid me the compliment 
in a letter in the Times the other day to say that he believed I was primarily 
responsible for the Admiral class. If it is so, I may accept that responsibility 
with pride, because I was associated with some of our most distinguished and 
most efficient naval officers who formed the Board of. Admiralty at the time 
that class of ships was designed. 

The foregoing quotations from remarks made by distinguished 
British naval officers are too direct and conclusive to need further 
comment. A brief summary of some of the most salient remarks 
will be useful, however, in fixing them in our minds. 

Lord Charles Beresford stated : 

/ do not believe they could have made a better ship than these new ones. 
* * * They have got the seamen together (by the seamen I mean the engi- 
neers and the artillerymen, and the men who have got to fight the ships), and 
they have stated what they wanted to have, both in regard to capability of 
offense and defense, draft, and speed. 

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby concurred in 
almost everything said by Lord Charles Beresford with reference to 
the service at large, and stated in conclusion that the requirements 
of the seagoing officers — 

* ♦ * have been carried out very much to the satisfaction of those who 
are particularly concerned — that is, the officers who have to command your 
fleets. * * * / say myself you have got every name barring one which could 
guarantee the propriety of these ships, and for my part I feel on their opinions 
much more strongly than I do upon my own that tliese ships are good, and will 
be serviceable ships, and such as any admiral will be fortunate to command. 

Eear- Admiral P. H. Colomb said : 

I think two distinct i>oints must be apparent to the meeting from the discus- 
Bions which have gone on. First of all, that you have got a number of naval 
officers in perfect agreement, which is not common; and, secondly, that the 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 13 

difficulties ichich the navaj architect has to ileal with in huilding battle ships 
are the difficulties of opinion. ♦ ♦ ♦ The navy has been taken into the con- 
fidence of the constructors and the Board of Admiralty In a way that it never 
was before, and I thinli the result must be this: That never in this theater will 
naval officers be able to get up and denounce those ships if they turn out 
differently from what they expect, but that the constructors will be able to 
turn round upon us and say: ** Then <^re your ships; they are not ours.'' 
* ♦ * But I want to say, finally , that I believe the feeling of the service is 
entirely clear on the desifjns of these new battle ships; that, talcing what the 
service asks for all round, they are the fairest, the nwst (tpen, and the most 
complete attempt to meet the naval opinion of the day. 

Admiral Lord Clanwilliam: 

♦ * * I only wish to add my testimony as a naval officer to the general 
opinion throughout the service that these vessels are of the right sort, and that 
we have every confidence in the ability of the officers who gave the instructions 
to Mr. White to design them. 

Capt. G. H. U. Noel: 

* * * I would lilie to express my entire confidence in the exceptional 
ability of the chief constructor of the navy, Mr. White, and to thank him for 
his admirable paper of yesterday. I believe that he came back to the Admiralty 
fully intending that what he did there he would do in concert with the naval 
authorities, and it was in consequence of his carryhig out that intention that 
we got this new type of ship, which was so greatly aj^proved of in the discussion 
yesterday. 

Nothing could possibly be more conclusive than the foregoing 
remarks as to the appraisal of the Royol Sovereign designs by the 
seagoing elewjents. The selfsame questions of " height of freeboard 
forward," " height of gun axes," ^' location of water-line belt 
armor," etc., were involved at that time in the same manner as to- 
day. The subsequent action of British Boards of Admiralty and 
British designers with respect to all succeeding battle ships of the 
British navy, up to the time of tho approval of the Dreadnoughts 
designs, was largely based upon the unanimous conclusions which 
had Deen reached in the case of the Royal Sovereign designs. 

Since, therefore, the general characteristics of the Royal Sov- 
ereign^ so far as concerned " displacement," " dimensions," " height 
of freeboard," " height of gun axes," " water-line armor distribu- 
tion," etc., are so strictly comparable with those of the majority of 
the battle ships in the United States Atlantic Fleet, it is especially 
interesting to note that the designed freeboard of the Royal Sov- 
ereign class abreast the forward barbette is abont 18 feet; the corre- 
sponding freeboard forvmrd on fourteen of the sixteen battle ships 
of the United States Atlantic Fleet is greater than 18 feet, the Kear- 
sarge and Kentucky being the only vessels in the whole battle-ship 
fleet now in comiaission whose forward freeboard is less than that 
of the Royal Sovereign. Moreover, the height of the forward main 
battery guns of the Royal Sovereign class above the designed load 
water line is about 3 feet less than the height of forward turret guns 
above the designed load water line of the five vessels of the Oon- 
nectictft class, the three vessels of the Maine class, and the two ves- 
sels of the Illinois class, now attached to the Atlantic Fleet, and 
more than 2 feet less than the four vessels of the Virginia class; the 
forward main battery guns or the Royal Sovereign class are thus 
appreciably lower than the forward main battery guns of all the 
battle ships of the Atlantic Fleet except the two vessels of the Kear- 



14 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

sarge class. The height of the upper edge of the main water-line 
belt armor of the Royal Sovereign gIvlss above the water line at 
designed load displacement is less than that of all battle ships of 
the Kearsarge^ Illinois^ Maine. Connecticut^ and Vermont classes, 
and just equal to that of the Virginia class, the height above water 
of the upper edge of the main water-line belt of the five vessels of 
the Connecticut and Vertnont classes being 1 foot 8 inches greater 
than that of the Royal Sovereign under similar conditions of load 
displacement. 

It is also worthy of note that the lower edge of the main water-line 
belt of the Royal Sovereign class, below the designed load water 
line is 5 feet 6 inches, and the responsible designer at that time had 
to defend himself against rather severe criticism from certain quar- 
ters for having, approved so narrow a belt of water-line armor. It is 
especially interesting to note, therefore, in this connection, that of the 
most serious criticism recently directed against battle ships of the 
United States Navy was that the lower edge of the water-line belt 
armor was too deeply immersed; although, as a matter of fact, in no 
case has the lower edge of the water-line belt armor of United States 
battle ships been more deeply immersed than 5 feet at the designed 
load displacement, the corresponding immersion of the Royal Sov- 
ereign''s armor, be it noted, bemg 5 feet 6 inches. 

Since " height of freeboard," " height of gun axes," and " location 
of water-line belt armor " are necessarily governed by the probable 
behavior of the vesesl in a seaway, and inasmuch as the behavior of 
the sea has in no sense changed during the past nineteen years, de- 
signs whose seagoing qualities fully satisfied the most representative 
officers in the British navy in 1889 should be entirely satisfactory to- 
day so far as concerns seaaoing qualities. As a matter of fact, the 
freeboard established for the Royal Sovereign and the degree of sub- 
mergence of the lower edge of the main water-line belt at designed 
load displacement have remained substantially the same for battle 
ships of the British navy which have been designed during the past 
nineteen years, with the possible exception of the Majestic class and 
the most recently designed battle ships, viz, those of the Dreadnought 
class. The extra freeboard of the Dreadnought, however, is a per- 
fectly natural and logical development for a vessel of such great 
length, fine water lines, and comparative concentration of heavy 
weights near the extremities. Therefore, the greater height of free- 
board forward on the Dreadnought is in no sense and can not possibly 
be construed as a reflection upon the designs of battle ships of the 
British navy which preceded the Dreadnought, nor is it in any sense a 
confession that the freeboard of the battle ships previously designed 
was insufficient. 

Appendixes I, II, III, and VI, and the cross sections of typical 
battle ships of the United States and foreign navies shown in Appen- 
dix VII, are conclusive in showing how favorably battle ships of the 
United States Navy compare with battle ships of corresponding 
dates in the British and Japanese navies as regards heights of gun 
axes and location of water-line belt armor. As already noted, the 
French school of design, which has previously been somewhat closely 
followed by the Russians, involved high freeboards, high gun axes, 
and more extensive water-line armor protection, but with obviously 
serious sacrifices in other directions. Aside from the conclusive tes- 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NA\Tr. 15 

timony afforded by the discussion of the Royal Sovereign designs, 
there is ample evidence to prove that questions of height of free- 
board, height of gun axes, and proper location of water-line armor 
with reference to the designed load water-line have been given most 
complete consideration by thoroughly competent oiRcers of the Ignited 
States Navy from the earliest days of our experience as builders of 
battle ships. 

On March 25, 189G, the Acting Secretarv of the Xavy ai)pointed a 
board (of which the late Rear- Admiral Jolin G. Walker, U. S. Xavy, 
was president) " for the purpose of considering and reporting upon 
the best plan for the installation of the main batteries of such battle 
ships as Congress may authorize during its present session/' and 
other questions relating to battle-ship design. The other members of 
this special board were Commodore R. L. Phythian. Chief Engineer 
Edward Farmer, Capt. Philip H. Cooper, and Xaval Constructor 
J. J. Woodward, U. S*. Navy. Subsequently Captain (now Rear- 
Admiral) Remey relieved Captain Cooper, and Lieutenant (now 
Captain) S. A. Staunton was appointed an additional member of the 
board. This board, though primarily convened to make recom- 
mendations with respect to the battery of vessels for which appropri- 
ations were expected to be made, very properly considered the whole 
question of battle-ship design, in order that it might arrive at an in- 
telligent conclusion with respect to the best type of battery to be 
adopted. By specific order of the Secretary of the Navy all bureaus 
were directed to furnish this board with complete data with respect 
to the subjects then under consideration, and the board witnessed 
various armor and gun tests, made a sea voyage on the U. S. S. Indi- 
ana^ and inspected the Massachusetts and lowa^ then in course of con- 
struction. The following quotation from the board's report is there- 
fore most interesting : 

The board upon its earliest inquiry into the nature of its duties found them 
of a most comprehensive character. The installation of th(» I>attery of a battle 
ship is not a question which stands alone. It is insei);iral)ly connected with the 
size of guns, their number, and the armorcnl protection wliich their emplace- 
ments are to have. This total weight of armament depends in Its turn ui)on 
the size of the ship, her hull protection, and the speed and coal endurance con- 
templated In her design. Connected with these features and l^earing materially 
upon her military etficlency are the habltability of a ship (which includes suf- 
ficient quarters and berthing space for the officers and men necessary to proi)- 
^rly navigate and fight the ship) and her seagoing qualities — i. e., her capacity 
for steaming and fighting In bad weather. 

The necessity of these adjustments Is a matter of conunon knowledge, and Is 
condensed Into the axiomatic saying that "every ship is a compromise." The 
board assumes, however, that the new battle ships will be as to size, speed, and 
coal endurance substantially the same as those already building, viz, of about 
11,500 tons normal displacement, 16 knots speed, and 1.200 to 1,G00 tons coal 
capacity, and with these assumptions it proceeded to attack the problem placed 
before it. 

To arrive at a conclusion upon a problem so complex it is necessary to narrow 
the issues by successive steps. Considering size, speed, coal endurance, and hull 
protection as fixed within narrow margins, the board had next to consider the 
different types of batteries Installed and projected. These are for our own 
Navy, three in number, viz : 

(1) That of the Indiana and class. 

(2) That of the Iowa. 

(3) That of the Kearsarge and Kentucky. 

It became the board's duty to recommend the adoption of one of these types, 
or to suggest such modifications as. In Its opinion, would make a better ship 
than any of them. 



16 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 

Subsequent comment upon the action of the Walker board and 
upon " rreeboard " in our own and in foreign services is fully set 
forth in the following quotations from the Chief Constructor's recent 
testimony before the House Naval Committee: 

The board also invited attention to the desirability of carrying a larger pro- 
portion of the coal and stores at the normal draft than had previously been cus- 
tomary, and that at her normal draft (which should also be her fighting draft) 
she should carry not less than two-thirds of her full capacity of ammunition, 
coal, and stores, and that the position of the armor belt should bear a proi)er 
relation to this load line. From that time to the present day two-thirds of the 
ammvUlon and all consumable stores, other than coal, have been carried on 
the designed load displacement of the vessel. The proportion of coal car- 
lied at designed load displacement, however, has not been in our service, nor 
in any other service, as much as ttco-thirds of the full capacity of the hunkers, 
except in the case of vessels of the Alahamn class, which vessels were the 
direct outcome of the Walker board's recommendations. The subsequent reduc- 
tion in the proportion of coal carried was due, undoubtedly, to the fact that 
while the Alabama class had a bunker capacity of only 1,200 tons, thus making 
two-thirds of the bunker capacity a very fair proportion of the coal to be car- 
ried at designed displacement, subsequent designs provided for a very much 
greater bunker capacity , so that 900 to 1,000 tons was regarded as a suitable 
amount to be carried at the designed load displacement. The practice of the 
United States Navy in this respect is practically identical with that of foreign 
navies. The Walker board also invited particular attention to the desirability 
of battle ships of the United States Navy being able to " perform any duty 
required of ships of their tyi)e and strength, and that their seagoing qualities 
should not be inferior to those of the battle shii)s of other navies." The con- 
clusion and recommendations of the board were as follows: 

'* That the new battle ships, when fully equipped for service, and containing 
not less than two-thirds of their full cai>aclty of ammunition, stores, and coal, 
should not be deeper than their * normal ' or designed draft upon which their 
speed is based: and that their weights of armor and arn.auient should be re- 
stricted accordingly. 

** That they should have sufficient berthing space to accrmmiodate the officers 
and men of their war complements in such a manner as to maintain their health 
and vigor. 

** That no feature of their design should be permitted to seriously impair 
good seagoing and sea-enduring qualities. 

"That they should have hijrh freeboard forward and low freeboard aft, sub- 
stantially like the Itnca, and be armor b<'lted like the Kearmrgc. 

"That their principal battery should cfnisist of fonr 13-inch guns mounte<l 
in two turrets in pairs, substantially as the Iowa's 12-inch guns are mounted; 
these principal turrets to be placed as close to each other as the machinery 
space conveniently permits. 

"That their auxiliary battery shall consist of fourteen rapid-fire G-inch guns, 
ten on the main deck and fonr on the iii>per dwk, all behind G-inch armor. Two 
of the guns on the main deck in the eyes of the ship have forward fire, two 
of the giHis on the upi)er deck have forward fire, and the other two fire aft. 
All of the 6-inch guns fire in broadside, seven on each side.'' 

It thus appears that this specially selected board, a large majority 
of whose members were seagoing officers, recommended a vessel whose 
freeboard^ water-line protection, etc., were regarded as entirely satis- 
factory to the seagoing element at that time. The actual vessels whose 
design embodied the reconunendations of this board are the Alabama^ 
Illinois^ and Wisconsin^ and the board's recommendation as to " free- 
boards " indicated that they regarded the " forward freeboard " pro- 
vided for the Alabama class as " hiffh." 

Again^ the General Board of the >avy, which is composed entirely 
of seagoing oflScers and is presided over by one of the most distin- 
guished officers the American Navy has ever had, recommended under 
date of October 17, 1903, in a report submitting its opinion as to the 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 17 

principal characteristics which should be embodied in battle ships, as 
lollows : 

To have high freeboard forward. In this respect the Iowa type impresses 
favorably. Armor protection, similar to the Mfiine class. 

Subsequently the Board modified its recommendation as to the 
armor protection and concurred in the recommendation of the Board 
on Construction as to the superiority of distribution of armor on the 
Vermont class. It may be noted in this connection that the " high 
freeboard " forward on the Iowa is slightly less than that of any 
vessel in the United States Atlantic Battle Ship Fleet except the 
Kearsarge and Kentucky. 
^ We therefore have a height of freeboard and distribution of water- 
line belt armor in the large majority of battle ships of the United 
States Navy^ which commanded the explicit approval of thoroughly 
representative seagoing ofjicers in our own service; and vessels of 
similar characteristics had and stUl have the approval of service senti- 
ment in the British and Japanese navies; and tne sentiment to-day of 
those who have given careful and exhaustive consideration to these 
subjects is just as definite and pronounced as it was when these mat- 
ters of freeboard and water-line armor arrangement were first under 
consideration. 

It should also be remembered that the desims of all vessels of the 
United States Navy are passed upon by the Board on Construction. 
The original title of this board was, in fact, " The board on the de- 
signs oi ships." Among the membership of this board from 1889 to 
the date of the approval of the designs of the Connecticut class (the 
most recently designed class of vessels now attached to the battle-ship 
fleet) were the following well-known officers of the United States 
Navy : 

BOARD ON CONSTRUCTION. 

Period of service. 

Admiral of the Navy George Dewey — L 1889-189B 

Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard 1889-1800 

Capt. G. B. White 1889-1880 

Chief CJoustructor T. D. Wilson 1889-1898 

Engineer in Chief George W. Melville 1889-190B 

Rear-Admiral W. M. Folger 1890-1893 

Rear-Admiral Charles H. Davis 1890-1898 

Rear-Admiral Norman H. Farquhar 1890-1893 

Rear-Admiral French E. Chadwick 1893-1897 

Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson 1893-1897 

Rear-Admiral Frederick Singer 1893-1896 

Rear-Admiral E. O. Mathews 1894-1898 

Chief Constructor Philip Hichbom 1893-1901 

Rear-Admiral Charles O'Neil 1897-1^04 

Rear-Admiral R. B. Bradford 1897-1903 

Capt. Richard Wainwright 1897- 

Rear-Admiral Richardson Clover 1900-1902 

Rear-Admiral Charles D. Sigsbee 1900-1902 

Chief Constructor Francis T. Bowles 1901-1903 

For further information concerning the duties and qualifications 
of the Board on Construction attention is invited to the annual re- 
port of the Secretary of the Na\'y for 1907, page 32, and to the 
Annual Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and 
Kepair for 1907, pages 16 and 17 and pages 47 to 49. 
30584— S. Doc. 297, 60-1 2 



18 ALX.EGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF ISTAVY. 

Considering, therefore, the overwhelming preponderance of repre- 
sentative naval opinion as to the desirability of free hoard and armor 
distribution similar to that a^ctually provided on battle ships of our 
own Navy and. on those of the same type and date of design in 
British and other important foreign navies, it is evident how very 
much astray are the self-satisfied critics who state that "all of our 
battle ships are deficient in freeboard, water-line protection," etc. 

Perhaps the critic is not aware, however, that there are two dis- 
tinct " schools of design," so far as concerns height of freeboard, 
height of gun axes, and water-line armor protection, and that, while 
the Engli^, Japanese, Amerfcan, and, to a less extent, the German 
designers preferred moderate freeboard and a certain arrangement 
of water-line armor protection, the French and Russian designers 
had different ideas on those subjects. Thus, for many years, the 
tendency among French designers has been to elevate the main 
battery high afcve the water line, as a rule about one. deck height 
higher than in the British, American, and Japanese ships — at least 
so far as concerns the forward turrets. This possibly permits the 
forward main battery to be operated under conditions of sea during 
which gun fire of any kind must be regarded as futile: but, under 
any condition of sea in which naval battles are likely to be fought, 
such extreme elevation of the battery is regarded by naval designers 
and naval officers of most other countries as quite undesirable in 
view of the ^eat sacrifices involved in such an arrangement, the 
consequent raising of the center of gravity of the vessel, less efficient 
armor protection to turret supports, and greatly increased size of 
target being disadvantages of a most serious character. 

I think it is pertinent in this connection to remark that the princi- 
pal battle ships of the Russian fleet which took part in the battle of 
the Sea of Japan were designed in accordance with the ideas of what 
may be termed the " French school ; " while practically all of the 
battle ships and armored cruisers of the Japanese fleet were designed 
in accordance, with British and American ideas of moderate free- 
board, moderate gun heights, etc. All of the Japanese battle ships 
and armored cruisers which took part in the battle of the Sea of Japan 
were afloat and in good condition at the termination of the battle, and 
while high freeboards and a certain character of water-line armor 
protection may not have been directly responsible for the foundering 
of such vessels of the Russian fleet as were sunk by gun fire, the sac- 
rifices which had to be made in order to develop that type of design 
were undoubtedly contributory to the ultimate foundering of those 
vessels. In order that it may be clearly apparent that the weather 
conditions during the battle of the Sea of Japan were such as to 
"try out" the moderate freeboards of the Japanese vessels, the fol- 
lowing quotations with respect thereto are given : 

John Ley land, in Brassey's Annual for 1906, chapter 6, says on page 105, 
that *• a heavy sea was rnnning." On page 99 he says that " the weather was 
misty with a wind from the southwest and a sea which caused Rojestvensky's 
ships to roll heavily and jrreatly distress the detroyers." 

Lieut. R. D. White, in the Proceedings of the Naval Institute of June, 190G, 
quotes one of the Russian officers as saying that " the morning of May 27 was 
raw and cheerless; the cold wind blew from the southwest; a grayish mist hung 
overhead and shut out vision well short of the horizon. When the rain fell 
later in the day, it was cold and penetrating." 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 19 

Henry Reuterdahl in Jane's " fighting sliips/' 1906-7, relating the story of the 
fight as told him by survivors states that *' there was a strong breeze and 
heavy sea, rising almost to a gale." 

In order, however, that there may be no possible misunderstanding 
as to gtm-fire casualties in the battle of the Sea of Japan, it should 
be noted that reports indicate that only two Russian battle ships 
were sunk as the direct result of gun fire during the more than j&ve 
hours' fighting on the first day, and this in spite of the excessively 
overloaded condition of these vessels at the time of the battle, as indi- 
cated by subsequent official statements, this overloading naturally 
resulting in the complete submergence, of the heavy water-line belt 
armor and a marked decrease of stability under damaged conditions. 
It is noteworthy, therefore, that even under these unusual conditions 
of excessive overloading, with the definite decil'ease in defensive qual- 
ities consequent thereupon, only two battle ships entirely succuml^ed 
to gun fire and one of these only after five hours* fighting. These 
facts would seem to be sufficiently eloquent when considering the 
possibilities of our own battle ships. 

Again, we surely can assume that the Japanese have had as exten- 
sive experience under modem battle conditions at sea as any nation 
in the world ; and yet a very recently designed Japanese battle ship, 
which presumably embodies the lessons learned at Tsushima, has 
approximately the same freeboard forward as our ships of the Maine 
ana Alabama classes^ although from 100 to 125 feet longer, thereby 
indicating clearly that the Japanese are willing to sacrifice some- 
thing in " freeboard " and " gun height," even in so long and speedy 
a vessel, in order to more fully develop other qualities. 

Although the British in their Dreadnought and the United States 
Navy in the Delaware have considerably increased the freeboard 
forward on such vessels^ such an increase in freeboard is in no sense 
a reflection upon previous designs or a confession that previous 
designers were in error, but is a perfectly normal and logical devel- 
opment due to increase in length of ship, increase in fineness of 
water lines, concentration of heavy weights relatively near the ex- 
tremities, etc. 

WTien a critic recently stated in a magazine article that it was only 
" after special pressure from the President of the United States that 
our latest ships were given proper freeboard," he simply advertised 
himself as a disseminator of false statements and as one quite ignorant 
of the subject he was presuming to discuss. As the Chief Constructor 
of the Navy, I can state most positively that no such criticism, no 
such suggestion, no such direction, has ever come to me from the Presi- 
dent of the United States in relation to the designs of the Delaware 
class, the only class of battle ships in the United States Navy with 
very high freeboard forward, this high freeboard being given by 
the designer for reasons already set forth. 

Generally speaking, freeboard in excess of seagoing requirements 
is most undesirable in a battle ship. High freeboard involves a high 
center of gravity and considerably less stability under damaged con- 
ditions; it also means greater target area; moreover, the extra weight 
devoted to high freeboard decreases the percentage of displacement 
which can be devoted to other seriously important elements of the 
design. So far as I am aware, the sentiment of the English and 
Japanese services is distinctly in favor of the moderate freeboard 



20 AliLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

which has been characteristic of our ships wherever such moderate 
freeboard is practicable. In the very long and fine lined ship, how- 
ever, with concentration of weight nearer the extremities, it is de- 
sirable, for seagoing reasons, as already stated, to raise the forecastle ; 
but the Japanese are apparently so impressed with the desirability of 
limiting the elevation of their top weights and devoting as much 
weight as possible to armor and armament that they appear to be will- 
ing to make some sacrifice in freeboard. They have, therefore, main- 
tained aproximately the same freeboard in their new and larger battle 
ships as seemed sufficient for their older and shorter vessels; and 
surely the Japanese have the advantage of great experience so far as 
concerns the essential requirements of battle ships under modem 
battle conditions. 

From all of the foregoing, I have no hesitancy whatever in stating 
that the freeboard forward on American battle ships now in commis- 
sion, with the sole exception of the Kearsarge and Kentucky, is ample 
to m^et all the requirements of the batteries of those vessels under any 
conditions of sea which are likely to be met with in naval actions. 
The experience of the Japanese battle ships in the battle of the Sea 
of Japan leaves no possible ground for doubt upon that score, the 
Japanese battle ships, be it remembered, being somewhat inferior in 
freeboard and gun height and having less effective distribution of 
water-line armor than a large majority of the battle ships of the 
United States Atlantic Fleet. 

With respect to the distribution of water-line armor in our battle 
ships, as compared with foreign battle ships of the same date of 
design, attention is invited to the cross sections of typical battle ships 
of the United States and foreign navies shown in Appendix VIL 
The cross sections speak for themselves, and I have already described 
the care with which these cross sections have been prepared, all 
available data being consulted. 

It is especially noteworthy that the water-line armor pr6tection of 
practically all of the battle ships of the United States Atlantic Fleet 
is equal, or superior, to that of Admiral Togo's flagship Mikasa: 
that the armor above the water-line belt for the Virginia class, and 
the Connecticut and Louisiana, is of the same thickness as that of the 
Mikasa; that the armor above the water-line belt on the Vermont, 
Kansas, and Minnesota is 1 inch thicker than that of the Mikasa; 
that the height of the tipper edge of the main-belt armor above the 
load water lirw on the jicc vessels of the Connecticut class is 1 foot 
9 inches greater than the corresponding height of the belt armor on 
the Mikasa; also that the upper edge of the main-belt ai^mor of all 
other battle ships in the United States Atlantic Fleet is more than 
6 inches higher out of water at the designed load displacement than 
the upper edge of the main water-line belt armor of the Mikasa. 
Moreover, the main water-line belt and upper side belt of the 
Japanese battle ships Kanhitna and Katoru which were in course of 
construction for the Japanese navy at the time of the Russo-Japanese 
war, were practically identical with that of the Mikasa. Again, the 
distribution of main water-Hne belt and other side armor of the Aki, 
one of the latest Japanese battle ships, designed in 1906 after the 
iiose of the u:ai\ is ahnont iderdif al with tliat of the United States 
battle ship Vemiont, d( signed in lOOJi. except that the upper edge of 
tlie main-belt armor of the Aki lacks inches of being as high above 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVT. 21 

the designed load water line as the corresponding armor of the Ver- 
mont, The Japanese have had very considerable experience as to the 
necessity of certain dispositions of armor, guns, freeboard, etc., so 
that I have no hesitancy in predicting, in view of the foregoing state- 
ment as to armor distribution, that the battle ships of the United 
States Atlantic Fleet could give a most excellent account of them- 
selves in any naval encounter in which they mi^ht become engaged. 

The plans and tabular data accompanying this report are so com- 
plete and so self-explanatory that it does not seem necessary to make 
further comment with respect to the alleged insufficiencv of free 
board, water-line armor protection, etc., of battle ships of the United 
States Navy. As a matter of interest, however, there will be attached 
to this report, as an appendix, some extracts from foreign periodicals 
which clearly indicate the high esteem in which American designs of 
battle ships have been held by foreign naval critics. The following 
quotation from the Chief Constructor's recent testimony before the 
Naval Committee of the House gives a statement of the reason for 
locating the water-line armor protection in the manner followed by 
American, British, and Japanese desifimers: 

The consensus of opinion among naval designers, and those naval officers who 
have given very considerable attention to the subject, appears to be that the 
lower edge of the main water-line belt armor at the designed load displace- 
ment should be immersed about 5 feet. It should be remembered that this is 
the immersion at the designed load displacement or trial displacement, as it is 
usually called in our service and not the deep load displacement. This depth 
of submergence is, of course, more or less arbitrary and is based upon the 
amount of weight which can be devoted to armor protection, and is governed to 
a certain extent also by the beam of the ship. The subject of weight is a very 
serious one for naval designers, and the immersion of the lower edge of the 
armor belt has been limited to 5 feet, not because that is ample, in the judg- 
ment of the designer, under all conditions, but because it is all that can be 
permitted under the allowance of weight for armor protection, and, under 
ordinary conditions, it should give ample protection. If the vessel were very 
light it would not give satisfactory protection under ordinary conditions of 
rolling, but that risk must be taken. When, on the other hand, the vessel is 
deep loaded, the protection of the vessel under conditions of fairly heavy roll- 
ing is good, but even then a roll of 10° would cause the lower edge of the 
armor to come out of water. It is thus obvious that protection of the water 
line is limited by the weight of armor which can be used for this purpose, and is 
more or less a compromise. 

Mr. BuTLEB. Why do you want this protection below the water? 

Admiral Capps. Because of the action of the sea. As the ship rolls the armor 
tends to emerge. Moreover, in a perfectly smooth sea — and I can show you 
dozens of photographs indicating this fact — the formation of waves at right 
angles to the line of travel of the vessel when going at high speed will cause an 
exposure of the side of the vessel below the average water level of 3 or 4 feet, 
and this in smooth water. 

Mr. Butler. And when the ship rolls back it will expose what we call the 
skin of the ship? 

Admiral Capps. It is very apt to expose the skin of the ship. There will 
doubtless be many times during a naval action, in rough weather, -when the bot- 
tom below the armor belt will be exposed ; and while a hit at the water line or 
below the water line is apt to be rare (and this is the experience of naval bat- 
tles so far) such a hit must always do very serious damage when penetration 
ensues, because there is a likelihood of hitting boilers or engines or magazines; 
and even if vital portions of the vessel are not struck, the vessel is much more 
easily flooded through an underwater opening in the bottom. It is thus apparent 
why protection helow the water to a moderate extent is relatively of far greater 
importance than protection above the water line, and armor distribution is 
governed accordingly. 

In the case of the Connrdirut class, for Instance, the heavy belt is 9 feet 3 
inches wide and extends, at designed disi)lju'enient, fnnn o fret hchnv to Jf feet 



22 ATJ.EGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

S inches above. Above the main belt there are two other belts, the lower G 
inches thlcli, the upper 7 inches thick. For the Vermont, Kansas, Minnesota, 
New Hampshire, Mississippi, and Idaho both upper belts are 7 inches thick. 
Moreover, the belt immediately above the water-line belt is reenforced by deep 
coal bunljers. In other words, a shot striliing just above the main belt on the 
Minnesota would have to pass through 7 inches of armor, nearly 1 inch of 
structural plating, and then nearly 20 feet of coal, if the upper bunliers are full. 
This very substantial protection above the heavy water-line belt is usually 
entirely ignored by critics, although it is worthy of note that this upper helt 
armor protection of the Minnesota and class is as heavy or heavier than the 
main irater-line armor protection of thirteen important hattle ships in the 
British navy hiiilt or purchased during the past ten years. So far as concerns 
the intalte of water, it must be remembered that a shot hole just above the 
water line can only admit small quantities of water, which can easily be taken 
care of by the pumps of the water-tight subdivision of the hull; whereas 
damage below the water line and especially below the protective deck is much 
more serious, since water then flows in quite freely under a " head " and may 
easily be beyond the capacity of the pumps. 

******* 
In this connection, I would like to say, right here that none of the allega- 
tions as to insuflicient water-line armor have any bearing upon the South Caro- 
lina and Michigan and the North Dakota and Delaware, because the upper belt 
of those ships has a mean thickness equal to that of the main wafer-line belt 
of the Minnesota and class, being 10 inches thick at the bottom and 8 inches 
thick at the top; moreover, these vessels have a compartmental subdivision 
which will afford ample protection and stability even under conditions of seri- 
ous underwater damage. Also, if compartments on one side of the ship are 
flooded, as Mr. Butler suggested a few moments ago, so that under ordinary- 
conditions a change of trim of the ship would result, there would be no such 
continuing change of trim in these vessels, since complete arrangements have 
been made for flooding the opposite compartments and restoring the vessel to 
an approximate " even keel." 

The Chairman. I wish you would explain the length of this armor belt; and 
also state how our distribution of armor compares with the distribution of 
armor on the British and Japanese ships. 

Admiral Capps. In general, the distribution of armor on ships of the same 
date, Japanese, English, and American, is veiy similar. The actual lengths of 
the belts on our ships have been calculated and are given in the table already 
alluded to. This sort of data for foreign vessels is not readily accessible, but 
we have fairly reliable information which has been gleaned from various sources, 
and, so far as our inforniati(»n goes, the armor protection of ships of the United 
States Navy is quite equal to and in many instances surpasses that of English 
and Japanese battle shii)s. In this connection it may be noted with ccmsiderable 
interest that in the Stnith Carolina class, which are vessels of nearly 2,000 tons 
less displacement than the British Dreadnoughts, the weight assigned to armor 
and hull is practically the same as that allowed for the Dreadnought. It is al- 
most certain, therefore, that the armor protection of the South CaraHna is su- 
perior to that of the Dreadnought. Tlie annor protection of the Delaivare is 
also sui)erior to tliat c>f the latest British and Jai)anese battle ships, so far as 
our information indicates. The armor iirottM'tion of the Minnenota is very simi- 
lar indeed to that of British vessels of the King tJdirard class. While the belt 
above the main belt on the King Edward is 1 inch thicker than the corre- 
sponding belt in the Mium nnia, the Minnrsotd's main belt is 1 foal .i inches 
wider than that of the King Edward, and theref(»re there is / foot 3 inches more 
of the Minnesota's main belt out of irater at the designed load displacement. 
Armor disi)lacenient, like other elements of warship design, is a compromise, but 
the fundamental principles which govern its location are the same in all cases 
and in all countries. 

The plans and tabular data accompanying this report, in conjunc- 
tion with such explanations as appeared necessary in the text, will, I 
feel sure, conclusively demonstrate that '* freeboard/' "gun heights,'' 
" appropriate water-line armor distribution," and other seagoing 
necessities of battle ships have always received most earnest and intel- 
ligent consideration by naval officers charged with the grave respon- 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 28 

sibility of developing the best battle-ship designs for the United 
States Navy, and that an adequate development of these qualities has 
always been provided, having in view the state of advancement of 
naval materiel at the time of the approval of the designs in question. 

I will now proceed, as briefly as possible, to a consideration of the 
most serious misrepresentations contained in a recent magazine article 
contributed by a writer who claims unusual knowledge of, and 
familiarity with, the vessels of the United States Navy. 

It is obvious, however, that a reasonable brevity in this report will 
make it wholly impracticable to consider, in detail, all of his mislead- 
ing statements. In order that there may be no necessity for referring 
directly to the article in question, quotations therefrom will be given, 
followed by such comments as may appear appropriate. 

The writer of the article, after indicating the tragic results which 
would follow an outbreak of war which found our Navy unprepared, 
continues : 

This article will show some of the reasons why the American Navy is unpre- 
pared for war. It will be a statement of facts, not of opinions. 

A careful perusal of this report, and an examination of the tabular 
statements and plans herewith transmitted, will doubtless convince 
the impartial reader that this particular mai^azine writer has ^reat 
difficulty in distinguishing between facts and his own unsubstantiated 
and erroneous opinions. 

Under the caption* of "A fleet with main armor under water," this 
critic informs us that — 

A modern battle ship is a simple thing in its big general principles. Two 
points are essential in its protection — a shell-proof armor, which guards Its 
water line and high, shell-proof turrets which lift up its guns just above the 
wash and spray of the waves. An X-ray photograph of its heavy armor would 
show a monitor with high turrets. The lower i>art of tUe smokestacks, the 
minor gun positions, the conning and signal towers, are all protected; but 
these two major points are the essentials in the armor of a battle ship. 

Obviously, the most important feature of all must be the belt along the 
water line. A wound upon a turret may silence that one turret's guns. A hole 
upon the water line will cripple or sink the ship. Of all the Russian follies 
which came to light in the great battle of Tsoushima, that sealed the fate of 
the Russian- Japanese war, one stands out esiiecially. The Russian battle 
ships, when they went into that fight, were overloaded until the shell-proof 
armor of their water line was underneath the water. They were not battle 
ships at all. Within a year afterwards our Navy awoke to a realization of a 
startling fact: The ships of the battle fleet of the V">ted States are in exactly 
the same condition as the Russian ships at Tsoushima — ^not temporarily, but 
permanently. 

The Chief Constructor, after twenty-eight years' service in the 
Navy, twenty-two of which have been devoted to special prepara- 
tion for and performance of the duties of a naval constructor, re- 
grets that he can not concur in the fore|nroing opinion as to the sim- 
plicity of a battle ship. A greater familiarity with the subject would 
perhaps lead the critic to modify his opinion, and perhaps even tend 
to make him concur in the opinions of many highly trained men of 
large experience, both as naval architects and naval officers, that, 
instead of a modern battle ship being a " simple thing," it is, in 
reality, a most complicated structure. 

This magazine critic asserts that the most important feature of all 
" must be the belt along the water line." That the belt along the 
water line is a most important feature may be accepted without dis- 



24 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

pute. There are many other qualities, however, of equally great im- 
portance. He also asserts, with great assurance, that '' a hole along 
the water line will cripple or sink the ship." The size and location ot 
this hole, the subdivision of the ship, and the facilities for disposing 
of water entering under these conditions will unquestionably deter- 
unne whether or not such a wound would " cripple or sink the ship." 
It may be stated with assurance, however, that no properly designed 
modem battle ship would have its buoyancy seriously mipaired — and 
certainly could not be sunk — ^by a single or even several shot holes 
" along the water line." On the contrary, the behavior of the Russian 
ships in the battle of the Sea of Japan indicates conclusively how dif- 
ficult it is to sink a battle ship by gun fire even when the vessel is 
heavily overloaded with an excess of stores, coal, etc., which carried 
the heavy armor belt far below the position which it might reasonably 
be expected to occupy under the stress of battle. As a matter of fact, 
despite the very unusual and quite unnecessary^ condition of overload- 
ing under which the Russian ships went into battle, it is worthy of 
special note that it was only after nearly an hour of heavy, concen- 
trated fire by the Japanese that the Osliabia foundered, this vessel be- 
ing the first of the Russian battle ships to succumb to gun fire. The 
lar^e majority of the other Russian vessels which were ultimately 
suii, foundered as a result of torpedo attack or the opening of sea 
valves by their own crews, and not gun fire. It is also noteworthy 
that the next ship after the Osliabia which foundered as a direct re- 
sult of gun fire, had successfully resisted vital injury by gun fire for 
more than five hours— a profound tribute to the ability of the dam- 
aged battle ship to remain afioat even under the serious disadvantages 
01 overloading which prevailed on vessels of the Russian fleet at the 
battle of the Sea of Japan. 

It has already been stated in this report, and in fact is perfectly 
well known to those who have given any serious consideration to the 
subject of water line and above water line armor protection of l)at- 
tle ships, that a wound above the main armor belt is of mitwr conse- 
quence as compared with one through the main water line armor belt 
or below the main armor belt^ for the simplest of all reasons: Ist^ a 
shell penetrating the upper armor belt would be above the protective 
deck and would explode in coal bunkers, in all probability, if it ex- 
ploded at all. The fragments of such a shell could not, under ordi- 
nary conditions, seriously affect the vital portions of the ship. More- 
over, the inflow of water throu<rh a hole in the armor above the 
main belt, at or above the water line, would be gradual and quite 
within the control of the ship's pumps. Penetration through the 
main armor belt below the water line, however, or penetration of the 
hull entirely below the main armor belt, would open the vessel to an 
inflow of water under a " head," and, while in the best designed 
ships, the flow of water through 12-inch holes, even under these con- 
ditions, could be taken care of l)y the pumps or the compartniental 
subdivision of the ship, it is possible that fragments of a shell so 
entering would strike poi*tions of the motive machinery or boilers, or 
other vital apparatus, anJl seriously affect the efficiency of the vessel. 
For this reason, with a given amount of armor, it is imperative that 
the greatest protection should be given to the water line of a vessel in 
wake of marhimry, boilers, and magazines, and that the loxrer edge 
of thh (D-mtn- belt should be .^ifffirlmth/ bdow the load irnf(r line as 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 25 

to afford ample protection to the vitals of the ship when the ship is 
subjected to the rolling and pitching motion of the sea. After a most 
exhaustive consideration of this subject by naval constructors and 
the best informed naval oflScers of every important navy, the con- 
clusions reached in each particular country are almost identical, and 
for the many battle ships which have been designed in England, 
France, America, Japan, Russia, and Germany during the past 
twenty years, the depth of submergence of the lower edge of the side 
belt armor below the designed load displacement water line is the 
same^ within comparatively small variations^ as is fully set forth in 
the plan of cross sections. Appendix VII. 

The usual depth of submergence of the lower edge of main belt 
armor is about 5 feet, as shown on the various sections of typical 
ships given in Appendix VI. The cross sections show clearly the 
remarkable agreement among the designs of battle ships of all coun- 
tries with respect to this much agitated question of depth of sub- 
mergence of lower edge of main armor belt, and that for all the bat- 
tle ships of the United States Navy,, as well as those of foreign navies, 
designed since 1899, there is almost absolute agreement, the maximum 
variation for American, British, French, Japanese, and Russian 
battle ships being only 3 inches^ the overwhelming majority having a 
depth of submergence of just 5 feet, the depth of submergence 
adopted in the United States Navy. 

It has been fully shown in another part of this report that our 
battle ships, when fully loaded^ do not have the upper edge of their 
main armor belt immersed, and that even with a large excess oi 
stores, ete., on board, the upper edge of the main armor belt of the 
five vessels of the Connecticut class, now with the fleet, and the Mis- 
sissippi^ Idaho, and New Hampshire^ about to go into commission, 
would have more than a foot of their main belts above water. The 
author's statement that — 

The ships of the battle fleet of the T'nited States are in exactly the same con- 
dition as the Russian ships at Tsoushima — not temporarily, but permanently. 

is therefore a heedless misstatement of fact as can be readily demon- 
strated by the plans of the vessels, the vessels themselves, and the 
character of the consumable and nonpermanent stores carried when 
our battle ships are at their deep-load displacement. 
The critic states that — 

Of all our battle ships, not one shows its main armor belt 6 inches above the 
water when fully equipped and ready for sea. 

Disregarding the fact that there is a very substantial belt of ar- 
mor above the main belt, also that a vessel fully equipped, with 
bunkers full, all stores and ammunition on board, etc., is by no means 
in the best condition, or the most probable condition, in which a ves- 
sel may be expected to meet the enemy, the statement just quoted is 
not only misleading as to some of our battle ships, but absolutely 
false as to the rest. Carefully prepared data indicating the draft of 
water of battle ships of the Atlantic fleet at the time of their de- 
parture from na\'y-yards preliminary to assembling at Hampton 
Roads in December last (these vessels being then in an unusual con- 
dition of loading), directly disprove such a statement. Nearly all 
of these vessels had full bunkers, and in addition to the regular al- 
lowance of ammunition, stores, etc., had extra stores, ammunition, 
water for boilers, etc., also a large number of extra men and all the 



26 AIiLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

outfit and stores necessary therefor. But, even under these condi- 
tions, involving in some cases extra weights of several hundred tons, 
not one of the five vessels of the Connecticut class, on reaching the 
high seas, had the upper edge of the belt armor Uss than 1 foot above 
the very deep-load water line then existing. 
The writer states that — 

The constructors* plans were made to have from 12 to 30 inches of this out 
of water when each vessel makes her trial trip. 

This is simply a false statement. The fact is that the '' designed 
load displacement," or " trial displacement " of every vessel of the 
present Atlantic Battle Ship Fleet provided for not less than 36 
inches of the Tuain side armor belt being out of water at the designed 
load displacement^ and the Connecticut class had ^ feet 3 inches of 
the heavy side armor belt out of water at the designed load draft. 
The overdraft due to " changes," " weights added," etc., subsequent 
to approval of the design has already been alluded to, likewise the 
comparatively moderate " overdraft " of our battle ships. 

So far as our information can determine, however, the United 
States has no monopoly of such " changes," " extra weights," and 
" overdrafts." As a matter of fact, I believe the United States Navy 
to be somewhat more fortunate than the majority of navies in this 
respect, the battle ship Dreadnought being a particularly apt illus- 
tration, in support of this belief, since not a single vessel of the 
United States Atlantic Battle Ship Fleet was as much as 1 foot orer- 
draft when completed, while the Dreadnought is reported as con- 
siderably more than 1 foot over her designed draft. 

The writer next states that — 

Above this (the heavy water-line armor) is a thinner armor which can be 
pierced by heavy shells. The standard heavy gun of to-day throws a steel pro- 
jectile 12 inches in diameter. 4 feet long, and weighing 850 i)onn(ls, charged 
with a high explosive. The bursting of one of these shells in this thinner 
secondary armor would tear a hole bigger than a door upon a ship's water 
line. 

The Chief Constructor has attended many experiments in which 
12-inch projectiles have beon fired against armor of the character of 
that constituting the "thinner armor*' of battle ships above alluded 
to and has yet to see, and knows of no record of, any damage to such 
armor by a 12-inch projectile of the character presumably intended 
to be described by the writer. Of course, the writer has the privi- 
lege of selecting the size of his " door," and it may have been that 
it was only a '* wee bit of a door '* that he had in mind. 

The writer's statements with res])ect to the Russian battle ship 
OsUahia. and the remarkable effect of gun fire. etc.. on one of the 
armor plates of that vessel are not substantiated by such reasonably 
authentic accounts concerning the results of the battle of the Sea of 
Japan as have come to my noti<'e. and a fairly extensive knowledge 
of the effects of gun fire on armor plate leads me to believe that the 
writer's informant had a too highly developed imagination. The 
effect described is more clos(»ly akin to what might happen if the 
unarntored side were struck by high explosive shells. 

The writer makes certain other references to what happened to 
other vessels during the battle of the Sea of Japan, but the informa- 
tion on that subject is so contradictory and the overloaded condition 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 27 

of the Russian ships at the time of the battle was so uiuisual and un- 
necessary that further consideration seems useless. It is well to 
remember, however, that all reports indicate that, with two excep- 
tions^ the vessels of the Russian fleet in the battle of the Sea of 
Japan withstood a teiTific amount of punishment for more than -five 
hours before foundering^ and that the destruction of the large major- 
ity of those that were actually sunk was dus to subsequent torpedo 
attack^ or opening of sea valves after the vessels were in a helpless 
condition, and not to gun fire. It appears to me that the " thin 
armor " and coal protection did noble work. 

The writer then proceeds to conmient upon — 

" Our investment in ships with submerged armor," stating that our 
" battle ships lack a first essential of a battle ship — protection of the 
" water line." Also that " No ship * * * has yet been planned 
" to have a water-line protection reaching more than 6 inches above 
"' the water when she is ready to fight." 

These statements are, in effect, a reiteration of previous misstate- 
ments, and, like them, are wholly misleading with respect to the 16 
battle ships now comprising the Atlantic Fleet, and not only mis- 
leading, but. fundamentally false as regards the last 4 battle ships 
designed and now under construction, but not yet launched. These 
4 vessels (the South Carolina^ Michigan^ Delaware^ and North Da- 
kota) have above the water-line belt an upper belt whose mean thick- 
ness is equal to that of the thickness of the main water-lin^ belt of 
the Kansas^ Vermont^ Minnesota^ New Hampshire^ Mississippi^ and 
Idaho; also e^ual to the thickness of the main armor belt of Admiral 
Togo's flagship^ the Mikasa^ and the lately designed WpOO-ton Jap- 
anese battle ship Aki. So that while the Mikasa^ the Aki^ and the 
United States battle ships of the Vermont and Mississippi classes, 
just noted, have the upper edge of their main water-line armor belt, 
at designed load displacement, out of water from 2 feet 6 inches in 
the case of the Mikasa to 4 f^^^ ^ inches in the case of the Vermont^ 
the South Carolina and Delaware classes have the upper edge of 
their upper heacy side armor belt 10 feet and more above the water 
Une. 

The writer then proceeds to state that — 

No other nation of the world has exer niado this fiuulaniental mistalie, except 
in the case of a few isolated ships. 

Whatever may be the " fundamental mistake " to which the writer 
alludes, the water-line belt armor of United States battle ships is 
quite as favorably disposed for keeping out unfriendly projectiles as 
those of British, Russian, and Japanese vessels, and Appendix VII is 
quite concUisive on this point. 

The writer then refers to the French and British methods of de- 
sign, etc., ending with the statement — 

The Dreadnought — their famous battle ship, embodying the secret lessons of 
the Russian-Japanese war — represents the principle upon which all their ships 
are being built to-day. 

As the Dreadnought is the only vessel of her class in commission, 
or anywhere near commission, and as the full fighting strength of the 
British battle-ship fleet, of all classes, at the present time, is com- 
posed of more than sixty battle ships of characteristics entirely dif- 
ferent from those of the Dreadnought^ the writer's generalizations 



28 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 

are misleading, to use no stronger term. Incidentally, it may be re- 
marked that he makes a very curious mistake with respect to the 
depth of submergence of the lower edge of the main water-line belt 
of the Dreadnought. The "Naval Pocket Book" for 1907 states 
that the lower edge of the main water-line belt armor of the Dread- 
nought is 7 feet below the water line. The most reliable information 
to which the Bureau has had access indicates that the lower edge of 
the main water-line belt of the Dreadnought^ when the vessel was 
floating at the designed water line^ was about 5 feet below the de- 
signed water line (this, however, when only 900 tons of coal out of 
2,700 tons bunker capacitv were on board). Although such informa- 
tion as is generally available indicates that the submergence of the 
lower edge of the Dreadnoughts main belt armor is less than 7 feet 
and approximately 5 feet, there is a report on file which states that 
the lower edge of the main belt armor of that vessel is 8 feet below 
water; identical mistakes of this character are unusual. 
Further along in his article the writer states that — 

Meanwhile the United States makes no movement to raise its water-line 
armor to where it should be. There is no defense for placing this armor under 
water. It is kept there simply because it has been placed there in the past. 
The initial mistake might be understood, for the designing of a battle ship is 
a most complex problem; but the continuation of the policy seems more in- 
credible than its beginning. 

The writer is to be congratulated on getting away from his original 
suggestion that a battle ship is a " simple thing " and recognizing 
that it is really " a most complex problem." With due respect to the 
critic's authority as a naval architect, however, the Chief Constructor 
beg[s to remark that defense for the placing of the water-line armor, 
as it actually is placed, on United States battle ships is not needed; 
it is purposely kept where placed because it is the best disposition 
which could be made. The initial idea in so placing it was not a 
mistake^ and the continuation of the policy is entirely comprehensible 
to those who hare any real knowledge of the subject. The opinion 
of our own and foreign designers and naval officers of greatest dis- 
tinction is quite in accord on the subject, and were there weight to 
spare ^ the lower edge of main water-line belt» would tend to go lower 
instead of being raised. Private advices from our battle-ship fleet, 
now on its way to the west coast, indicate that some of those who 
thought that battle ships could not roll their armor belts out of 
water in ordinarily rough water have "seen a light" and are. not 
now so vehement about " submerged armor belts." 

Next follows a plain, ordinary, false statement, since the writer 
says : 

The United States has five big battle ships now bnilding, not one of them, 
in si)ite of the continual protest of our seagoing officers, with its main belt 
above the water line. 

There are seven battle ships "now building" — the Misf^iMsippi and 
Idaho^ the New Ilainpshire^ the So^ith Carolina and Michigan^ and 
the Delaware and North Dakota, The first three battle ships just 
mentioned have the upper edge of main belt 4 feet 3 inches above the 
water line at designed load displacement. The upper edge of the 
upper main belt of the SoutJi Cai^olina and Michigan and Delaware 
and North Dakota (this belt is 10 inches thick at the bottom), is more 
than 10 feet above the water line at designed load displacement. In 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 29 

this respect these ships are superior to any known battle ship in the 
world. 

The writer then proceeds to inveiffh against — 

" The Lovmess of American Ships. He tells us that " a battle ship 
must fight at sea — in heavy weather." It may he necessary to fight 
" in heavy weather," but I feel safe in saying that a battle ship does 
not have to fight under such conditions; m fact, there are more 
chances for moderately good weather than for rough weather, and 
history so proves. The design of a battle ship must provide, however^ 
for fighting under such conditions of weather and sea as may probably 
exist at the time " action " becomes necessary, and the policy of foreign 
designers with respect to foreign designs and the direct testimony of 
our own battle ship commanders leaves no doubt as to the ability of 
our battle ships to give an excellent account of themselves in any sea 
in which battles are likely to be fought, for it may be taken for 
granted that the enemy will have the same sort of seaway in his part 
of tfie ocean that our ships will be having in theirs. 

The writer next proceeds to inform us tnat a battle ship's gun ports 
and turrets must be " well out of water." Also that — 

♦ ♦ ♦ if this were not the case the monitor — long since discarded — would 
be the fighting ship of the world. 

Comment is then made upon the Indiana^ Kearsarge^ and Ken- 
tuchy classes. The Indiana class was designed about eighteen years 
ago^ and it has been more than twelve years since the contract for the 
construction of the Kearsarge and Kentucky was signed. These 
vessels undoubtedly have low freeboard as measured by more recent 
standards. It should not be forgotten, however, that they were ap- 
propriated for and designed as " coast-line battle ships,^' and that 
many foreign battle ships of that time had about the same freeboard. 
In an appendix to this report will be found quotations from a for- 
eign scientific publication lauding the Indiana class of battle ships. 
In fact, the battery of the Indiana class, when considered in rela- 
tion to the displacement of those vessels, created a distinct sensation 
in foreign services, and many and loud were the complaints at that 
time by foreign critics as to the ability of American designers to 
obtain so m,uch greater offensive power in their battle ships than 
seemed to be possible with foreign designs, while preserving suf- 
ficiently good seagoing qualities. The Indiana and Kearsarae classes, 
however, which comprise altogether only five vessels (only two of 
them being now with the fleet) are the only battle ships in our Navy 
which can be regarded as " low freeboard '' vessels, cdl of the others 
having a freeboard which, in the opinion of those who have had ex- 
perience tn command of such vessels and in the opinion of highest 
naval authority in our own and foreign services^ is ample for all con- 
ditions of weather under which naval battles are likely to be fought 
with profit to either side. Dismissing further consideration of such 
" long-ago " designs as those of the Indiana and Kentucky classes, 
the height of freeboard forward provided for all other battle ships 
of the United States Navy is substantially the same as that adopted 
for every group of battle ships in the British Navy prior to the de- 
sign of file Dreadnought, with the possible exception of the Majestic 
class. It also corresponds substantially to, though rather greater 
than, the freeboard of all battle ships of the Japanese Navy, with the 



BO ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 

exception of those captured from the Ihissians. and refitted^ but ifi- 
cluding one of their latest 20fi00'ton battle ships; and this last fact 
is worthy of particular note, because this 20,000-ton battle ship is 
about 500 feet in length and is designed for high speed and a con- 
temporaneous design of a 20,000-ton battle ship for the United States 
NavT has about 6 feet more freeboard forward than this Japanese 
battle ship. This additional height of forward freeboard, however, 
does not m any sense mean that the " freeboards " previously pro- 
vided for American battle ships were insufficient, but simply means 
that, with a vessel of so much greater length, flrier water lines\ and 
^reat cofwentration of weights 7iearer the extremities^ additio7ial 
freeboard forward is regarded as essential if such vessels are to fight 
their forward battery in a heavy sea when going at comparatively 
high speed. 

The critic's love of exaggeration leads him to express himself very 
curiously in the following sentence : 

• • • all modem battle ships in foreign navies have forward decks from 
about 22 to 28 feet above the water. ♦ ♦ ♦ And in the latest of the foreign 
ships, especially in the French and British navies, the high bow is universal. 

It has already been stated that the French type of battle ship carries 
its main battery about one deck height higher above the water line 
than is the case with English, Japanese, and American battle ships. 
Since, however, out of the more than sixty battle ships in the British 
na\y built and commissioned since 1889, only those of the Majestic 
class and the Dreadnought have greater freeboard than about 21 feet, 
and since all Japanese battle ships except those captured from Russia 
have freeboards of 20 feet or less, the statement that " all modem 
battle ships in foreign navies have forward decks from about 22 to 28 
feet above the water," is as inaccurate as the majority of the state- 
ments made in this truly remarkable article. The use of " universal " 
in this connection scarcely needs comment. We are next advised of 
the disastrous results which would follow such grave deficiencies in 
freeboard as he alleges exist on our battle ships, and the critic gives us 
a graphic description of the way in which " green seas " come aboard, 
and how the Virginia ^* with all her ports closed by steel bucklers, 
shipped one hundred and twenty tons of water," etc., etc. The lowest 
guns on the Virginia (those of the 6-inch broadside battery) are at 
about the same level as the gim deck 6-inch broadside guns on the 
Royal Sorerei(/n^ and at approximately the same heights as those of 
the majority oif gim-deck broadside gim's in British battle ships. They 
are higher^ however, than the lowest tier of broadside guns oi the very 
recent British Duncans, King Edicards, and Siciftsures, the Frendi 
Ncpuhli(ptt\\\ and the majority of Japajiese battle ships, so far as the 
data available indicates. The turret guns of the Virginia are higher 
than those of the British Duncans, King Edwards, Swift^ures^ and 
the majority of Japanese battle ships. 

In view of the mass of opinion of distinguished seagoing officers 
of the ITniteil States Navy and the British navy, already quoted, as to 
the excellent qualities, fivm a seaman's p>oint of view, of the British 
Royal Somrign and our own Iowa and Alabama, it is a waste of 
time to ix)nsider further the allogod inability of our battle ships of 
similar characteristics to fight their batteries in any seaway in.which 
battles could be fought. 



ALUSOED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 31 

Before leaving this subject of broadside gun heights, however, it 
may be just as well to state that the magazine critic appears to con- 
fuse "gun heights" and "deck heights;" otherwise it is incompre- 
hensible why he should reduce the broadside gun heights of nearly all 
the battle ships of the Atlantic Fleet by about 4 feet — ^the heights of 
axes of the broadside guns of the majority of our battle ships being 
about 16 feet instead of 11 feet above the designed load water line of 
the vessel. 

Again, this imaginative critic informs us that — 

The broadside guns of foreign battle ships and cruisers are, generally speak- 
ing, twice as high as ours, and many of them are three times as high. 

This is truly a remarkable statement and is wholly without truth 
even as regards the " high freeboard " French ships. As previously 
stated, the heights of the axes of the lowest broadside guns of nearly 
all British battle ships are about the same as those of the United 
States battle ships ; those of the Japanese, slightly lower ; those of cor- 
responding guns on some of the later French battle ships, even lower 
still. As previously noted, however, in certain of his very broad ffen- 
«ralties this magazine critic is apt to speak of the " French type '' of 
battle ship as representing the rest of the world. In this instance, 
however, he quite oversteps himself even with respect to French hat- 
tie ships^ since the Rejmbliqice^ one of the latest design of French 
battle ships in commission, has four of her broadside guns nearer the 
water than any broadside guns of any battle ship in the United States 
Navy, and the next higher tier of broadside guns is only 6 feet higher 
than the lowest broadside 5-inch or 6-inch guns of our battle ships. 
So that, instead of being three times higher, which would make them 
more than -^ feet above the water line, thw are in fact only about 19 
feet above the designed load water line. This is only another indica- 
tion of this critic's unreliability even as to data which is susceptible 
of easy verification. 

The critic next proceeds to contrast the speed of the vessels of 
other navies with that of vessels of the United States Navy. The 
determination of the most suitable speed to be provided for anv given 
type of battle ship is a question which has always involved much 
difference of opinion, and the speed finally decided upon is usually a 
compromise. The most suitable speed for battle ships is therefore 
hardly a suitable subject for discussion in a report of this kind. As 
usual, however, the critic's statements are general and inaccurate^ 
even when they do not relate to the particular question at issue, for 
his next statement applies rather to freeboard than to speed. The 
critic says: 

In only fairly heavy sea«, while the French and Japanese could be using 
their entire batteries, our forward turrets and three-quarters of our windward 
broadside guns would be heavily handicapped, if not quite useless. 

Some of the guns on the French battle ships, we know, have high 
emplacements ; others have unusually low locations. As for the Jap- 
anese, their battle ships, with the sole exception of those refitted since 
their capture from the Russians, have their ^ns at about the same 
height above the water line, etc., as guns similarly situated in battle 
ships of the United States Navy, with the advantage on the side of 
the United States ships, as already noted. 



32 ALU5GED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

The critic next tells us that the defects above noted have long been 
known to the Navy Department, etc. He also makes the specific 
statement that — 

In 1903, after our last type of battle ship, the Connecticut, was well estab- 
lished, the Idaho and Mississippi were proposed, with forward decks 16 feet 
high and after decks only 9. 

It is presumed that the critic intended to convey the impression 
that the forw ard upper deck of the Idaho and Mississippi was 16 feet 
above the water line and the after upper deck only 9 feet. The fact 
is that the forward upper deck of the Idaho and Mississippi is 19 
feet 3 inches above the designed load water line and the after upper 
deck more than 11 feet above the designed load water line. Although 
much shorter vessels than the Connecticut class, and with 1 knot 
less designed speed, the Idaho and Mississippi have only 9 inches less 
freeboard abreast their f&rward turrets than the Connecticut^ and, in 
proportion to their displacement, have a much more powerful arma- 
ment and equally efficient armor protection. The Chief Constructor, 
therefore, dissents entirely from the critic's dictum that — 

The building of these ships, in face of the knowledge of what their lowering 
upon the water meant, was preposterous. 

The designed freeboard of the Smith Carolina class, which the critic 
describes as " our semi-Dreadnoughts^'^^ is 19 feet 6 inches, instead of 
18 feet, as stated by the writer. The freeboard of these vessels is only 
1 foot less than that of the Connecticut class, is greater than that of 
Admiral Togo^s flagship^ the Mikasa^ is greater than that of the lowa^ 
whose freeboard was highly commended by the General Board in 
1903,^ and is about the same as that of the Royal Sovereign class and 
the majority of British battle ships whose seaworthy qualities^ ability 
to fight their guns under all conditions of weather^ etc,^ have never 
been seriously questioned. 

The writer's next statement is probably the most inexplicable of a 
large number of false or misleading statements. Referring to our 
last designed, 20,000-ton battle ship, he says: 

And these latest ships were given a proper freeboard only after si)ecial pres- 
sure from the President of the United States. On this point, again, the Navy 
itself refused to change its policy. 

This is a definite and unequivocal statement concerning the official 
acts of at least two officials. So far as it concerns the work of the 
Chief Constructor in connection with any designs of ships which have 
been produced during the past four years, it is wholly false. The free- 
board of the Delaware and North Dakota was determined in a ra- 
tional and lo^cal manner in conformity with the fundamental prin- 
ciples governing the design of vessels of that size and character and 
without suggestion or compulsion from anyone. Since the Delaware 
class have much greater length than any previously designed battle 
bhips of the United States ^"avy, and since, in order to obtain the 
high speed required, the extremities of the under- water body of these 
vessels are unusually fine for battle ship^^, and, therefore, have less 
buoyanc}', it was imperative, in view of the concentration of heavy 
weights comparatively near the extremities of the vessels, to give 
much greater freeboard forward to vessels of the Delcnrare class than 
had been previously given to vessels of the Connerticut class, in order 
to preserve the same relative degree of seaworthiness when traceUng 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 83 

at high speed in a seaway. As already fully explained, however, this 
was a natural development for this type of vessel and did not in the 
slightest degree discredit the designs of the battle ships which had 
gone before. 

The Chief Constructor has taken great pains to dispose, in detail, 
of the sensational allegations of this magazine w riter with respect to 
those questions which directly affect work under the cognizance of 
the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and especially the vital ques- 
tions of freeboard^ height of gun axes^^ and water-line annor protec- 
tion. The allegations of the critic w ith respect to matters in which 
the Bureau of Construction and Repair is only incidentally concerned 
are almost as sensational^ or misleading as those relating to matters 
for which the Bureau is directly responsible. To effectually dispose 
of the majority of these allegations would be a comparatively simple 
task; but inasmuch as this i-eport has already extended itself to an 
unusual length, the Chief Constructor hardly feels warranted in cov- 
ering ground which has already been covered, in all probability, by 
his colieagiie, Rear-Admiral George A. Converse, U. S. N., retired, 
whose report is understood to cover all matters relating to the Bureau 
of Ordnance, as well as those relating to personnel, drilL organization 
of the fleet, etc. 

Moreover, many of the writer's misleading statements with respect 
to superstructure armor protection, size of gun ports, protection of 
crew, type of ammunition hoists, etc., have been treated at some length 
by the Chief Constructor in his recent testimony before the House 
Naval Committee, a copy of which will be filed w ith this report as 
soon as received from the printer. For a gentleman who clanns " a 
closer seagoing acquaintance '' with the American Navy *' than any 
other civilian possesses " the writer evinces a most unwarranted ten- 
dency to indulge in loose, irresponsible, misleading, or false state- 
ments concerning matters with which he should have definite knowl- 
edge if his ten years' familiarity with the Navy have been devoted to 
earnest and even passably intelligent study of its materiel in compari- 
son with that of foreign navies. His apparently insatiable desire for 
sensation at any cost leads him to make statements which, upon their 
very face, are too absurd for serious consideration. A few conspic- 
uous instances of this must suffice. 

The critic states in his article, referring to the Kearsarge and Ken- 
tucky,, that — 

The oi)euiuf;s above and below the gnus in the turrets of these vessels are 
10 feet square. 

If this w^ere true, practically the entire " port plates " of the 13-inch 
turrets of these vessels would have to be removed. The mere pub- 
lication of a statement of this nature leaves the author open to an 
accusation of ignorance, gross carelessness, or malicious misrepre- 
sentation. 

Again, this writer says: 

The mechanism for furnishing anmiunition to the crews of the medium guns 
can give them only from one-fifth to one-third the amount that they can fire. 

The rate of ammunition supply now provided for the main and 
secondary battery guns of nearly all of our battle ships is such that 
if the battery is served at the maximum possible rate of supply of the 
30584— S. Doc. 297, 60-1 3 



84 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

ammunition hoists the magazines would be emptied in considerably 
less than an hour. It has been reported — and there is no good reason 
to doubt the accuracy of this report — that after five hours' fighting 
during the first day's battle of the Sea of Japan the Japanese fleet 
was still well supplied with ammunition. Reports indicate also that 
the number of rounds of ammunition per gun for battle ships of the 
United States fleet is not inferior to that provided for vessels of the 
Japanese navy. So that if the critic really meant what he said, it 
would necessitate a rate of ammunition supply which would permit a 
rapidity of "fire more than twenty --five times as great as the average 
found practicable by the Japanese fleet in the battle of the Sea of 
Japan^ and would empty the magazines in less than ten minutes^ if 
the entire battery were engaged. The effect upon both materiel and 
persmmel of the ship maintainiiig this rate of fire would probably be 
nearly as disastrous as that produced by the projectiles themselves 
upon the enemy'' s ship. 

In view of the ^ave misrepresentations. which have been made, 
not only in the article now under consideration, but in the public 
press generally, brief allusion will be made to those criticisms which 
deal with thait most important subject — turret ammunition hoists. 

In making reference to what he styles "^ the open shaft to the mag- 
azine," the critic makes the following statement : 

Never since the use of powder ui)on fighting ships lias there been such danger 
to the magazines as exists in every battle ship and armored cruiser in the 
American fleet. It is a first principle, recognized even hi the days of wooden 
frigates, that powder must not be passed directly up to the gun deck through 
:a verticle shaft. Primitive common sense demands tliat there must be no 
passageway straight down from the fire of the guns on the fighting declj to 
the magazines. The open turret of the United States battle ship is the only 
violation of this principle in the practice of the world. 

The first sentence of the above quotation is wholly and unwar- 
rantably untrue, if we are to accept the positive statenient of ord- 
nance experts who have given this matter serious attention. In the 
first place, the type of turret ammunition hoists in service in the 
United States Xavy was developed by ordnance officers of conspicu- 
ous ability and knowledge of their profession. Among the Chiefs 
of Bureau of Ordnance during the time that this type of ammuni- 
tion hoist was being generally installed in the turrets of our battle 
ships and armored cruisers were : 

Kear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard, who was subsequently com- 
mander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet. 

Eear-Admiral William T. Sampson, who was subsequently com- 
mander in chief of the American naval forces in the Atlantic Ocean 
during the war with Spain. 

Kear-Adniiral William M. Folger, who was subsequently com- 
mander in chief of our fleet in Asiatic waters. 

Rear-Admiral Charles O'Xeil, who for seven years was Chief of 
the Bureau of Ordnance. 

Associated with the above-noted distinguished officers were officers 
who had the complete confidence of their colleagues in the Navy and 
who were themselves subsequently in charge of some of the very tur- 
rets whose ammunition hoists are now alleged to be so very deadly 
and inexcusable. As a matter of fact, upon no single question con- 
nected with battle ship design does there appear to have been greater 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 35 

misunderstanding than there has been with respect to the relative 
safety of different types of ammunition hoists. There is the best 
possible authority for the statement that, as regards safety, the pres- 
ent United States type of turret ammunition noist, with automatic 
shutters, is as safe as the two-stage type of ammunition hoist under 
the condition of greatest rapidity of service in action. Ordnance 
experts of unquestioned ability and experience have stated most posi- 
tively that the real advantage of the two-stage hoist is that of greater 
rapidity of ammimition supply, and not increased safety, since the 
increased rapidity of supply of ammunition can only be attained by 
having an auxiliary supply of ammunition in what may be termed 
the upper handling room, or else permitting several charges to be 
in transit from the magazine to the turret chamber at the same time. 
Moreover, the use of two independent small-chamber trunks for the 
two ammimition hoists increases the chance of explosive ignition of 
ammunition in transit from the magazine to the turret chamber 
should such charges be ignited by burning grains of powder or other- 
wise while in the tube, since the ignition of powder in a confined 
space is almost certain to cause dangerously high pressures, whereas 
the ignition of the same powder in a large unconflned space would 
result in less rapid combustion and comparatively low pressure. 

It must not be forgotten that in the turret ammunition hoists of 
United States battle ships, the car is loaded in a magazine handling 
room which is wholly separated from the magazines themselves by 
water-tight doors. * These water-tight doors have in them scuttles 
with automatic flaps, the ammunition being passed from the maga- 
zine through the scuttles into the handling room. There is no neces- 
sity for an accumulation of powder in the handling room, and there 
are stringent regulations to provide against such an accumulation. 
There is, moreover, a platform shutting off the handling room from 
the upper part of the turret well. The ammunition car passes 
through this platform, automatic shutters closing the entrance as 
soon as the car has passed. As a matter of fact, the ignition in the. 
turret chamber, on four separate occasions, of charges of powder, and 
on one of these occasions the ignition of a considerable quantity of 
powder in the handling room, without an explosion of the ammuni- 
tion in the magazine resulting therefrom, would tend to indicate, not 
that the magazines were in danger of explosion from such a cause, 
but that they were unusually immune. The type of turret ammuni- 
tion hoist in the United States Navy had nothing to do with the 
origin or causes of the ignition of the powder charges in the turret 
chamber on any of these occasions ; nor will the substitution of a 
different type of hoist entirely remove the inevitable danger which 
must always exist in the handling of high explosives under target 
practice or battle conditions. 

That every possible precaution will be taken to minimize these 
risks goes without saying, and I believe that the bureaus charged 
with such matters in the United States Navy have so far taken 
every possible precaution whose practicability and utility have been 
demonstrated. 

I have excellent authority for the statement that all of the tun^et 
ammunition hoists of armored cruisers in the British Navy l^^d ^vc^Ol 
from the magazine handling room to the turret cYiaraV)eT. aiv^ are uot 



36 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

of .the interrupted-hoist type. Also that a large number of turret 
ammunition hoists on British battle ships are of the same direct-hoist 
type. The direct hoist is also in use on many French battle ships. I 
am informed that the essential difference between British direct hoist's 
and American direct hoists is that in the British type there is a long 
tube leading from the magazine handling room to the turret cham- 
ber, open at the bottom, and having a suitable closure at the top, 
whereas in the American type of hoist the charge goes direct from 
the handling room to the turret chamber, this hoist having no cir- 
cumscribing tube, there being instead an intermediate jylatform with 
automatic shutters as previously described. In the opinion of some 
well-known ordnance experts, the use of the direct tube as in the Eng- 
lish Navy is no safer than that of the American type of direct hoist 
with intermediate platform^ for reasons already stated. 

The question now naturallv arises, Why should there be any 
change in the turret ammunition hois-ts of American battle ships if 
the present hoist is satisfactory? An entirely satisfactory reply to 
such a question would involve a complete review of a large mass of 
official correspondence relating to ammunition hoists and extending 
over a period of many years. Briefly, however, it may be stated that 
there has apparently arisen during the past few years doubt as to the 
safety of the present type of ammunition hoists. This distrust is 
believed by some of those best qualified to judge to be wholly with- 
out foundation in fact. Those who have had any extended experience 
in the control of men, however, fully realize the serious results which 
might easily follow undue distrust of the safety of so important a 
mechanism as the turret ammunition hoist. The official records in- 
dicate that the two-stage type of hoist was directed to be installed in 
the turrets of all battle ships and armored cruisers of the United 
States Navy (other than the four last designed) as a direct result of 
the recommendation of a turret board appointed shortly after the 
accident in the turret of the Georgia^ and that the Bureaus of Ord- 
nance and Construction and Repair have acted in direct conformity 
with the Department's instructions approving the report of the 
board. It is also true that one of the seriously controlling features 
(so far as the Bureaus of Ordnance and Construction and Repair are 
concerned) in taking the preliminary steps to make this change in 
turret ammunition hoists was the recognition of the apparent dis- 
trust in which the present type of hoist was beginning to be held on 
account of the serious misrepresentations which had been made as 
to the safety of that type of hoist. Inasmuch, therefore, as the 
efficiency of any body of men is seriously impaired if they honestly 
believe that the tools with which they are to work are at all unsafe, 
the Bureaus of Ordnance and Construction and Repair have been 
working together for some years past to make such modifications of 
ammunition hoists and turret arrangements as would meet all practi- 
cable requirements of both speed and safety. 

Inasmuch as this subject will be fully treated in the report to be 
submitted by Rear-Admiral Converse, further comment will not be 
made, except to state that, judging by past experience, it is not at all 
beyond the possibility of rapid evolution or service sentiment in such 
matters that modifications may be made in the type of turret ammuni- 
tion hoist now in service which will entirely meet the requirements 
of those who desire an increase in speed. If, however, the present 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 37 

hoists are modified so as to provide, in effect, a two-stage hoist, such 
modification, or the substitution of entirelv new two-stage hoists, in 
the opinion of many ordnance experts, will not be productive of an 
increase of safety, but an increase of speed, unless speed is? sacrificed 
to safety — an accomplishment hitherto found to be practically impos- 
sible under the intensely competitive conditions now prevailmg with 
respect to target practice. 

The strictures of the critic upon the Bureau system of the Navy 
Department and Bureau management of the Navy, are severe, and 
if all of £hem had reasonable semblance of truth, would furnish just 
cause for alarm. A system, however, which has carried the Navy 
through three wars and which directly superseded an administrative 
organization of the general character of the one now put forth as a 
" cure-all " for the alleged defects of the present Bureau system, 
must surely have very definite merit. It can not, therefore, be lightly 
brushed aside to meet the views of the irresponsible critic whose com- 
ments upon our materiel have been provea to be so misleading and 
inaccurate. Moreover, it is not entireW apparent that experience as 
an artist and an author should adequately qualify a critic to express 
a really valuable opinion concerning the administration of so vast 
and complex an establishment as that of the Department of the Navy. 
A scheme for the effective reorganization of so important a branch of 
the public service might well tax the best eflforts of those who have 
devoted to that subject years of study and have brought to its intelli- 
g[ent consideration the valuable experience of successful endeavor in 
similar lines of work; it obviously has no terrors, however, for either 
the naval or civil amateur in such matters. After an experience of 
more than four years as chief of one of the most important bureaus 
in the Navy Department, and an administrative experience of man}'^ 
years prior to his appointment as Chief of the Bureau of Construction 
and Repair, the Chief Constructor can say, without hesitation, that 
he knows of no branch of the public service which has more earnest, 
loyal, and devoted servants than has the Department of the Navy 
in the present heads of its various bureaus and offices. Faults of ad- 
ministration there doubtless are. and the bureau system may not be in 
all respects ideal; but all forms of corporate or governmental admin- 
istration have their defects, and, all things considered, I believe the 
underlying principles which governed the original establishment of 
the present bureau system are as sound to-day as they were when 
Congress authorized the establishment of the bureaus more than sixty 
years ago. 

Moreover, after actual experience of the practical workings of such 
a system, I have no doubt whatever that, for direct administrative 
responsibility, it is, as a system, one of the best that can be devised, 
and that with the further development of certain consolidations and 
changes in navy-yard administration which are now being tentatively 
undertaken, the bureau system of the Navy Department can be made 
to give more effective results than any system of " board responsi- 
bility " ever devised. 

The Chief Contsructor's conclusions with respect to certain alleged 
defects in the battle ships of the United States Navy have been stated 
definitely as each subject was disposed of. It is therefore needless 
to do more, in conclusion, than make a positive general statement 



38 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

based upon the detail statements already given. It is therefore a 
privilege to be able to state that the height of freeboard^ height of 
gun axes^ character of water-line armor protection^ general type of 
turret ammunition hoists^ etc., of the ships of the Unit^ States xf avy 
are such as have heretofore been embodied in many of the best " all- 
around " battle ships of which the Chief Constructor has knowledge, 
and they have been determined upon only after the most painstaking 
investigation and devoted attention of some of the most experienced 
and distinguished oflScers of the United States Navy, including those 
of the seagoing element as well as those of technical branches of the 
service. Also, that considering each vessel in its own period of design^ 
the hattle ships of the United States Navy compare most favorably 
with those of the most important foreign navies and have been used 
by certain foreign expert critics as standards which foreign designers 
should emulate. 

Comparison of vessels of the United States Navy with foreign 
vessels is not agreeable nor ordinarily desirable, but this must be 
regarded as an extraordinary occasion since the public and a large sec- 
tion of our own service have been misled or misinformed, and positive 
statements of fact and opinion are necessary to remove these false 
impressions. The features of battle-ship design which have been 
covered in the foregoing report are among the most important with 
which the naval constructor and others responsible for tne design of 
battle ships of our Navy have to deal. They are also, apparently, the 
least understood and appreciated by those whose superficial knowl- 
edge of the general subject of ship desi^ leads them to make rash, 
inaccurate, and unwarranted statements in relation thereto. 

In preparing this report the Chief Constructor has taken an 
unusual degree of pains to accumulate and prepare data which would 
be as reliable as the sources of information would permit. With 
respect to our own and certain foreign battle ships it has been possi- 
ble to give data with an unusual degree of ac<'uracy, details with 
respect to the other typical foreign battle ships, for which plans and 
tabular data have been prepared, are the best available, the sole desire 
being to state the farts and let the conchfsioiis therefrom Ix? so plain 
that even the unwilling may be convinced. Moreover, in preparing 
this report and devoting so large an amount of personal attention to 
the collection and arrangement of data in relation thereto, the Chief 
Constructor has had in mind not so mach the refatation of the 7niS' 
stat< taents of an irresponsible magazine writer as the retnoral of an 
erronroas impression from the mind of the public at large ^ and es pe- 
dal bj to correctly in form those whose naral training and profes- 
sional association should already hare afforded them more accurate 
knowledge of, and greater faith in, the materiel which may s(nne day 
be under their command in time of }rar. 

The Chief Constructor is constrained to believe that there is among 
some of the personnel of our naval service an inexplicable amount of 
misinformation concerning the development of naval materiel in our 
own as well as in foreign services: also a complete failure to grasp 
the essential fact that all battle-ship design is necessarily a compro- 
mise, and that the undue development of one feature must necx^s- 
sarily te a(!com|)lished by sacrificing some other perhaps equally 
important feature. That there is grave misinformation as to real con- 
ditions with resj)ect to naval materiel is unfortunately indicated by 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 39 

btatements of magazine and other writers, that the information upon 
which they have based their criticisms has been obtained from those 
who were in a position to have exact knowledge on the subject. 

After due consideration and consultation with the Department, it 
has been deemed unnecessary to deal fully with this particular phase 
of the subject in a report of this kind. Some reference thereto, how- 
ever, appears necessary in view of the ^ery widespread impression 
that many of the most sweeping criticisms which have appeared in 
recent magazine and other articles had a certain amount of direct 
inspiration. 

That those who are responsible for the design of battle ships in the 
United States Navy are not infallible, is readily conceded; that er- 
rors doubtless have been and will be made in some of the details of 
battle-ship design, may also be regarded as indisputable. This mat- 
ter was, however, tersely disposed of by tlie Secretary of the Navy 
in his last annual report, page 3'^. in the following statement : 

IVcuIiarly fitted tis are our sliip ilesi^jciiers fdr the work they linve in hand. 
we have, nevertheless, in the i)ast made some mistakes; hnt these, when dis- 
(•ovennl. haxe been i»r(>mi)tly nH-titi*'d. Siicli is tlie liisjory of i!a.\al cniistrnctic^n 
under foreijni governments as weU as onr own. We liave no monopoly of 
ernn's in warship desijnis. On the whole, I believe that the members of the 
eonstrnetion corps of tht» rnite<l States Navy have greater opportnnity for 
keeping in touch with the recpiiremo'its of the fleet and th(» views of seagoing 
officers than is possessed by any similar corps in any other navy. 

There is a tendency among many critics to compare the good points 
of the design of to-day with the comparative inferiority of the design 
of ten or more years ago. There is also, among all critics of naval 
materiel, a strong tendency to criticise some particidar element of 
battle-ship design, without duly considering all the other elements 
which enter into the design of the vessel as a whole. It also often 
happens that each critic has his own particidar ideas as to the relative 
value to be assigned to each essential element of battle-sliij) design, 
and if his individual views are not met, the design, as a whole, is, in 
his opinion, faulty. 

The failure to consider, as a whole, all the elements which enter 
into the design of any particular battle ship, and the failure to prop- 
erly inform themselves as to previous practice and the conditions 
under which any particular design has been developed, is one of the 
most fruitful sources of such unfavorable criticism as is made by 
critics in the naval service. 

The majority of those who bring to the Department's attention 
their views concerning matters pertaining to the naval service are 
doubtless actuated by the highest motives, and some of them may 
really believe that they are domg a great public service in appearing 
to reveal and hold up to public condemnation alleged glaring defects 
in the battle ships of the United States Navy. Apparently it has 
never occurred to such insufficiently informed critics that they have 
no monopoly of professional knowledge, loyalty, and devotion to 
duty, qualities which, in the judgment of the Chief Constructor, are 
characteristic of the overwhelming; majority of officers of the United 
States Navy. Neither do these critics appear to take time to consider 
that while they may possibly be accomplishing in their own par- 
ticular fields oi labor, splendid results for which all officers are only 
too glad to accord them their full measure of praise, other officers, 
fully as devoted to their work, fully as loyal to the naval service as 



40 AIJiEOED DEFECTS IK VESSELS OF NAVY. 

themselves, and possibly much more completely equipped as regards 
the particular professional work for which they have definite and 
very great responsibility, are giving their very best energies, in sea- 
son and out, to the accomplishment of the one great thing which all 
right-thinking, right-minded, fair-dealing naval officers have in view, 
namely, the bringing to the highest possible state of efficiency the 
service in which they have all been trained from 'boyhood and which 
the large majority love so well that they will leave nothing undone 
to make it excel in all thin^ and to defend it from its detractors. 

So far as concerns criticism in general, it is always welcome when 
it is timely and well-considered, since much good can and does result 
from the consideration of intelligent criticism of this kind. There 
{ire ample means, however, of bringing to the attention of the Depart- 
ment criticism either of the pei*sonnel or materiel of the naval service, 
and in the hist annual report of the Cliief Constructor there was set 
forth in great detail a history of battle-ship design in the United 
States Navy for the past ten yeai's, with definite allusion to some of 
the most important criticisms that have been made and definite orders 
published by the Secretary of the Navy witli a view to eliciting from 
officers in general intelligent criticism upon naval materiel. Refer- 
ence was also made to some of the very unfortunate results which had 
followed the overruling of the opinion of the Department's respon- 
sible and trained designers in favor of the ill-considered and unwise 
recommendations of those whose training and experience in such 
matt(»rs were not so complete as that of the Department's official 
advisers. 

That Bureau of the Navy Department of which I have the honor 
at the present time to l>e the chief does not shrink from^ but courts 
criticism; but in order that such criticism may be helpful and valu- 
{•ble it must come from xrell-informccl and expeHenced in en whose 
sole desire is to ifnprore and not to fear doiru. and who are willing 
to set forth their views in defftil with depnite reasons for '* the fulth 
that is in tJicm.'^ If in tho last analysis those who have final and 
definite responsibility for results and whose knowledge and experience 
does not permit them to concur in the views of the critic — no matter 
how definite tho-e views may be or how strongly or persistently 
expressed— rely upon their own best judgment, reenforced, it may be, 
by the unanimous concurrent opinion of their responsible official 
colleagues, the critic has no just right to insist that only he and his 
sympathizers are right, and that all those who differ from them in 
opinion are wholly wrong, esperialh/ when the sujjject andcr rntieistn 
is one for which others and not the critics have defnite responsit>ility. 
That they alone are right, however, appears to i)e the point of view 
of those whose opinions are not accepted, and their subsequent action 
must, in many instances, be prejudicial, rather than beneficial, to the 
navai service, if we are to accept as true the statements of certain 
magazine ami other writers that their articles are based upon infor- 
mation obtained from officers of the Navy. 

In view of the foregoing, and in spite of the very great additional 
burden of work imposed u])on the Chief Constructor, it has been a 
real privilege to join with his colleague, the president of the board 
on construction, in setting forth the facts concerning the materiel of 
the United States Navy. In doing so the Chief Constructor is fully 
/I ware how great has been the inisrepresentation as to such matters. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 41 

how far-reachinq may be the results, and, ultimately^ how disastrous 
to discipline and e-fficiency of the -fleet itself must be smj widespread 
dissemination of false or misleading statements concerning our naval 
materiel unless such false impressions are promptly removed ; for it 
is quite too much to expect that the best work can be done either by 
commissioned or enlisted personnel if they once become thoroughly 
imbued with the idea that the possible " enemy " has the " best " and 
our own service only the '* worst " in naval materiel. 

Those features of battle ship design which have been covered by 
this report and which aflfect the design of the vessel as a whole, in 
matters directly under the cognizance of the Bureau of Construction 
and Repair, are height of freeboard^ gun height^ and water-line 
armor distribution. The detailed discussion of these features of 
United States battle ships in the foregoing report would appear to 
leave no doubt whatever as to the accuracy of the followmg con- 
clusions : 

First, That the height of freeboard of United States battle ships 
has been given the most careful consideration in every design of bat- 
tle ship, and that the comparatively inferior freeboard of the three 
vessels of the Indiana class and the two vessels of the Kearsarge class 
was due in part to a literal compliance with the phraseology of the 
act making appropriation for those vessels and in part to a desire to 
obtain the greatest possible battery power and or^'^atest possible bat- 
tery and hull protection on the displacement finally decided upon. 
All other battle ships in the United States Navy, with the exception 
of those above noted, have ample freeboard for seaworthiness and 
ample freeboard for the purpose of eftectual service of the battery 
unaer all probable conditions of battle. Since freeboard in excess of 
that necessary for seaworthiness and the service of the battery is ob- 
tained at a distinct sacrifice of other important and essential qualities, 
the action of the responsible designers of the battle ships of the United 
States Navy has been fully justified by the results attained. More- 
over, a comparison of the freeboard of American battle ships with 
that of battle ships of the British and Japanese navies indicates that 
the responsible designers of these three navies have arrived at sub- 
stantially identical conclusions in treating this very important ele- 
ment of battle-ship design. 

Second, That the heights of gun axes on battle shij)s of the United 
States Navy are directly aiul most favorably comparable with the 
heights of gun axes on battle ships of the British and Japanese navies, 
and that such gun heights are entirely adequate for the effectual serv- 
ice of the battery under all probable conditions of weather during 
which naval actions are likely to take place. The most direct evi- 
dence in support of this statement is the effective work performed by 
the batteries of the Japanese battle ships during the battle of the Sea 
of Japan, it being noted in this connection that the heights of gun 
axes of the battle ships of the Japanese fleet were slightly less than 
the heights of gun axes of nearly all battle ships of the United States 
Navy, with the exception of those of the Kearsarge and Indiana 
classes. 

Third, That the water-line aruior distribution on battle ships of 
the United States Navv has be^n made with due regard to the imper- 
ative necessity of giving adequate protection not only to v\i«i\ ^W 
ments of the vessel, such as machinery, boilers, and ir\siga'L\Tv^'S.> \>\3X. 



42 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

also — and most important of all — to the stability of the vessel under 
battle conditions. The data contained in the text of this report, sup- 
plemented by the plans herewith forwarded as appendixes, leave 
no possible room for doubt that the water-line armor distribution of 
battle ships of the United States Navy is in no sense inferior to that 
of similar protection on typical battle ships of the British and Jap- 
anese navies, and in many instances, as is clearly shown, is superior. 
Where the designs of battle ships of other navies have indicated a 
greater protection to the water line, such greater protection has inev- 
itably been accompanied by serious sacrifices of other most important 
qualities, a sacrifice which in the judgment of British, Japanese and 
American designers has been without justification. 

Speaking, therefore, as one who has no responsibility, either direct 
or indirect, for the designs of battle ships now attached to the Atlantic 
Fleets but as one who has unusual opportunities to know fcu^ts, and 
who has, moreover, a keen appreciation of the responsibility inevita- 
bly attaching to such a statement made by him, the Chief Constructor 
desires to go fairly and squarely on record as stating that ship for 
ship in its own peri<id of design^ the battle ship feet of the United 
States Navy compares most fat^orahly with that of any other naoy in 
the worlds and, in the opinion of certain foreir/n critics, is superior to 
all in battery power and protection^ the two vitally essential elements 
in all battle ships. In making the foregoing statement the Chief Con- 
structor earnestly desires to disclaim any boastful intent. As pre- 
viously noted, comparisons of this kind are unpleasant and ordinarily 
undesirable, but there are times when they are necessary, and this ap- 
pears to be one of them. 

In conclusion, and by way of illustrating the fact that the United 
States Navy has no monopoly of unfair ana unjust criticism, and that 
there are in other countries individuals or cliques whose tendency is 
to criticise to destruction rather than to assist in upbuilding, and who 
evince an undue interest in, and responsibility for, the work for which 
others are legally responsible. I beg to submit and close with the fol- 
lowing quotation from an article in a well-known and widely read 
British service publication of so recent a date as January K), li>08: 

♦ ♦ ♦ Tlu' I'onl dnnpT to Iti-itisli ujinmI sniuM'inncy nt th«» pr^soiit time lies 
not in the possession of fast bnttlo sliips, nor in tlio snporiority r>f the material 
of the fleet, but in the formation of calwils. Lr»yalty to tlieir chiefs is what the 
nation expects and requires from its naval othcers of all ranl< — tliere can be no 
success in war witliont it. Some remarlvs penned by an oflicer of rank one hun- 
dred and twenty-odd years a;ro, are not without point even at tlie i)resent time. 
A certain Captain Cornewall, descril>inir a ** strai^dit tallv " he had witli his com- 
mander in cliief, relates how lie ad<lressed him in the following remarkable 
words: "By what power I can not say. but from the eftVK-ts of that power he 
(the second in conunand) lias drawn over to himself a party of at least half of 
the otticers under your connnand; these are traiiH'd up in discontent, and p(?r- 
hai)S I don't ^'o too far if I siiy in ojjen contemjit of every resoluti<»n s(Mit from 
the Admiralty." 

There is a lot to be learned from naval hist()ry. if we can only int«'r|)ret its 
lessons aright. And the first and last lesson to learn is loyalty tf» the chiefs, 
whether at the A<lmiralty, on shore, or in command afloat. 

Very resi^ectfullv, 

W. L. (\\rrs, 
Chief Constructor^ U. S, ^V., Chief of Bureau. 

The Secretary of the Navy. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 



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Appendix III. 

TABULAR STATEMENT OF DESIGNED HEIGHTS OF UPPEB EDGE OF MAIN 
WATER LINE BELT ABHOB ABOVE TBIAL OB LOAD WATEB LINE FOB TYP- 
ICAL FOBEION AND UNITED STATES BATTLE SHIPS. 

[To accompany report of the chief constructor of February 14. 1908, to the Secretary of the Navy in 
relation to alleged defects in battle ships of the U. 8. Navy.] 

TYPICAL FOREIGN AND UNITED STATES BATTLE SHIPS. 
Height of top of heavy armor belt above designed load water line. 

UNITED STATES BATTLE SHIPS. 

Ft. In. 

Indiana 3 

Iowa 3 

Kearsarge 3 6 

Alabama 3 7f 

Maine 3 3} 

Virginia 3 

Connecticut • 4 3 

Vermont 4 3 

Mississippi 4 3 

New Hampshire 4 3 

South Carolina 11 

Delaware 10 2} 

FOREIGN BATTLE SHIPS. 

British: 

Royal Sovereign -. 3 

Majestic 10 9 

King Edward 3 

Dreadnought 8 

Japanese: 

Asahi 2 8 

Mikasa 2 6 

Kashima 2 6 

Aki 3 6 

French: 

King Henri IV 3 9 

Suffren 3 6 

Republique 7 8 

Russia: 

Pobieda 3 6 

Kniaz Suvaroff 1 9 

53 



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aujEGed defects in vessels of navy. 



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Appendix XI. 

Extracts from foreign publications containing criticisms of United States and 
foreign battle ships. The underscoring is not in the original. 

Extracts from a paper contributed to the proceedings of the Institution of 
Naval Architects (London) in 1891, on "Some recent war-ship designs for the 
American Navy," by J. H. Biles, subsequently professor of naval architecture at 
the University of Glasgow, and extracts from the discussion on the above-noted 
paper. 

Extracts from the French annual Les Flottes de CJombat, 1907, and the 
English annual All the World's Fighting Ships, edition of 1905-6 and edition 
of 1907. 

Also a few extracts from foreign periodicals commenting on various designs 
of vessels of the United States Navy, as follows : 

Engineering of March 26, 1907, in relation to the designs of the Alabama 
class. 

Engineer of June 14, 1901, in relation to casemates and the attitudes of the 
British, French, Japanese, and Italian services with respect thereto. 

Engineer of July 12, 1901, giving a comparison of the qualities of various 
foreign vessels and United States vessels of the New Jersey-Virginia class. 

Engineer of December 27, 1901, containing further comments concerning ves- 
sels of the New Jeraey^ Virginia^ and Connecticut classes. 

TBAKSACTI0H8 07 THE DTSTITTmOH 07 HAVAL AECHITECT8, 1891. 
"SOME RECENT WARSHIP DESIGNS FOR THE AMERICAN NAVY." 

By J. H. Biles. 

Referring to the earlier protected cruisers, Mr. Biles says : " The 
American ship designers and builders have shown that they are capa- 
ble of producing vessels quite equal to their promises^ and at least 
equal to the best European practice. * * * [Referring to the New 
York.'] Compared with the Edgar class, this vessel is much more 
powerfully armed and much better protected. Her sustained sea speed 
will probably be greater. She is, however, 800 tons more displace- 
ment and should, therefore, be a superior vessel. * * * The coast 
line battle ships (the Indiana^ Massachusetts^ and Oregon) are the 
most*important vessels of this programme. * * * They have been 
designed ' to be able to iBght vessels carrying the heaviest guns and 
armor,' and by inference comparison with our most recent battle ships 
can not fail to be courted. * * * The armament of these vessels 
seems to be more powerful than that of any European battle ships, 
there being four ffuns capable of piercing any armor afloat, and eight 
8-inch guns capaole of penetrating almost any armor, and certainly 
of penetrating the armor at the ends of the belts and on the barbettes 
ana r<idoubts of most of our battle ships at close quarters. 

" Of course in order to attain this result something has had to be 
sacrificed; or, rather, something is not existent in these ships which 
exists in the larger ones. The speed estimated compared with our 
latest battle ships is probably about l\ knots less. The coal supply 
is 500 tons less. 
58 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 59 

" The breadth of the armor belt is 1 foot less, but it is as wide as 
that of the Admiral class, which has not the advantage of the 5-inch 
belt above. 

" As these vessels will probably have to act very much nearer their 
base than European vessels, their bottoms will probably be in better 
condition, so that the real speed would not be much, if any, less. For 
the same reason their coal supply need not be so large, and therefore 
it would seem that their preponderance of armament would give them 
an advantage in a combat near their own coast line with any Euro- 
pean vessel. They are distinctly sicperior in most respects to any 
European vessels of the same displacement^ and^ for the purpose in- 
tended of protecting the American coast line, they seem to be quite a 
mMch for any ships afloat. They can keep the sea as well as any 
battle ships and must not be looked upon as coast-defense vessels 
in the ordinary restricted sense, though they are called coast-line 
battle ships. Compared with the Admirals, their freeboard at the 
ends is 15 inches higher, and compared with the turreted battle ship 
Hood, it is practically the same. It is, however, 8 feet less forward 
than the barbette battle ship of the Royal Sovereign class. Judging 
by the amount of water which will come on board, an Atlantic liner 
with a freeboard forward of 26 feet, the chance of fighting the 13-inch 
turret guns end on in a head sea is not very great, but the 8-inch guns 
could probably be fought in almost any weather. ♦ ♦ ♦ j^ ma- 
neuvermg power this ship will be superior at her normal load draft 
to the Royal Sovereign class on account of her less length and draft." 

DISCUSSION ON THE ABOVE PAPER. 
[By Admiral, the Right Hon. Sir John Hay, K. C. B., D. C. L., F. R. S., vice-president.] 

" I think, my lord, this paper is rather an eye opener. ♦ ♦ * 
In Mr. Biles's statement I think he indicates that the United States 
now are becoming a great naval power and that they are beating us 
in speed. Speed is of very great consequence, and that is exactly 
what the United States did some seventy years ago. While we were 
supposing ourselves to be the first naval power of the world they 
built a certain number of very large ships and captured all the 
frigates which were supposed to be their equals except in one or two 
famous actionsv ♦ ♦ * I think the fact that the United States is 
coming back again into the range of great naval powers * ♦ ♦ 
makes it necessary that she should be considered in all the estimates 
of naval power which we have hitherto been conducting rather with 
reference to our possible European relations." 

[By Admiral A. F. R. De Horsey, K. C. B., associate.] 

" * * * I am glad to see that our friends across the Atlantic, 
with their great cleverness, stick to water-line protection. * * ♦ 
Any damage above the water-line, however much the ship may roll, 
may probably be temporarily repaired; but there is a poor chance of 
dealing with injury oelow the water line.^^ 



60 AliEGED DEFECTS IK VESSELS OF H-AYY- 

[By Mr, W- H, Whit*, C. B,, F. EL S., vke president,] 

***** The facts * * ♦ sho^r that in America the recon- 
struction of the Navy has been undertaken in a most businesslike 
manner. Our friends there * * * at first * * * did not pro- 
duce rival designs, but obtained from this country designs and work- 
ing drawings for sliips and engines. * * * Xhe first result at 
which they aimed has been most satisfactorily achieved* Ships are 
now afloat built in the States from d&signs acquired here which com- 
pare favorably with ships of the same date built in this country, 

* * * Having got through that stage of progress, the Americans 
n^re undertaking designs of their own, 

' " * * * Xs regards the freeboard in the battle ships and the 
heights of the guns above the deck and above water, Sir Nathaniel 
Barnaby has well said that there is an essential difference between 
the Admiral cla^ in the Royal navy and the new American naval ves- 
sels, * * * There are, however j ships like the Nilt\ Trafalgar^ 
and Yietoriaj where the sp^d is practically the same and the free- 
board is about the i>ame as the Americans contemplate. The general 
feeling of naval officers * * * is, however, in favor of our later 
practice in the RoyQl Sovereign class. * * * The new vessels are, 
It is true, called ' coast-defense vessels ' in the official pi'ogramme, 
but we are also told that they have a coal supply, or rather a bunker 
capacity, • * * tliat would give them the power to go almost 
anywhere that other battle ships could go. With bunkers filled, 

* * ' the thick armor would be about on the level of the water 
line. That is a matter calculated upon and accepted by the designers 
as a featui-e which they do not object to when the bunkers behind the 
5-inch armor are full of coaL We have ships which come into the 
same class, I do not myself see the least objection to filling up the 
bunkers if they exist, but I think that what needs to be clearly under- 
stood is that the nominal speeds of which we have heard are associ- 
ated with a certain weight of coal in the ship and not with the condi- 
tion of full bunkers. So long as there is such a clear understanding, 
no harm is done." 

LES FLOTTES DE COMBAT, 1907. 

This annual contains references to various United States vessels as 
follow : 
Iowa, — ^" May be compared to the CamotP 

V^QfTS^—Oamoi laid down 1801; completed 1896. loxca laid down 1893; com- 
pleted 1897.] 

Kearsarge and Kentucky, — " The superposed turrets offer certain 
advantages in simplicity and working and saving of weight, but 
if the turning axis is displaced (or the thinner upper turret dis- 
abled) one-haif of the battery is out of action. The secondary battery 
is well protected and the speed is sufficient for a battle ship. Every- 
thing on this slightly modified Iowa has been installed in as simple 
and practical a manner as possible. The main battery has been re- 
duced in favor of the secondary, which will perhaps oe slightly re- 
stricted as to arcs of fire. On the other hand, the protection nas been 
considerably improved and the annor belt extends to the stem." 



AliLBQBD DEFECTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 61 

Alabama. — " If we compare this class with the preceding one, we 
see that much attention has been paid to the protection and that the 
gun positions will be habitable during action. Speed is not increased. 
In America this is considered as a secondary factor for battle ships. 
* * * The Alabama type is preferable to the Majestic from every 

Soint of view. While it has as much freeboard^ it is on less draft and 
isplacement It has more armor and armament and a speed approxi- 
mately equivalent." 

[Note. — Majestic laid down February, 1894; Alabama laid down December^ 
1896.] 

Connecticut. — " These battle ships, which are a reply to the British 
King Edward VII ^ are better protected than the latter for the same 
displacement and, in particular, are more heavily armed?^ 

New York. — " This cruiser, which was a complete success, was in 
advance of all others built at the same time and still holds a good 
place among them." 

Brooklyn. — ^" Her sponsons are excellently arranged and the fore- 
castle at a height of 10 meters makes her superior to most cruisers 
now afloat. She could fight in any weather. Her protection is more 
than adquate." 

Tennessee. — ^" These vessels, which much resemble the English 
Drake as to their general arrangement, speed, and displacement, have, 
however, the advantage of a complete belt. Their main battery is 
just double that of the Drake^ and they have two more 6-inch guns 
and eight 3-inch. They are inferior to the English Duke of Edin- 
burgh?'^ 

jane's fighting ships (ed. 1905-06). 

[Page 380.] 

" To the United States belongs the credit of being the first nation 
to sanction that battle ship with a uniform armament of big guns^ 
which * * ♦ has hovered on the horizon of the building pro- 
grammes of most naval powers. * * * In large cruisers no de- 
parture is being made. The Washington^ which is the most powerful 
armored cruiser afloat, is the standard model, so far as can be gath- 
ered. * * * No cruisers of moderate dimensions are contem- 
plated, the American ideal that every ship is to be the best possible 
of its class being faithfully adhered to.^^ 

jane's fighting ships, 1907. 

[Preface.] 

" Few, if any, ships are likely to be built in the future which can 
not use all guns on either broadside. * * * America in the South 
Carolina led the way in this direction and the ship of the future i» 
bound to be some improved variation of her. 

" Certain tables upon page 433 are a new feature.x * * * These 
tables omit all ships projected under 1907-08 programmes. Such fig- 
ures would slightly increase United States superiority in long-range 
attack. The extraordinary high figures for United States ships 
afford food for considerable thought, for both in ships with high- 



62 ATJiBGED DEFECTS IN \^SSELS OF NAVY* 

powered gum or impervious to vital injury at lan^ ran</e the United 
States feet u s^upertor to any oth^r rutvy in the world. Even by the 
inclusion of iO-caOber (12*inch) of types extinct, so far as new ships 
are concenied, the United States of America is an extremely good 
second, and the correspandmg lead in invulnerability outside 7,000 
yards is considerably increase.," 

JEXTEACTS FROM TABLES HEFEHRRD TO. 

{a) Ship with high-powered guns* Number of ships able to at- 
tacK outside 7,000 yards: 




BrftEsb. 


United 
Btttea. 


Fr^QCli. 


Oemum. 


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*Iiie1adefl three protected crulfl^n). 

(5) Ships impervious to injury at long range. Number of shipa 
whose water-line belts are safe outside 7,000 yards against — 




Brltbdi. 


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French. 


<l«nEian'] Japanese. 


Modem %'l to lO-iiich guni^ *...#.............«.... 




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NEW WABSHIP CONSTRUCTION. 



" The Dreadnought herself was found to have certain minor de- 
fects. * * * Her fighting power has, however, probably been 
overestimated. There is very little reason to believe that she is ' equal 
to two King Edwards^ despite her undoubted belt superiority. 
* * * An extremely important point about a battle ship, recog- 
nized far more fully in the Unitea States than anywhere else, is 
embodied in the following observations of Mr. Robinson of the 
United States Constructional Board : ' The writer is of the opinion 
that at some periods in all services too much consideration has been 
given in design to the development of characteristics tending to 
eflSciency in individual ship action to the detriment of a correspond- 
ing eflSciency in squadron or fleet action. 

" ' This has doubtless been due to lack of proper knowledge avail- 
able as to squadron or fleet maneuvers, a knowledge recently much 
augmented by the naval maneuvers conducted by the different coun- 
tries and by the experience gained in the Spanish- American and 
Russo-Japanese wars. The attainment of the desired results in the 
South Carolina and Michigan could only be reached from a most 
careful consideration of all questions and the elimination of such 
features as were considered least tending to fighting eflSciency under 
the conditions in which they might naturally be called upon to act. 
These considerations led to the arrangement of battery shown in the 
belief that broadside fire through a considerable arc from bow to 



ALI^EGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 63 

stern was of vastly more moment in fleet action than volume of fire 
ahead or astern. It seems to be generally conceded that this deduc- 
tion is correct.' 

"The merit or otherwise of the Dreadnought depends upon the 
sort of fleet unit that she makes * * * the United States 1906-7 

i programme embodied * * * a development of the South Caro- 
ina, and having ten of her 12-inch on the broadside should be con- 
giderably superior to the Dreadnought * * * The South Caro- 
lina and Michigan * * * are * * * characteristically Ameri- 
can. 

There is room for considerable doubt as to whether the upper big 
guns can fire over the lower turrets without putting the latter tempo- 
rarily out of action; but the ships have probably been unduly criti- 
cised because of this. Any arrangement that permits of all guns 
being used on either broadside is open to some kind of criticism. For 
broadside fire the American ships seem very well adapted and that, 
rather than the ' four guns and on ' was the chief thing aimed at by 
the designer. The alternative method of securing this result, as in 
the Inflexible type of cruiser, while superior for end-on fire on paper, 
is inferior in the matter of actual broadside discharge, since one tur- 
ret has to fire over the decks, a thing for one or two reasons open to 
criticism. * ♦ * Discussing the paper of Mr. Robinson already 
referred to, the Engineer, London, said : ' It is almost an axiom in 
Europe that in the United States they are not very particular what a 
war ship is so long as she " whips creation " on paper. Those who 
hold this view will find their faitn severely shaken by the singularly 
able paper of Naval Constructor Robinson already referred to. The 
opinions expressed are understood to be those of the Bureau of Naval 
Construction, to which Mr. Robinson belongs.' 

"Mr. Robinson begins with the Indiana and tells us, what few 'of 
us have ever realized before, that that ship was designed as a ' coast 
defender ' pure and simple ; hence, many of her obvious defects, when 
regarded as a battle ship of ordinary type. She is, as a matter of 
fact, merely a monitor of large size and large secondary armament. 
The lowa^ s2ljs Mr. Robinson, was an attempt to turn the Indiana into 
a seagoing ship. Thence he traces the course of the modern Ameri- 
can Navy, witn manjr candid admissions as to the diflSculty before 
naval architects. Quite a formidable one, he says with emphasis, 
is the modern demand for increased comfort aboard, bathrooms, 
etc. Without beating about the bush the author describes these 
as peace-times attributes and shows that on a given displacement 
every comfort means a corresponding loss of efficiency. These com- 
forts are demanded and they must be supplied, but they have to be 
paid for somewhere in the total displacement. Of course this is a 
truism, but Mr. Robinson has been the first to tackle it boldly. The 
American Board of Construction apparenth^ intend to oppose, so far 
as may be, the combined hotel and warship idea, which in some navies 
has made so much headway of late. 

" It is not necessary to follow Mr. Robinson through his review, 
* * * except to note * * * the constant call upon naval 
architects to provide for fresh necessities, such as improving coaling 
facilities, storage of high explosives^ and so on. * * * As we 
have already mentioned, the popular idea is that in America they do 
not bother much over these things. After reading Mr. Robinson's 



\ 



64 ALI^EGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY- 

paper we are driven to suspect, that no other nation bothers m muob. 

* * * Thence he proceed.^ to the 8mdk Carolina and Michigan 
in which both cost and displacement were fixed t>efore the naval ardii- 
tect commenced his labors. The point is one that nil critics of these 
ships ignore. Without these limitations it is easy to design something 
better than the Dreadnought^ but to design a Dreadnought of 2,000 
tons less displacement is quite another matter, 

'' * * * The aim has been to produce a ship suitable for fleet 
action^ rather than a vessel for individual combat against something 
similar to herself. This has led to a strict elimination of features 
which may be described as 'luxuries* rather than 'necessaries.* 

* * * There is some good reason to believe that^ taking all things 
into consideration^ the Soiith Varolina type is the best all-big gim 
ship yet put in hand. * * * 

*'The extinction of the protected cruiser is in many ways re- 
markable. * * * Goalies and ^ sco^tB^ all suffer from their 
stnall size and small endurance. * * ♦ There are few more curi- 
ous views in modem naval programmes than this ignoring of war 
needs. The V, S. S. Birmingham class ' scouts ' with a considerable 
endurance represent tlie realization of sound perception in the direc- 
tion of protected cruisers, as in them alone of all small cruisers is 
there a sufficiency of coal. * * * —f 

EXTRACTS FROM SOME FOREIGN PERIODICALS REGARDING DE- 
SIGNS OF UNITED STATES VESSELS* 

IFroiQ Bnglneerln^, Harcb 2B, 1S97.1 

Discussing Admiral Hichbom's paper on the Alahama^ the editor 
says: 

'^^ The dedgn of the ship differs materially from that of recent ves- 
sels of a similar class in the British navy; indeed, it is marked 

throughout by originality and boldness of arrangement, both in gen- 
eral features and matters of detail. The armored protection is very 
complete. * ♦ ♦ It will be seen * * * that the central por- 
tion of the ship is completely inclosed by armor extending from 4 
feet below the load water line to the level of the upper deck, or 
a height of about 23 feet, the minimum thickness being 5| inches. 

[The Engineer, June 14, 1901.] 

" Some time ago the Engineer prophesied that casemates would be 
an exploded idea for new British battle ships. We hear that the 
new 18,000-ton battle ship will have continuous batteries like the 
Mikasa^ Benedetto Brin^ all modem American ships, and all save the 
latest French battle ships. Bearing in mind the process of explo- 
sives, we can not but see that the Admiralty are wise m returning to 
the old boardside ironclad idea." 

[The Engineer, July 12. 1901.] 

" In conclusion we may give the broadsides of existing ships of 
the same type as the Kvn<f Edward: King Edward^ four 12-inch, 
two 9.2-inch, five 6- inch; Mikasa^ four 12- inch, seven 6-inch; Tav- 
ritchesky^ four 12-inch5 eight 6-inch; Brin^ four 12-inch, two 8-inch, 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 65 

six 6-inch; WitteUhach^ four 9.4-inch, nine 6-inch; American, four 
12-inch, four 8-inch, four 6-inoh. Reckoning an 8-inch as equal to 
one and one-half 6-inch sheel power we get the totals : British, King 
Edward^ 31 in a minute ; Japanese, Mikasa^ 29 in a minute ; Russian, 
Knaiz P, Tavritchesky^ 32; Italian, Benedetto Brin^ 31; German, 
Wittleshdch^ 29 ; American, New Jersey^ 44. All these ships except 
the Wittlesbach are identical in design. The Wittlesbach is perhaps 
a rather superior design in defense, the guns being more scattered, 
though it is not clear how she will use her offense to the full without 
interference. In general she is, however, of the same type. The 
Russian ship, completing for sea, is of low freeboard, but otherwise 
identical with the King Edward in the placing of her guns. She is 
less seaworthy and rather less likely to be hit. The Brin has re- 
cently been launched. The American ship is still in the clouds and 
may be made more powerful. As she is, however, it will be seen that 
she is far and away the leader. For each ship ' the best in the 
world ' claim has been put forward, but on paper, the 16,500-ton 
American seems to carry off the prize. In speed and armor she is 
equal to the King Edward^ 

[Note. — Instead of the figures given above, tbe .Ycjr Jersey class, on a dis- 
placement of 14,948, have six 8-inch and six 6-inch on the broadside, nialiing a 
total of 49 points, instead of 44, as given above.] 

[The Engineer, December 27, 1901.] 

" No warships, perhaps, have had so many vicissitudes as the 
United States battle ships of the New Jersey class. Once again they 
have been definitely decided on, permanently, perhaps now; but it 
need not be forgotten that earlier designs have been • final ' also. 
There is no getting away from the fact tliat each new finality has 
been better than the preceding designs. As with each the displace- 
ment has gone up, this is not to be wondered at ; but the great and 
essential point is this increase in displacement. In the past American 
ideals have tended to ' whip creation ' with the minimum displace- 
ment; now obviously nautical influences can be seen at work, with the 
result that we observe an honest striving after a real best in place of 
what, rightly or wrongly, has hitherto been under suspicion of being 
rather a paper best. In fine, America is now definitely settling to 
building American war ships to American needs * * *." 

Further along in the same editorial comment appears the follow- 
ing reference to the designs of the Connecticut class, full. report upon 
which had been submitted to Congress a short time before. xVfter 
inviting attention to various alleged defects the editor makes the fol- 
lowing comment: 

" We have drawn attention to these defects not in a carping spirit, 
but because in spite of them we still hold these 17,604-ton ships, so far 
as the meager details available allow, superior to any other battle ship 
designs, not merely as ships, but per ton of displacement. ♦ * * 

"A very important feature * * * is the abolition of triple 
screws, after which the engineer in chief is supposed to hanker. 
Executive officers seem to have formed the opposition, and they have 
carried the day on the grounds that however advantageous the triple 
system may be in coal economy, it lacks the tactical advantage of the 

30584— S. Doc. 297, 60-1 5 



66 ALIiEOED DEFECTS OI VESSEIS OF HAVY, 

twin-screw system. Purely en^neering disadvantages might also be 
allegedj but the primary question Is one of fighting capacity. With 
two screws there is over 8,000 indic^ited horsepower available f<Mr 
assistance in a sudden turn; with triple screws considerably less 
power is available* This is the gist of the argument that has carried 
the day again with the United States construction board, and it 
arffiies'a sound appreciation of a war ship as a fighting machine 
before all else* This is the dominant note all through tlie report, 
from the specific reasons against wood sheathing — of which we shall 
have more to say on another occasion — the situation of magazineS| 
and facility of ammunition supply. Never before do we remember 
to hmve seen Amemcan demr/ns thought out with m single an eye to 
iha practical in all thinffa^^^ 

« In the foregoing extracts the underscoring is not the author's. 



Appendix XII. * 

EXTKACTS FBOM KEPOBT OF THE SECKETARY OF THE NAVY FOR THE 
FISCAL YEAR 1907, AND EXTRACTS FROM REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF 
THE BTTREATT OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 
1907. 

[Extracts from report of Secretary of Navy for fiscal year ending June 30, 1907.] 
THE METHOD OF DESIGNING NAVAL VESSELS. 

From time to time in the public press, and even among naval 
officers, criticism is made concerning our naval materiel. Investiga- 
tion has almost invariably developed the fact, however, that such 
criticism is based largely upon misinformation, and in most cases 
rests upon the attempt to compare the designs of ten or more years 
ago with what might have been accomplished had the designers of 
the earlier period been able to anticipate and take advantage of all 
subsequent developments in naval materiel. Criticism of this charac- 
ter is unfair, without resultant advantage, and may be dismissed 
without comment. 

Another species of criticism occasionally heard is worthy of more 
attention. It is the suggestion that seagoing officers do not have 
enough to say in the construction of vessels of the Navy. If such 
officers were in any way ignored in this matter the situation would be 
grave. But it is not the fact. On the contrary, the Department has 
earnestly desired to avail itself of their valuable practical experience, 
and, accordingly, June 20, 1907, by General Order No. 49, a formal 
invitation was addressed to all officers of the service, asking them to 
submit suggestions which, in their judgment, would tend to promote 
efficiency; and the assurance was given that such suggestions would 
receive consideration, and that, if they were approved and recom- 
mended for adoption, an entiy to that effect would be noted on the 
record of the officer who made them. The only limitations placed 
upon this invitation were, j5rst, that the criticisms should concern 
methods and not persons; and, secondly, that they should be accom- 
panied in all cases by a well-digested scheme of improvement. 

The object of this order was clearly to give the Department the 
benefit of the experience of officers in all branches of the service. 
Nevertheless, it was well understood that all suggestions could not 
be adopted; that there would be differences of opinion; and that, 
ultimately, there must be some established method of sifting the 
wheat from the chaff. A responsible court of reference was, there- 
fore, absolutely indispensable. So far as concerns all matters relat- 
ing to the design of ships, their armament, armor protection, motive 
power, equipage, etc., the Department has, in the board on construc- 
tion, a logically constituted " board on design." The individual mem- 
bers of this board are distinctively representative men in the §>eN^\:%\ 

^1 




68 ALLEGED DEFECTS IIJ VESSELS OF NAVY* 



branches of their profession, and have under their immediate control 
officers specially selected from the service, havini^ to do with material 
in all its varied forms. Moreover, the nature of their administrative 
duties is such as to keep them constantly informed regarding devel- 
opments in materiel, not only of our own but in foreign services; 
and, finally, they bring to their exacting duties as members of a 
board on design large experience, definite knowledge, and conserva- 
tive judgment, coupled with a sense of the crucial responsibility rest- 
ing upon them for the success of the completed ships when fully 
equipped. The Department, therefoi-e, relies with confidence upon 
the determinations of this highly competent board for the final arbit- 
rament of technical questions relating to the materiel of the Xa^^. 



THE CORPS OF NAVAL OONSTRUCTORS, 

While appreciating the excellent work done in all branches of the 
naval service, I am prompted bv certain recent comment with respect 
to the method of preparing dcf^igns of naval vessels to emphasize my 
sincere appreciation of the work done by the highly trained corps of 
naval constructors. The offi(^rs composing this corps are chos^^m from 
the foremost memliers of their respective classes at the Naval Acad- 
emy; they are sent to sea, and are afterwards given a specialized 
course of study at home or abroad. T know of nooody of men better 
equipped by thorough preliminary training for the duties devolving 
upon thexn. 

The result of this admirable technical equipment is that many of 
these officers have been tempted by offers of higher remuneration than 
a career in the Nav^^ holds to leave the service, and some former mem- 
bers of the corps are now en^iged in the employ of private ship- 
building concerns in supervising the construction by contract of 
important vessels of the new Navy. 

Peculiarly fitted as our ship designers are for the work they have 
in hand, we have, nevertheless, in the past made some mistakes; but 
these, when discovered, have been promptly rectified. Such is the 
history of naval construction under foreign Governments as well as 
our own. We have no monopoly of errors in war-ship designs. On 
the whole, I believe that the members of the construction corps of 
the United States Navy have greater opportunity for keeping in touch 
with the requirements of the fleet and the views of seagoing officers 
than is possessed by any similar corps in any other navy. 

The limited number of officers in the corps of naval constructors 
has made it quite impracticable, however, tx) assign such officers to 
duty with the fleet as frequently as the Department and the Chief 
of the Bureau of Construction and Repair might desire; but I have 
decided to approve the Chief Constructor's recommendation that not 
less than two officers of the construction corps accompany the battle- 
ship fleet and the torpedo-boat flotilla on their voyage from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific coast. The officers so detailed will be in a 
position to obtain and transmit to the Department, for the informa- 
tion of the technical bureaus concerned, valuable professional data 
with respect to the performance of the various types of ships com- 
posing the fleet, under actual service, seagoing conditions, including 
target practice. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 69 

[Extracts from Annual Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair for the 

Fiscal Year 1907.] 

THE PBEPARATION OF NAVAL DESIGNS. 

There have appeared from time to time during the past few months 
comments in various publications concerning certain alleged defects 
in vessels of the Navy and particularly in battle ships and armored 
cruisers. Nearly all of this criticism was obviously based upon inac- 
curate and insufficient information on the part of the critic, who 
invariably failed to state some of the most material and relevant facts 
necessary to a proper comprehension of actual conditions. As you 
are aware, the Department has been kept fully advised as to the 
unreliability of these reports concerning alleged aefects, but the criti- 
cism eventually became of such a character as to make it apparent 
that some individual or individuals connected with the naval service 
were circulating inaccurate information which, on account of the posi- 
tion of those presumably responsible therefor, seemed to be accepted 
as wholly reliable. 

Up to the present time the Department and its responsible bureaus 
have studiously refrained from any action which might be construed 
as giving undue weight to careless and unwarranted statements 
concerning vessels of the Navy. The wide publicity given to some 
of these statements, however, coupled with the fact that many per- 
sons, both within and without the naval service, were giving a certain 
amount of credence to this misrepresentation of conditions, rendered 
it desirable for the Department to make some authoritative statement 
in the matter which would make it evident to all those interested in the 
welfare of the Navy that those who had been supplying the informa- 
tion upon which msLny of the above-noted criticisms were apparently 
based were either seriously ignorant of the facts or else willfully 
perverted the truth. The Department therefore authorized the chief 
constructor to submit with his annual report a general statement out- 
lining the methods followed in the preparation of designs of naval 
vessels, with specific statement as to the actual conditions under which 
the designs oi our more recent battle ships were developed and ap- 
proved. In this connection particular note will be made of the par- 
ticipation of the seagoing element in determining the general cnar- 
acteristics of naval vessels, since it has been repeatedly alleged, both 
in the public press and by individual naval officers, that the " sea- 
going element^' received very little consideration in connection with 
the designs of naval vessels and that their opinions were given very 
little weight even with respect to those features of design which were 
essentially military or tactical. 

In considering this general subject of war-ship design it is well to 
keep constantly in mind the fact that there can be no such thing as 
perfection in tne development of any one of the many elements which 
are essential to the success of the completed design. That every war 
ship is a compromise is well known to all those who have any famil- 
iarity with such matters, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
under date of February 18, 1898, enunciated this well-known charac- 
teristic of men-of-war m the following terse language : 

Every war ship, big or smaU, is of course nothing but a compromise. Speed, 
safety, gun power, protection, and coal endurance being each and every one 
sacrificed, to a greater or less extent, in order that any of the others may be 
developed at all. 



70 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

It thus happens that with the constant developments in guns, 
armor, torpedoes, motive power, and other essential elements of na^al 
material, there must necessarily be differences of opinion as to the 
relative importance to be assigned to the various elements which enter 
into the design of a thoroughly efficient vessel of war. Moreover, 
rapid developments in naval material might soon render subject to 
adverse criticism a design which, at the time of its inception, was 
entirely satisfactory even to the most competent and exactmg critics, 
this change in attitude on the part of the critics being largely due 
to developments in material and methods of utilization of same sub- 
sequent to the preparation of the original design of the vessel. Un- 
less these developments in naval material were of a most radical 
character, however, the vessel designed during any particular period 
would not by any means become obsolete for many years thereafter, 
but would, if skillfully designed in the first instance, be merely less 
efficient than one which might be designed at the later period under 
consideration. 

The accuracy of the foregoing statement would seem so obvious as 
to make its enunciation wholly superfluous, and yet it is the complete 
disregard of this feature of war-ship design, and the insistence of ill- 
informed critics upon comparing the product of to-day with that of 
ten or more years ago, without making due allowance for the great 
developments which have taken place in the interval, which renders 
a large portion of all such technical criticism misleading and 
valueless. 

In the following statements of fact there is no intention whatever 
of claiming that the work of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, 
or indeed mat of any other department of human endeavor, is wholly 
without fault ; nor is there the slightest desire to evade the full meas- 
ure of responsibility for any and all matters which come under the 
cognizance of that Bureau. The chief constructor feels, however, 
that he has an indisputable right to claim for his predecessors in of- 
fice a just recognition of their most loyal and efficient work as evi- 
denced in the character and quality of the vessels of the United States 
^i\vy now in active service; moreover, since he has no direct respon- 
sibility whatever for the original design of vessels now in active serv- 
ice, he feels that whatever he may say with respect to the present 
condition of our ''fleet in being" can be accepted as the impartial 
statement of an official who, though without any personal responsi- 
bility for their design, is in a position to form a very accurate esti- 
mate as to their value when compared with present-day standards. 
He therefore claims, without fear of successful contradiction, that the 
present battleship fleet of the United States Nav^^ is fully equal in 
all respects to that of any equal number of vessels in any other navy 
designed during the same period. That the foregoing opinion is fully 
confirmed by at least one eminent foreign critic, whose ])revious criti- 
cisms would indicate that he was not especially desirous of giving 
undue praise to vessels of the United States Xa\^% is shown in the 
following extract from an editorial comment contained in a well- 
known foreign publication devoted to naval subjects. Keferring to 
certain comparative tables, the editor says: 

The extraordinary high figures for United States ships afford food for con- 
siderahlo thought, for hoth In ships with higli-powered guns or impervious to 
vital Injury at long range the United Slates fleet is superior to any other navy 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 71 

In the world. Even by the inclusion of 40-caliber 12-inch types, extinct so far 
as new ships are concerned, the United States Navy is an extremely good second, 
and the corresponding lead In invulnerability outside of 7,000 yards is consider- 
ably increased. 

The chief constructor does not consider it suitable or proper to 
attempt a complete refutation of the many unwarranted statements 
as to defects in naval ships which have appeared from time to time 
during the past few months. Such a procedure would seem to be 
undignified, and more or less without profit, and would tend to 
encourage the idea that any idle or ill-considered statement, if not 
contradicted by competent authority, must be accepted as true. As a 
matter of fact, this attitude seems already to have been assumed by 
some of the critics, and, strange as it may seem to those having even 
a superficial knowledge of such matters, there appear to be many indi- 
viduals, even including some officers of the naval service, who have 
accepted as fact the wholly, unwarranted allegation that in the prepa- 
ration of designs of naval vessels the seagoing officer has little or no 
opportunity to express or enforce his views. That such a condition 
oi affairs does not exist at the present time, and has not existed, so far 
as the chief constructor is aware, for a great many years, is common 
knowledge to those having even a faint acquaintance with the actual 
methods of developing naval designs. Should there be those who 
still have doubt as to the facts above stated, it is hoped that such 
doubts will be dispelled after giving careful consideration to what 
follows with respect to the design of naval vessels. 

In the first place, it should l)e noted that, by explicit provision 
of the Navy regulations, the " general supervision over the design- 
ing, constructing, and equipping of new vessels for .the Navy," is 
vested in a board known as the Board on Construction, which board, 
at the present time, is composed of the chiefs of the Bureaus of Equip- 
ment, Ordnance, Construction and Repair, and Steam Engineering, 
and, for some years past, an additional officer of the seagoing branch. 
Inasmuch as the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and the Chief of 
the Bureau of Equipment are seagoing officers of the line of the 
Navy, it is obvious that the seagoing element is not only in an actual 
majority, but that the proportion oi seagoing officers to officers of the 
construction corps is three to one, thus disproving at the outset the 
unwarranted intimation that the constructive branch of the Navy 
exercised arbitrary control over the design of naval vessels, even with 
respect to their military and tactical qualities, and that officers of the 
seagoing branch had wholly inadequate representation. Moreover, 
the chiefs of the Bureaus of Ordnance and Equipment have as their 
assistants a large number of seagoing line officers, who are unques- 
tionably thoroughly representative of the seagoing branch of the 
naval service, and, by reason of frequent interchange of duty, ashore 
and afloat, brin^ to their special duties in those bureaus the latest and 
most advanced ideas which may be held by seagoing officers actually 
serving on board ship. As a matter of fact, there were, on the 1st 
day of July, 1907, thirty-four seagoing officers serving in the Bureau? 
of Ordnance and Equipment and on duty under the Bureau of Ord- 
nance at the Washington Navy- Yard. In a similar manner the engi- 
neer-in-chief and the chief constructor have associated with them as 
assistants in their respective bureaus officers who are in intimate 
touch with work on board ship, at navy-yards, and at private yards 



72 ALLEGED DlFECTS TS VESSELS OF KTAVY. 

where vessels are in course of construction, Moreov-er, the chiefs of 
the designing biii-eaus hnve at their disposition all the facilities for 
conductuig investigations and making experiments of every descrip- 
tion and a thomijghljr organized technical ntaff for the development 
of plans and the making of calculations. There are also at tlte dispo- 
sition of the various bureaus and the board on construction all reports 
of the board of inspection and survey, all reports received from naval 
attachfe abroad, and the continuous succe.ssion of reports received 
from na^y-jards and vessels in active service. 

It will thus be seen that, although the Bureau of Construction and 
Repair is charged with the " responsibility for the stnictural strength 
and stability of all ships built for the Navy, all that relates to de- 
signing, building, fitting, and repairing the hulls of ships, turrets,'' 
etc., the general designs of all vessels must be Bnally considered and 
approvea by a board T^hich includes in its membei*ship three seago- 
ing officers of the line of the Navy, two of whom have under their 
immediate control a large number of additional seagoing officers of 
all grades upon whose personal experience they can draw at any ^J 
moment to supplement their own extended experience at sea, ^H 

It is also worthy of note that during the incumbency of the present ^^ 
Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and to a great extent 
prior thereto, it has been the practice to refer to the bureaus concerned, 
lor comment and criticism, all important matters affecting work under 
their cognizance. It has thus been possible for the seagoing officers in 
the bureaus of Equipment and Ordnance to comment upon features 
which directly pertained to work under those bureaus, including 
magazine arrangements, ammunition stowage, coaling arrangements, 
anchor gear, location and arrangement of navigating appliances, loc»- 
tion and method of installation of all mechanisms imder the cogni- 
zance of tliose bureaus, and many other matters which directly relate 
to the work of the seagoing officer on board ship. Moreover, there 
were on duty in Washington on the 1st of July, 1007, attached to 
the Bureau of Navigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the board 
of inspection and survey, and the general board, thirty-two additional 
seagoing officers of the line of the Navy, some of whose views con- 
cerning certain features of war-ship design have been presented to 
the board on construction either through the Secretary of the Navy, 
the individual chiefs of bureaus who were members of the board on 
construction, or by direct communication to the board or the bureaus 
concerned. 

As if the direct and possible participation of the seagoing element 
above noted in the design of naval vessels were not enough, the 
Department has on several notable occasions convened special boards 
to further consider questions of war-ship design which had previously 
been given very exhaustive consideration by the board on construction. 

That the general statements already made with respect to the very 
extensive participation of the seagoing officer in the design of naval 
vessels may be adequately reinforced by the citation of specific 
instances, a brief resume will be given of the procedure followed in 
the preparation of plans of battle ships which have been designed 
since the Spanish- American war. 

Before dismissing consideration of the vessels designed prior to 
the Spanish- American war, however, and in order that the Depart- 
ment may fully appreciate the opinion in which our naval materiel 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 73 

was held by seagoing line officers who had had experience on board 
ship during that war, attention is invited to Special Order No. 79. 
which was issued by the Secretary of the Navy at the instance or 
the Bureau of Construction and Repair, in order that the bureaus of 
the Navy Department might have the full benefit of such recom- 
mendations for improvement in materiel as might have become neces- 
sary as a result of actual experience in war. Special Order No. 79 
was as follows : 

Navy Department, 
Washington, November 7, 1898, 
Commanders in chief of stations, commandants of stations, and commanding 
officers of vessels acting singly will direct those officers under their command 
who served on board ship during the present war to make reports, in detail, as 
to the operation of all parts of the ship and her fittings, her armament, her 
equipment or equipments, as were under their charge or came under their 
immediate observation. These reports are to be made in detail, a separate report 
In regard to the matter coming under the cognizance of each bureau concerned. 
They must cover specifically with respect to each fitting or appliance, machine, 
or gun with which they deal — 

1. The good points. 

2. The bad points, defects, or breakdowns. 

3. Suggested improvements. 

These reports are to be forwarded to the Department through the Bureau of 
Navigation. 

John D. Long, Secretary. 

If ever there was a free and untramraeled opportunity for the 
seagoing oflScer to submit his views in full concerning " the opera- 
tion of all parts of the ship and her fittings, her armament, her equip- 
ment or equipments," etc., Special Order No. 79 would seem to have 
furnished the occasion, and if serious defects of any description were 
apparent in any of the vessels then in active service, surely this was 
a most appropriate season to bring them to the attention of the De- 
partment and the bureaus concerned. It appears, however, that at 
that date the vessels in active service were regarded with favor by all 
seagoing officers, although such objection as is now being made to 
certain most important reatures of the designs of these vessels would 
have been quite as pertinent then as now. Despite the unusual oppor- 
tunity afforded by Special Order No. 79 to seagoing officers to submit 
extended criticism oi the vessels of the fleet, an analysis of the very 
large mass of reports then submitted indicates that, in the opinion of 
seagoing officers at that period, such defects as existed were not of a 
serious character. In fact, the reports were so favorable that the 
Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair seems to have derived 
great encouragement therefrom, judging from the following state- 
ment contained in the annual report of that official to the Secretary 
of the Navy for the fiscal year 1899 : 

In response to Special Order No. 79, the Bureau has been furnished with a 
large mass of criticism and comment as to matters under its cognizance. This 
criticism Is the result of experience under war conditions of seventy-five officers, 
and covers twenty-five vessels of various classes. Its independent nature and 
wide range, when talsen In connection with the linowledge gained from the con- 
dition of the vessels on their return to the various yards, have made it of 
BuflScient value to warrant here a brief mention of the most important points 
touched on. 

With regard to the strength, stability, seaworthiness, and maneuvering powers 
of the vessels of the various classes, the war experience tended to confirm the 
favorable opinions previously arrived at, and the general success of the designs 
in these respects may be said to t>e thoroughly demonstrated. 



^ 



Turning miw to the question of detail, the ctrnmient and cHttelsiu nritnnUljr 
centered on siich f^aturet as were mo&t luthiiatt^ly connected witU war service, 
and wliieb were, under the comlitloiin, Beverely uud tluironghly tested. 

The various engagementa aflfordeil anipl^ testi of the arrangements installed 
for tlie supply of ainmnnitlon to the bntlerles^ and tlie Bureau is gratified to be 
able to state that Iheii^e rKjrtians of this Important feature tmder its cogniiF.nnce 
have given very genera] s^itlsfactjori. 

It is also worthy of note that the report of the Secretary of the 
Is'^avy, issued under date of Xovember 15, 1898, contains the following 
statement with respect to the performance of the Navy as a whole 
and the satisfactory character of the ordnance material; 

Since my laRt annual report the Navy bai?, for the first time since It^ rehahUl- 
tation* been put to f?ie supreme teat of war. Years of patient, persistent tniln- 
log and deveiopment Imve brought it to a jiolnt of high efficiency, which resulted 
lu the unparalleled victories at MtiuIIa and Santiago. * * * 

lieporta have been received from the various vessels as to the perforiiiance 
of their ordnance outfit and eMuipment during: the war, and the perfornnince of 
tJie guos, mounts, turrets, and aui munition was in general thoroughly satis- 
factory. 

Moreover, the Department, in the preparation of the descriptive 
circulars and plans for the constraction of the three battle ships 
authorized on May 4, ISOS, decided to duplicate the general designs 
of vessels of the ^Jllinois class, then in course of construction, but 
whose designs had been prepared and contracts avvarded more than 
two years previonsiy. The plarxs of the Maine class, us jituiUy 
adopted^ provided for vessels of the same general character as the 
Illinois^ but with one knot more speed and 1^000 tons greater displae&* 
ment. 

It thus appears from the action of the Department with respect to 
the Maine class that, with aU the experience derived by ^seagoing 
officers during the naval operations of the war of 1898j and specific 
rei)orts from seventy -five seagoing officers relative to the performance 
of twenty -five vessels of various classes, a board, the majority of 
wbn<e members were sea^jroin^r officers, recommended the approval 
of plans for three battle ships which, in all essential arrangements, 
were similar to vessels designed prior to the war with Spain. Nothing 
could prove more conclusively that, so far as the experiences of sea- 
going officers were expressed — and they were certainly given every 
opportunity and invitation to express their opinions — the general 
character of the designs of battle ships then in course of construction, 
or contemplated, was entirely satisiactory to the seagoing element. 

We will now pass to a consideration of the development of the 
designs of the Virginia^ Georgia^ Nebraska^ Rhode Island^ and New 
Jersey^ a class of vessels whose various vicissitudes in the design stage 
are probably unequalled by those of any other class of vessels in any 
navy. Whether or not the seagoing element had an opportunity to 
express its views with respect to certain most important features of 
these vessels, can be easily determined from the following recital of 
facts: 

On March 3, 1899, Congress authorized the construction of " three 
coast line battle ships, carrying the heaviest armor and most power- 
ful ordnance for vessels of their class upon a trial displacement of 
about 13,500 tons, to be sheathed and coppered, and to have the highest 
practicable speed and great radius of action," and on June 7, 1900, 
made an additional authorization of " two seagoing battle ships, carry- 
ing the heaviest armor and most powerful ordnance for vessels of 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 75 

their class, upon a trial displacement of about 13,500 tons, to have 
the highest practicable speed and great radius of action." The 
designs for the vessels authorized on March 3, 1899, were immedi- 
ately taken in hand by the Bureau of Construction and Repair and 
the board on construction, and, in May, 1900, a majority of the 
board on construction submitted to the Secretary of the Navy a 
report which recommended for his approval plans of a vessel which, 
in their opinion, would fulfill all the requirements of the act making 
appropriation therefor. The main battery of this vessel consisted 
of four 12-inch ^ns, eight 8-inch guns, and twelve 6-inch guns, the 
12-inch guns being disposed in 2-gun turrets mounted amidships, 
one forward and one aft, and the 8-inch guns being disposed in 
four 2-gun waist turrets in the usual quadrilateral arrangement. The 
6-inch gims were mounted in broadside on the gun deck. The board 
on construction at this time was composed of three seagoing line 
officers, the chief constructor, and the engineer-in-chief, and the 
majority report of the board was signed by two of the three sea- 
going Ime officers, the chief constructor and the engineer-in-chief. 
The other seagoing member of the board, while accepting the con- 
clusions of his colleagues with respect to all the other features of 
the proposed design, dissented from the report of the majority so 
far as concerned the arrangement of the battery, and recommended 
that the arrangement proposed by the majority for the 8-inch bat- 
tery be modified -so as to have only two waist 8-inch turrets, the 
other four 8-inch guns to be placed in turrets superposed upon the 
12-inch turrets. 

This lack of unanimity on the part of the board on construction 
served to reopen a question which had been most fully discussed at 
the time of the adoption of the plans of the Kearsargc and Kentucky^ 
vessels whose contracts had been awarded in January, 1896, and 
which had been completed and placed in commission only a short 
time prior to the consideration of the plans of the Virginia class. 
Although the sentiment of the seagoing element at the time of the 
final decision with respect to the plans of the Kearsarge and Ken- 
tucky had been in favor of the superposed turret, and although that 
arrangement of battery had been adopted despite the strenuous oppo- 
sition of the chief constructor, ^the designs of battle ships immediately 
following the Kearsarge and Kentucky did not embody the super- 
posed turret idea, the six battle ships of the Illinois and Maine classes 
having their batteries arranged in a manner wliich conformed quite 
closely to the practice of foreign navies at that time. 

In order that so important a question should receive the fullest 
possible consideration irom seagoing officers of large experience and 
high reputation, the Department, on June 14, 1900, convened a special 
board, which was composed of the members of the original board on 
construction and eight additional line officers, so that the member- 
ship of the board was as follows: Five rear-admirals (one of whom 
was the engineer in chief), seven captains, and one naval constructor 
(representing the chief constructor, who was absent on other duty). 
This board was instructed to consider the question of the distribu- 
tion of battery for the five battle ships of the Virginia class, there 
being two plans under consideration — one with 8-inch turrets in 
quadrilateral, as recommended by a majority of the board; the otlier, 
with two waist 8-inch turrets and two superposed 8-inch turrets, as 




^ 



76 ALLEGED DEFECTS I^ VESSELS OF NAVY- 

re^onmiended by the minority of the board on construction, Tlie 
first vote of thi^ board, which convened on the morning of June 20, 
1900j was as follows: 

For the superposed turret arrangement: Two rear admirals (one 
of whom was the engineer- in -chief ) and five captains. 

For the quadrilateral arrangement: Two rear-admirals (one of 
whom was the chief of the Bureau of Ordnance) , two captains, and 
the naval-constructor member of the board. 

For building thi^ee of the battle ships with 8-inch turrets in quad- 
rilateral and two battle ships with superposed 8-inch turrets: On© 
rear admiral. 

Upon the reconvening of the board on the afternoon of the same 
day twelve of the thirteen members signed a compromise report, 
stating that — 

In eonglderntlon of the strong miDorlty, DonslsUng of five members, and one 
tucDitier of divided oplolan, against the majority of seven, imd to relieve tlie 
Depsirtineot of embarrassment, the undersigned members, constituting twelve 
out of thirteen of the Ijoard, recommend that three of the five battle shipa 
referred to In the Department's order of June 14, ItiOO, No. 351CMM)» be built 
with isutjerposed and wnlit S-iuch turret^ ns per plan B. and two with quad- 
rilateraJiy arrrtnged 8-inch turrets, jib |jer plan A, a^xximpanylng the minortty 
report of the board on ranstruetion referred to thin hoard. 

The original minority report signed by five members, and the final 
minority I'eport signed by the naval-constructor member of this 
special board, so accurately represent the most serious obiections 
-which actual subsequent experience proved to be thoroughly well 
founded that the c^uotation at this time of extracts therefrom seems 
unusually appropriate, 

WASHrnGToif, D. C.t June 20, 190C. 

T. • * * 

2. Whtle conceding that certain advnntagei are gained hf disposing the eigh^t 

S-inch gnns, the locution of vvbi*?b 1?^ the only point at isisiie. in the manner rec- 
ommended by the majority, namely, four in superposed and four in waist tur- 
rets, the minority are of the opinion that such advantages are neutralized, to a 
great extent, if not outweiglied, by the disadvantages attending such installation. 
The lack of independent action of the 8-inch guns in the superposed turrets 
recommended by the majority is believed by the minority to be a decided 
disadvantage. 

3. The fact that the superposed turrets contain four guns, two of which differ 
from the other two in caliber, range, energy, and rapidity of fire, and all of 
which must move together in the horizontal plane, is, by the minority, consid- 
ered objectionable, and it believes that the efficiency of the individual guns of 
the group Is Impaired by such an arrangement, and that guns so placed and so 
circumscribed will deliver a less volume and a less accurate fire than would be 
the case were the 8-lnch guns mounted in an independent turret. 

4. The minority are of the opinion that the best practice requires that guns 
on shipboard should be isolated as far as practicable, rather than concentrated 
in groups of four. Guns are placed in i)alrs from the force of circumstances and 
on account of conditions which can not be overcome on shipboard, not for tac- 
tical advantages, but at a tactical sacrifice. 

5. Among the objections which the minority find to the superposed system and 
waist turrets recommended by the majority. Is that In the superf)osed turret 
there Is a great concentration of weight toward the extremities of the vessel 
and an enormous weight on the roller path of the superposed turret. 

6. That the efficiency of four important guns is dependent uix)n one con- 
trolling apparatus, any accident to which would put them all out of action for a 
time at least; that a heavy projectile striking either the upper or lower turret 
would probably disable four guns ; that the Independent firing of the four guns 
would probably have a disturbing Infiuence upon tlie accuracy of the individual 
guns ; that the error of one gun pointer enters Into four guns ; that the working 



ALLEGED! DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF KAVY. 77 

of the apparatus necessary for the service of four guns in the confined space 
allowed will have a disturbing influence on the gun servants. The saving in 
weight which is claimed for superposed turrets is by no means as threat as is 
supposed, and, in fact, is of but little moment in vessels of the diemnsious of 
those under discussion. 

7. The use of waist 8-inch turrets as recommended by the majority seriously 
interferes with the mounting of secondary guns. 

10. For the above and other reasons, which it is not considered necessary to 
enumerate in detail, the minority are of the opinion that plan A is preferable to 
plan B, both of which are shown on a print accompanying the report of the 
minority of the board on construction, herewith, and therefore recommend the 
adoption of plan A so far as relates to the mounting of 8-inch guns. 
Very respectfully. 



Rear Admiral, V. 8. N,, President of Board. 



Rear Admiral, U. s. y., Meviber. 



Captain, U, 8, V., Member . 



Captain, U. 8, N., Member, 



Naval Constructor, U, 8. y.. Acting Member. 
The Secretaby of the Navy. 



(Minority report) 

Navy DEPABTMKiNT, June 20, 1900, 
Sib: 1. I regret that I can not concur with the * ♦ ♦ recommendation 
of the majority, but being convinced that further temporizing in this matter 
will be detrimental to the interests of the Navy, am compelled to dissent.^ 

2. The matter before the board is one of prime importance, involving the 
principal features of five battleships much larger than any previously under- 
taken by us, practically equal in size to the largest in the world, and to cost, 
complete, in round numbers, thirty million dollars. 

3. Of the two plans before the board, one must be the better, and I believe 
that we should build all five vessels upon it, or, if there is any reasonable doubt 
as to which is the better plan, we should spare neither time nor cost to determine 
this point, obtaining incidentally the by no means small advantage of uniformity 
in the construction of five such important vessels. 

4. We have four turrets on two vessels upon the superposed principle which 
are completed and in working condition. 

5. Tests made with these turrets so far have practically no bearing upon the 
essential points at issue. While all of these points can not be decided by tests, 
many of them can, and I believe that if thorough and exhaustive experiments 
were carried out by this or some other equally representative board upon each 
of the four superposed turrets of the Kearsarge and Kentucky the board would 
then be practically unanimous in finally accepting or rejecting the superposed 
principle for our battle ships. 

6. To divide these vessels between two types is to definitely advertise to the 
world that although we have completed two superposed turret vessels we do not 
know whether or no they are better than if they had been built with separate 
turrets. 

7. I believe that we are at last in a position to settle this question, which has 
been such a vexed one in the Navy for five years, and that such settlement 
should be no longer delayed. 

8. As a further reason for my dissent, I beg to say that if it is admitted or 
determined that the advantage of being able to concentrate six 8-inch guns on 
either broadside instead of four is sufficiently gi*eat to warrant some sacrifice 
in other directions, I believe that this result can be readily obtained by an 
arrangement involving disadvantages less grave than those following from the 
superposed principle. 

Respectfully, , 

Naval Constructor, U. 8, N,, Acting Member. 

The Secbetaby of the Navy. 




78 IIXEOED DSFECTB IN VESSEIB OP NAVY- 



> 



The Department approved the report of the majority of the above- 
Doted special board, this i*eport providing for three battle ships with 
superjiosed turrets, and two battle ships with 8-iiich turrets in 
quadrihiterah The bureaus concerned were therefore directed to 
develop the plans accordinglv, it being assumed that this vexed ques- 
tion was now finally disposed of. Subsequent events proved quite the 
reverse* however. 

On January 24, 1901, the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, in a 
communication to the Department, stated that, in his opinion, all of 
the battle ships of the Vtrgima class "^ shoidd carry similar batteries 
similarly arranged, rather than that three should differ from the 
other two in this respect, as now contemplated." He also proposed 
an entirely new main battery for these vessels,' consisting of four 
12-inch, four 8-jnch, and sixteen 6-inch guns— the secondary battery 
remaining unchanged. The advantages of the arrangement proposed 
by the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance were fully described by him 
in the above-noted communication to the Secretary of the Navy, and 
although the circular defining the chief characteristics of these vessels 
had been issued ?orae time previously and bids for the construction 
of the vessels had been received and contracts preliminarily awarded, 
the DepartmenL under date of January 29, 1901, convened another 
sppMal hoard " for the purpose of reconsidering the question of dis* 
tribution of battery upon battle ships Nos, IS to J?^ contemplating the 
two arrangpuientjs prescribed in the Department's circular of July 
19, 1900, and that described and discussed in the letter of the Bureau 
of Ordnance of Junuary 24, 1901." This second special board was 
composed of the members of the board on construction, with tlie addi- 
tion of two rear-admirals and five captains- This board, under date 
of February 5^ 1901, approved the I'ecommendations of the Chief of 
the Bureau of Ordnance with respect to certain changes in armor 
arrangement, but entirely disapproved of the battery arrangement, 
iht' final resiilt being that ten otU of tlie twelve meml>ers composing 
the board signed a ^majority report recommending that the super^ 
posed turret arrangement for four of the eight 8-inch gims be adopted 
for all of the vessels of the Virginia class. One rear-admiral and the 
naval constructor member of the board signed a minority report 
which clearly and explicitly set forth the reasons for their dissent, 
and concluded with an earnest plea for practical tests of the 12-inch 
and 8-inch turrets of the Kearsarge and Kentucky^ these vessels 
having superposed turrets and being at that time in commission. The 
recommendations of the majority ot this board were approved, how- 
ever, and shortly thereafter contracts for the construction of the 
vessels were signed and the actual construction begun. 

In view of the large number of boards which passed upon the 
design and battery arrangements of these vessels, the ratio of naval 
constructors to seagoing officers on two of these boards being in the 
proportion of 1 to 10 and 1 to 11, it would seem that the final result 
should have been eminently satisfactory to the seagoing branch of 
the service. Long before the completion of these vessels, liowever, 
service sentiment had undergone a complete change, and the prin- 
cipal objections to the superposed turret arrangement, which had 
been presented by the Bureau of Construction and Repair and its 
representative on the special boards above noted, proved to be abso- 
lutely valid. At the present writing there is certainly no well- 
informed officer of the seagoing or constructive branch who would 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 79 

advocate a system of gun mounting which, only a few years ago, 
was urgently recommended by a large majority of the seagoing 
element and quite as strenuously opposed by every naval constructor 
who had an opportunity to give official expres5:ion of opinion on 
this subject. 

So far, then, as the Virginia class is concerned, the seagoing officer 
had every opportunity to express his opinion, and the constructive 
branch of the Navy was heavily outvoted. The results can hardly 
be regarded as satisfactory. 

The grave differences of opinion which arose in connection with 
the preparation of plans of the Virginia class, just described, appa- 
rently had their effect upon Congress, since the naval appropriation 
bill approved March 3, 1901, contained the following provision: 

That, for the purpose of further increasing the naval establishment of the 
United States, in accordance with the latest improvements in the construction 
of ships and the production of armor and armament therefor, the Secretary 
of the Navy is hereby directed to prepare the plans and specifications of two 
seagoing battle ships and two armored cruisers, carrying the most suitable 
armor and armament for vessels of their class, and to submit to Congress a 
general description of such battle ships and cruisers on the first Monday in 
December next; and said Secretary, in preparing said plans and description, 
shall review and further consider the questions whether said ships should be 
sheathed or unsheathed; what should be the weight and extent of the armor 
therefor; what should be the form and location of the turrets; whether any 
changes should be made in the number and kind of guns of the various sizes 
heretofore constituting the armament of similar ships ; what, if any, torpedo 
tubes should be built into large ships ; to what extent electricity should be 
used for auxiliary purposes, and all ^ other questions which have arisen and 
are now pending among naval architects and ordnance experts concerning the 
construction of battle ships and cruisers under modern conditions; and said 
Secretary shall, to such an extent as he may deem expedient, report to Con- 
gress in connection with said description his opinion upon the foergoing 
questions. 

In view of its very recent experience with large boards supple- 
mentaiT to the board on construction, the Department seemed to have 
reached the conclusion that the specific information required by the 
above-quoted provision of the act of March 3, 1901, could best be 
obtained and submitted by the board on construction. The Depart- 
ment therefore, under date of March 6, 1901, directed the board on 
construction to thoroughly investigate the subject of war-ship design, 
in conformity with the provisions of the naval appropriation act of 
March 3, 1901, and on July 12, 1901, the board, being unable to reach 
a unanimous agreement concerning the armament and its disposition, 
made a preliminary report for the information of the Department in 
order that instructions might be issued which would permit progress 
upon some definite design at an early date. The majority of the 
board, including the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, the engineer- 
in-chief, and the chief constructor, recommended for adoption a 
design for which they submitted a schedule of the most important 
general characteristics. The Chief Intelligence Officer, who was a 
member of the board, had previously suggested a scheme which was 
subsequently recommended also by another member of the board (the 
Chief of the Bureau of Equipment), but the Chief Intelligence Offi- 
cer, apparently by reason of absence, did not have an opportunity to 
consider the design submitted by the majority. This preliminary 
report of the board on construction also stated explicitly that " The 
conclusions of the board have been reached after a consideration and 





80 AUMfm) DEFECTS W TESSEL© OF NAVY. 

comparison of the designs of battle ships already built^ and also of 
about seven or ei^ht sketch designs; illustrating various types of arma- 
ment, gun mounting, and armored protection. The design submitted 
by the majority of the board reduced the nmnber of calibers of the 
main battery to two, so that the proposed main battery consisted of 
four 12-inch guns in 10-inch armored turrets and twenty 7- inch guns 
in casemates. The water-line armor belt of this design was also very 
much more extensive than that hitherto provided for any battle ship 
of the United States Navy, and the submergence of the lower edge of 
the belt below the nonnal load water line was equivalent to that 
hitherto provided for vessels of the Navy, ha\4ng due regard to the 
increase m beam of the vessel and the great importance of making 
adequate provision for the protection of the vital i>ortions of the 
water line when the vessel was subjected to the action of the sea under 
battle conditions. 

This preliminary report of July 12 of the board on construction 
was quite exhaustive and drew special attention to the desirability 
of limiting the number of calibers and utilizing in the armament of 
this vessel the lately^ developed 7-inch gun, concerning which, on the 
authority of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, the board stated : 
" The proposed 7-inch ^n far exceeds the 8-inch gtms now in the 
service in the extent of its range and the flatness of its trajectory for 
a given distance/' This direct comparison between the new Tinch 
gun and the 8-inch gun then in service was due to the claim of the 
minority that the 8-inch gun should be retained, since the Spanish- 
American war had demonstrated its ^eat desirability as an armor- 
piercing weapon. Moreover, the majority report of the board on 
construction stated that — 

Utiifornilty of caUber, siDipUdtj of mounting, Bcpanition of smm, giving Inde- 
pendent iictiou to each, are features of great Importance, to whicb tbe majority 
have given npeetal attention In the preparation of their plan, which pre^teots a 
vessel more powerful than any yet built or projeetetl by nny power. 

The minority report, submitted under date of July 19, 1901, by 
the then Chief of the Bureau of Equipment, made a most urgent 
plea for a different arrangement of battery from that proposed by 
the majority of the board on construction, the definite proposition 
of the minority being that the battery should be as follows : Four 12- 
inch guns in turrets, as proposed by the majority of the board; four 
8- inch guns in turrets superposed upon the 12-mch turrets; four 8- 
inch guns in waist broadside turrets, and twelve 6-inch guns mounted 
in broadside upon the main deck. Elaborate dia^ams accompanied 
the report, showing the relative superiority or inferiority in gun 
fire of the various plans proposed. 

It is unnecessary to go at length into the reports of the majority 
and minoritv, as they are too voluminous to be considered in a resum6 
of this kind. Since the minority report specially urged the adop- 
tion of the superposed turret, the following quotation is, however, 
especially significant as demonstrating the consistent and persistent 
opposition of officers of the construction corps to a type of ^un 
emplacement which has now become definitely discreditea, it being 
quite well recognized that it is not the most eflScient method oi 
arranging the main battery of battle ships : 

At various times during the past year and a half no less than five of the 
senior naval constructors of the service have been members of the board on con- 



"^ 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 81 

struction. Notwithstanding the many advocates of the superpose<l turret among 
the line officers, the above-mentioned constructors have opposed it at all times. 

In fact, so far as known, out of a corps of forty naval constructors there i» 
not a single advocate of the superi>osed turret. It is suggested that this in itself 
is sufficient either to suggest a corps policy or prejudice against this form of 
turret 

The unfavorable criticisms of the superposed turret are thus far purely theo- 
retical. In practice they have fulfilled every expectation of their advocates 

The above remarks were made by one of the ablest seagoing officers 
in the Navy; they were unquestionably written in all sincerity. 
There was doubtless no intention of complimenting the good judg- 
ment of the naval constructors who opposed the superposed turret, but 
subsequent events have made it possible to definitely convert an un- 
favorable criticism into a most direct compliment, since naval con- 
structors most certainly did have a " prejudice against this form of 
turret ^^'^ and their prejudice has since been proved to be absolutely 
well founded. 

The preliminary reports of the majority and minority of the board 
on construction were, by agreement, submitted to the Department 
separately and complete, " without examination or criticism of the 
minority plan by the majority, and vice versa." Subsequently, the 
minority was given an opportunity to criticise the report of the 
majority, and the majority an opportunity to criticise the report of 
the minority. In the supplemental report of the majority, submitted 
under date of July 24, 1901, the following very pertinent comments 
were made with respect to the superposed turret, which, in this 
instance, as in the case of the designs of the Virginia class, was the 
principal " bone of contention ; " and in view of the very grave im- 
portance of this feature of design, it seems well to quote that portion 
of the supplemental report of the majority which deals with this 
question : 

With reference to the remarks contained in the minority report relating ta 
the alleged opposition of the corps of naval constructors to superposed turrets, 
the chief constructor comments as follows, the majority concurring therewith : 

" In designing ships, and with special reference to the arrangement of the 
battery, the greatest importance is naturally given to securing the gi'eatest 
possible arc of fire for each gim. The results obtained in this respect by the 
use of the superposed turret give to any battery plan an advantage which is 
more imaginary than real, because it is considered that each gun in the four- 
gun turret is of equal efficiency to a gun mounted singly. For instance, in all 
diagrams of weight of fire, it is presumed that these four guns are as efficient 
as if each could be trained independently ; whereas, each being secured to its 
turret and the turrets immovably fixed together, they must train together in a 
horizontal plane. 

" In the following remarks it is intended to be shown that the four-gun tur- 
ret as a weapon of offense is objectionable, owing to the greatly reduced effi- 
ciency per gun, due to the interference of one gun with another, in actual 
operation, and that the four-gun turret is also seriously objectionable from the 
increased target exposed and the liability to having a larger proportion of the 
battery placed out of action by a single well-placed shot of small caliber. 

•* The efficiency of a gun is measured by the number of hits which can be 
made in a definite time. 

"The maximum efficiency of any gun is necessarily obtained when mounted 
singly, and considering that the guns in this comparison each have the same 
arc of train, the efficiency of a gun mounted singly will be called 100. 

" This has been thoroughly recognized by the French in all their designs, and 
they have only recently yielded to mounting guns in pairs, in spite of the 
obvious weight saving thereby effected. 

"For purposes of economy in weight of armor, turret supports, gun mount- 
ings, ammunition hoists, or for economy of room, or other reasons, guns are 

30584— S. -Doc. 297, 60-1 6 




I 

83 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESBBLS OF NAVY. 

mounted In pairs. This uecesfiarily det^reaitei* the eflicleua^ i>er jpin, because 
the guns raufst iviila together mid the firiug of one jcfuii neeessiiriiy loterferes 
with the living Df the other. The redut?etl efflcieDcy i.n?r j^in ^>f gnus mounted 
in pairs niiist he \em thiiu 100, and may he considered, for the puri>o^e3 of argu- 

'* When four guns are mounted In one turret ivhleh is the iir act leal resitilt of 
the diDOiLile turret now !n use* the efficiency per giin la further reduced ; and 
supposLog for the moment that the four guns nre of the same C3) liber, the effl- 
ciencj* I>er Knn mu.st be k»-sa than 75, and a fair aseignment would be, say, 50. 
Therefore, the total gun ettlciency of the double turret would be 200, or equiva- 
lent to two gujis mounted singly* 

"It is naturally dlQieuIt to obtain the sauie arc of train for the four guns 
considered as mounted independently, und therefore some allowance is necess^ary 
from the proportions above given. On the other hand, some increase of these 
proportions U due to the fact that the four guns In the turret ore not of etiual 
<'aliber and that guns of eaiall cuHher are very materially reducing the efficiency 
-of gun'n of large crilllrwr. 

"A plain comparl.^ou of the gun mounted singly and the four-gun turret l& of 
the results which would be obtained t>y one sportsman i^hootlng birds with u 
four-barrel gun and four men shooting with single barrel gims* 

"All the preceding considerations relate to the subject from the point of view 
of offense^ but when the subject is considered from the point of view of deft^n^e 
the four-gun turret provides a very considerable economy of weight and space; 
but exposes more than one- thirst of the total battery of the ship to diaaljlemeut, 
either from one shot of the enemy or from slight derangement of the mechanical 
devices it eon tains. 

" There can be no question that the placing of the 8-lnch turret on top of the 
13-inch turret considerably {jicreasefi the danger of disablement of the 13-inch 
turret, and also of the 8-inch turret itself* This is very oonclusively shown 
in * * *, an tiEtniet from a report on the protection of gun positions, 
wherein a eom^ftfteii la madft between certain foreign and our own battle sblpa 
of the Kentucky cI^sb by a welMuformed officer of the Navy/* ♦ • • 

The report of the majority stated^ moreoverj that " the experience 
gained with the double turrets on the Kearsargg and FCentuvky Ims 
been sufficient to show that the features of the design, so far as they 
relate to the mechatiical means of operation, are guccessful; but the 
features of the design, so far as they relate to the efficiency of the 
superposed turret as a weapon of onense, have not been developed 
by any practical tests.'' Furthermore, in order that the Department 
might have a definite proposition upon which to act, the majority of 
the board on construction recommended that thorough tests be con- 
ducted with the battery of the Kearsarge and Kentucky^ and outlined 
the details for such test. 

Under date of July 25, 1901, the minority of the board on construc- 
tion submitted a supplementary statement, but as the principal argu- 
ment contained in this supplementary statement related to the advisa- 
bility of installing an arrangement of turret (superposed) now 
regarded as undesirable it seems unnecessary to go into the details 
of this minority supplementary report at this time. The very com- 
plete reports relating to these designs are, however, matters of official 
record in the Navy Department, and are accessible to those who may 
hereafter be directly interested therein in connection with their official 
duties. 

It should be noted in this connection that a memorandum of the 
Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, descriptive of the 
types of battle ship being developed by that bureau, was submitted 
to the board on construction under date of June 13, 1901, and one of 
these types was subsequently approved by the majority of the board 
and submitted to the Department with its report of July 12, 1901, 
above referred to. The remarks of the chief constructor upon the 



t 






ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 88 

battery arrangements of the sketch plans proposed are especially sig- 
nificant as indicating that the battery proposed by that official was 
distinctly more powerful than that subsequently adopted by his col- 
leagues; it should also be noted that all of the members of the 
majority of the board on construction recognized the advisability of 
reducing the number of calibers of the main battery to two, the Chief 
of the Bureau of Ordnance recommending four 12rinch and twenty 
7-inch guns, and the chief constructor recommending four 12-inch 
and sixteen 8-inch guns, the comments of the chief constructor in 
this connection being as follows : 

This design does not involve nor permit the use of the double turret, con- 
cerning which my views are contained in the accompanying memorandum. 

While I am of the opinion that scheme No. 1, already presented to the board, 
involving a main battery of four 12-inch and sixteen 8-inch guns, disposed in 
a manner similar to that shown herein, is more desirable for the United States 
Navy on a number of grounds, I am satisfied that the battery recommended 
by the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance will produce a vessel which is a dis- 
tinct improvement upon its predecessors and one in which I can join in recom- 
mending. 

The majority and minority reports of the board on construction, 
and the supplementary statements of the majority and minority, 
necessitated further reference to the board, which, after additional 
investigation, submitted its final report under date of November 26, 
1901. This report was unanimous and was signed by all the members 
of the board on construction, which included at this tim'e three sea- 
going officers of the line, the engineer-in-chief, and the chief con- 
structor. Since the arrangement of the battery was practically the 
only point in dispute — the general arrangement of the vessel, distri- 
bution of armor, and all questions of tnat character having been 
settled to the satisfaction of the board — it seems only necessary to 
make brief allusion to that portion of this -final report which concerns 
the character and arrangement of the battery : 

Numher and kind of guns. — The board is of the opinion that the most suitable 
types of guns for such vessels as are herein referred to, are high powered, 
breech-loading rifles of maximum length and of large chamber capacity, having 
the highest attainable muzzle velocity and energy within proper limits of 
chamber pressure. Guns of this type have very flat trajectories and corres- 
pondingly large danger spaces, which seem to be indispensable for efliclency in 
naval warfare, in consideration of the fact that under ordinary conditions of 
battle both gun and target will be moving rapidly. 

The tendency is to reduce somewhat the caliber of the heaviest guns and 
increase the caliber of the intermediate sizes forming the main battery of battle 
ships, and to supplement them with powerful secondary batteries of light and 
very rapid-firing guns. 

Guns of 12 inches in caliber have been adopted by nearly all nations as the 
maximum size for battle ships, and such is the size designated for the battle 
ships under consideration, four being proposed for each vessel. 

The question as to what should be the caliber of the guns of the intermediate 
battery of the battle ships is one with regard to which there is considerable 
difference of opinion, some good authorities preferring a uniform battery of 
6-inch R. F. guns and others a mixed battery of 6 and 8 inch guns, while others 
prefer 8-inch only. 

The board having given careful consideration to this important question in 
all its aspects, and having before it the opinions of upward of eighty naval 
officers of prominence on the subject. Is of the opinion that a combination of 
8-inch and 7-inch rapid-firing guns is best suited for the intermediate battery of 
the battle ships under consideration. The use of heavier armor of improved 
quality over a large area of the latest types of foreign vessels, renders the use 
of guns of great range and energy imperative. Hence, the 8-inch gun, which is 
essentially an armor-piercing gun at long range against all but the heaviest 




84 AliLEGED DEFECTS IST TESSELB OF NAYT, 

armor^ has been selected* od accouDt of Itjs great efflr-ieiicy, as part of tbe iDter- 
noedfate battery ♦ supplemented by tbe 7- 1 neb ^ns* wblcb, wblle embodying all 
die features of a rapid-firing gun, have the energy to perforate 7 inches of th# 
best quality of armor, when striking normally, at a distance of S.Om yarda 

The above quotation and the plans and other correspondence 
relating to the designs under consideration indicate conchisirely that 
the board had most assuredly given careful consideration to the 
important question of battery arrangement and had before it *' tfie 
opinions of upwards of eighty nacal officers of prominencey 

While the body of the report tstated that some of the 8-inch guns 
may be superposed upon the turrets containing the 12-inch guns, 
the ^neral description of the battle ships which accompanied this 
unanimous report of the board on construction explicitly provided 
for a main battery of four 12-inch guns, eight 8-inch guus, and 
twelve 7-inch guns, the board stating that "the eight 8-mch guns 
will be mounted in pairs in four electrically controlled, balanced 
turrets in quadrilateral on the main deck *«♦_'' 

The Department finally approved the main features of the battle 
ship as submitted by the board on construction under date of No vera- 
ber 2t>, 1001, and, in conformity with the explicit provisions of the 
naval appropriation act approved March 3, 1901, submitted to Con- 
gress a general description of the battle ships and cruisers recom- 
mended by the board on construction. As a result, in the naval appro- 
priation act approved July 1, 1902, Congress made provision for 
*' two first-class battle ships, carrying the heaviest armor and most 
powerful ordnance for vessels of their claas, iij>ou a trial displace- 
ment of not more than sixteen tliousand tons, and to have the high- 
est practicable speed and great radium of action * * ♦ _» 

■ The Department having already prepared general plans for theae 
vessels, on the basis of the characteristic.^ recommended by the board 
on construction, a contract for the construction of one of these ves- 
sels was signed on October 15, 1902, and, in eoufonnity with the 
direction of Congress, the construction of the other ves-^el appro- 
priated for was undertaken at the navy-yard, New York, N. Y. 

It thus clearly appears that the designs of the Connecticut class 
were determined upon only after the most exhaustive investigation, 
and that the final report recommending to the Department the gen- 
eral characteristics of these vessels w^as unanimous and signed by 
every member of the board on construction, and that during the 
preparation of the designs the board had consulted " upwards of 
eighty naval officers of prominence." It is obvious, therefore, that 
the seagoing element had most adequate representation in determin- 
ing the principal features of the Connecticut class. 

In the naval appropriation act of March 3, 1903, provision was 
made " to have constructed by contract or in navy-yards as herein- 
after provided three first-class battle ships carrying the heaviest 
armor and most powerful ordnance for vessels of their class, upon a 
trial displacement of not more than sixteen thousand tons, and to 
have the highest practicable speed and great radius of action 
* * * ; " and " two first-class battle ships carrying the heaviest 
armor and most powerful ordnance for vessels of their class, upon a 
trial displacement of not more than thirteen thousand tons, and to 
have the highest practicable speed and great radius of action." The 
three 16J000-ton battle ships provided for in the above-noted act were 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 85 

contracted for upon the identical plans and specifications previously 
prepared and approved for the Connecticut and Louisiana^ with the 
exception of the water-line and upper side belt armor. The upper 
side Delt in the case of the Connecticut class was 6 inches in thickness, 
while that of the three sister vessels was increased to 7 inches in 
thickness ; the water-line belt of the Kansas^ Vermont^ and Minnesota 
was made of a uniform thickness of 9 inches, instead of being tapered 
from 11 inches to 9 inches, as in the case of the Connecticut and 
Louisiana; all other characteristics of the Vermont class were iden- 
tical with those previously approved for the Connecticut class. 

With respect to the 13,000-ton battle ships, however, a difference 
of opinion developed among the seagoing members of the board on 
construction as to certain characteristics of the design, and in this 
instance speed and torpedo tubes seem to have shared the honors 
with battery arrangement as elements upon which unanimous de- 
cision could not be reached. Four of the five members of the board 
on construction, however, including two of the three seagoing mem- 
bers, recommended a vessel whose battery arrangement was similar 
to that previously approved for the Connecticut class, and, in the 
first instance, did not recommend submerged torpedo tubes. The 
majority of the board on construction in this case gave special 
prominence to a powerful battery, with adequate armor protection 
for battery and hull, and deliberately sacrificed 1 knot of speed, 
since the limitations as to size imposed by Congress did not make 
it possible to give high speed and great batterj^ power to a vessel 
of this displacement. Before approving the majority report in the 
case of the two 13,000-ton battle ships above referred to, the Depart- 
ment invited an expression of opinion from certain seagoing officers 
of large experience, and under date of September 26, 1903, trans- 
mitted to the board on construction letters from nine officers of the 
Navy, whose views had been requested by the Department with 
respect to the two battle ships in question. The report of the board 
on construction, in compliance with the Department's instructions of 
September 26, 1903, was submitted under date of October 9, 1903, and 
is of such great interest, as indicating the views of four-fifths of the 
board at that time, that a quotation therefrom is given below : 

The board does not consider it necessary to comment upon the individual 
opinions expressed in the accompanying letters. 

While it is interesting to obtain the views of the service upon the desirable 
qualities for naval vessels, and while it is always the earnest endeavor of this 
board to meet those views so far as practicable in the designs which are pre- 
pared, it is nevertheless difficult to obtain individual opinions on specific points 
of design which will lead to a satisfactory determination of any vexed question. 
The officers consulted necessarily can not have the matter set l)efore them in all 
its bearings, with full data, plans, and the evidence necessary to arrive at a 
satisfactory conclusion, and the exact question at issue is liable to become 
secondary to particular opinions of the writer on what battle ships in general 
should be. 

The act of Congress of March 3, 1901, required the Department to report to 
Congress a full description of the designs of battle ships and armored cruisers 
which it would recommend for adoption, and this board submitted a report on 
that matter, dated November 26, 1901, which was adopted by the Department and 
forwarded to Congress, resulting in the authorization of the two 10,0(K)-ton battle 
ships Connecticut and Louisiana, of 18 l^nots speed, and the two 14,500-ton ar- 
mored cruisers Tennessee and Washington, of 22 knots speed, on July 1, 1902, 
and which are now under construction. In the same act authorizing the two 
13,000-ton battle ships now under consideration, Congress appropriated for three 
first-class battle ships of 16,000 tons trial displacement, which have already been 




86 atjT.eged defects in vesseib of navy. 



(xmtriicied for, oti desIgOK almost the s-ime iis their predeeessora* also of 18 knots 
irhil s^peeil, oqU named the Vennont, Kams», and i/*Mfl*^*fiffl* 

Tlie iKKird is still attonply and unaiiluifiusly of the opiuloo tUat an actually 
flTift-cIaf^A battle ship shouUl have a speed of IS knots, and in the re<xjmmendn- 
tions heretofore made or herein expre^^sed does not intend to con%^ey that the 
design of the l3*0(M)-tou buttle sliips represents its oplnton of what ^rst-cla^^ 
battle shiijs should be, nor what the United States Navy should have. 

The problem has, however, presented itself of preimriiig a de^j^ign to meet the 
Condi tlona of the law aa esc pressed In the act of Congress of March li, 19()<{» hi 
the following wordi? : 

■* • * * two first-eliiss battle ships* carrying the heaviei?t armor and most 
powerful ordnance for vessels of their ciasi^t opcm a trial displacement of not 
more than thirteen thoujwind tons, and to have the highest practicnhle speed nnA 
great radiua of action tind to cost escluslre of aiiuor and armament not exceed- 
ing three million five hundred tbousaud dollars each/* 

In the judgmeet of the present chief constructor, the argumenta 
siibniitted by lh« board on construction in 11*03, Jis above noted, wero 
absolutely sound and indisputable, and in lectiii*e.s delivered by him 
many years ago at the Naval War College the question of hattenj 
power versus speed was treated at length, in order tliat seagoing 
officers might clearly understand tlie great sacrifices which had to be 
made to attain one or two knots of extra *ipeed in vessels whose dimen- 
sions were necessarily snch as to preclude high speed being attained 
except by a wholly disproportionate increase in horsepower of pro- 
pelling machinery witn consequent serious sacritices in offensive 
power. 

We now come to that period of our development in naval material 
in wJiich the undersigned has had direct participation as chief con- 
structor and as a memb<3r of the board on construction. 

The first battle ship for which the present administration of the 
Bureau of Construction and liepair is directly responsible was that 
authorized in the naval appropriation act approved April 27, 15)04, 

^fio » Ji|iMTOJ^nTMri^v of flp^ hj"iI , cr> fit- ,% ^ \\ T'^'I'^'t^^l *'> * |h> r L^t ►v '"^MitT for a 

first-class battle ship, being identical with that making provision for 
the 16,000-ton battle ships which were authorized by the naval appro- 
priation bills of the two preceding years. 

In order that there might be a homogeneous group of six battle 
ships having practically identical characteristics, the chief constructor 
recommended, and the board on construction and the Department 
approved, plans for a battle ship w^iich was in all essential particulars 
a duplicate of the Vermont class, w^ith only minor changes, including 
a slight change in thickness and distribution of a portion of the 
armor. Prior to the award of a contract for the construction of this 
vessel, but subsequent to the advertisement inviting proposals there- 
for, a question w^as again raised as to the advisability of substituting 
an all-big-gun battery for the one originally recommended. Various 
memoranda were submitted to the Department at that time bearing 
upon the subject of battery arrangement; some of these indicated that 
the all-big-gun battery was the only thing worth considering; others, 
that the intermediate battery w^as a very valuable adjunct. For rea- 
sons previously noted, however, the board on construction unani- 
mously recommended, and the Department approved their recommen- 
dation, that the new battle ship be substantially a duplicate of the 
Vermont, 

The all-big-gun idea of battery arrangement, which was beginning 
to be received with high favor in 1904, was in no sense novel, but its 



I 



AIA^GED DEFEOTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 87 

desirability under modem conditions of ordnance and artillery fire 
had not been definitely established. As a matter of fact, sketch de- 
signs of an all-big-gun ship had been made by the Bureau of C!on- 
struction and Repair only a few years previously, but artillery fire 
had not then developed to such a degree as would have warranted 
further consideration of such a battery at that time. In response 
to the chan^ng conditions as to artillery fire, however, ana the 
reconmiendations of the general board, the Bureau of Construction 
and Repair and the board on. construction again took up the develop- 
ment 01 the general features of a design which would embody the all- 
big-gun arrangement for the main battery. As a result, the board on 
construction unanimously recommended to the Department the con- 
struction of two vessels whose main battery was to consist of eight 
12-inch guns mounted in four middle-line turrets so arranged as to 
permit broadside fire from ei^ht 12'inch guns, four of which could also 
fire directly ahead and four directly astern. It may be noted, more- 
over, that the battery and hull armor protection of these vessels was 
of a most substantial character and that unusually complete water- 
tight subdivision of the under-water hull afforded special protection 
to the buoyancy and stability of the vessel under damaged conditions. 

The naval appropriation act approved March 3, 1905, having au- 
thorized the construction of " two first-class battle ships carrying the 
heaviest armor and most powerful armament for vessels of their 
class upon a maximum trial displacement of not more than sixteen 
thousand tons, to have the highest practicable speed and great radius 
of action," the Department decided to construct these vessels upon the 
plans of an all-big-gun battle ship, the general features of which had 
already been developed, as above noted. The contracts for these ves- 
sels, which were named South Carolina and Michigan^ were awarded 
July 21, 1906. The plans of these 'vessels, and especially their battery 
arrangement, were subjected to severe criticism, not only by seagoing 
officers of the United States Navy, but also by foreign critics. It seems 
needless to state, however, that the features of the design which re- 
ceived most adverse criticism were accepted and approved by the 
board on construction only after the most exhaustive investigation, 
and so convinced was the board that its judgment with respect to the 
battery arrangement, armor protection, etc., was entirely correct that 
these essential features were duplicated in the next battle ships 
authorized by Congress on June 29, 1906, and March 2, 1907, viz, tl^e 
Delaware and North Dakota, 

Although, as just stated, professional criticism, both at home and 
abroad, with respect to the battery arrangement of the South Caro- 
lina and Michigan^ was somewhat adverse at first, a great change in 
opinion subsequently developed, as has been clearly shown by the 
recommendations of the general board, the individual expressions of 
seagoing officers of the United States Navy who were previously 
opposed to this arrangement, and the following quotation from a 
well-known foreign publication exclusively devoted to naval affairs: 

Few, If any, ships are likely to be biiilt In the future which can not use all 
guns on either broadside. This njny be talven as certain. America, in tlie f^onth 
Carolina, led the way in this direction, and the ship of the future is bound to 
be some Improved variation of her. * * * 

There is some good reason to believe that, talsing all things into consideration, 
the South Carolina type is the best all-big-gun ship yet in hand. 




) 



88 ALLEGED DEFECTS IK VESSELS -OF NAVY. 



Here again subsequent experience has demonstrated that the vieivs 
of the Bureau of Construction ai^d Repair and the board on construc- 
tion with respect to the desirable characteristics to be embodied in 
naval ve^sseb were much more mature and well developed than those 
of casual critics of the ^agoing branch, whose opmions, though 
entirely sincere, were evidently based upon insufficient information. 

The last battle ships desired for the United States Navy, namely, 
the Delaware and North Dakota^ were authorized, one under the act 
approved June 20, 1^0<>, and the other under the act approved March 
% 1907, the first-named act providing as follows: 

One ftrf?t-class bflttle ship* carrying as hear,v armor and a» r^werful armament 
fls an3' known yesael of its cIhs«s> to linre tbe blgh^t pracdcable speed a ad lereat- 
est pnictleable nidfus of u^:'tiou. and to c^i^t, <*xc']usive of armiiment iind urmor^ 
not exceeditij? six miliion doilars: Provided, Ttiiit tiefore npprt>viug nny pinna 
or st|>ec-i flea t ions for the conMnictlon of ^ticli battJe ttUip the Setxetnry of the 
Navy shad afford, by advertisement or otherwise, in tila dlaereti(jm a reasonable 
opportunity t<» iMiy coniiK-tent 0tu?*tructor who may desire so to do to suimilt 
plans and speoification.^ for iiis coosideration, for whicli said plans, sbonld the 
8ami? be a*'*ed by tlie Department and be not submitted by or on l>ehnlf of a 
fiuccessful bidder for the con tract, such compeusatioa shall l>e paid as the 
SeiTetary of the Navy a hall deem Just and equitable out of the amount herefn 
apt^roprlated under the head * 'Contingent. Nu^t''^ Proviiferh That before any 
propfisala for said battle ship shall be ift«ue*l of any bids rect*ived and accepted 
the Secretary of tlie Navy ^hali nsttort to Coufjresg at lie next sesssion full 
details covering the tyi>e of such battle ship aud the speciflcallons for the samOp 
Including its dl^phi cement, draft, and dimensions, and the kind and extent of 
armor and armament therefor. 

In accordance with the specific provisions of the act of Jiint* 2fi, 
1906, quoted above, the Department invited the submission of designs 
by private shipbuilding firms and naval constructors, and al^o directed 
the board on construction to develop j)lans for a battle ship which 
would satisfy' the provision contained in the act of Congress above 
noted. The "plans and desert j^tion of the design prepared bj the 
board on construction were submitted to the Deportment prior to 
the date nanit^d in the Department's f^ircular for the submission of 
all other designs prepared by outside parties. The Department 
subsequently referred all plans submitted, including those prepared 
by the board on construction, to a mixed board under the presidency 
of the Assistant Secretary of the Na\7\ and having as additional 
members four seagoing officers of the line, the engineer-in-chief, 
and the chief constructor. This board, after careful examination 
of all plans submitted, unanimously reported that the design sub- 
mitted by the board on construction was — 

* * * tlie most suitable of all the designs submitted for the purposes of the 
TTnited States naval service within the provisions of the act of Congress men- 
tioned in the board's precept * * *. 

A vessel constructed on tliis design will carrj' as ** heavy armor and as power- 
ful armament as any known vessel of its class; " it will have a speed which is 
believed to be tlic "highest practicable" for a vessel of this type and class In 
the present state of knowledge: it will have "the highest practicable radius 
of action," and can be l)uilt within the limit of cost fixed by Congress. 

In compliance with the specific instructions of Congress, the plans 
and specifications prepared by the board on construction, and ap- 
proved by the special ooard, together with the report of the special 
board, were submitted by the Department to Congress, with a general 
letter of description, uncler date of December 12, 1906, and on March 
2, 1907, Congress authorized the construction of — 



M 



AIJ^GBD DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 89 

♦ ♦ ♦ one flrst-class battle ship, similar in all essential characteristics, and 
additional to, the battle ship authorized by the act making appropriations for 
the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1907, plans and specifica- 
tions for which last-named vessel have already been prepared and submitted 
by the Secretary of the Navy for the information of Congress, as required by 
the provisions of the aforesaid act. 

It thus appears that the designs of the Delaware and North Dakota 
were unanimously approved by the board on construction, a major- 
ity of whose members were seagoing officers; that they were then 
referred to and approved by a special board, the majority of whose 
members were seagoing officers; that they were then submitted to 
Congress, and, by special act of Congress, the battle ship previously 
authorized, as well as the one authorized in the act of March 2, 1907, 
were to be " similar in all essential characteristics to the battle ship 

* * * plans and specifications for which * * * have already 
been submitted by the Secretary of the Navy for the information 
of Congress." 

It would appear that the criticism to which this last-described de- 
sign of battle snip was subjected prior to its final adoption would have 
been sufficient to develop any faults which might have existed therein, 
no matter how cleverly concealed ; the accepted design was not to be 
so fortunate, however, for there arose, shortly before the date of 
awarding the contract, a Question as to the location of the water line 
belt armor. This particular criticism was referred to the board on 
construction, fully considered, and the board, in a unanimous report, 
advised against any change whatever in the plans and specifications 
of this battle ship. There is no doubt in the mind of any single officer 
of the board as to the wisdom of its previous action in this matter, 
and since the Department has given it thorough consideration and 
has definitely sustained the board on construction, further reference 
thereto seems wholly unnecessary at this time. 

Any reference to the method of developing designs during the in- 
cumbency of the present chief constructor would be incomplete with- 
out a brief allusion to the suo:gestions which have been received from 
time to time from a board or officers whose opinion should command 
the highest respect of all officers, and especially those of the seagoing 
branch of the service, since it is composed exclusively of seagoing 
officers of recognized ability. While the chief constructor does not 
for one instant admit that the judgment of any individual or board 
not directly concerned with the design of naval vessels should have 
as much weight in matters relating to the design of ships as that of 
the board on construction, or the Bureau of Construction and Repair, 
both of which are continuously engaged in design work, it is of 
distinct interest to review some of the suggestions of the general 
board, which have been made from time to time, with respect to the 
size of battle ships, their speed, endurance, armament, armor, etc. 
In submitting this brief review of the principal recommendations 
made by the general board during the past four years, with respect 
to the general features of naval vessels, it will be clearly apparent 
that the judgment of the board on construction was decidedly more 
accurate and valuable with respect to the essential characteristics 
necessary in a battle ship than that of a board composed wholly of 
seagoing officers. In making the foregoing statement it is not in- 
tended, in the slightest degree, to reflect upon the professional or 
other attainments of the general board, especially in matters con- 



90 AlxLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY, 

ceming which thej have e.\p^rt knowledge; it is merely a state- 
nient of fact which ought to be self-evident, sinc^j it is intended to 
convey the idea that a board which is definitely, specifically, and con- 
tinuonslj engaged in the consideration of qitestloriis vitally affect- 
ing the design and construction of naval vessels, and a majority of 
whose mem&rs am seagoing officers, should be better informed in aJi 
questions relating to v:ar-ghip design than any group of seagoing of- 
ficers, no matter what may be their individual attainments; the fact 
that the special and Vj?ry important duties of tht^ general board are 
noi those connected witli the design of ships, only add.s force to the 
accuracy of the statement already made as to the more reliable knowl- 
edge and experience of the board on construction with respect to war- 
ship design. 

On September 21, 190-3, the Secretair of the Navy requested an 
expression of opinion from the eeneiaf board as to what types of 
vessels and what numbers of eacn type were necessary, taking into 
consideration the vessels then on the navy list and the graduardete- 
rioration of same. The general board submitted a reply under date 
of October 17, 1903, ana stated that, ''After careful consideration, 
the following numbers and types of ships are regarded by the general 
board as esFential to the interests of the country j" the characteristics 
of the battle ships being as follow^s: 

SuRtalned sea speed : 16 knots to Culebra and return* 

Maxinmra stenmlng radhis: 3,000 mUee. 

Armniuent : F'our 12 Im^h gonfl mounted In pairs In turrets^ eight S-Sncll 
tnciutited In pairs In turrets, jind ns nmny O-tuf-h and lighter calibers as practl- 
enWe* depending upon d(«pl a cement 

Armor protet*tion : Similar to t be Maine elaus^ 

To bare high Urn board forward. In tlilf* ris}<«|«»ti tlie lotra type Impresses 
fflvonibly. 

To have isubmerged torpedo tubes, one on eaeh side, or preferably two on eatcll 
side. 

It ts ho|>ed that these requtrements can be obtained on a deep load dl^^pl arc* 
ment of 16,000 tons. 

This recommendation of the general board was submitted by the 
Secretary of the Navy to the board on construction under date of 
October 21, 1903, with the following specific inquiry: 

Can ships of the general type and with tlie gem^ral characteristics proposed 
in the letter of the general board be designed and constructed? If not, in what 
respect do the types and characteristics require modification? 

The answer to this inquiry was contained in a letter from the board 
on construction dated December 11. 1903, in which letter it was 
clearly set forth that a vessel embodying the characteristics recom- 
mended by the general board could not be designed within the limita- 
tions of displacement imposed by the general board, the reasons 
for the conclusions of the board on construction being clearly and 
fully set forth. The board on construction also specifically stated 
that it had " confined itself to specific replies to the questions pro- 
pounded by the Department and has not felt called upon to discuss 
the merits of the programme proposed, either as to number or types, 
except in so far as the types proposed might be practicable or 
impracticable." 

Under date of December 15, 1903, the general board submitted 
its reply to the communication of the board on construction just 
noted, stating that it submitted " the following modifications of the 



^ 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 91 

types and characteristics originally recommended in order to meet 
the criticisms of the board on construction." The general board 
especially emphasized its opinion that " the displacements now pro- 
posed, which are the same as those given in its report of October 
17, except in the type of protected cruisers, should in no case be 
exceeded." Also that — 

With regard to the nraianient recommended for battle ships, the general 
board particularly holds to the four 12-lnch and eight 8-inch guns mounted in 
pairs in turrets, only specifying as to the intermediate and secondary batteries 
that there shall be as many H-inch and lighter calibers as mny be found pos- 
sible by the board on construction, wlien. in studying the plans and limiting 
their consideration to the proposed speed and disf)lacement. they make the 
usual allowances for weight oi' armament, armor, machinery, etc. The armor 
for the battle ships proposed is similar to that of the Maine class, with the 
addition of the four 8-inch turrets. 

The general board then renewed its recommendation as to the 
characteristics of battle ships, previously submitted, except that the 
speed was to be 18 knots on trials and the maximum steaming radius 
was reduced to 5,000 miles. 

This last-named communication of the general board having been 
submitted by the Secrteary of the Navy to the board on construction, 
the latter board, under date of January 9, 1904, submitted a report 
to the Secretary of the Navy, in which it was pointed out that the 
speed, steaming radius, and other characteristics required by the 
general board could not be obtained on a deep-load displacement of 
1G,000 tons except by reducing the battery and armor protection 
materially below those provided for the Connecticut class. The board 
on construction also discussed at length the question of steaming 
radius, definitely pointing out the difficulty of obtaining the radii 
of action recommended by the general board under the limiting con- 
ditions imposed as to other characteristics. 

In submitting the above letter of Januarv 9, 1904, the board on 
construction, in view of its extensive knowledge and experience in 
connection with matters of ship design, formally advised the Depart- 
ment of the entire impracticability of arriving at satisfactory results 
with respect to the design of naval vessels by following the procedure 
which had been followed in the various communications passing be- 
tween the Department, the board on construction, and the general 
board. The board on construction also invited the Department's 
attention to previous practice in such matters, and emphasized most 
strongly its opinion that responsibility for the design oi naval vessels 
and the actual designing oi the same should be definitely assigned 
to the bureaus concerned and the board on construction^ as had here- 
tofore been the practice^ since the bureaus and the board had every 

Eossible facility for such work, both in personnel and material, and 
ad, in addition, such assistance as might be desired from reports 
from the fleet and general information concerning latest practice in 
foreign navies. 

In order therefore to dispose of the points immediately at issue 
concerning the principal characteristics of battle ships, armored 
cruisers, etc., which were to be included in the forthcoming naval 
programme, the Secretary of the Navy, by verbal order, convened a 
special mixed board, under the presidency of the Admiral of the 
Navy, the other members being the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, 



^ 



92 ALLEGED DEFECTS IK VESSELS OF NAVT. 

the chief constructor, and two captains in the Navy who werc members 
of the general board. The report of this board stated that — 

Tbese tyiies, aa herein describeil, embody the tactical requitements desired by 
the geueral board, In so far us the board on constniotlon regards tbem fea.s!blei| 
and the board oa oonstiiiction regards each of these types as practicable. 

The modifications unanimously recommended by this special board 
related principally to armor protection and displacement, the armor 
protection being made similar to that of the Vef^moni and not that of 
the 3 fame J ancTlhe displacement being 16,000 tons on tnal and not 
16,000 tons deep load. These, of coiii'se, were very radical changes, 
as can well be undei'stood by those who are at all familiar with the 
armor distribution of the Maine^ and Vermont classes, and involved 
an increase of deep-load displacement of about 1,700 tons over that 
originally proposed by the general board. 

In the case of the armored cruisers the Chief of the Bureau of 
Ordnance and the chief constructor distinctly dissented from the 
opinions of the other members of the special board with respect to 
the battery, those officers insisting that tl>e main batteiy should con- 
dst of 10- inch gims, while the general board representatives adhered 
to their previous recommendation for a batter}^ of ei^ht 8-inch guns. 
As the 8*ineh guns would neceasarily be mounted in t unlets, two 
middJe-line and two broadside, the net result, if the general board^s 
recommendation had been approved, would have been six 8 inch guns 
in broadside and a less numl.>er of 0-iiich guns, as against the four 
10-inch guns and G-inch guns recommended by the board on con- 
struction. 

This conference report of the special board, consisting of repre- 
Aentatives from the general board and the board on construction, was 
fe'f erred again to the general board, which accepted all the modifica- 
tions origmally recom upended by the board on construction with 
respect to the chanicteri?tics of battle ships; also the modifications 
recommended by the board on construction with respect to the arma- 
ment of the armored cruisers. This acceptance of the views of the 
board on construction was, howev^er, as appears definitely in the 
report, not for the reason that the majority of the general board be- 
lieved the 10-inch guns more desirable, but " in order to save the time 
required to make new designs," the plans of the North Carolina and 
Moritava^ the armored cruisers whose plans were in course of prepa- 
ration, being nearly completed. 

It thus appears that the greater experience and expert technical 
knowledge possessed by the board on construction in all that relates 
to the design of naval vessels made it necessary for the general board 
to completely modify its views as to the characteristics of battle ships 
and to accede to the retention of 10-inch guns on the armored cruisers, 
a most fortunate concession, no matter tor what reason, since service 
sentiment a very short time thereafter was strongly in favor of a 
battery of guns of greater caliber than 8 inches for vessels of the 
armored cruiser class. 

As indicating the degree of consideration given by the general 
board to the al)ove-note(l interrogatories of the Department with 
respect to the types of vessels, etc.. the following extract from its 
final report, dated January 20, 1904, is conclusive: 

The general board, in obedience to your order, has given long and very carefal 
study to the question, not only " what types of vessels," but also " what nam- 



AUSEQED DBPEOTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 93 

bers of each type are necessary?" Its conclusions are founded upon the expe- 
rience of sea officers, comparison of foreign navies, consideration of the 
national needs, and application of the principles of strategy and naval tactics. 

There should be no doubt, therefore, as to the very thorough con- 
sideration given to this matter, and it is especially noteworthy that 
the very extensive modifications recommended by the board on con- 
struction were not only accepted by the general board but approved 
by the Department. 

It will be noted that the type of battle ship finally recommended 
by the general board was the Connecticut-Vermont type, although 
the original recommendations provided for a battle ship distinctly 
inferior to that type. Recent adverse criticism of the Connecticut- 
Vermont class must therefore be considered in connection with the 
official correspondence just referred to. 

AVhile the general board has from time to time during the past 
three years submitted suggestions with respect to particular features 
connected with the design of battle ships, especially those relating 
to armament and displacement, which suggestions have always been 
given most careful and serious consideration by the board on con- 
struction, the attempt to prescribe detailed characteristics has not 
been repeated, and I believe it is now^ fully recognized that the 
knowledge, experience, and facilities possessed by the board on con- 
struction are quite adequate for the proper development in every 
detail of the plans of naval vessels, and that any attempt to intrust 
the definite prescription of even the general characteristics of such 
vessels to any other board or body of officers would be exceedingly 
detrimental to the public interests. 

The preparation of even a summarized statement of the conditions 
under which the designs of vessels authorized since the Spanish- 
American war have been prepared has consumed so much space that 
it will only be possible to allude in the briefest manner to some of 
the most important criticisms which have recently been made con- 
cerning particular features of the design of battle ships. 

One 01 the most serious of these criticisms was that recently made 
with respect to the coal endurance of armored cruisers of the Tennes- 
see class. 

It was specifically charged in this instance that the faulty designs 
of the Bureau of (Jonstruction and Repair had seriously limited the 
bunker capacity of these vessels, and that seagoing officers had re- 
cently recommended that the forward torpedo room te converted into 
a coal bunker. 

The actual facts in this case are distinctly interesting as disclosing 
another instance in which changes in the original design have sub- 
sequently been discredited by those of the same branch of the naval 
service originally responsible for the changes in question. 

The plans of the Tennessee were signed by the Secretary of the 
Navy and the chief constructor in 1902. At that particular period 
torpedo tubes on battle ships and armored cruisers were not in favor. 
In fact, on March 29, 1901, the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance — 
who certainly must be recognized as a seagoing officer and the highest 
authority in matters of ordnance equipment — recommended to the 
Department that " the board on construction be directed to reconsider 
the question of providing torpedo tubes and outfits for the five battle 
ships and six armored cruisers " then under construction. This 



94 ALLEGED DEFECT6 IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 

recommencktion was referred to the board on construction and, under 
date of April 10^ 1901, the board on construction, a majority of whose 
members were seagoing officers of the line, i-eeonimended that — 

■ * * * ia tlie case of tlie fitx nrm*)red crui set's authorized by iiete of Marcli 
3* 1899* and on June 7, in*Ki, torpedo tiib*?8 and outfitH he disiwnsed wltb, anti that 
the qiiefttton of rraviaJng sulnnerged torpedo tubes and torpedo outfits for tbe 
five battle Bbips hIbo authorized hj the above-«juoted arts be deferred until 
ex[»erienoe with sucli tubes on tbe vesseli* of the Mahte cbiss shall have d<^moii- 
Btrated the advlstabiUty of their lusjtaUation on l>oai"d other vessiels. 

The Secretary of the Navy approved this recommendation of the 
board, and necessary steps were taken to remove the torpedo tubes 
from the six armored cruisers then in course of const ruction. The 
question of removing torpedo tubes fi'om the five battle ships of the 
Virginia class remained in abeyance entil the latter part of 1901, 
when definite action became imperative in order that the contractor 
for these battle ships might be given final instructions with respect 
to torpedo installations. The matter was therefore again referred to 
the board on construction, and, mider date of January 20, 1902, a 
majority of four of the board, inclndini^ two of the seagoing line 
officers/ recommended that " submerged torpedo tubes be omitted on 
all five of the vessels of the Virginia class,'' the reason for this action 
being definitely set forth in the body of the report and based on 
information furnished by the Chief of Ordnance. 

One of the seagoing members of the board, however, dissented from 
the views of tbe majority, the reason for his recommendation for the 
retention of the torpedo tubes being based upon the '* moral effect of 
a ship being armed with torpedoes '^ and the practice of installing 
torpedo tubes on foreign battle ships. The Department approved 
• the recommendation of the majority of the board on construction and 
adhered to this approval despite additional minority and majority 
reports. Steps were then taken to remove torpedo tubes from the 
five battle ships in course of construction. 

Just at this time the designs of the Teniiessee class were in course 
of development and were subsequently approved unanimously by a 
board a majority of whose members were seagoing line officers. As 
noted above, no torpedo tubes were provided for in these the original 
designs of the Tenruissee and Washington^ torpedo tubes being then 
out of fashion, additional coal bunkers being preferred instead. 

Just prior to the award of contracts for the Tennessee class, how- 
ever, the whole question of "having or not having" torpedo tubes was 
resurrected, and the Department, under date of December 20, 1002, 
requested information from the board on construction as to the rea- 
sons governing the board's action " in discarding torpedoes from the 
designs of battle ships and armored cruisers." The board, under date 
of December 27, 1902, submitted its report, signed by a majority, 
including two of the three seagoing members, the principal reason 
assigned by the majority for the omission of the torpedo tubes being 
as follow^s: 

Assuming perfect discharging apparatus, and considering the probable condi- 
tions of battle-ship actions and the present and prospective effective range of 
torpedoes, and especially the limitations of underwater discharge, it is a grave 
question whether it is advisable to sacrifice any important feature on a battle 
ship or armored cruiser for the installation of a secondary weapon of remote 
value, and which requires tactics differing entirely from those best adapted to 
the gun, the primary weapon of such vessels. 



') 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 95 

This second report of the majority of the board on construction 
was approved by the Secretary of the Navy, who thus adhered to 
the action taken a year previously as to the omission of torpedo tubes 
from battle ships and armored cruisers. 

The " torpedo tube question " was not destined to remain long at 
rest, however, for in the summer of 1903 the reinstallation of tor- 
pedo tubes on battle ships and armored cruisers was again actively 
discussed, the Bureau of Navigation expressing itself in their favor, 
and the general board stating that — 

♦ ♦ ♦ The range, speed, and accuracy of torpedoes have so greatly 
increased within the last year or two that at the present time the torpedo may 
be considered a weapon of offense to be seriously reclioned with up to 3,000 
yards, and even more. Since gun fire, in order to result in a decisive action, 
must be delivered at a range not gi'eatly exceeding 3,000 yards, it follows that 
the tactics of fleet actions will hereafter be influenced by the presence or 
absence of torpedoes. 

The Bureau of Navigation also stated that "gun fire, in order to 
result in a decisive action, must be delivered at a range not greatly 
exceeding 3,000 yards." 

In view of the opinion of the general board and the Bureau of 
Navigation, as quoted in the preceding paragraph, the Department, 
on October 8, 1903, again referred this vexed question of " torpedo 
tubes " to the board on construction, and the present chief constructor 
found it to be among the urgent matters to be disposed of upon his 
assumption of the duties of Chief of the Bureau of Construction and 
Repair on November 1, 1903. 

After full consideration of the condition of work on the battle 
ships and armored cruisers then in course of construction, the board 
on construction, having in view the very radical change in " service 
sentiment " with respect to torpedoes, apparently based upon " recent 
and prospective improvements in the service torpedo of the United 
States Navy," and " a battle range not exceeding 3,000 yards," rec- 
ommended that there be installed in battle ships and armored 
cruisers then building as many torpedo tubes as could properly be 
installed without serious interference with essential features already 
provided for. Subsequently the Bureau of Construction and Repair, 
m reporting upon the changes necessary on individual ships, invited 
attention to the decrease in bunker capacity and stowage space by 
reason of the installation of torpedo tubes. 

It thus appears that the designs of the Tennessee class as originally 
prepared in the Bureau of Construction and Repair and approved 
by the board on construction and the Secretary of the Navy pro- 
vided ample coal endurance but no torpedo tuhes^ the latter at that 
time being considered unnecessary by the representatives of the sea- 
going element. Subsequently a demand was made for torpedo tubes 
by the seagoing element, and although it was clearly shown that they 
could only be installed at the sacrifice of bunker space and storage 
capacity and, in some cases, magazine space, their installation under 
such conditions was recommended by seagoing officers. Later, the lack 
of bunker space was alluded to as a serious defect, and despite the 
well-known facets in the case this alleged fault was charged to the 
Bureau which, five years previously, had prepared the plans in a 
way which would have fully disposed of present-day criticism with 
respect to limited bunker capacity. 



96 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVT. 

As a result of later experience the probable battle range of 3.000 

Sards, settled upon bv the Bureau of Navigation and tne gener;il 
oard in U)Oa, has increased to 8,000-10,000 yards in 1907, and the 
" to be or not to be " of the torpedo tube on armored ve:^els is again 
receiving attention from the seagoing element; in support of this 
statement it is interesting t43 note a report from one of our b&st 
informed seagoing officers, now in command of one of the very 
armored cruisc^rs which has been throiigli so many vicissitudes with 
respect to torpedo tubes. This officer, in a carefully prepared official 
report which has received commendatoiy endoi'sements from the 
Bureau of Navigation and the general board. F^tates — 

1 am uciable to Imagine uny probable condUion in actJon in which the sub- 
merged torpeilo lTibe& of this ship cuuld l^ effect] rely used. 

He also notes, as one of the principal defects of that type of ship, 
the '* amount of coal space devoted to a submerged torpedo outfit of 
doubtful utility/' 

Moreover, one of the most conspicuous of those officers w^ho have 
done so much for the advancement of artillery fire in our fleet recently 
made this very significant and fair-minded admission with respect 
to the subject of submarine torpedo tubes : 

As for stibmarine toiT>edo tubes, I had the honor to be affiliated with the 
group of officers who brought the aubjet't up for <ioaslderatiou ; yet Kvlieu we 
cou&;ider the range of the torfjedo at tlie time tubes were omitted, aud Uie gmrri* 
fices reQulred tor their inetallatlon, I am force<i to recognize tliat there were 
two i^id^ to the qucstlou. 

It thus appears that in less than five years there have been two com- 
plete revolutions in sentiment with respect to torpedo tubes. As 
battle ships and armored eruiseri^ usually rcimire at least thre^ years 
in their construction, it is evident that it is almost impossible to keep 
pace with the changes of opinion in such matters. It is fully conceded 
that these changes of opinion are largely based upon changed condi- 
tions, yet there is no possil^le excuse ftrr any subsequent attempt to 
place the blame in such matters upon those naval officials who are 
primarily responsible for the designs of ships, and who, having once 
or even Uvice acceded to the view^s of the seagoing element, can not 
ahvays see their way clear to recommending heavy expenditures for 
additional changes which appear at best to be of doubtful value in 
the opinion of other representative naval officers; for it is well to 
note in this connection that in the matter of so extensive a change as 
that necessitated bv the reinstallation of torpedo tubes in armored 
vessels in course oi construction in 1904, the increased expenditures 
amounted to nearly, if not quite, $1,000,000. 

The chief constructor hopes that he has demonstrated fully and 
clearly that such alleged serious faults as may exist in battle ships 
and armored cruisers were not due to the arbitrary methods of the 
board on construction or the Bureau of Construction and Repair, but 
were almost wholly due to developments in materiel and the insist- 
ence of seagoing officers that certain military features should be 
embodied in the original design, or, subsequently, that changes cover- 
ing same should be made ; and under these last-named conditions the 
changes obviously involved a very considerable " increased cost." 

A brief review of general and specific instances of criticism would 
not be complete without stating explicitly that neither the Bureau 
of Construction and Repair nor the board on construction — so far as 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 97 

the chief constructor can speak for that board as one of its members — 
has the slightest desire to claim immunity from criticism; nor does 
the Bureau of Construction and Repair contend that errors have not 
been made in previous designs, nor that future designs will be fault- 
less. On the contrary, it is fully recognized, in the light of subsequent 
experiments and developments in materiel, that errors have been made 
in the past and doubtless will be made in the future, just so long, in 
fact, as men are fallible and progress continues to be made in mate- 
riel and the training of the personnel. It can be stated, however, with 
the greatest positiveness, that every effort has been made and is now 
being made to have our vessels of war as nearly perfect as contem- 
poraneous knowledge concerning developments in materiel, tactics, 
etc, will permit, and those having full knowledge of all the facts can 
best judge of the results. 

It should be noted that by far the greater portion of the criticism 
received by the various bureaus of the Department is that arising 
from details which might or might not have been otherwise arranged 
in the original design. It is well, however, for critics to bear in 
mind that the bureaus of the Navy Department have in their records 
voluminous correspondence indicating that " many men have many 
minds," and that changes recommended by one commanding officer 
may be strenuously opposed by a successor. For example, the Bu- 
reau of Construction and Repair has been consistently and continu- 
ously opposed to the incorporation in the design of a naval vessel of 
any weights or fittings which are not absolutely essential to the mili- 
tary value and habitability of the vessel and its general efficiency as 
a fighting machine. Instances are frequent, however, of additional 
items, involving an increase of weight, which are installed at the 
request of seagoing officers, despite statement from the Bureau of 
Construction and Repair as to their increasing the weights to be 
carried to a prejudicial degree; and subsequent change of opinion 
has resulted in a recommendation for removal of the same items. 

It is also a noteworthy fact that the highly favored plan of dimin- 
ishing the number of boats carried and the cranes necessary to handle 
such boats; the omission of flying and other bridges wherever possi- 
ble; in fact, the omission of all top hamper and equipage not dis- 
tinctly required for the efficiency of the vessel as a fighting machine 
was previously recommended by the Bureau of Construction and 
Repair — some of the items many years ago — and yet it is only 
recently that the advantage of such elimination of nonessential 
structures and equipage has come to be generally recognized by the 
seagoing element. The records of the Bureau furnish convincing 
proof 01 the foregoing statements, and their accuracy is well known 
to those who have been directly connected with the design of ships. 

The tendency to criticise unduly the work of one of the principal 
designing bureaus of the Na\7' Department has been recognized for 
many years; so much so, in fact, that in the annual report of the 
chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair for 1000, the follow- 
ing very significant comment appears: 

The new regulations of March 28, 1900, make very slight alterations in the 
duties of this Bureau, which, as from Its inception, has to do solely with the 
designing, building, and repairing of ships. In the execution of its duties it 
is charged with by far the greater portion of such mechanical work upon the 

30584— S. Doc. 297, 60-1 7 



P8 AIXEGED DEFECTS TN VESSELS OP HATT. 

vessels of tlie X«vy a^ in not iJlrectly connected witti tUeir propelUug mnehlxiery. 
Its work is carneil out by a toriJ* of srM*ciaU3' trained ofJleers whose entire time 
Is devoted excliiJ^ively iu purely teehuieal and mecbanlcnl matters, and upon 
eompletioa leavers the Bnrt>flii's hands and control entirely and pusses Into the 
charge of atiother corps, who. hQvhig no other reason to be Interested In the 
BUCfeiss of the work than a desire to t>e provided with the most etficient fighting 
macbijie, are generally dispossed to be critical. While, then, the Bureau has at 
times been etuharraaaed by unnecessary and unwarranted criticism and fault* 
finding, real defects are quickly dlBc^jvcrcd, and since whoever discovers them 
baa no esprit de corps or iiernonal interest to inrtnetice hiiu hi glo«s over or 
minimize them— rather the ccmtrary — they quickly coaje to the attentlou of the 
Depjirtment nnd the Bureau has an opporttiulty to correct thenj. Though, for 
thin reason, the Department \^ fipt to hear more than is ik\arranted or merited 
of the defects and abortcondngs in the Bureau's work, the general rejsults are 
beuetleial to the Bureau and to the servk* at large. U Is inevitable that in 
work Involving at the same time such large considerations and compiicsited 
questions, coupled with a vast amount of petty detail, errors, and mlstakea 
should Bometinies be made. These are. bo^vever. s\s pointed out. soon brought to 
light to be corrected in the caue in hand and avoided in the future. 

The present chief constructor desires to add his indorsement to 
the statements alxjve made, and gives his as?^uranco that most care* 
fill consideration will be given to every well-considered criticism 
with respect to matters which come primhrilj under the jurisdiction 
of the Bureau of Construction and Repair; but he must msist that 
such criticism be fair miud(Hl and to the point and that, as far as 
possible, a definite rticommt*ndation h^ made as to the method of 
improvement, having due regard to the other features of the design 
of the ^hip which may thereby be affected. 

The Department having been fully acquainted by its responsible 
advisers with the reasons for fixing upon the exact location of belt 
armor on recent battle ships, further statement in this connection 
aeems umiecessary. Suffice it to say that those who, without a com* 
plete knowledge of all the circumstances of the case, have urged a 
raising of the water-lino hr^lt armor are not supported in their con- 
tention by either theoretical or practical considerations or the prac- 
tice of the principal foreign navies in such matters; and it is, more- 
over, noteworthy that one of the most conspicuous foreign designs 
of battle ships — which has even been alluded to as the battle ship 
par excellence — is reported on good authority to have a greater 
immersion for the lower edge of the water-line belt armor than is 
provided for in any of our battle ships, including those last designed. 

It also does not seem to be appreciated by those who are so willing 
to find fault with the designs of United States naval vessels that 
the direct turret-annnunition hoist previously installed in all our 
battle ships, except those last authorized, was designed by seagoing 
officers and had. at the time of its original design and for many 
years thereafter very definite advantages by reason of rapidity of 
hoist, etc. While this Bureau is not responsible for the turret 
ammunition hoists, but nuist make its design of turret to conform 
thereto, as far as practicable, it does not seem inappropriate to 
invite attention to the fact that the type of turret hoist now so freely 
criticised was installed on battle ships in service during the Spanish- 
American war and, so far as the records indicate, did not elicit any 
unfavorable criticism at that time. Subsequent criticism has un- 
doubtedly been made, but the extensive changes which have since 
been shown to be desirable in view of radical changes in rapidity 
and control of artillery fire can only be made by detaching vessels 



ALLEGED DBFEOTS IN VESSELS OF NAVT. 99 

from the fleet for a very long period — in fact, placing such ships 
out of commission. In view of all the conditions involved, such 
action has not heretofore been considered practicable for reasons 
which are fully known and appreciated by those responsible for the 
mobilization, drill, and movements of the fleet. Moreover, it ia 
common knowledge among the well-informed that safety devices 
installed in handling rooms and in connection with turret-ammuni- 
tion hoists have been in some cases rendered inoperative in order that 
there might thereby be attained a rapidity or ammunition supply 
never contemplated or deemed desirable in the original design. This, 
therefore, is simply another case of great development in materiel, 
introducing new and difficult conditions which can not always be 
inmiediately disposed of. 

The Department has also been fully advised that practically all 
of the important recommendations recently submitted by the turret 
board (which was composed entirely of seagoing officers having 
recent experience in command of turrets) had oeen anticipated 
in the designs of our latest battle ships, these designs having been 
approved many months before the lamentable accident on the 
Georgia^ which was the immediate cause of the convening of the tur- 
ret board. 

In other words, in criticising the materiel of the United States 
Navy, there is an unfortunate — and, I feel warranted in saying, an 
almost inexcusable — ^tendency to ignore the self-evident fact that 
opinions with respect to matters of design which hold good to-day 
may not be at all representative of opinions which were held a few 
years ago, or even one year ago, so that the merit of any design 
must be considered in connection with the state of knowledge of the 
art of design and the development of materiel at the time the design 
was prepared. 

In making the foregoing statements with respect to the responsi- 
bility for certain important features of naval design, and quoting 
in support of these statements official documents pertaining thereto, 
the chief constructor desires to disclaim any intention whatever of 
reflecting upon the methods, motives, or good judgment of any indi- 
vidual or individuals. His sole idea is to present a simple, straight 
forward statement of fact which he hopes will result, in the future, in 
more helpful, judicious, and fair-minded criticism from the service 
at large and trom those who may be influenced by such criticism, 
than has generally been received in the past. 

Before leaving this subject of the method of preparation of the 
designs of naval vessels and the responsibility therefor of various 
bureaus and officials, the chief constructor desires most definitely and 
explicitly to disclaim any intention of evading the slightest particle 
of responsibility for the designs of naval vessels in all matters which. 
directly or indirectly, come within the jurisdiction of the Bureau ot 
Construction and Repair, except in so far as the formal recommenda- 
tions of the chief constructor may have been definitely overruled by 
competent authority. On the contrary, the most complete responsi- 
bility is claimed for every feature of the design of naval vessels 
which comes directly or mdirectly within the jurisdiction of the 
Bureau, and this inevitably includes a large measure of responsibility 
for the character and location of armament, armor, motive machin- 
ery, etc, since the successful development of the design as a whole is 



100 ALLEGED DEFECTS m VESSELS OF NATT* 

vitally affected bv many details which may primarily fall within the 
juriscliction of otlier bureaus. It is hoped, therefore, that ill-advised 
and misinformed apologists will not repeat their efforts to defend the 
Bureau of Construction and Repair by assuming that its responsibil- 
ity; is limited to the design of the bare hull and such auxiliary ma- 
chinety and fittings as come solely within the jurisdiction of that 
Bureau. 

The record of facts hereinbefore set forth ought to remove any 
lingering doubt from the minds of those who might have entertained 
the idm that the views of seagoing officers have been ignored, and 
that they have not been allowed to participate in the determination 
of important features of naval design, and should give conclusive 
confirmation of statements made by seagoing officers of the highast 
rank and mmt extended experience that in no other navy in the world 
has the seagoing officer so great an opportunity to exercise an im- 
portant and direct influence upon w*ar-ship design as he has in the 
United States Navy* 

In view" of the laudatory comments made by many critics upon the 
ideal conditions which governed the design of a certain foreig^i battle 
ship whose principal Matures have occasioned widespread interest, 
the comi>osition of the }>oart1 which piissed upon the salient features 
of this design is mo^t interest ing- This board has been alluded to 
quite frequently as an " ideal board *' from the seagoing officer^s 
point of view ; and a rewnt seagoing critic described it as a board 
composed of *^six oi- seven naval officers, the chief constructor, an 
enginL*cr, and two master workmen of the leading dockyard. An 
ideal board/' The accuracy of this description of the personnel of 
the above-noted board is in keeping with some other recent criticism 
respecting naval matters, since the actual composition of the board 
was as follows : 

Seagoing members. 

1. The first sea lord of the Admiralty. 

2. The naval assistant to the first sea lord. 

3. The controller of the navy. 

4. The naval assistant to the controller. 

5. The director of naval ordnance. 

6. The director of naval intelligence, 

7. The officer in command of torpedo and submarine craft flotillas. 

Nonseagoing mem^hers, 

1. The director of naval construction. 

2. A chief constructor, on duty as assistant to the director of naval 
construction. 

3. The director of the Admiralty experimental tank (an assistant 
to the director of naval construction). 

4. A prominent naval architect (who was also professor of naval 
architecture at Glasgow University). 

5. A prominent designer and builder of torpedo boats. 

6. The engineer-in-chief of the navy. 

7. A prominent marine engineer in civil life. 

8. A most distinguished scientist, formerly professor of physics 
at the University of Glasgow. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 101 

It thus appears that the distinguished nonseagoing gentlemen, 
who formed a majority of the special board on designs, could hardly 
have been in the mind of our ill-informed critic, who referred to 
them as " the chief constructor, an engineer, and two master workmen 
of the leading dockyard." The contrast between this " ideal board " 
and our own special boards, in which an overwhelming majority were 
seagoing line officers, with only the chief constructor and the engineer- 
in-chief (and in the case of the last special board, the Assistant Sec- 
retary of the Navy) to represent the nonseagoing element, is most 
marked, and distinctly refutes the contention of the ill-informed that 
the methods of the United States Navy Department, in all that affects 
the design of ships, involve the suppression of the seagoing element. 
As a matter of actual fact, the board on construction, which is in 
reality the permanent board of design in the United States Navy, 
has a considerably greater proportionate representation of the sea- 
going element in its membership than the " ideal board " noted above. 

In conclusion, it does not seem inappropriate to submit brief com- 
ment concerning that of t-repeatod suggestion as to the necessity of a 
special board on designs in which the seagoing element should be 
predominantly represented, this board to be entirely distinct from, 
and independent of, all Departmental or Bureau influence, save in so 
far as the Secretary of the Navy may see fit to aj^prove or disapprove 
its recommendations. 

The past experience of the Navy Department with special boards 
on design, as evidenced in the case of the designs of the Virginia and 
other vessels, would seem to indicate most clearly and unequivocally 
that the United States Navy Department has now and has had for 
many years (in the board on construction) one of the most logically 
constituted boards on design possessed by any naval power in the 
world, four of the five members of this board holding technical and 
administrative offices of the highest responsibility, specifically pro- 
vided for by statute law. Of the board on construction as now 
constituted, the strictly seagoing element has three representatives, 
while the Bureau of Construction and Repair has only one, although 
the Navy Regulations confide to the last-named Bureau the " respon- 
sibility for the structural strength and stability of all ships built for 
the >iavy; all that relates to the designing, building, fitting, and 
repairing of hulls of ships, turrets, * * * etc." 

Of the seagoing line officers at present serving as members of the 
board on construction the senior has been, in succession. Chief of the 
Bureau of Equipment, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, and Chief 
of the Bureau of Navigation, and. since he is now on the retired list, 
it is hoped it will not seem out oi place to state what is well known 
to the Secretary of the Navy and every officer in the naval service, 
namely, that no officer of the Navy has a more thoroughly deserved 
reputation for ability and faithful performance of duty than that 
enjoyed by the present president of the board on construction. The 
other two seagomg members of the board are chiefs of two bureaus 
whose work is intimately associated with the materiel of the fleet, 
and within their own knowledge, and through their numerous sub- 
ordinates of the seagoing branch, they are intimately in touch with 
all developments in materiel in the fleet. The remaining two mem- 
bers of the board on construction are the engineer- in-chief and the 
chief constructor, whose duties are sufficiently indicated by their 



102 AMiEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

titles of office, and whose official positions and method of appointment 
should save them from any adverse comment as to ability or interest 
in their most exacting professions. 

An extract from a communication prepared for the information 
of the Secretary of the Navy more than three years ago, by one of 
the most distinguished seagoing officers of the Navy, sets forth 
quite clearly the opinion then held by a representative of the sea- 
going branch as to the performance of" duty and the personnel of the 
Board on construction and the excellence of the results obtained 
under the methods of preparing designs in vogue in the United Stat^ 
Navy, The quotation is as follows: 

The board on eoustnietion, !u Its coropoeitlon to-day fAirlj representative 

of what It has been tu the past, is t'Ompt>sted of four line offic^erna and ooe »taff 
officen the elifef constructor. It neaU ouljr a f^liiuce jit tl»e li«t of bureau 
olflcers of the line cou^ijoslng this board to bear wltnei^a to their long experience 
afloat In exeentive duty and coinuinnd, and in thlei Inatimce even the chief con- 
structor l8 not without experient^e with our fleetfi and Kbir*a under war and 
Iteixce conditional. coui>led with extended duty on the bonrti of ioe*r>eotioij and 
survey. 

It may 1^ put down as a general principle that no ship has ever been eon- 
Btrur*ted which does not have defects in the opinion of individuals who find 
certain qualities below the Rtandard Bxed by tbem as nel'essn^j^ Upon the 
yevy principle that the ship tnust meet the oplnkms and crlttcisms of the body 
of the officers of the service Is based the fact la Individual opinion, that 
defleiencles exist here ana there. A battle ship at tbe very best is a eompionilse ; 
annored cruJsers and other ships of the main fleet art* ^>okj promises* to an even 
greater extent. It must be so; and the ship which presents the Kreatest union 
of good Qualities Is the l)est ship to build. In connection with this latter point 
It is interesting to note that in Janets " Fighting Shlpsi of the World/* out of 
tw^cnty-eight battle ships of the fii^t importance — that is, those embracing the 
points of highest " fighting value "—eight are nnder const met ion for England, 
8lx for Fnmce. hvo for Unssia* two for Japan, and ten for the United States. 
of the New Hamfiishtri% Vonnet'tumt and \ew Jerneu classes, aioreover* the 
Id^ho elans, so severely "criticised in some quarters," Is piven place in the 
nest hl^riK--- —':■::. ,.,-.,..,...... -,.... ,-..... .,,,,.,. ,,., y>,y^. .,,..., ,r:^.,,., .,.,..,,.... ^ .,,j^|j 

foreign ships of 15,000 tons displacement in the same rating. In regard to the 
ability of the Idaho and }fissiftMippi to fight their guns in a seaway, their free- 
board forward and the height at which tliey carry their main battery guns is 
almost identical with the heights of similar guns in the Alabama class, all of 
which three ships have excellent sea qualities for fighting or steaming ; and it 
may be remarked that the additional 8-inch guns carried by the Idaho class 
are mounted at about the same height as the forward 12-incli guns, viz, 26 feet 
The system of designing our ships as it thus exists to-day has not. In my opin- 
ion, resulted in the production of inferior ships, and, in fact, ever since the 
design of our New Jersey class foreign efforts to ** go us one better " are 
distinctly traceable in the designs of certain " foreign " ships. ♦ ♦ • 

The foregoing quotation is too clear and explicit to need comment 
from the chief constructor other than that the personnel of the 
board on construction, with one exception, is the same to-day as it 
was three years ago, and its members have the added experience 
resulting from three years of intimate as.sociation with all that relates 
to the materiel of the Navy and the design of naval vessels. After 
a very long personal acquaintance with the various members of the 
present board on construction and an intimate official association of 
four years with the majority of his colleagues now on the board, it 
is a matter of especial satisfaction to the chief constructor to invite 
the Department's attention to the fact that in all important questions 
of design which have arisen during the past four years there has been 
absolute agreement as to essentials. This does not mean that the 
members of the board on construction are in the slightest degree 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 103 

lacking in strong individual opinions, because there have been at 
times very definite differences of opinion. It does mean, however, 
that the present board on construction has, through the mutual 
respect and confidence of its members, been able to consider without 

Prejudice and strictly upon their merit all questions which may have 
een referred to it for consideration; and after complete and thor- 
ough investigation, there has been little difficulty in reaching a satis- 
factory and unanimous conclusion or all important questions, espe- 
cially those involving the principal features of war-ship design. 

The officials composing the board on construction are, by the very 
nature of their duties, intimately in touch with all that pertains to 
the materiel of our Navy, including the ships of the fleet, their arma- 
ment, batteries, motive and auxiliary machinery, and all their equip- 
ments and equipage. The bureau chiefs who are members of that 
board have under their immediate control all of the seagoing and 
other personnel and technical equipment necessary to assist them in 
the most important work devolving upon them as members of a 
board on designs* It is believed, thereiore, that the board on con- 
struction is unusually well qualified to pass upon all questions per- 
taining to the design and equipment of naval vessels ; that no other 
practicable combination of officers could possibly bring to the exact- 
ing task of supervision of naval design the experience, technical 
knowledge, and facilities for such work as are now possessed by the 
board on construction and the bureaus under the immediate control 
of its constituent members; and many who have definite and accurate 
knowledge of the work performed by that board under past adminis- 
trations believe that its record can be viewed with pardonable pride 
by those whose labors have so greatly contributed to its success in all 
matters affecting the design of our naval vessels. 

It is therefore a real satisfaction to the present chief constructor 
to be able to testify that, despite the statements of irresponsible 
and ill-informed critics ; despite the minor mistakes which have been 
and will continue to be made so long as men are human and liable 
to error; despite the unfortunate results accruing from changes 
recommended by those whose merely casual connection with war-ship 
design and whose knowledge of the underlying principles relating 
thereto was wholly insufficient to enable them to speak with authority 
on the most important questions of design ; despite all of the inherent 
disadvantages under which war-ship designs are developed, on 
account of the necessary compromises which must always be made in 
adjusting radical differences of opinion of seagoing andf other officers 
as to the proper value which should be assigned to the various ele- 
ments which, when properly combined into one harmonious whole, 
result in the production of the most efficient fighting machine pos- 
sible; despite all of the foregoing, the chief constructor repeats that 
it is a real satisfaction to bear testimony to the splendid achieve- 
ments of his predecessors in office and their colleagues on the board 
on construction, which have resulted in the United States Navy being 
now possessed of a battle-ship fleet which commands the admiration 
of the well-informed naval critics of all countries, and which, ship 
for ship, taking each in its own period of design, is believed to be 
unexcelled by any known " fleet in being." 



104 ALLEGED DEFECT6 IN VESSELS OF NATT. 

t.X>fiFS OF NAVAL CON8TKUCT0K8* 

Rec42ijt criticbjTi with respect to the designs of vessels of the United 
States Navy gave gt*eat prominence to the claim tliat those respon- 
sible for the designs of ships weixi not in direct touch with the sea- 
going element of the service and that the resultant designs clearly 
demonstratecl the nonparticipation of the seagoing element in all 
esj^^ntial matter;^ relating thereto. 

The chief constructor is of the opinion that he has sufficientlj 
proved, in another section of this report, the wholly unwarranted 
character of these statements so far as they concern the nonparticipa- 
tion of seagoing officers in the design of naval vessels. It now only 
remains to describe in general terms the personnel of the corps of 
naval constnjctors and the manner in which that corps has been 
recruited during the past twenly-eight years in order to show con- 
clusively bow very closely they are in touch with the seagoing 
element, so far as concerns all matters of ship design, ship equi- 
pagCj etc. 

Tho construction corps was formerly composed of officers w*ho 
received their appointments from civil life aft^er having passed suit- 
able examinations, indicating that they were quahfied for the posi- 
tion of naval constructor or a?^sistant naval constructor. This method 
of recruiting the construction corps was in vogue until 1875. Some 
time thereafter it was decided by the Navy Department that it 
would be greatly to the benefit of the naval service to have officers 
of the construction corps specially educated therefor, and that it 
would be wise to take advantage of a long- neglected statute which 
authorized the Department to select for a special post-graduate 
course in naval architecture a limited number of graduates of the 
United States Naval Acadeni}^ who had completed with distinction 
their academic cour^^e. especially itj the ^cientifir and mechanical 
branches. The advocates of this system laid special stress upon the 
desirability of having officers of the construction corps educated 
under the same conditions and in the identical course of stud- 
ies pursued by officers ultimately intended for the seagoing branch 
of the service. It was also claimed, and with justice, that such a 
training would imbue them wnth " service ideas " and qualify them 
more effectively for future work in cooperation with their brother 
officers of the seagoing element. In 1871). therefore, the Navy 
Department made the first detail of officers under this new system. 
So satisfactorily did the new arrangement develop that in 1892, 
thirteen years after the inauguration of this system of recruiting 
the construction corps, the Secretary of the Navy, in his annual 
report for that year, made the following significant comments con- 
cerning the personnel of that branch of the naval service: 

The Department, in referring to tlie extent and character of the work done 
by the Bureau of Construction in tlie rebuilding of the Navy, desires to caU 
special attention to the important assistance rendered by the young constructors 
of the Navy. As far back as 1879 It was wisely decided, in view of the great 
changes taking place in naval architecture, in which this country had borne 
no part, to select from the most promising graduates of the Naval Academy a 
few each year who could, under the liberal arrangements made by certain 
foreign governments, aaiulre a complete professional training in modem naval 
construction at the best schools in the world. 

Eightj'-five per cent of the maxiimun marlc for the four years' course was 
fixed as the lowest limit for candidates for this special training. The students 



ALUSGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 105 

have been assigned to the various schools at Greenwich, Paris, and Glasgow, 
and have had additional advantages for the observation of practical worls of 
public and private establishments, which have shown tlie utmost desire to fur- 
nish all possible facilities to the United States constructors. The work per- 
formed by these students under the supervision of the naval attaches, as indi- 
cated by their standing at the institutions they have attended, has been In the 
highest degree successful. The small amount which the Government has ex- 
pended in their education has been returned to it fifty-fold by the zeal, ability, 
and knowledge which they have brought to the service, and which have con- 
tributed materially to the economy and perfection of design shown in the work. 

Except that since 1901 student officers intended for the construc- 
tion corps of the United States Na\^^ have been sent to American 
instead of foreign colleges, the system inaugurated in 1879 continued 
without serious interruption until the summer of 1902. For the next 
eighteen months no assignments of graduates of the Naval Academy 
were made for special instruction with a view to ultimate transfer to 
the construction corps, on account of the great scarcity of seagoing 
officers available for such assignment. In the winter of 1903, how- 
ever, the needs of the construction corps were so urgent, in view of the 
large number of resignations which had taken place and the small 
number of officers available for current work, that the Secretary of 
the Navy, at the instance of the Chief of the Bureau of Construction 
and Repair, went thoroughly into the subject of filling vacancies then 
existing in the construction corps, and after consultation with the 
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, approved the recommendation 
of the chief constructor that final selection of candidates for transfer 
from the line to the construction corps be made after such candidates 
had had experience on seagoing vessels of the Navy subsequent to 
graduation, thus permitting their cruise reports and general aptitude 
tor the service to be considered, as well as their Academic standing 
at graduation. It was also decided by the Department that the ap- 
plications of all candidates should be referred to the chief constructor 
Tor such recommendation as might seem desirable in the premises, 
and that recommendations to fill vacancies should be submitted in 
like manner. 

Since 1903 the procedure outlined above has been followed, and 
the Department has assigned each year, for a special post-graduate 
course in naval architecture, with a view to subsequent transfer to the 
construction corps, a suitable number of specially selected graduates 
of the Naval Academy who have had service at sea. Nearly all of 
the officers so assigned have completed a full tour of sea service sub- 
sequent to graduation, and the majority have received their commis- 
sions as ensigns prior to their assignment to duty in connection with 
the special post-graduate course in naval architecture. 

Referring to the above-noted arrangement for filling vacancies in 
the construction corps, the Secretary of the Navy, in his annual report 
for 1904, made the following statement : 

The Department desires to invite attention to that portion of the chief con- 
structor's report which relates to the personnel of the corps of naval constructors. 
As noted in a former report of one of my predecessors, tliis corps, since 1879, 
has been recruited from graduates of the Naval Academy, and at the present 
time the active list is entirely composed of such graduates. The system inau- 
gurated in 1879 has proved to be of tlie greatest advantage to the naval service, 
and the method of recruiting the construction corps then begun should be con- 
tinued. 

During the past few years, however, the great inducements offered in civil 
life have been such as to cause the resignation of a considerable percentage of 



106 AIXEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

the officers of the eonstnictloD corps, thus making it stid more difficult for th« 

reniiiiuing i>ersoai3el to carry out the duties devolvhig nimn ttieni, * * * 

Under the Department's generous recognition of the urgent neces- 
sity of filling vacancies in the construction corps as early as practica- 
blCj there now remain only eight vacancies. In view, however, of the 
large number under instruction, including five not vet actually trans- 
ferred to the construction corps, there are available for duty only a 
little more than two- thirds of the total strength of the corps as fixed 
by law. Moreover, of the officers acluftlly available for duty, more 
than 30 per cent have had only a comparatively limited experience 
in the active professional work of the construction corps, despite the 
fact that tliey have been from eight to ten years in the naval service, 
including their servi<!e at the Naval Academy and with the fleet snh- 
sequent to graduation. It is thus cleiarly apparent that the volume of 
work which has devolved upon the more experienced members of the 
corps has been very great indeed. 

Each year that passes, however, will add to the ability of this 
branch of tlie service to satisfactorily deal with the large amount 
of work devolving upon it without necessitating such excet^sive 
demands upon the time and energies of the senior officers of the 
corps as is now inevitable* It should, however,- be borne in mind 
that the good results which have been attained in the past and which 
have been the subject of such favorable comment by your prede- 
cessors, despite the comparatively small numl>er of officers available 
for this important work* have' l>een due wholly to the earnest, 
unselfish, and devoted attention to duty of the individual membei's 
of the corps of naval constructors* In Hie discharge of the exacting 
duties which have devolved upon them under these difficult condi* 
tions, these officers have not spared themselves in the slightest degree, 
and, as a result of this unusual demand upon their physical endur- 
ance, the Bureau has during the Inst few years lo?^t the services, 
permanently or temporarily, of some of its most experienced officers. 

While the chief constructor deems it to be a part of his official 
duty to accept responsibility and be accountable for such work under 
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Construction and Repair as may 
not have given entire satisfaction, he desires that the construction 
corps as a whole, and its individual members, should receive 
full and complete recognition for the excellent work performed by 
them under disadvantageous and ofttimes most discouraging con- 
ditions; and no one knows better than the present Chief of Bureau 
how very discouraging these conditions have been, especially in view 
of the many changes in personnel, not only in the corps of naval 
constructors, but in the civilian staff, the changes in the clerical staff 
of the Bureau alone having been more than 44 per cent during the 
past two years and a half. 

At the conclusion of a four years' tour of duty as Chief of the 
Bureau of Construction and Repair, under conditions which have 
been at times especially trying, through various circumstances not 
here necessary to enumerate, the chief constructor desires to express 
to the Department his profound appreciation of the devoted and 
loyal cooperation of his colleagues of the construction corps, and 
especially those who have constituted his immediate assistants in 
the Bureau of Construction and Repair at Washington. No officer 
could possibly have had more loyal assistance and support from his 



ALIiBGED DBPBOTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 107 

prof^sional coUea^es wherever stationed, but since nearly all have 
contributed, by faithful performance of duties assigned them, to 
such success as has been achieved, individual commendation is 
deemed inappropriate. Having personal knowledge of the serious 
pecuniary sacrifices which have been made by some in order that 
they might remain in the Government service, and a keen apprecia- 
tion of the arduous and exacting work which has been so cheerfully 
and successfully performed by all, the chief constructor hopes that 
the Department will jnake such reference to the work of the officers 
of the construction corps as may appear to be warranted by the 
actual results achieved, it being noted in this connection that the 
exacting technical and administrative duties which have fallen to 
the lot of this small group of officers have covered work of a most 
diversified character, whose aggregate cost during the past four 
years has been considerably more than $100,000,000. 



Appendix XIII. 

TO ACCOKPAinr REPORT OF THE CHIEF C0H8TRUCT0R OF THE HAYT DT REIUL- 
TIOH TO ALLEGED DEFECTS DT BATTLE 8HIF8 OF THE U. 8. HAYT 8UB1IITTBD 
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE HAYT OH FEBRVART 14, 1008. 

[No. 11.] 

THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS. 

Tuesday, January 21, 1908, 

The Committee this day met, Hoq. Oeo. E. Toss in tke chair, 

STATEMEHT OP WASHIHOTOH LEE CAPPS, CHIEF CONSTRUCTOR 
AHD SEAE-ADMIBAL, CHIEr BUREAU OP COHSTRUCTIOH AMD 
SEPAIB — Continued. 

The Chairman. You have doubtless seen from time to time Ib 
the papers allegations of grave defects in vesselB of the United States 
Navv, particularly as regards the location of the water-line armor, 
height of freeboard, etc. While many of these criticisms are obvi- 
ou^y without any real foundation in fact* there has recently appeared 
in a monthly magazine an article entitled "^The needs of the Navy'' 
which purports to be based upon fact, and nothing but fa^t, the 
author stating that the alleged facts can be readily verified by refer- 
ence to official documents and the opinion of practically all seagoing 
naval officers. The committee understands that you are preparing 
a statement as to the real facts covering the disputed points, out we 
would be glad to have you give us such information as you can with 
reference to these matters. 

Admiral Capps. In the first place, I think that it would be advisable 
to give the committee a brief outline of the procedure followed in de- 
signing a battle ship. To begin with, it must be understood that the 
essential elements which must be provided for in any successful bat- 
tle-ship design are seaworthiness and stability under all conditions; 
protection of stability by means of armor, etc.; protection of ma- 
chiner}^, magazines, and gun emplacements; suitable armament, 
speed, coal endurance, etc. From the earliest days of war-ship design 
tne relative degree of importance to be given to each of the qualities 
above noted has been different as viewed by different designers and 
others concerned. Therefore those who regard speed as perhaps the 
most important element are always dissatisned if armor or armament 
is given precedence, and those who favor excessive batteries are dis- 
satisfied if too much displacement is devoted to propelling machinery; 
and both battery and machinery devotees are dissatisfied if what they 
regard as an undue proportion of the available displacement is de- 
voted to the protection of the ship's stability; and so on through the 
whole range of possible and probable combinations of the various 
elements which are essential to the development of a satisfactory 
battle-ship design. In other words, there is uYiavoidable conflict of 
J08 



ALIiBGED DBPBOTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 109 

opinion among those whose experience and knowledge are worthy of 
greatest consideration as to what is the best compromise combination 
of qualities to be embodied in the design of a battle ship. Necessarily, 
then, the final development must always be a compromise based upon 
experience and the best information obtainable, and the naval con- 
structor is compelled, in the end, to limit the development of any par- 
ticular element to the actual weight and space which can be devoted 
to that purpose. 

In view of the very erroneous opinions entertained by many as to 
the methods of developing war-ship designs in the United States 
Navy, the Secretary of the Navy recently authorized the chief con- 
structor to incorporate in his annual report for 1907 a description of 
the procedure followed in preparing designs of navel vessels during 
the past ten years. The chief constructor accordingly set forth at 
some length m that document the exact procedure followed, and 
since, I presume, the members of the committee have already read 
this report, I shall do little more than allude to it in this hearing. 
Under the section of the chief constructor's report above alluded to 
there are paragraphs which fully met, in advance, some of the criti- 
cisms which have recently been given such wide circulation, though 
only casual allusion was made to other criticisms. Such criticism 
as mdicated that the seagoing element of the Navy was not sufii- 
ciently consulted in determinmg the general military and seagoing 
characteristics of war ships was, however, most fully and completely 
dealt with, and it is beUeved that those who have read that portion 
of the chief constructor's last annual report dealing with this sub- 
ject will have no possible difficulty in arriving at a true realization 
of the facts in the case. The comments of the chief constructor, 
above alluded to, will be found on pages 14 to 49 of the annual report 
of the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair for the fiscal 

irear ending June 30, 1907, so that I shall not detam the committee 
onger by giving consideration to that particular phase of the sub- 
ject of war ship design. 

Mr. HoBSON. Please state briefly the qualifications of naval con- 
structors to know the seagoing necessities of a ship. . 

Admiral Caffs. With your permission I will refer the committee 
to my last annual report for particulars of the method of recruiting 
and training members of the corps of naval constructors during the 
past twenty-eight years, these comments appearing on pages 52 to 55 
of the ''Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair 
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1907.'' To reply briefly, however, 
to Mr. Hobson's question, I may state that the corps of naval con- 
structors of the United States Navy is now composed entirely of 
fraduates of the U. S. Naval Academy who have been selected, as 
escribed by several Secretaries of the Navy in their annual reports, 
on account of high academic standing and special attainments. 
Secretary of the Navy Tracy, in his annual report for 1892, made the 
following comments in describing the great benefit which has accrued 
to the Navy through the methods adopted bv his predecessors in 
selecting officers for transfer to the corps of naval constructors. 
General Tracy reported as follows : 

The Department, in referring to the extent and character of the work done by the 
Bureau of Construction in the rebuilding of the Navy, desires to caU special attention 
to the important assistance rendered by the young confltructors of the Navy. As far 



110 AliLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OT KAVT. 

back aa 1879 it waa wisely decidfid, in view of the great changee taking plftoe in naval 
architecture, in which ihh country had borne no part, to select fn>m thfi moat promis- 
ing graduates of the Naval A cad amy a few each year who could, under the liheml 
arrangf»mentfl made by certain foreign govemmenta, acquire a complete profeflsionaJ 
training in modem naval construction at the best sehoola in the world* 

Eighty-five j>er cent of the maximum mark for the four years' course was fixed aa 
the lowest limit for candidate for this special training. The i^tudents have been 
assigned to the various school at Greenwich, PariSj and Glaag<:>w and have had addi- 
tional advantajges for the observ'ation of practical work of public and private eetab- 
Hahments, which have shown the utmost desire to furnish all poeeiblci facilities to 
the United Btatee conatructors. The work performed by these students under the 
supervision of the naval attach^, as indicated by their standing at the iniftitutions 
they have attended, hm been in the high^^t d€|jee micceesful. The small amount 
which the Government has expended in their ed&cation has been returned to it 5fty- 
fold by the xeal, ability, and knowledge which they have brought to the service and 
which have contributed materially to the economy and perfection of design shown in 
the work. 

Sinc^ 1892 other Secretaries have made special comment on the 
valuable services performed by the corps of naval constructors and of 
the desirability of continuing a method of selection which has pro- 
duced such excellent reaults, and in his annual report for the last 
fiscal year Secretary Metcalf comments as follows concerning the 
corps of naval constructors: 

While appreciating the excellent work done in all branches of the naval service, I 
am prompted by certain recent comment with respect to the method of pieparinf 
designs of naval vessels to emphasize my sincere appreciation of the work done by the 
highly trained corps of naval const nictors. The officers composing tbia corps are 
chosen from the foremost membera of their res|>ective clflssea at the Nav^al Academy; 
they are eent to sea and are afterwards |B:iven a specialized couree of study at home or 
abroad. I know of no body of men better equipped by thorough preliminary training 
for the duties devolvinij^ upon them. 

The result of this adniirabie technical equipment is that niany of the«e officers have 
been tempted by offers of higher remuneration than a career in the Navy holds to 
leave the service, and some former mem bare of the eoTpa are now eugag>ed in the 
employ of private fihipbuildtng concerns in supervieiag the construction by contract 
of iinp'_rl:iij:t \ ef^feb: ci the iiiiw S:i\'y. 

Peculiarly fitted as our ship designers are for the work they have in hand, we have, 
nevertheless, in the past made some mistakes; but these, when discovered, have been 
promptly rectified. Such is the history of naval construction under foreign govern- 
ments as well as our own. We have no monopoly of errors in warship designs. On 
the whole, I believe that the members of the construction corps of the United States 
Navy have greater opportunity for keeping in touch with the reauirements of the fleet 
and the views of seagoing officers than is possessed by any similar corps in any other 
navy. 

The limited number of officers in the corps of naval constructors has made it auite 
impracticable, however, to assign such officers to duty with the fleet as frequently as 
the Department and the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair might desire; 
but I have decided to approve the chief constructor's recommendations that not lesfc 
than two officers of the construction corps accompany the battle-ship fleet and the 
torpedo-boat flotilla on their voyage from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast. The 
officers 80 detailed will be in a position to obtain and transmit to the Department, for 
the information of the technical bureaus concerned, valual)le professional data with 
respect to the performance of the various types of ships composing the fleet under 
actual service, seagoing conditions, including target practice. 

Many of the earlier selections of graduates of the Naval Academy 
for transfer to the construction corps were not made until such officers 
had had two or more years' serv ice at sea subsequent to graduation 
from the Naval Academy, and for several years past such sea service, 
subsequent to graduation, has been regarded as essential before 
an officer can be considered eligible for assignment to a special course 
of instruction in naval architecture preliminar}^ to transfer to the con- 
struction corps. 



AliliEOED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. Ill 

Until 1902, all officers transferred to the construction corps, with 
one single exception, were given a special course of instruction in 
naval architecture in either Great Britain, France, or Germany. 
Since 1902 they have been given a special three years^ course in naval 
architecture at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, this course 
having been specially arranged to meet the requirements of the Navy 
Department and for the exclusive benefit of officers destined for the 
corps of naval constructors of the United States Navy. 

It will thus be seen that officers of the corps of naval constructors 
receive not only the most excellent training afforded by a full course 
at the Naval Academy, but prior to assignment to the corps have a 
substantial amoimt of service at sea, and subsequently receive the 
best possible technical training which the Government can provide; 
and, after from nine to ten years^ service in the Navy, and trie most 
complete preparation for their special work, they are ready to begin 
their active professional career as members of the corps of naval con- 
structors. Thereafter their attention is entirely and continuously 
devoted to the highly specialized work of their corps. In due course 
they are assigned to duty as subordinate officers or heads of the de- 

gartment of construction and repair; also to duty in the Bureau of 
onstruction and Repair in the Navy Department; also duty as super- 
intending constructors or assistant superintending constructors of 
vessels being built under contract for the Navy; also membership on 
. various technical boards, including the Board of Inspection and Sur- 
vey, this last-named board being one especially authorized by law 
and having under its jurisdiction the trials and final acceptance of 
all vessels built for the Navy, also the periodic inspection of other 
vessels of the Navy. Naval constructors are also liable to assign- 
ment afloat, and although the limited number of officers in the con- 
struction corps has made it impracticable to assign such officers to 
sea duty as often as could be desired, there are three officers of the 
construction corps now on duty with the battle-ship fleet and torpedo- 
boat-destroyer flotilla. 

It is therefore entirelv evident that the range of duty and experi- 
ence of the officers of the corps of naval constructors of the United 
States Navy are most unusual, and I believe it is no exaggeration 
to state that in no navy in the world have officers performing similar 
duties had such unusually complete and continuous experience, not 
only in the specialized technical work of *' naval design," but also 
in actual experience as seagoing oflScers on ships of various types. 

Mr. HoBSON. Please state how many years the present chief con- 
structor has been at sea. 

Admiral Capps. About three years and a half, not including the 
time spent at sea and valuable experience obtained concerning the 
performance of vessels under seagoing conditions while a member 
of the Board of Inspection and Survey. 

To return to the consideration of designs of vessels in the United 
States Navy: As I said before,* the general method of preparing 
designs has been fully set forth in the last annual report of the 
Bureau of Construction and Repair, and it has been clearly shown 
that the seagoing element has oeen given every consideration and 
has been aflfordea ample opportunity to express its opinions as to 
military features of our battle ships. 



113 AliLEOED DUFBCTB IN VESSELS OP NAVY* 

Those questions relatiDg to cortaiu featurps of war-ship design, 
which have come to the front most prominentlv during the last few 
montlis and which definitely affect the work ol the Bureau of Con- 
struction and Repair, and which have been given first consideration 
in a recent magazine article, are diMrihuHonm vMer-line armor, JteigM 
of free boards and iieight of gun axes. For the present^ therefore, I 
shall confine my attention to those particular subjects. 

As these are questioosj of the f^eatest importance in war-ship 
design and have always received nn3st thorougli and complete atten- 
tion, not only in our own but in all im|)ortant navies, I am going to 
refer at length to a historic discussion which took place in London 
about nineteen years ago in connection with the design of a battle 
ship which has since been regarded as a 'typical desi^/' sine^ the 
free board of this vessel and water-line armor distribution (with such 
variations as were necessarily consequent under development in 
naval matMel) have been generally followed in all battle ships of the 
British navA^ up to the design of the iJreadmnighi: and even in the 
last-named vessel the increase in free board forward is a logical devel- 
opment based upon the great increase in length, the finenass of water 
lines, and corresponding decrease in buoyancy at extremities of ves* 
sel, developments wliicn have been necessary" in order to obtain such 
a great increase in armament and speeii. It will be subsequently 
shown, howeverj that the Japanese, whose experience in naval war- 
fare under modern conditions is certainly not excelled by that of any^ 
other nation, have been content to retain a moderate free board 
forward in their recently designed battle ships of great length and 
high speed. 

In 18S8 and 1889 the British Admiralty was subjected to especially 
severe criticism in relation to its sliipbuilding programme, types of 
ships, etc, and the newspaper and other attacks were quite similar 
to those which have ftpi>efired recently in cnnnfrtinTi \v\{}i thf* ifinf/nd 
of our own Navy. There was one marked difference, however, since, 
in the attack on the materiel of the British Na^"^' the severest criti- 
cism came from the technical side, one of the most outspoken critics 
of the Admiralty at that time being a former director of naval con- 
struction. The questions of "water-line protection," ''height of free- 
board," and other essential quaHties of battle ships were earnestly 
discussed ever}' where, and the comparatively low freeboard of the 
Camperdown and Trafalgar classes (vessels whose designs immediately 
preceded those then under consideration) were freely criticised in 
connection with criticism of the designs of the proposed new ships 
of the Royal Sovereign chiss. In preparing the designs of this class 
of battle ships, the then l)oard of admiralty, which was composed of 
some of the most distinguished officers of the British nay\', deter- 
mined to go into the matter most thoroughly. The director of naval 
construction was therefore directed to prepare several alternative 
designs, embodying the various features which different groups of 
seagoing officers considered essential. After these "general" or 
'^ sketch" designs were prepared, the board of admiralty invited cer- 
tain distinguished naval officers who had been in command of fleets 
and had recently returned from sea duty, also other prominent naval 
officers on duty in London, to view and discuss the ])lans, and every- 
one was given full opnortvmity to make such criticism as seemed 
appropriate. The final and practically unanimous result of all this 



ALIiBGBD DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 113 

criticism was the adoption of a design from which ships of the Royal 
Sovereign class were subsequently built, the freeboard forward of 
these vessels being one complete deck height greater than that of the 
battle ships of the British navy which had immediately preceded 
them. The Royal Sovereign class had its four heavy guns mounted 
in two barbettes, one forward and one aft, with a broadside battery 
of ten 6-inch guns distributed on two decks. The axes of the highest 
turret guns were 25 feet above the water hne ; the axes of the lowest 
tier of broadside guns were 14 feet above the water hne. The free- 
board forward was 18 feet. All of the above-noted heights were 
from the water Une of the vessel on the designed normal load displace- 
ment with only about 900 out of 1,800 tons of coal in the bunkers. 
An alternative design of battle ship was also proposed by the Admi- 
ralty, although not generally approved by the board of admiralty* 
The alternative design provided for turrets instead of barbettes y and 
had considerably less freeboard forward than the Royal Sovereign^ 
Oidy one vessel of this type was subsequently built. 

When the Admiralty designs had reached this stage, some idea 
of their characteristics became known to the pubUc, .and imme- 
diately severe attacks were made upon certain of their features, these 
critical articles being, in many instances, signed by those making 
them and appearing in the London Times. The du-ector of naval 
construction requested and obtained the permission of the Admi- 
ralty to prepare a complete description of tne proposed designs then 
under consideration, with profuse illustrations; this paper, with its 
diagrams, gave full information concerning the points at issue and 
was presented for discussion at the spring meeting of the Institution 
of Naval Architects in 1889. The Institution of Naval Architects 
is unquestionably the largest and most representative body of pro- 
fessional naval architects m the world; it has among its membership 
not only naval architects of all countries, but a large number of sea- 
going officers of British and other navies, and the papers of great 
technical value which are read and discussed at its meetings usually 
eUcit thorough and valuable criticism from the best-known and most 
experienced experts. The unusually complete discussion of the 
Royal Sovereign designs, covering as it does the very points recently 
raised with respect to alleged defects in our own ships, is especially 
interesting. Tne Royal Sovereign is a vessel longer tnan any battle 
ship we have in the Atlantic Fleet to-day, with the exception of the 
Virginia and Connecticut classes, and is only shghtly inferior in 
len^h to the Virginia. Her beam is also greater than that of any 
of me vessels of the Atlantic Fleet except the Virginias and Connect- 
icuts and is only slightly less than the beam of those vessels. Her 
displacement is also greater than that of any of the vessels of the 
Atlantic Fleet except the Virginias- smd Connecticuts and is only 
slightly inferior to the displacement of the vessels of the Virginia 
class. Also, her speed of 17^ knots is only slightly inferior to that 
of battle ships of our own and other services which were designed 
during the dozen or more years immediately following the date of her 
design and was regarded as unusually high at that time. As pre- 
viously stated^ the freeboard forward of the Royal Sovereign we^a a 
whole deck height ^eater than that of the battle ships of the British 
navy which luui immediately preceded her. Her displacement^ 
speed,, and armor protection were also a distinct advance upon those 
305S4— S. Doc 297, 60-1 8 



114 AU^EGID DEFECTS IN TEBSmJS OF NAVY. 

of any battle ship previously designed for the British navy. It vnR 
be very interesting to note/therefore» the highly Jauclatorv comment 
made upon the general eharact eristics of this vessel from the seagoing 
officers' point of view, since the general behavior of the sea has not 
changed one particle since the Royal Soverei^jn was desi^jned, and 
the necessity for a certain character of water-line armor distribution 
And a certain height of freeboard was quite as definite at that time 
as it is to-day. 

In passing!^ it may be noted that the freeboard forward of the Royal 
Scwereujn is less than that of any vessel of the Atlantic battle-ship fleet 
except the Kfarmrge and Kfiitucl-y, '1 he heights of the for^vard gun 
axes are also less, and the height of the lower tier of broadside gun 
»x*^ is ako less, all nieasiirements in this conneetion being baseti upon 
designed load waterline. In this connection, it may be well also to 
note that there is a very general tendency among inexjierienced and 
ignorant critics to compare gun heights, Ireeboards, etc.t of American 
battle ships at deep load disphicement with corresponding tigures for 
foreign battle ships at normal or demfimd load displacement, a vei'y 
obviously jerroneous and wholly unfair method of criticism. It m 
also worthy of note that although the lovier edge of the main water 
line belt armor of the Royttl Sm^ereiifu was 5 feet 6 inches below the 
waterline at di-signed loacl draft, this immersion is more than inches 
deeper than that of the lower edge of the main waterline Indt armor 
of the majority of our battle ships at their designed displacement. 
The narrowness of this )>plt and insufficient sul>mension below the 
normal load waterline was adversely commented npnii by several 
distingnished naval arcliitects, particularly Sir Edward Reed, so 
that at tliat time Sir William Wliite had to defend liiinself against 
the use of what was styled by some a narrow walfrline Wit, altli<^ugli 
it was unanimously agreed hj the seagoing element in its criticism 

thjit tJif ^vidfh nf }yr\i Tisird 1>A Rtr AYminTH Whih* \\ n^ siifTrrJrut i-rtn- 

sidering the many compromises which had to be made, and the utter 
impossibility of having an unlimited amount of armor for protection 
of the vessel without the sacrifice of other more important qualities. 
This point should be borne carefnlly in mind when considering recent 
criticism of the foo great sul)mergence of the lower edge of tlie main 
waterline belt armor of American battle ships, this submergence being 
in all cases less than that of the lower edge of the main waterline belt 
armor of the Rm^al Sovereign. 

Mr. Loud. AVhat width was the armor? 

Admiral Capps. Plight feet 6 inches, or 5 feet 6 inches below the 
water line and 8 feet above the water line when the vessel was at her 
normal load displacement with 000 tons of coal on board. 

Mr. Roberts. How did the width of the above waterline compare 
with ours? 

Admiral Capps. The height of the upper edge of the main water- 
line belt armor of the Connecticut class above the designed load water- 
line is 4 feet 3 inches, that of the Royal Sovereign being 3 feet. The 
width of the belt armor above the waterline belt of the Royal Sover- 
eign class was 7 feet and its thickness 5 inches, whereas the width 
of corresponding armor of the Connecticut class was 14 feet with 
thickness varying from 6 to 7 inches; the corresponding armor of 
all vessels subsequent to the Connecticut class being at least 7 
inches in thickness. In fact, the thickness of the side belt armor 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. . 115 

immediately above the main waterline belt armor on the South 
Carolina and Michigan^ Delaware and North Dakota, is only 1 inch 
less than that of the main waterline belt armor, being 10 inches thick at 
the bottom and 8 inches thick at the top. In every respect the armor 
distribution on the Royal Sovereign cJass is inferior to that on all of 
our recent battle ships. A great deal of the superiority in armor 
protection of our recently designed battle ships as compared with 
armor protection of the Royal Sovereign class is, however, obviously 
due to the great developments in armor manufacture which have 
taken place since the design of the Royal Sovereian. 

Mr. KoBERTS. The height of the armor on the Royal Sovereign 
above the water line was substantially the same height as the heaviest 
armor on our ships ? 

Admiral Capps. The height of the upper edge of the heavy water- 
line belt above the designed waterline was less than that of the upper 
edee of main waterline belt armor on most of our battle ships and 
dia not exceed in height any of the others. 

One of the principal causes of error and confusion in criticising the 
location of armor belts on our battle ships and the submersion or the 
lower edge below the water line is undoubtedly due* to a misunder- 
standing (>f the terms ^^load displacement '^ and ''deep load disjylace- 
mentJ^ The sensational statements concerning the alleged improper 
location of our water-line armor have little if anv foundation in fact. 
It is wholly improper and unfair to compare the location of the upper 
edge of the water-line armor of our ships when they are completely 
filled with stores, coal, ammunition, etc., with the location of the 
upper edge of water line of foreign ships when they have on board less 
than half their bunker capacity of coal and only a portion of their 
stores, ammimition, etc. The difference in draft between the load 
and deep load condition varies approximately from IJ feet to 2 J feet 
for our battle ships and a corresponding nniount for foreign battle 
ships. 

Returning to the particulars and discussion of the designs of the 
Royal Sovereign class, I consider them worthy of most careful con- 
sideration since they cover explicitly points now raised with respect 
to our own ships, the necessity for adeejuate height of freeboard and 
gun axes and depth of water-line belt armor submergence being as 
great at the time of the cordial approval of the Royal Sovereign designs 
as it is to-dav. 

The sketch plans and description of the Royal Sovereigrx, as previ- 
ously noted, were presented at a (::athoring of distinguished naval 
officers and others in London in April, 1887, and the naval contingent 
had a field day. Practically every naval officer of ])rominence in 
London was there and the discussion was most animated; but the 
practically unanimous verdict of the naval officers present was that 
the seagoing element had at last ohtained a design that met the require^ 
ments of those who wovld have to command the ships in battle. Some 
of the comments of the seagoing element were so very pointed and 
laudatory that I shall beg your indulgence and submit a few brief 
extracts from remarks made by the following well-known British 
naval officers and others : 

Lord Armstrong, a most distinguished inventor and gun maker 
and founder of the well-known gun factory and shipbuilding plant 
at Newcastle-on-Tyne; Capt. (now Admiral) Lord Charles Beresford, 



116 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

whose reputation at the present day is too well kno\im to require 
further notice here; Admiral of t&e Flet^t, Sir Geoffrey Pliipps 
Hornby, principal naval aid-de-camp to the sovereign, one of tn© 
most distmgiusned officers of the British navy, whose name was a 
household word at the time of the discussion of the Btn/Ql Sovereign 
designs; Rear- Admiral P. H. Colombo a well-known British naval 
officer, who has contributed hberally to service literature; Admiral 
Lord Clanwilliam; Capt. (aften^ards Admiral) S. Long; Capt, (now 
Admiral) G. H. U* Noel, until recently in command of the British 
Asiatic fleet* and a most. progres.sive officer who has written ex ten- 
fiivel3' on naval subjects ; and, finally, Mr, (now Sir) William H, White, 
at that time and until recently director of naval construction and 
assistant controller of the British navy, and one of the most distin- 
guished and best-knowm naval arcliitects of the present day, who, 
thougth on the retired list and not now actively connected with the 
Admiralty, is still intimately associated with professional and 
technicalwork, and was the consulting naval arcliitect for the ship- 
building firm which recently built the Alauretunia and was inti- 
matcl}' associated with the development of the designs of that vessel. 
Quotations from Sir Willinm White's paper will be first given, inas- 
much as they indicate, hrieflv* some of the conditions under which 
the desi^s were prepared. *The comments of those who took part 
in the discussion will follow immediately thereafterj beginning with 
those submitted liy Lord Armstrong: 

[Eitraots trom « paper ** On tbo designs for the tic^w battle eliipa/' rwifl lit th^ Sffth kssIqd of tb» 
InititTltloQ of NflTftl AiTlirteptfi, April 10. Ifm.] 

Mx. William IL White (fturectot of naval eonstniction). Reco^sdng the great 
interest which m now being taken in the dt^sigtii* ol the eight firpt-claw battle ships 
whicli are proposed to be added to the navy^ and feeling convinced that no equally 
suitable opportunity could be obtained for replying to cnticiamfl of the designa which 
have appeared in the public prese, I applied lor and obtained permifision from thus 
Firat Lord of the Admimlty to prepare tiue paper. 

Apart from the fact that I am the head of that staff, and apart from any question of 
my personal competence, I desire to state that there never has been a time during my 
experience at the Admiralty office — an experience extending over twenty-two years — 
when the members of that staff included so many thoroughly educated, capable, and 
qualified naval architects and marine engineers as are now serving there. 
« * * * * * 

If with such a staff, with all our recorded data and experience, with our grand 
experimental establishment at Haslar, so ably conducted by my friend, Mr. Froude, 
and with all the valuable assistance and suggestions coming to us from the naval serv- 
ice, and our professional colleagues in the dock yards, as well as the constant benefits 
we derive from a full knowledge of the work done by private shipbuilders and foreign 
competitors, we do not, in the ^'Wliitehall Office," succeed in producing "the heesi 
possible ships" consistent with the instructions of the Board of Admiralty, then there 
can be no excuse. But I contend that the allegations made against the professional 
officers of the Admiralty have been loosely made, and are proved to be unfounded, as 
regards the designs of the new battle ships, by the facts which have been adduced. 

On this question I shall not be expected to give an opinion. It involves an inquiry 
into the competency of the board of admiralty and our system of naval administration. 
But at the risk of repeating statements already made, I must say that there never have 
been designs more deliberately and carefully considered. Tne selection was made 
from among a large number oi alternative designs, after a careful review of what is 
being done abroad, and with reference to various proposals not yet embodied in actual 
ships. Fortunately, it could be based upon a great mass of new experimental data, 
obtained by actual trials against the Resistance and elsewhere, and giving the latest 
and best imormation in relation to guns, projectiles, explosives, and armor. More- 
over, the board of admiralty has availed itself of the advice and assistance of a 
number of distinguished officers before coming to a decision. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 117 

Obviously there is room for differences of opinion, since actual experience in naval 
warfare under modem conditions is almost entirely wanting. The matter, therefore, 
resolves itself into one of relative authority and experimental information. Under these 
circumstances, the naval service and the country will probably prefer to accept the 
conclusions of a responsible and well-informed body like the board of admiralty, 
rather than those of any individual. 

[Discussion of the paper presented by the Director of Naval Construction. Mr. White.] 

Lord Armstrong. With regard to the question of armor, it certainly appears 
to me, from all that we have heard both from Mr. WTiite and from Sir Edward Reed, 
and from all that we can gather from these numerous diagrams, that we may come 
to this conclusion, that if we render a ship absolutelv safe from being sunk by modem 
artillery we shall simply eliminate its power of sinking anything else. It is clear to 
me we must have a compromise between defensive power and offensive power, and as 
far as I can judge from a hasty inspection of these diagrams, and from listening to all 
that has been said upon the subject, it does appear to me that the compromise which 
is presented b^ these latest designs, especially by the battle ship of the barbette stamp, 
that we have in that ship the best compromise between defensive power and offensive 
power that has yet been submitted to the public. 

Captain Lord Charles Berespord. I tnink that Lord Armstrong hit the right nail 
on the head in this great controversy as to what is the best platform that you can build 
to send your men and gims to sea to fight an action with . The controversy is between 
the armament and the armor, and L^rd Armstrong, in my humble opinion, hit the 
right nail on the head when he said if you build a ship with the capabilities which 
Sir Edward Reed demands, and justly demands, from his point of view, you would 
have nothing offensive to hit your enemy with. That is the real point, as I look at it. 
A ship is always a compromise. 

******* 

I say distinctly as a seaman, and I hope one of my brother officers will get up and 
contradict me if ne does not agree with me, that what we want in a ship is the offensive 
part. We are very glad to have as much defensive as we can, but we do not want to 
sacrifice in any particular whatever the offensive power which we possess of knocking 
the enemy into a cocked hat. 

******* 

I do not believe they could have made a better ship than these new ones, although 
Sir Edward Reed does not agree with it. I hope he will produce his ship. I think he 
will be the first to agree with me that, in a fair argument, theory is of no use to any man, 
and theoretical argument should be practically demonstrated. Mr. White and the 
Board of Admiralty have produced their ships, and I dare say I could find fault with 
those ships, but taking the compromise I think thev are the best class of battle ship 
you can make for the present day, having regard to the new high explosives. * * ♦ 
On our navy depends our existence, and we must not run the chance, with our want of 
knowledge of actual warfare, of foreign nations getting something other than we have 
got which might win them the action if we came to hoalility. * * * Those new 
ships now have, in my humble opinion, for the first time been proposed to be built in 
a businesslike way and in the way in which any mercantile nrm would build their 
own ships or a man-of-war if they had to build one. TJiey have got the seamen together 
(by the seaman I mean the engineers and the artillerymen, and the men who have got to fight 
the ships) J and they have stated what they wanted to have, both in regard to capability of 
offense arid defense, draught, and speed. * * * You must have a ruling power; some- 
bodu Jias got to lay down your ships, and this somebody, whoever he has been, has been put 
to do it in a Imsinesslike way for the first time, and therefore I should take the opinion of 
my brother officers against my own, who have been asked first of all, }Vhat do you want to 
fight with? o 

******* 

It was put very well the other day by Mr. \Miite in his paper; we keep on arguing 
as to what damage the ship will receive, and we quite forget the offensive power that 
we possess, that we are going to give the enemy the benefit of. 

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby. Lord Ravensworth, my lords, 
and gentlemen, I have come here following an officer (Lord Charles Beresford) whom I 
am sorry to say I must call a younger officer. In almost everything he has said with 
reference to tne service at large I entirely agree, and I think that he expresses the 
feeling of the greater part of the naval profession. 

******* 

All I wish to point out is this, that I feel with reference to these ships as a naval 
officer, and as one who has served on board ironclads, that I should be glad indeed to 

*» Italics ngt author's. 



US ATJ-EGED DEFKCTS TN VESSELS OF HATT- 

»erv^ in »iwh ghtp^ «* fh^t^r v^hifh orr noft^ shtm^n m, hfrnm*^ thy $^4Tri f/} itu to anbftfip thf; 
idea uhix'h Lord (-hurhs Bittatfurd hnx m ^tr&ngh put /tTrtmrc/, ami wliat 1 bdiievi- is tli** 
idea of fvcnf 71a vul officft, tluit they ore ahips of r^Ty (jreat off mm w potuet. They have 
gr^t'fpec'J, which I cciiiRiJer is liW high**! qualil? tliat any ship can hav^; omV. mind 
^'011, I do not want to put my opinion forward; f go upon the opinion of our highest 
authority, that of Lord Nelson. * * * \\ hy 1 approve pariicukrly of these ships 
\» that I think, aa Ijonl Charity Roresford aaid, that hithert^j ouri^hipe Have never been 
built in the right way; th&t is to eay, you have never aeted tlie man ytho is going to 
inhabit the house whrtt sort of hou^e hi* would like to have, hut ha^ e disregamed the 
opinion that tliostr gentlemen have given^ — the lequiremcnts that those gentlemen \iavb 
laid do'srn. But now tlieiie requirements have Vu^en carried out, very mvi'h to the 
MttikfaciUm rif those nhft ttre parti^miarhj am^cTju^d — that is, the ojjjccn who have to wm- 
m4gnd YGurflerU, The namee of the oJhcf^re to whom theee plans have been referTPtd, 
and wto have approved of them, are tbo^ of ofliet^rs who have juM left active service* 
Only one nanie hm heeu omitted, vise, that of Admiral Try 00, wo J that ig iu coueuqueEice 
of his having been bid up by an accident, hut olherwiae you have the opinion of the 
officer comniaiDding the Channel fleet, the officer lately m command of the I'hinft 
fleet, flud theoffictT la teiv commanding the India fleet? 1 miy myi?elJ you have got 
«vesi^ ruane feamjwj onf. which could guarantee the proptkttf of IJkm Mps^ and for my 
p6rt I fe»l on th*^ir oi>iiiions much more i?tn>ngly llian 1 dct ujH^n my own, that thcM *hip9 
at9 food, end will W $erti*rabte ^M'pfp und such m anij admiral mil ht fortunaU I0 

CQf^ffUBid* 

Rear-Admiral P. IT. Colomb. My Lord and genflemen, I think two distinct point* 
must he apparent to the meeting from the discussions whirh have gone on. First of all, 
that you have got a number of navd officcors in ptr/rd agrecmeni, u:hich is twI commrm; 
and, secondly, that the di^tiliieji which the mival arfhkefi ha.^ to d*^l with ill building 
hi^th ihips are the ditJimUifs o^opiniomj that i^ to Bay, tlie tuhxiI arrhihrt has lo go b^ the 
09«rnon of tht day u^cn fn bmldt; and sojnf iim€s a/frr hf ho^ htilt ctpinirm hirwi aom*- 
fchat against Mm, 

I should like to my, speaking &? a naval officer, about these deaigns, that tMs thin^ 
has not l»een done in a confer. Thai is !<► eay, (he navy has been tak»>n into thf- eotyi- 
dtiU't of the totistmdort, and the hoarfi of admmdty. in a way that it ft^i^rr wajs brfore^ 
and I think the remit mu^t be thi*?, thai. nev<r in (hiit iheattr will naval officers ht able to 
get up and dcnmitur. those Mfm U rhey turn OfH difrrttalu frt^ro what th*y aped, but 
that the canstruj^iora will be able Idi iitrti round upon iijs.and nay, " Th^yare ymtT Mp§: 
they me not awi,*' 1 think the navy is qiiitf^ prepared to accept the reaponiibilityfor 
thf^e ship5, for» takiiig thevt all in all, wc arc figrfjcd grn^rtillij that they are a« good aa 
the opinion of the dai^ will fill ft w iii* Xo hmr thnr^ * * * f^iu | ^^ant to r=ay, finally ^ 

battle ?hips; that taking what the service a^k.s fur all round Ouy arc the fairest, the most 
open, arid the most cowpietc attempt to meet the naval opinioyi of the day. 

Adminil I^)rd Clanwilliam. I will not detain the meeting two minutes. I only 
wi.^h to -ddd my te.'^timony a?; a naval otrieer to the general opinion throughout the 
service that these vessels are of tJie rujht sort, and that we have every eonfidenee in the 
ability of the ojjicers who gave the in^^t ructions to Mr. White to desiffn them. 

('apt. S. T.oNG. The only otlier point in)on which I would take up the time of the 
meeting i."^ with reg*ard to the high freeboard forward of the new shi})s, which is an inter- 
esting question. 

I notice in Plate IX that the lower j>art of the freeboard forward is divided up into 
small spaces. I was very sorr>' to see that, but 1 would remark that the height of 
freeboard which is necessary' f^ is a very important question, and one upon which,JI 
think, experiments might throw a good deal of light. 

[Discussion r f a paprr prosontrd l»y Sir Nathaniol Baniaby.] 

<'apt. (t. II. XoEL. Being the third naval ollicer who has spoken in succession, IJam 
afraid you will be tired of hearing what the navy has got to say; Itut 1 won't l>e very 
long. In the few remarks I have to make 1 hope that Sir Nathaniel Barnaby and the 
gentlemen present will excuse my dwelling mt so nuich on to-day's j)ai^cr as on yes- 
terday's. I would like to express my entire conlidence in th(» exceptional aldlity of 
the ( hief Constructor of the Navy. Sir. White, and to thank him for his admirable 
paper of yesterday. I believe tliat h(* came l)ack to the admiralty fully intending 
that what he did there he vouUl do in concert with the naval autlumties. and it waa in 



« "Any excess over what is necessiiry is most objectionable, owing to the increased 
weight and size of target involve<l in it." 



aijLeged defects in vessels of navy. 119 

consequence of his carrying out that intention that we got this new type of ship, which 
was so greatly approved of in the discussion yesterday. 

******* 

We want to have some offensive power as well as being, to some extent, protected. 
On this question, speaking of the Admiral class, I stated in a paper read at this institu- 
tion in 1885 that with an addition of about 150 tons of 3-inch stool plating, sufTicient 
Xjo give the Collingwood a 6-foot water-lino belt at her unarraored ends, 1 thought that 
she would be as capable and effective a vessel as any afloat at that time. I still adhere 
to that opinion. 

Note. — The freeboard of the Collingwood, forward, was about 7 feet less than that of 
the Royal Sovereign and about 10 feet less than that of the Connecticut. 

Admiral Sir W. Houston Stewart. During the ten years that I was at the admi- 
ralty, the admiralty of the day, one administration after another, used the utmost 
endeavors to obtain the \dews, opinions, and criticisms of naval officers in regard to- 
the designs proposed, and I confirm what I said yesterday when that noble lord^ 
gallant naval officer, popular orator, and efficient member of Parliament was speaking, 
that during the time I was comptroller of the navy no design went forth from the 
admiralty that was not stamped with the board's-seal in the presence of the board of 
admiralty, and signed by the responsible naval officers of the day. Sir Edward Reed 

Faid me the compliment in a letter in The Times the other dav to say that he believed 
was primarily responsible for the Admiral class. If it is so, Iviai^ accept that responsi- 
bility with priae, because I was associated with some of our most distinguished and most 
efficient naval officers who formed the board of admiralty at the time tliat class of ships was 
designed, b 

The foregoing description of the conditions under which the Royal 
Sovereign was developed indicates quite clearly the degree of con- 
sideration given to the designs of the Royal Sovereign class of battle 
ships by the most representative officers of the British na\^^ I shall 
now invite vour attention briefly to two other notable occasions upon 
which the detail characteristics of battle-ship design were given most 
specific attention by boards of officers in our Navy, althougli it should 
be borne in mind that these questions are always given most serious 
attention in the development of the designs of battle ships. 

On March 25, 1896, tne Acting Secretary of the Navy appointed a 
board (of which the late Rear-Admiral John (j. Walker, V. S. Navy, 
was president) ''for the purpose of considering and reporting upon 
the best plan JFor the installation of the main batteries of such battle 
ships as Congress may authorize during its present session,'' and 
other questions relating to battle-ship design. The other members 
of the Doard were Commodore R. L. Pythian, Chief Engineer Edward 
Farmer, Capt. Philip H. Cooper, and Naval Constructor Joseph J. 
Woodward, U. S. Navy. Subsequently Captain (now Rear-Admiral) 
Remey relieved Captain Cooper, and Lieut, (now Capt.) S. A. Staun- 
ton was appointed an additional member of the board. Although 
this board was primarily organized for the purpose of making rec- 
ommendations with respect to the battery, it very properly consid- 
ered the whole question of battle-ship design, in order that it might 
arrive at an intelligent conclusion with respect to the best type of 
battery to be adopted. In connection with their duty the board 
made a sea voyage on the U. S. S. Indiana, and inspected the Massa- 
chusetts and Iowa, then in course of construction, with a special view 
to comparing the relative advantages of these vessels. It also had 
before it Capt. W. T. Sampson, then Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance^ 
and Prof. P. R. Alger; also Chief Constructor Hichborn, Naval Con- 
structor Taylor, and Assistant Naval Constructor Dashiell, these 
officers being caUed to testify particularly with respect to the adop- 

b Italics not author's. 



120 ATJJCTgP DEFECTS t^ VESSELS OF ITAVT. 

tion or elimination of superimposed turrets. The board also wit- 
nessed the firing of 10-inch and 12-inch projectiles against a fac- 
simile of the turret of the Massaehuseti^y and also considered a mass 
of documents submitted to it in connection with the general subject 
of battle-ship design. The following quotation from this report is 
most interestmg: 

The board upon its ettrliest inquiry^ into the imture of ita duties found them of a moet 
-compreben^i v*? character. The initallation of the battery t>f a battlt^ fillip 19 mA a ques- 
tion which Blandfi alone. It is inseparably connected with the size of ^uns, their num^ 
ber, and xhe armored protection which their emplacementa are to have* This t4>tal 
weight of armament depends in ita turn upon the size of the ship, her hull protection, 
and the epeed and coal endimince contemplated in her design. Conner: ted with these 
features and bearing material I3' up^m her military etFicienty are the babitability of ft 
ship (which includes auffirienl quarters and berthing apace for the officers and men 
necessary to properly tKivi^*ite and fight the ship) and her seagoing qualities, i, e., her 
CBtpjici ly for stea-mi ng and hgh li ng i n had w t^a t her . 

The noceaeity of tnc^e aajustmen{9 i& a matter of common knowledge, and is con- 
den^sed int^ tho axi^unatic saying that ''ovt^ry ship va a compnimise," The board 
assumes, however^ that the new battleships will be as tfj siKe, epeed, and coal endur* 
ance sul)stantially the same as those abeady building, viz, of about 11 ,500 tons normal 
displacement, 1*5 knoti* sp^ed, and l,2W to 1,600 ttms C(.tal i-apacity^ and with these 
Afisumptions it proceeded to attack the problem placed before it. 

To arrive at a conclusion upon a problem s*^ cfimplex it is necessary to narrow the 
iflauea by auccei:(give steps, Ojnsidering size, speed, coaX endurance, and hull protec- 
tion ae Iixed witLiin narrow margins, the Ixiard uad next to eonsider the different typ«« 
of batterii*B intstalled and pntjectetl . Thf^e ar*% for utir own Navy , three; in nuraberrvisE: 

(I) That of tile Indiana and oiasa. 

h\ That of the Jowa. 

(3) That of the iCiarnargt and Kmludty. 

It became the board's da 13^ to recommend the adoption of one of these typee, or to 
suggcsat iuch mctdificationa as in ita opinion would make a better ship than any of thf ni 

The board also invited attention to the desirability of carrjang a 
larger proportion of the coal and stores at the normal draft than had 
previously been custoinar^^ and that at her nonnal draft (which 

ghoidd r^'-^ ^'f lirr ^'-i M-- Jrrv'*t; ^^o should carr}' nut less thr^Ti t-.n- 
thirds of her full capacity of ammunition, coal, and stores, and that the 
position of the armor belt should bear a proper relation to this load 
line. From that time to the present day two-thirds of the ammuni- 
tion and all consumable stores, other than coal, have been carried on 
the designed normal displacement of the vessel. The proportion of 
coal carried at designed load displacement, however, nas not been 
in our service, or in any other service, as much as two-tliirds of the 
fiUI capacity of the bunkers except in the ciise of vessels of the Ala- 
bama class, which were the direct outcome of the Walker board's 
recommendations. The subseciuent reduction in the proportion of 
coal carried was due, undoubtedly, to the fact that while the Alabama 
class had a hunker capacity of only 1,200 toris, thus making two-thirds 
of the bunker capacity a very fair proportion of the coal to be carried 
at designed displacement, subsequent designs provided for a very 
Tnuch greater bunker capacity, so that 900 to 1,000 tons was regarded 
as a suitable amount to be carried at the designed load displacement. 
The practice of the United States Navy in tliis respect is practically 
identical with that of foreign navies. 1 he Walker board also invited 

Particular attention to the desirability of battle ships of the United 
tates Navy being able to ^ ^perform any duty required of ships of 
their type and strength, and that their seagoing qualities should not 



AliLBGBD DBPEOTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 121 

be inferior to those of the battle ships of other navies." The conclu- 
sion and recommendations of the board were as follows: 

That the new battle ships, when fully equipped for service, and containing not less 
than two-thirds ot their full capacity of ammunition, stores, and coal, should not be 
deeper than their "normal" or designed draft upon which their speed is based; and 
that their weights of armor and armament should be restricted accordingly. 

'Diat they snould have sufficient berthing space to accommodate the officers and 
men of their war complements in such a manner as to maintain their health and vi^or. 

That no feature of their design should be permitted to seriously impair good seagoing 
and sea-enduring qualities. 

That they should have high freeboard forward, and low freeboard aft, substantially 
like the Iowa, and be armor belted like the Kearsarge. 

That their principal battery should consist of four 13-inch guns mounted in two 
turrets in pairs, substantially as the Iowa's 12-inch guns are mounted; these principsd 
turrets to be placed as close to each other as the machinery space conveniently permits. 

That their auxiliary battery shall consist of fourteen rapid fire 6-inch guns, ten on 
the main deck and four on the upper deck, all behind 6-inch armor. Two of the guns 
on the main deck in the eyes of the ship have forward fire, two of the guns on the upper 
deck have forward fire, and the other two fire aft. All of the 6-inch guns fire in broad- 
side, seven on each side. 

It thus appears that this specially selected board, a large majority 
of whose members were seagoing officers, recommended a vessel 
whose freeboard, water-line protection j etc., were regarded as entirely 
satisfactory to the seagoing element at that time. The actual ves- 
sels whose desigQ embodied the recommendations of this board are 
the Alabama, Rlinois, and Wisconsin, and the board's recommenda- 
tion as to freeboards indicated that they regarded the '^forward 
freeboard" provided for the Alabama class as '^high." 

Again, the general board of the Navy, which is composed entirely 
ofjfseagoing ollicers and is presided over by one of the most distin- 
guished officers the American Navy has ever had, recommended 
under date of October 17j 1903, in a report submitting the principal 
characteristics which should be embodied in battle ships, as follows: 
''To have high freeboard forward. In this respect tne Iowa type 
impresses favorably. Armor protection : similar to the i/aine class." 
Subsequently the board modified its recommendation as to the armor 
protection and concurred in the recommendation of the board on 
construction as to the superiority of distribution of armor on the 
Verm/mt class. It may be noted in this connection that the '^high 
freeboard" forward on the Iowa is slightly less than that of any 
vessel in the Atlantic battle-ship fleet except the Kearsarge and Ken- 
tucky. 

We therefore have a height of freeboard and distribution of water- 
line belt armor in the large majority of battle ships of the United States 
Navy which commxinded the explicit approval or thoroughly representa- 
five seagoing officers in our own service; and, vessels of simitar character- 
istics had and stiU have the approval of service sentiment in the British 
and Japanese navies; and the sentiment to-day of those who have given 
careful and exhaustive consideration to these subjects is just as defi- 
nite and pronounced as it was when these matters of freeboard and 
water-line armor arrangement were first under consideration. 

It should also be remembered that the desims of all vessels of the 
United States Navy are passed upon by the board on construction. 
The original title of this board was, in fact, *Hhe board on the designs 
of ships/' Among the membership of this board from 1889 to the 
date of the approval of the designs of the Connecticut class (the most 



122 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

recently desimed class of vessels now attached to the battle-ship 
fleet) were the following well-known oflicers of the United States 

Navy: 



I Period 
Name. '■ of serv- 

; ice. 



Admiral of the Navy George Dewey | 188&-1893 

Rear-Admiral Montgomen- Sieard 188^1800 

Capt. G. B.White I 188^1890 

Chief Constructor T. D. Wilson ' 1889-1893 

Engineer in Chief George W. Melville 1^9-1903 

Roar-Admiral William M. Folger , 



Rear-Admiral Charles 11. Davis 1890-1883 

Rear-Admiral Norman II. Farqiihar 1890-1893 

Rear-Admiral French E. Chad wick 1893-1897 

Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson 18a3-18©7 

Rear-Admiral Frederick Singer 1893-1896 

Rear-Admiral E. O. Matthews i 1894-1898 

Chief Constructor Philip Ilichbom , 1893-1901 

Rear-Admiral Charles 0* Neil ; 1897-1904 

Rear-Admiral R. B. Bradford 1897-1903 

Capt. Richard Wainwright 1897 

Rear-Admiral Richardson Clover 1897-1900 

Rear-Admiral Charles D. Sigsbee 1900-1902 

Chief Constructor Francis T. Bowles 1901-1903 

! 

Considering, therefore, the overwhelming preponderance of repre- 
sentative naval opinion as to the desirabifity of the freeboard and 
armor distribution actuallj^ provided on battle ships of our own 
Navy and on those of similar type in British and other important 
foreign navies, it is evident how very much astray are the self-satis- 
fied critics who state that *^all of our battle ships are deficient in 
freeboard, water-line protection, etc/^ Perhaps the critic is not 
aware, however, that tnere are two distinct '* schools of design," so 
far as concerns height of freeboard, height of gun axes, and water-line 
armor protection, and that while the English, Japanese, American, 
and, to a less extent, the German designers preferred moderate 
freeboard and a certain arrangement of water-line armor protection, 
the French and Russian designers had different ideas on those sub- 

{'ects. Thus, for many years the tendency among French designers 
las been to elevate the main battery high above the water line — as 
a rule, about one deck height higher than in the British, American, 
and Japanese ships, at least so far as concerned the forward turrets. 
This possibly permits the forward main battery to be operated imder 
conditions of sea during which gun fire of any kind must be refgarded 
as futile; but, under any condition of sea in which naval Battles 
are likely to be fought, such extreme elevation of the battery is 
regarded by naval designers and naval oflicers of most other coim- 
tries as quite undesirable in view of the great sacrifices involved in 
such an arrangement, the consequent raising of the center of gravity 
of the vessel, less ellicient armor protection to turret supports, and 
greatly increased size of target being disadvantages of a most serious 
character. 

1 think it is pertinent in this connection to remark that the prin- 
cipal battle ships of the Russian fleet which took part in the battle 
of the Sea of Ja{)an were designed in accordance with the ideas of 
what may be termed the ''French school," while practically all of 
the battle ships and armored cruisers of the Japanese fleet were 
designed in accordance with British and American ideas of moderate 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 128 

freeboard, moderate gun heights, etc. All of the Japanese battle 
ships and armored cruisers which took part in the battle of the Sea 
of Japan were afloat and in good condition at the termination of the 
battle, and wliile high freel)oards and a certain character of water-line 
armor protection may not have been directly responsible for the 
foundering of such vessels of the Kussian fleet as were sunk by gun 
fire, the sacrifices which had to be made in order to develop that type 
of design were undoubtedly contributory to the ultimate foundering 
of those vessels. In order that it may be clearly apparent that the 
weather conditions during tlie battle of the Sea of Japan were such 
as to "try out" the moderate freeboards of the Japanese vessels, 
the following quotations with respect thereto are given: 

John Leyland, in Brassey's Annual for 1906, chapter 6, says, on page 105, that **a 
heavy sea was runnuig." On page 99 he says that "the weather was misty with 
a wind from the stnithwost and a sea which caused Rojestvensky's ships to roll heavily 
and greatly distress the destroyers." 

Lieut. R. D. White,' in the Proceedings of the Naval Institute of June, 1906, quotes 
one of the Russian officers as saying that "the morning of May 27 was raw and cheerless; 
the cold wind blew from the southwest; a grayish mist hung overhead and shut out 
vision well short of the horizon. When the rain fell later in the day it was cold and 
penetrating." 

Henry Reuterdahl, in Jane's Fighting Ships, 1906-7, relating the story of the fi^ht 
as told him by survivors, states that "there was a strong breeze and heavy sea, rising 
almost to a gale." 

In order, however, that there may be no possible misunderstanding 
as to ^'gun-fire" casualties in the battle of the Sea of Japan, it should 
be noted that reports indicate that only two Kussian battle ships were 
sunk as the direct result of gunfire, during the five hours' fighting of the 
first day; and this in spite of the excessively overloaded conchtion of 
these vessels at the time of the battle, as indicated by subsequent 
official statements, this overloading naturally resulting in the com- 
plete submergence of the heavy water-line l)elt armor and a marked 
decrease of stability under damaged conditions. It is noteworthy, 
therefore, that even under these unusual conditions of excessive overload- 
ing with the definite decrease in defensive qualities consequent thereupon 
only two battle ships succuntbed to gun fire and on£ of these oidy af ter five 
hours' fighting. These reported facts would seem to be sufficiently 
eloquent when considering the possibilities of our own l)attle ships. 

Again, we surely can assume that the Japanese have had as exten- 
sive experience under modern battle conditions at sea as any nation in 
the w^orld; and yet a very recently designed Japancvse battle ship, 
which presumably embodies the lessons learned at Tsushima, has 
approxnnately the same freeboard forward as our ships of the Maine 
and Alabatna classes, although from 100 to 125 feet longer, thereby 
indicating clearly that the Japanese are willing to sacrifice something 
in ^^ freeboard" and ^^gim height, "even in so long and speedy a vessel, 
in order to more fully develop other qualities. 

Although the British in their Dreadnaught and the United States 
Navy in the Delaware have considerably increased the freel)oard for- 
ward on such vessels, such an increase in freeboard is in no sense a 
reflection upon previous designs or a confession that previous design- 
ers were in error, but is a perfect I v normal and logical development 
due to increase in length of ship, mcrease in fineness of water lines, 
concentration of heavy weights relatively near the extremities, etc. 

When a critic recently stated in a magazine article that it was only 
''after special pressure from the President of the United States that 



124 Al^LEGED DIFECTS IN VESSEL8 OF NAVY. 

OUT latest ships were given proper freeboard" he simply advertised 
himself as a dissermnator of false statements and as one quite igno- 
rant of the subject be was presuming to discuss. As the Chief Con- 
structor of the Navy I can state most positively that no such criticism, 
no such suggestion, no such direction » has ever come to me from 
the President of the United States in relation to the designs of the 
Delaware class^ the only class of battle sldps in the United States Navy 
with very high freeboard forward, this high freeboard l>eijag given by 
the designer for reasons already set forth. 

In order that the gross misstatements concerning: our naval mate- 
rial which have recently appeared in print might Be fidly disproved 
so far as the Navy Department is concerned, the Bureau of Construc- 
tion and Repair, under the authorization of the Secretary of the Na\^y, 
has taken great pains to arrange data with respect to the United 
States Na^'y in sncii form that the members of the Naval Committee 
can readilj see the exact condition of our shins with respect to free- 
board, height of gun axes, location of waterfme armor, etc. There 
has also iSen conected similar data from every practicable source 
respecting typical foreign ships, and there have been constructed 
''cross sections*' and "profiles," which indicate clearly the arrange- 
ment of freeboard^ armor ^ etc., on those ships in direct comparison 
with thtjse of the United States Navy. This information, and any 
other information in the posst^ssion of the Cliief Constructor, is at 
the disposal of the committee, and there ftill be added to this hearing 
as an append be a few comments from foreign technical publications 
showine the regard in which American battle ships are held abroad. 
Some o1 these comments are especially significant, as they were made 
contempiiraneously with the first appearance of particulars concern- 
ing these designs and make direct comparison between American and 
foreign battle ships of the same periotl. Sections and profiles of the 
following typical battle ships of the British, Japanese, Kus&iant 
French, German, anil Unitt'*! Statci^ nnvirs of tlu^ i^mnv period of 
design have been prepared and so arranged as to permit direct com- 
parison. 

U. S. NAVY. 

Indiana. Connecticut. 

Iowa. Vermont. 

Kearsarg«\ Mississippi. 

Alabama. New Hampshire. 

Maine. South Carolina. 

Virginia. Delaware. 

BRITISH NAVY. 

Royal Sovereign. King Edward VII. 

Majestic. Dreadnaught. 

JAPANESE NAVY. 

Asahi. Kashima. 

Mikaea. Aki. 

RUSSIAN, FRENCH, AND GERMAN NAVIES. 

Pobieda. Rebublique. 

Kniaz Souvaroff . Hessen. 

Suffren. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 125 

The diagrams show clearly the location of water-line armor, 
heights of freeboard, gun axes, etc. The French and Russian ships, 
as previously stated, are in a class by themselves, the forecastle and 
forward guns being as a rule one deck height higher than the American, 
British, Japanese, and German battle ships. 

The plans of cross sections, profiles, and tabular data referred to 
are at tne disposition of the committee and will be explained in detail 
if desired. The list is as follows: 

I. Tabular .statement giving principal characteristics of typical 
foreign battle ships. 

II. Comparative table of gun heights, etc., of typical battle ships. 

III. Tabular statement or ''designed" heights of upper edge of* 
main water-line belt armor abov.e trial or load water line for typical 
foreign and United States battle ships. 

IV. Length and thickness of water-line armor and upper side belt 
armor for United States battle ships. 

V. Tabular statement of principal characteristics of Russian and 
Japanese ships which took part in tne battle of the Straits of Tsushima, 
or Sea of Japan. 

VI. Tabular statement of heights of turret and broadside gun axes 
above designed load water line for United States battle snips and 
armored cruisers. 

VII. Cross sections of typical battle ships of the United States 
and foreign navies, showing breadth and thickness of main water- 
line belt armor; also depth of submersion of lower edge of main armor 
belt below the designed load water line; also height of top of main 
armor belt designed load water line; also designed load displacement 
and coal carried on designed load displacement; also height of free- 
board and height of broadside gun axes. 

VIII. Profiles and cross sections of typical battle ships of the United 
States Navy, giving distribution of armor, heights or gun axes, etc. 
(Sheets 1 to 14.) 

IX. Profiles and cross sections of tyipcal foreign battle ships, 
giving distribution of armor, heights of gun axes, etc. (Sheets 1 
to 15.) 

In preparing the above-mentioned cross sections and profiles of 
foreign battle ships and data concerning freeboard, armor distribu- 
tion, gun heights, etc., the following were among the numerous 
sources of information consulted: 

Parliamentary papers and other publifihed official documents relating to foreign 
ships. 

Special reports. 
. Pnotograpns of foreign ships. 

Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects. 

Bulletin de L' Association Technique Maritime, and other foreign technical society 
publications. 

Engineer (London J. 

Engineering (Lonaon). 

Naval and Military Record (London). 

Nautical Gazette. 

Armee et Marine. 

Le Yacht. 

Braasey's Naval Annual. 

Naval Pocket Book (Clowes). 

Jane's All the World's Fighting Ships. 

Les Flottee de Combat. 



136 aClegid defects tn vessei^s of navy. 

Referring again to tKi> magazine article wliic-h has been alJudcd to 
by the ehainrian and others, it has doubt U'as hoen noted that the 
article itself nuikes use of the terms '" universal/' ''all other navies/' 
etc. Ijeaving the magazine writer's reahii of fiction, however^ and 
considerintr only the farts, it may be stated that in the British and 
Japanese navies every single ha tile ship which has Iwen designed 
since the Rt:>yul Soiyerdgrij with the exception of the Majesticg and 
Drmdnoughis of the British naW, has had approximately the same 
or just a h'ttle greater freeboard tlian llie Royal Sovereif/n cla^, which, 
as previtiu>sly n<Jted, has a slightly k^s neeboard than the gn^at 
majority of our battle ships. 

The JJrmdnttuffhi has, as previously noted ^ a forecastle about one 
deck height higljcr tlian prevnous^ British battle ships and in thia 
respect is not unlike mir latest battle ship6 of the brUiware class. 
But because the Dreadnf/uffJit anil DfMware with their greater length, 
fine watt-r lines, and concentration of weiglits at extremities were 
given a higher forecastle, in the orilinary logical development of 
ship design, our friends » the critics, assume tliat ever\^ ship with 
lower forecast k* which preceded the I/readnought and Delaware was 
hopelessly deficient in freeboard and seagoing qualities. In other 
words, they drew entii"ely WTong conclusions antl illustrated the old 
adage that *'a little knowledge in a dangerous thing/' The plans 
show HO clearly the freelnmrd^^ heights of pm axes of noiin and 
secondary batteries, etc-, timt I need not dwell longer on tbissubjccl. 

Mr. BVtt.kr. How would the fn^dioard of the Dehwart" claas 
coMjpare with tlic freeboanl of the IhemfmnHjht class '^ 

Admiral Capfs. The dcsitn-ied freeboard o^ tlie fhlaymi'e class is 
approximately about two h»et less than that of the Dreadnought^ 
hut the actual iiifference will probably be less on account of tlie 
reported "eonsideraI>li' overdraft" of the Dreadnought. 

(jcnerally speaking, freeboard in excess of seagoing requirements 
is most tmdesirable in a battle ship. High freebi)ant involves a high 
center of gravity and consideral)ly less stability under damaged con- 
ditions; it also means greater target area; moreover, the extra 
weight devoted to higli freeboard decreases tlie percentage of dis- 
placement whicli can be devoted to otlier seriously important ele- 
ments of the design. So far as I am aware, tlie sentiment of the 
English and Japanese services is distinctly in favor of the moderate 
freeboard whicn lias been characteristic of their ships wherever 
such moderate freeboard is practicable. In the very long and fine 
lined ship, however, with concentration of weight nearer the extremi- 
ties, it is desirable, for seagoing reasons, as ahcady stated, to raise 
the forecastle: but the Japanese are apparently so impressed with 
the desirabdity of limiting the elevation of their top weights and 
devoting as much weJLdit as possible to armor and armament, that 
they appear to be willing to make some sacrifice in freel)oard. They 
have tlierefore maintained approximately the same freeboard in their 
new and longer battle ships as seemed sullicient for their older and 
shorter vessels: and surely the Japanese have the advantage of great 
experience so far as concerns the essential reciuirements of battle 
ships under modern battle conditions. 

Mr. Mi'DD. 1 would like to ask a question. 

The Chairman. I would like to have Admiral Capps take up these 
things in consecutive order. The freeboard comes first, and the 
water-line armor is another proposition. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 127 

Mr. Loud. I would like to ask you a question. What is the free- 
board of the Royal Sovereign in feet ? 

Admiral Capps. It is reported by Sir William White, the designer, 
in the paper from which I nave quoted, as 18 feet. It is also reportea 
m a taoular statement, in the same paper, as 19 feet 6 inches forward 
and 18 feet aft. 

Mr. Loud. And what is the freeboard of the Minnesota? 

Admiral Capps. The forward freeboard of the Minnesota under the 
same condition as the Roxjal Sovereign as to coal, stores, etc., is 20 
feet 6 inches; after freeboard, 20 feet. 

The Chairman. Are there any more questions to be asked on the 
subject of the freeboard ? 

Mr. Roberts. I would like to ask the Admiral if he can give us 
the relative heights of the heavy battery emplacements of the Japa- 
nese and Russian vessels in that sea fight ? 

Admiral Capps. This data is given for typical ships in the tables 
and in the diagrams previously referred to. The heights of gun 
axes of the principal battle ships of the Japanese fleet in the battle 
of the Sea of Japan were practically the same as those of British 
vessels of the same date of design, and were substantially the same, 
or less, than those of battle ships in the United States Navy. The 
largest and most recently designed battle ships of the Russian fleet 
were those of the Borodino class, and their forward main battery 
heights were approximately 7 feet greater than those of the Japanese. 

Mr. Roberts. What was the height of battery of the Russian 
vessels ? 

Admiral Capps. The elevation of forward main battery of the 
principal Russian vessels was, roughly speaking, 7 to 8 feet higher 
than corresponding guns of the Japanese battle ships. Tiiey were 
one deck higher up. The designed height of the forward turret guns 
of the Borodino class was about 32 feet. 

Mr. Roberts. That is the emplacement of their heavy guns? 

Admiral Capps. Yes; their forward heavy guns. 

Mr. Roberts. If my memory is not at fault, we were told within 
a year or so that the Dreadnovght was supposed to be the embodi- 
ment of all that could be deduced from that fight in the Sea of Japan. 
She was supposed to embody all of the latest ideas, drawn from the 
observation of that fight. She has a very high freeboard, has she 
not? 

Admiral Capps. Yes. 

Mr. Roberts. Can you give it to us in feet as compared with our 
ships ? 

Admiral Capps. The parliamentary paper which gives the draft 
and other particulars of the Dreadnought states that it is 28 feet 
forward. The freeboard amidships and aft appears to be about the 
same as that of our Connecticut class, namely, 20 feet. 

Mr. Roberts. Are we to understand, when you say 28 feet free- 
board, that that is the level of the main battery? 

Admiral Capps. Oh, no. The freeboard is the distance from the 
edge of the upper deck to the water line. 

Mr. Roberts. What I want to get at is the height of the main 
battery over the water. 



128 ALLEGIB DEFECTS m TESSELB Of NAFf, 

Admiral Capps. If you add about 5^ feet to the freeboard of 
American, British ^ and Japanese vessels you will get the approxi- 
mate height of the turret guns on that deck. 

Mr. Loud. That is, taken amidships? 

Admiral Capps. No; the freeboara abreast the guns. The 28 feet 
is the freeboard forward. In speaking of the freeboard of a ship, 
when we do not specially locate itj we refer to the ''freeboard for- 
ward/' because that is tlie important freeboard* 

Mr. Louii. And that is the one you referred to a moment ago, 
when you referred to the freeboard* of the Royal Sovereign and 9ie 
Minnmitaf 

Admiral Capps. Yes, sir. Although, as regards the Royal Sover-- 
eiguj the forward freeboard has been stated in one official document 
to be 19 feet 6 inches, while in another part of the same paper the 
freeboard is given as 18 feet inch; both^ howeyer, are considerably 
less than the freeboard of the Minnesota. 

Mr. Loud. I was told the other day that it was 24 feet, and I 
wanted to have it exact. 

Admiral Capps, The height of the turret gim axis M^oiald be 5 feet 
6 inches or feet more than that. The forward turret gim axis of 
the Minnesota is 26 feet 5 inches above the water line at her designed 
normal load draft. 

Mr. Roberts. I had not quite finished about the freeboard, or 
rather the gun axis— if that is the technical term — on the Dread- 
nought. 1 have been told tliat it is about 36 feet; that their gims are 
about 36 feet above the water. 

Admiral Capps. So far as can be determined from the most accu- 
rate data available, the heights of the DrmdnougMs turret guns 
above the normal or designed load water Hne are approximately as 
follows: 

Ft. In* 

Forward turret 33 6 

Waist turrets 24 

After turret 22 6 

After turret 22 10 

Mr. Roberts. How does that compare with what we call our 
Dreadnought, recently authorized? 

Admiral Capps. Tne height above the designed load water line of 
the gun axes of the turrets of the Delaware are as follows: 

Ft. In. 

No. 1 forward turret 31 5 

No. 2 forward turret 39 5 

No. 3 after turret 32 2 

No. 4 after turret 24 2 

No. 5 after turret 24 2 

Mr. Roberts. You say the English Dreadnought is higher? 

Admiral Capps. No; the most lofty turret of ours is higher, but 
that is No. 2 turret from forward. 

Mr. Roberts. How much higher? 

Admiral Capps. Nearly 6 feet. But do not get the idea that the 
higher the gun the better the results, because that would be abso- 
lutely fallacious. 

Mr. Roberts. I am not getting that idea. I am wanting to get 
some information simply to compare by. 

Admiral Capps. All this information is tabulated or contained in 
the diagrams already referred to. The most complete information is 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 129 

being prepared and will be at the disposition of the committee. I 
have with me now the tracings of cross-sections and profiles of tj^pical 
ships. 

Mr. Roberts. If I m^ht continue along this line, did you give us 
the height of the main battery of this new Japanese ship, the Alcit 
Is that the name of the ship ? 

Admiral Capps. The freeboard, I said, was about 20 feet, fonvard. 
The turret gun axis should be about five feet and a half greater, making 
the height of the turret gun axis about 25J feet above the designed 
load water line. 

Mr. Roberts. Then that is practically a fixed rule for getting the 
gun axis — to add five feet and a half to the freeboard ? 

Admiral Capps. No, it varies with different ships. Some of the 
French ships have the axes of their turret guns aoout 9 feet above 
the deck. 

Mr. Padgett. I notice this statement in the article which has been 
referred to: *'The three ships of the Indiana class have their bows but 
11 feet above water; the two ships in the Kearsarge class but 13." Is 
that statement accurate? 

Admiral Capps. That is one of the few nearly accurate statements 
in the article, the designed freeboard of the Indiana being 11 feet 6 
inches, and that of the Kearsarge 14 feet 6 inches; and it is known to 
all the well-informed naval world that their freeboard is higher than 
that of British battle ships which immediately preceded the Royal 
Sovereign, 

Mr. Padgett. Now, another statement is this: ''Of all our battle 
ships, not one shows its armor belt.'' But I believe jon wanted to 
reserve that, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. I want to reserve the question as to armor belt. 
Are there any further questions as to the freeboard ? 

Mr. Dawson. What is the height of the freeboard, forward, on 
ships of the Delaware class? 

Admiral Capps. Nearly 26 feet. 

Mr. Bates. Are there the heights without coal, or when laden with 
coal? 

Admiral Capps. This is the height at the normal or desimed dis- 
placement. The same baeis of comparison is u^ed for all the ships, 
American and foreign. 

Mr. Bates. What is the variation, as a matter of fact? 

Admiral Capps. The designed displacement contemplates having 
on board about two- thirds of all con>umable stores, including ammu- 
nition, etc., and a variable amount of coal, the amount of coal being 
somewhat dependent upon the displacement and speed of the vessel. 
In the latest designs of our Unitecl States ships, also those of British, 
Japanese, and French battle ships, they allow for about 1,000 tons of 
coal to be carried at the designed displacement. To be specific, in 
the case of the Dreadnought the Admiralty memorandum, wliich is 
absolutely official, indicates that the coal carried at the load displace- 
ment would be 900 tons, the bunker capacity being 2,700 tons. 

Mr. Bates. How much difi*erence would that make in draft? 

Admiral Capps. It would be in the neighborhood of 2 feet ad- 
ditional draft for the coal alone. 

Mr. Bates. If the ship were laden heavily it would bring it down 
2 feet or more, then, in all these measurements ? 

30584— S. Doc. 297, 6C-1 9 



130 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSEUS OF HAVT. 

Admiral Capps, Ye^, for the late-t ?liips; but the height of the free^ 
board, etc., must be referred to some definite plane of flotation, and 
the one u^ed in the United States Navy i^ that in uj^e in all other 
navie.5. 

The Chairman. Are there am^ other questions on the freeboard? 

Mr. Tx>UD, What difference would there be in the draft of the 
Minnesota, for instance, as she went out on tliis trip, and when she 
would be in normal draft? 

Admiral Capps, About 3 feet; hut it muat not be forgotten that 
all of the sliips of the Atlantic fleet carried excess stores, ammuni- 
tion, men, etc, and many of them a large amount of extra fresh 
water for the boilers. Even then, the upper edge of the heavy 
water line armor was more than oni" foot out of water. 

Mr. RoBEETs. I would like to ask one question on the matter of 
the freeboard, that partakes somewhat of the armor feature. If you 
desire, I will rest*r\^e it. 

The Chairman. [ wish you w^ould^ if it touches the armor question. 

Admiral Capp?. I do not want the committee to think that because 
I have laid so much stress an the very exhaustive investigation in 
the case of the Rmjal Sm^ereign, which is just as applicable to-rlay as 
it was twenty years ago, that we have not in our own re<^ords plenty 
of documentary' evidence relating to the question of freeboard and 
water line armor distribution. We have had board after board pass 
upon various matters connected with battle ship design, as noted in 
my last annual report, and I have already referred to the views of 
the board of which Admiral Walker was president, ako to the \4ewa 
of the general board, not to mention those of the board on construc- 
tion, the majority of w^iose members have been of the seagoing ele- 
ment. In the case of the Walker board, which had in its member- 
ship four seagoing line officers, an engineer officer, and only one naval 
con-titrrK h^^, 1 hav*^ lu^pn infnrmfM^ nuil if wh^ tbi^ njivjt] i-iiTwtrnrtor 
who had to insist on having high freeboard, there being a tendency 
among the sealing officers to cut it down as much as practicable, 
for the perfectly sound military reasons that low freeboard meant 
small tar":et, and the less target there was, the less chance there was 
of being nit; also that it was justifiable to take some risk as to the 
probable condition of the sea when ])attles were fought. However, 
what was then regarded as ''the high freeboard'' element won out, 
altliough in the minds of ill-informed critics, the ''lii^h freeboard" 
of 1806 seems to have become the dangerously ''low freeboard'' of 
1907. It is well to note, however, that the laws of nature and the 
behavior of the sea were the same then as now. 

Mr. Butler. Then the question of the height of the freeboard is 
almost as old as ship design itself? 

Admiral Caffs. Almost. 

Mr. Butler. And has been under discussion always on naval 
boards ? 

Admiral Caffs. It has been under discussion frequently; but those 
who are fully informed as to what has previously been done are quite 
aware that the conclusions ultimately arrived at will probably be 
the same. dF^' 

Mr. Butler. I understand; but it has always been under discus- 
sion in the board? 

Admiral Caffs. Always. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 181 

Mr. Butler. And the height of our freeboard is the result of the 
wisdoDi, after conference, of naval experts? 

Admiral Capps. Unquestionably. 

Mr. Butler. That is all I want to know. 

Admiral Capps (resuming). No member of a '^ board of design" 
who has regard for his reputation as a ship designer would alter his 
opinions on an important technical question (when he was convinced 
that he was right) merely to conform to the opinion of the majority; 
but the chances are ten to one that when iill the members of the 
board have been advised of aU the facts y the history of such matters 
in other countries and our own previous experience in design work, 
and have in addition their own personal experience in battle ships at 
sea, there is usually little difficulty in coming to a unanimous agree- 
ment; at least this has been my experience in the Navy Department 
during the past four years. There is nothing in our ship designs to 
conceal from those who have a right to know. There is nothing 
imusual or secretive in the action of boards on design. Battle-ship 
design, like everything else, must, however, conform to the laws of 
nature and the development of naval materiel, and when one has all 
the facts it is not so very difficult to reach a satisfactory conclusion. 
But when thoroughly experienced and competent men, after most 
careful deliberation, have made a decision as to the principal elements 
of the design, some bright genius is apt to think ne has discovered 
something that was possibly known or disposed of many years before. 

Mr. Padgett. Admiral, 1 notice in that same article that has been 
referred to, this statement: ^*In the latest of the foreign ships, espe- 
cially in the French and British navies, the high bow is universal." 
I wanted to ask if that was accurate, as it relates to the British, in 
their later policies ? 

Admiral Capps. He makes, as I have stated before, a very free 
use of the word '^universal." 

Mr. Padgett. Yes. 

Admiral Capps. Prior to the des^ning of the Dreadnought — for 
the past nineteen years, in fact — British oattle ships were designed, 
as to freeboard, on the basis established so definitely in the case of 
the Royal Sovereign; even the Majesties, which apparently had much 
greater sheer forward than previous or subsequent British battle 
ships, except the DreadnoughtSy have their freeboard abreast the for- 
ward turret only 2 feet higher than that of our Connecticuts. 

Mr. Padgett. What I wanted to get at was whether they have 
altered that plan. Have they changed that policy of late and 
adopted a different one ? 

Admiral Capps. Not in the slightest degree, for vessels of the same 
dimensions, etc., as those formerly designed. The increase in forward 
freeboard, as previously noted, is a logical development on account 
of increase in length, increased speed and finer water lines, and dif- 
ferent distribution of weights. 

Mr. Padgett. That is what I wanted to know. 

Admiral Capps. With the development of speed, which means finer 
water lines and less buoyancy at the bow; with the increase in length, 
which in the new vessels would probably mean greater immersion of 
the extremities while pitching in a seaway; with the concentration 
of weights at the extremities of the vessels, which accentuates the 



132 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVT. 

pitchm^ motion — the raising of the forecastle is a perfectly logical, 
reasonable deveJopment of what was accepted as entirely true and 
correct in previous designs, 

Mr. Roberts, I would like to ask the Admiral how the freeboard 
of the ships that are being laid dow^n by the English since the Dnad- 
noughi compares with that of the DreadnougJd f 

Admirai Capps. The same thing, practically. 

Mr, Roberts. In other words, tney s^em to be uniform on the 
principle of that high freeboard design % 

Admiral Capps. If you must have 525-foot ships, and 21 knots 
speed and fine water lines, and heavy turrets and barbettes well for- 
ward and aft, it \^ill be ^\^se to provide greater freeboard than for 
shorter, fuller, less speedy shipSj if you desire relatively the same 
seagoing qualities. 

Mr, BuTLEB. What is the length of tlie Delavjaref 

Admiral Capps, Five hundred and twenty feet, about. 

Mr, Roberts. Is not that likely to be tfie policy of the navies of 
the future, on the long, high-speed, fine-line ships? 

Admiral Capps, Not necessarily. You know what must be the 
experience of the Japanese as regards such matters, an<l yet they are 
apparently willing to sacrifice a certain amount of seaworthiness in 
rouffh weather in order to save the great weight necessary to cany 
the bow one deck height higher. They take their chances, of course, 
in very rough water. If they should be compelled to fight in very 
rough weather, vessels mth high bows would undoubtedly have M}mB 
advantage over those ^ith low bows. The Japanese naval authori- 
ties appear, however, quit^ willing to take tliat chance for the sake 
of the great saving in weight which the lower freeboard permits, and 
there are those who think their decision very far from unwise. Ab 
bearing on this very subject, in an article published in a well-known 
scientific paper a few years ago, this article being wTitten by a sea 
going officer wlio had been on duty on the Kentuchj for nearly three 
years, it was stated that at no time during his cruise of three years 
had it been impossible to fight every gun of the battery, and the 
freeboard of the Kearsarge is 6 feet less than that of the Connecticvi 
class and nearly 5 feet less than that of all other vessels of our Atlantic 
battle ship fleet, except her sister ship, the Kentucky. 

Mr. Roberts. We did not get that testimony from the oflicers on 
the Oregon and Indiana and Massachusetts ^ did we? Was not the 
testimony there that the water came right into the turrets? 

Admiral Capps. Probably not; but it must be remembered that 
the Oregon, Indiana , and Massachusetts are of the same class and 
were our first battle ships and were appropriated for and designed as 
''coast line battle ships" and had low freeboards forward. 

I simply gave the testimony of the officer on the Kentucky as the 
contribution of one who had been on board that ship for three years 
and who apparently made an exact statement of fact. There have 
been other statements to the eflect that those ships are too low for- 
ward, and in that opinion I concur. Their design has not been 
repeated, hut they were designed to meet specific demands for that 
type of ship, and it is as useless to criticise them at this time as it 
would be to criticise the earher low-freeboard vessels of other navies. 

The Chairman. Now we will pass to the second, perhaps most 
important, criticism which has been made relative to the armor belt. 
Tell us about that, please. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 133 

Admiral Capps. The armor-belt question — that is, the degree of 
submergence of -lower edge below water at normal displacement — 
was covered also in the mscussion of the Royal Sovereign desipi. I 
have previously read various extracts from the discussion in the 
case oi that vessel, so will not repeat' them. In the case of the Royal 
Sovereign the main water-line belt armor was 8i feet wide, and of that 
5J feet were below water and 3 feet above, at normal load displace- 
ment — a fact which has been the subject of much misunderstanding, 
since many have assumed that the submergence of 5 J feet below 
load water line was the submergence below the deev load water 
line, a very different thing, indeed. As was clearly stated in 
the Admiraltv memorandum, there were only 900 tons of coal on 
board when tne lower edge of armor was 5i feet below the water line, 
while the capacity of the bunkers was about 1,800 tons. As pre- 
viously stated, the height of the upper edge of the Royal Sovereign's 
heavy water-line belt armor above normal load water line was 3 
feet, and our own ships designed about that time and since then have 
had not less than 3 feet above water and from 4 to 5 feet below water 
at designed load displacement. While the Kearsarges and Alor- 
hamas had about 4 feet submergence for lower edge of belt armor 
at designed load displacement, tms submergence is relatively about 
the same as that of the Delaware class, when consideringthe difference 
in the breadth of beams of the two classes of ships. Five feet has, 
however, been generally regarded as the minimum immersion per- 
missible for the lower edge of the main belt armor of battle snips 
at designed displacement, and such is the usual allowance in the Eng- 
lish, French, Japanese, and other navies, so far as we have knowledge. 
Data on this subject have been prepared and are at the disposition 
of the committee. 

Mr. Loud. Is that armor that you speak of the same in the Minnie- 
sofa — 5 feet below ? 

Admiral Capps. Yes; 5 feet below at designed load displacement. 
In the Minnesota class and the Connecticut class, however, another 

freat mistake has been made by our misinformed critics since the 
eavy water-line belt armor in the case of the Connecticuts and Minne- 
sotas is 9 feet S inches in width, and the upper edge of this heavy belt 
is, therefore, 4/^^^ ^ incites above the designed load water line, 

Mr. Loud. And the Minnesota the same? 

Admiral Capps. The same. 

Mr. Loud. How much below and how much above ? 

Admiral Capps. Five feet below and 4 feet 3 inches above. Then 
above that, in the case of the Vermont, Minnesota, Kansas, and New 
Hampshire, there are two belts of 7-inch armor of a total width of 
14 feet 6 inches — a side armor protection far exceeding that of the 
Royal Sovereign, or any British battle ship since designed until the 
advent of the King Edward class. 

Mr. Loud. May I suggest in that connection that I saw the Minne- 
sota the day before she sailed. I noticed that the upper edge of her 
armor came out of the water just aft of the gang^\^ay and disappeared 
imder water amidship — I judge a foot and a half under water. When 
she came back to her normal draft, would it then, amidships, be 4 
feet out of water? 

Admiral Capps. The report of the draft of the vessel and the 
weights on board, etc., at the time the vessel left the navy-yard, 



184 ALI/EGED DEFECTS IK VESSELS OF KAVT. 

New York, N. Y., indicate that ships of the Minnesota class'' had, 
when they left Hampton Roads, at least 12 inches of the heavy armor 
above the^ vxUer line, in spite of the large amomit of excess stores, 
ammunition, water, etc., carried. It should be noted that the main 
water-line belt armor is 15 inches higher than the armor at the bow 
and stem. 

Mr. Loud. The projection did not show above water, however. 

Admiral Capps. Were you looking at the painted water line, or the 
armor itself? 

Mr. Loud. I was looking at the projection of the armor. 

Admiral Capps. Nevertheless, it is a fact, as sIiot^ti by the actual 
report of the draft, etc., that the upper edge of the main water-line 
armor — that is, the heavy armor — must have been 12 inches above 
the water line with the vessel on an even keo], the upper edge of the 
armor at the bow and stem being practically just awash. 

Mr. Loud. I had it called to my attention as they were leaving. 

Admiral Capps. Quite so; but mistakes B,rv sometimes made, and 
it is^ possible that the vessel had a list tou ard the side you were 
looking at. There is a positive statement iii an ofticial report made 
to the Secretary of the Navy to the effect that the commanding 
oflSicer of the Connecticut on July 8, 1907, stated that the main water- 
line armor of the Connecticut was 6 inches below the water line when 
the vessel was full of coal, stores, etc. As a matter of fact, even 
with the excess of stores carried when this battle ship left Hampton 
Roads, there was Ifoot of the heavy water-line belt atill above water 
according to the official drafts reported when the vessel left New York, 
When the vessels of the Atlantic fleet left Hampton Roads their 
bimkers were full, thev had their fuU allo^vance of ammunition in 
their magazines, and there were over 100 toiu^ of extra ammunition 
for target practice alone on board some of i hem ; there were also a 
lar^e numoer of additional men with their necessary outfits; also 
additional stores, and, in some instances, several hundred tons of extra 
water for boilers in the double bottoms and trimming tanks. The 
condition of these vessels as to loadin^^ was therefore distinctly 
abnormal^ and yet vessels of the Connecticut class had more than 1 
foot of their heavy belt armor out of water. 

Mr. Loud. That is why I asked the question a few^ minutes ago as 
to what the difference or draft would be when they left port heavily 
loaded and what the normal draft would be when they were in ordi- 
nary condition. 

The Chairman. I wish you would go into this whole theory of 
armor-belt protection in your own way and explain that to us, at the 
same time giving a little history of it. 

Admiral Capps. It is rather an extensive subject, but I will try to 
be brief. The consensus of opinion among naval designers and 
those naval officers who have given very considerable attention to the 
subject appears to be that the lower edge of the main water-line belt 
armor at the designed load displacement should be immersed about 
5 feet. It should be remembered that this is the immersion at the 
designed load displacement or trial displacement, as it is usually called 
in our service, and not the deep load displacement. This depth of 
submergence is, of course, more or loss arbitrary" and is basecl upon 
the amount of weight which can be devoted to armor protection and 
is governed to a certain extent also by the beam of the ship. The 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OP NAVY. 135 

subject of weight is a vf ry serious one for naval designers, and the 
immersion of the lower edge of the armor belt has been limited to 6 
feet not because that is ample, in the judgment of the designer, 
imder all conditions, but because it is all that can be permitted under 
the allowance of weight for armor protection, and under ordinary 
conditions it should give ample protection. If the vessel were very 
light it would not give satisfactory protection xmder ordinary con- 
ditions of rolling, but that risk must oe taken. When, on the other 
hand, the vessel is deep loaded the protection of the vessel under 
conditions of fairly heavy rolling is good, but even then a roll of 10 
de^ees would cause the tower edge of the armor to come out of water. 
It IS thus obvious that protection of the water line is limited by the 
weight of armor which can be used for this purpose and is more or less 
a compromise. 

Mr. BuTLEK. Why do you want this protection below the water? 

Admiral Capps. Because of the action of the sea. As the ship rolls, 
the armor tends to emerge. Moreover, in a perfectl}^ smooth sea — 
and I can show you dozens of photographs illustrating this fact — 
the formation of waves at right angles to the line of travel of the 
vessel when going at high speed will cause an exposure of the side 
of the vessel, oelow the average water level, of 3 or 4 feet,and this in 
smooth water. 

Mr. Butler. And when the ship rolls back, will it expose what 
we call the skin of the ship? 

Admiral Capps. It is very apt to expose the skin of the ship. 
There will doubtless be many times during a naval action, in rougli 
weather, when the bottom below the armor belt will be exposed; 
and while a hit at the water line or below the water line is apt to be 
rare (and this is the experience of all naval battles so far) such a hit 
must always do very serious damage when penetration ensues because 
there is a likelihood of hitting boilers or engines or magazines; and 
even if vital portions of the vessel are not struck, the vessel is much 
more easily jBooded through an underwater opening in the bottom. 
It is thus apparent why 'protection below the water to a moderate 
extent is relatively of far greater importance than protection above 
the water line^ and armor distribution is governed accordingly. In 
the case of the Connecticut class, for instance, the heavy belt is 9 feet 
3 inches wide and extends, at designed displacement, from 6 feet 
below the water line to 4 fi^l ^ inches above. Above the main belt 
there are two other belts, the lower 6 inches thick, the upper 7 inches 
thick. For the Vermont, Kansas, Minnesota, New HampsTiirej 
Mississippi, and Idaho, both upper belts are 7 inches thick. More- 
over, the oelt immediately above the water-line belt is reenforced by 
deep coal bunkers. In other words, a shot striking just above the 
mam belt on the Minnesota would have to pass through 7 inches 
of armor, nearly 1 inch of structural plating, and then nearly 20 feet 
of coal, iif the upper bunkers are full. This very substantial protec- 
tion above the neavy water-line belt is usually entirely ignored by 
critics, although it is worthy of note that this upper belt ai-mor pro- 
tection of the Minnesota and class is as heavy or heavier than the main 
vxiter-line armor protection of thirteen important battle shijys in the 
British navy built or purchased during the past ten years. So far as 
concerns the intake of water, it must be remembered that a shot 
hole just above the water line can only admit small quantities of 



136 AliLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY, 

water, which can easily be taken care of by the punips or th© water- 
tight subdivision of the hull; whereas litoiage below the water 
line, and especially below the proteetivo deck, is much more serious, 
siDce water theu flows in quite freely under a *'head" and may easily 
be beyond the capacity of the jiumps. 

Mr, Butler, If a smp gets lut in here a foot or two above what is 
ki\o\m as the water-line armor belt 

Admiral Capps. The heavy armor belt? 

Mr. BuTLEit, The heavy armor belt — ^suppose she should pitch 
enough to enable the ordinary sea to come in. Would that fill the 
ship and so expose the skin of the ship on the other side? 

Admiral Caffs. Hardly. With reasonably good pumping facilities 
it would take a long time to flood the spaces above the protective deck 
to such an extent ais to materially affect the trim of tlie ship. 

Mr. BuTLEH, But suppose 3'ou did get enough to tip her over and 
endanger her. Would not the bottom of the sliip be exposed on the 
other side? 

Admiral Cafps. Unquestional>U% if you got enough water on one 
side. 

Mr, Butler. I got that point from Captain Hobson the other day. 

Admiral Caffs, In this comiection I would like to say right here 
that none of the allegations as to insuHieient water-hne armor have 
any benring upon the SoufJi Curofivn and MkUgan and the North 
Dakota ami Deluware, because the upper belt of those ships has a 
mean thickness equal to that of the ntmn water-line belt of the Alin- 
nesoiii and class, Wing 10 inches thick at the bottom and S inches 
thick at the top; moreover, these vessels have a compartmental sub- 
division which will affonl ample protection and stability even imder 
conditions of serious underwater damage. Also, if compartments on 
one side of the ship are flooded, as Mr. Butler suggested a few mo- 
ments ago, so that under onlinary condition- n c"|>nT>'r,Y of i^\m i>f the 
ship would result, there would be no such continuing change of trim 
in these vessels, since complete arrangements have been made for 
flooding the opposite compartments and restoring the vessel to an 
a})proximate 'even keel." 

The Chairman. I wish you would explain the length of this armor 
belt; and also state how our distribution of armor compares with 
the ( list ri hut ion of armor on the British and Japanese ships. 

Admiral Capps. The distribution of armor on ships of the same 
date, Japanese, Enijlish, and American, is very similar. The actual 
lengths of the belts on our ships have been calculated and are given 
in the table already alluded to. This sort of data for foreign vessels 
is not readily accessible, !)ut we have fairly reliable information 
which has been gleaned from various sources, and, so far as our 
information goes, the armor protection of ships of the U. S. Navy is 
quite equal to and in many instances surpasses that of English and 
Japanese battle ships. In this connection, it may be noted with 
considerable interest that in the South Carolina class, which are 
vessels of nearly 2,000 tons less displacement than the British Dread- 
nou(/hts, the weight assiirned to armor and hull is practically the 
same as that allowed for the Dreadnoiujlit. It is almost certain, there- 
fore, that the armor protection of the South Carolina is superior to 
that of the Dreadjiovqht. The armor protection of the Delaware is 
also superior to that of the latest British and Japanese battle ships, 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAYY. 137 

SO far as our information indicates. The armor protection of the 
Minnesota is very similar indeed to that of British vessels of the 
King Edward class. While the belt above the main belt on the King 
Edward is 1 inch thicker than the corresponding belt in the Minne- 
sota, the Minnesota's main belt is 1 foot 3 inches wider than that of 
the King Edward and therefore there is 1 foot 3 inches more of the 
Minnesota's main belt out of water at the designed load displacement. 
Armor distribution, like other elements of war-ship design, is a com- 
promise, but the fundamental principles which govern its location 
are the same in all cases and in all countries. 

Mr. Loud. May I ask the thickness of the main belt armor of the 
Connecticutf 

Admiral Capps. The Connecticut and Louisiana are different from 
the other four vessels of the class. The thickness of the main belt 
armor of the Connecticut is 9 inches at the bottom and 1 1 inches at the 
top. But the other vessels of that class have a main water-line belt 
9 mches in thickness throughout. 

Mr. Loud. And the Minnesota would have? 

Admiral Capps. The Minnesota, the Vermont, the Kansas, Idaho, 
Mississippi, and New Hampshire have a 9-inch belt. 

Mr. MuDD. Admiral, if it can be answered without involving too 
much repetition of what you have already stated I would like to nave 
you answer this question: How far, if at all, is it true that the ships 
of the battle fleet of the United States are exactly in the same condi- 
tion as the Russian ships at Tsushima — not temporarily, but per- 
manently. 

Admiral Capps. It is very difficult to compare our ships with the 
condition of the Russian ships at Tsushima, since it is doubtful if any- 
one has exact data as to the condition of the Russian ships when 
they went into action. From all accounts, official and otherwise, 
however, it is quite safe to assume that the main water-line belts of 
the Russian battle ships were under water. It is also evident from 
such testimony as -we have that the Russian ships were not only car- 
rying excessive amounts of stores, coal, etc., but that some of them 
had large quantities of water in their double bottoms. The condition 
of complete submergence of main armor belt was therefore, in all 
probability, one which could possibly have been avoided. In the 
case of our own battle ships, the upper edge o'f the main armor belt 
for vessels of the Connecticut class is more than 1 foot above water 
when all coal, stores, etc., and large amounts of excess ammunition, 
stores and water are on board. Other battle ships of the Atlantic fleet 
have the upper edge of main belt near the water line under similar 
conditions. But these . conditions are clearly abnx)rmal, are in no 
sense permanent, and statements to the contrary are false — no other term 
can properly characterize them. 

Mr. MuDD. The criticism, I apprehend, then, is to some extent true 
that the Russian battle ships went into the fight at Tsushima with the 
belt-line armor underneath water? 

Admiral Capps. From all accounts I should say that was very 
nearly true of the main belt armor, but it has no bearing on the actual 
condition of our ships. 

Mr. MuDD. That fact, if true, did not arise from the construction 
of the ships? 




188 ALLEGED DEFECTS IN ^ 

A< Ci *[ I I i ) B article has 

1 ' \ I A e frequently 

•] 1 i wrote the article under e^nsid- 

j\ sjAfi i 1 believe. I should also say 

ac s and inisleadingstatements 

B made in the article referred 

Mr. Padgett. Admiral^ I notice in this article this statement: 
"Of all our battle ships not one shows its main armor belt 6 inches 
above the water when fully equipped and rea<ly for sea/' Is that 
statement accurate? 

Admiral Capps. That is nearer the truth t han some of his st at ementsi 
but even thit is quite misleading. In the ftrst place, it is misleading 
in that it is inferentiallv assumed that the battle contiition is going 
to be that of the deeply laden condition. We have most emment 
authority to the contrary, in fact. But* assuming^ that you may, 
by some rare chance, meet the enemy immediately after filling up 
with coal, stores, etc., you certainly would not be justified in taking 
or keeping on board large quantities of excess supplies^ including 
hundreds of tons of water m (Joubie bottoms anu elsewhere. As 
stated before, moreover, five of tlie battle sliips now on their way t^ 
the Pacific coast have their main water-line armor belts more thaii 12 
inches out of water even imder abnormal conditions of loading, and 
in this respect probably excel any battle ships in commission m the 
British or Japanese navies, with tJie sole exception of the l^eadnonahL 

Mr. Padgett. If you have time, the question I want to put is thia: 
In the construction of the ship, anri its plan of design for hatt le action, 
what is the line of the heavy aniKir aoove the water when the ship 
is in battle condition? 

Admiral Capps. It is my desire to give the committee all possible 
information. In the first place, in time of war the ship must always 
be regarded as in battle condition. I mean, whatever condition the 
ship may be in she should be able to give a very good account of 
herself in action. If, however, you mean what would be the best 
condition in which the vessel could go into battle I should say, for 
the average battle ship, with about two-thirds of all stores, etc., on 
board and with about 900 tons of coal in her bunkers. 

Mr. Padgett. When the ship is in that condition what would be 
the height of the upper edge of the main armor belt above the water? 

Admiral Capps. The designs of our battle ships, up to the South 
Carolina class, provided, under this condition, from 3 feet to 4} feet 
of main belt armor above the water, dependent upon the class of 
vessel, the (Connecticut class having the widest main armor belt of 
any of our battle ships now in commission. The South Carolina, 
Micliifjan, Delaurire, and North Dakota, however, have the upper 
edges of their lieavv armor more than 10 feet above the water line. 

Mr. MuDD. Are our ships so constructed as to have that width of 
armor? 

Admiral Capps. Yes, sir; We must not lose sight of the fact, 
however, as the critic apparently does, that the belt armor above the 
water-line belt is of jrreat value. Above the main belt is armor from 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 189 

5 to 7 inches in thickness (depending upon the particidar ship) . More- 
over, damage to hull above the main belt is Iby no means so serious 
as damage below, for reasons already given. 

The Chairman. That is, above the protective deck? 

Admiral Capps. Above the main armor belt and above the flat 
part of the protective deck. 

The Chairman. So there is practically nothing in the contention 
that our ships are all wrong in the location of their armor belts? 

Admiral Capps. No. Such a contention is wholly unfoimded in 
fact. 

Mr. Padgett. There is one other question I want to ask, Admiral, 
if you just bear with me for a moment. It was stated in this article — 
it is not before me here — that in the after part of the ship, after you 
pass the portion protected by heavy armor, there is a large part of 
the ship that is practically unprotected that could be pierced by 
almost anv missile. 

Admiral Capps. I know the point to which you allude. This criti- 
cism does not apply to the six battle ships of the Connecticut class nor 
to the Idaho and Mississippi; it does not apply to the five battle ships 
of the Virginia class, nor to the four battle ships of the South Carolina 
and Delaware classes now under construction. It does apply, in a 
most limited degree, to the three battle ships of the Alabama class, the 
three of the Maine class, and the Kearsarge and KentucTcy, This is 
only another case of the inevitable compromise, however; there was 
just so much weight available for armor on the Alahama^ MainCy and 
KerUuckyj and it was distributed to the best possible advantage in the 

f'udgment of those responsible therefor. In other words, the particu- 
ar places alluded to are on the superstructure just abaft the forward 
turret and just forward of the after turret and receive a larg:e measure 
of protection from the turrets themselves. The board which passed 
upon the designs of these vessels, with full knowledge of all the facts, 
deemed it best to omit the armor from points that were otherwise 
fairly well protected and to apply the extra weight so gained where it 
would do the most good. IJnder certain conditions projectiles 
could easily penetrate that part of the superstructure, but it should be 
remembered that all of the superstructure armor is light and pene- 
trable with ease by 8-inch projectiles. It only protects the secondary 
battery from the fire of secondary batteries or the enemy. Lately, 
when one of these ships was about to be overhauled, the matter was 
again considered, and it was unanimously decided that in view of past 
experience and recent developments in naval materiel it was quite 
useless to expend extra weight in extending the superstructure armor. 
Moreover, there has recently been made, by officers of high standing 
in their profession, objection to the use of any armor protection for the 
secondary battery of 5-inch or 6-inch guns. 

Mr. Padgett. Do you regard that portion of the ship as one that 
is subject to vital injury in battle? 

Admiral Capps. Injury to that part of the ship would be by no 
means vital; it is high above the water. Should the secondary bat- 
tery be manned, those in the immediate vicinity would of course be in 
danger; but they would also be in danger elsewhere if the superstruc- 
ture armor was penetrated, and the superstructure armor, as I stated 
before, is only 5 J inches thick on the Alabama class and 6 inches thick 
on the Main£ and Kentucky classes. 



140 AIIiBGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 

The Chairman. Are there any other questions upon the subject of 
the armor belt? 

Mr. Roberts. Admiral, you have seen this picture in the article 
we have been considering, showing the Mikasa with a hole in the 
secondary armor? 

Admiral Capps. Yes. 

Mr. Roberts. And you will notice the statement there tliat this 
ship would have sunk nad the sea been heavy. With a hole of that 
size, located as it is there, would the ship gink f 

Admiral Capps. With a hole located as that appeal^ to be it would 
be a very easy thing to make temporary repairs with canvas^ coUisian 
mats, or otherwise. 

Mr. Roberts. But suppose you could not get the canvas over it. 
Would that necessarily sink the ship ? 

Admiral Capps. Not at all. It would take a long time, if the 
pumping appUances were reasonably good, before sufficient water 
would get in to sink the ship. 

Mr. KOBERTS. Was that wound above the protective deck? 

Admiral Capps. Apparently it was, if the photograph is a corr^t 
indication of the facts. 

Mr. Roberts. It is said to be. 

Admiral Capps. If that is a photograph of the ship itself, it indi- 
cates a very imusual result of gun fire. I have attended a great 
many armor tests — ^in fact, all of special importance, as affecting hull 

Srotection, that have taken place at Sandy Hook and Indian Head 
urin^ the last four years, and very many before then. I can say, 
thereiore, from personal knowledge, that 6*inch armor (the thickness 
of the upper belt of the Mikasa) does not go to pieces in the manner 
indicated in the photograph, even when attacked by 12-inch shell. 
It looks much more like the opening which would he made in the thin 
side plating by a large projectile exploding at time of impact. 

The Chairman. What is the name of that vessel, the Mikasa'i 

Mr. KoBEUTS. The Mikasa. It states: ^^This drawing was made 
by the author from a Japanese war photograph taken immediately 
after the battle of Rouncl Island, August 10, 1904. The hole in the 
secondary armor of the sliip was made hy a 10-inch shell. The ship 
would have sunk had the sea been heavy." 

A(hnirai Capps. I slu\ll not dispute the author's statement as to 
the manner of making the drawing and the source from which he ob- 
tained the photograph. I do dispute, however, the allegation that 
such results would ensue from attacking 6-inch armor with 10-inch 
projectiles. 

Mr. Roberts. It shows what is apparently a mattress being low- 
ered. 

Admiral Capps. Yes; it also looks very much to me like a photo- 
graph of a sketch. 

Mr. Roberts. It is a drawing made from a photograph. It was 
rumored about the time we first knew of the Dreadnought that the 
English had commenced extending their armor under the water 
farther than thev had ever done before. Do you know whether that 
is true or not ? 1 mean under the water toward the keel. 

Admiral Capps. There are various and seriously conflicting reports 
as to the depth of the Dreadnoughfs armor below the load water line. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 141 

The best information obtainable, however, is that the lower edge of 
the DreadnoughV 8 armor is about 5 feet below the designed load water 
line (which means the water line when the slup has only 900 tons of 
coal on board, the bunkers holding 2,700). There is very excellent 

f round for the belief, however, that the Dreadnought was over her 
esigned draft more than a foot. In fact, a recent London paper 
placed it at 3 feet, but that I believe to be a great exaggeration. There 
is given in the Naval Pocket Book, the naval annual founded by the 
late Sir William Laird Clowes, a statement that the armor is 7 feet 
below the water line. There are other statements, photographs, and 
published sketches, however, which indicate that tne depth of sub- 
mergence of the lower edge of the DreadnoughV s main armor belt is 
between 4 and 5 feet at the designed load draft. So I should say the 
designed depth of submergence of main belt, with 900 tons of coal on 
board, was somewhere about 5 feet, since nearly all British battle 
ships, after the time of the Royal Sovereign ^ had an immersion of 
lower edge of main belt armor or about 5 reet at designed load dis- 
placement. 

Mr. Roberts. Is this armor which is under water designed in any 
wav to resist torpedo attack ? 

Admiral Capps. No; so far at least as concerns the ordinary water- 
line belt armor. Torpedo attack is likely to come much lower down, 
and, so far, the tendency in our service, also in the British and Jap- 
anese navies, as far as I am aware, is to relv largely upon compart- 
mental subdivision of the hull structure, which is probably the most 
reliable defense possible against torpedo attack. For instance, in our 
latest battle ship there are four water-tio;ht skins between the boilers, 
etc., and the sea. Also numerous atnwartship water-tight bulk- 
heads. 

Mr. Roberts. What would be the effect if you had armor down 
where you would expect a torpedo attack? 

Admiral Capps. It you had armor on the outside of the ship, a thin 
armor belt, the chances are that a large area would be crushed in, 
even larger than if you had no armor at all^ unless the armor was 
thick enough and its supporting structure rigid enough to absolutely 
resist the force of the explosion. 

Mr. Roberts. And what thickness would do that? 

Admiral Capps. The thickness would have to be so great that there 
would be little weight left for guns, machinery, and other essentials. 
Its weight would, in my opinion, be prohibitive. 

Mr. Roberts. Can you give us some idea in inches or feet? 

Admiral Capps. That can not be stated definitely. 

Mr. Roberts. In other words, then, it is absolutely impracticable 
to armor below water against torpedo attack? 

Admiral Capps. It is quite impracticable to cover all of the under- 
water surface of a battle ship with armor of suflScient thickness to 
absolutely resist torpedo attack. And there is information just at 
hand that the Navy, which formerly used this method of protection, 
has now abandoned it. 

Mr. HoBsoN. Can you build a structure that would hold up such 
armor? 

Admiral Capps. Yes; if there were no limitation on size of ship 
and other quaUties were sacrificed. Under normal conditions of size 
and weight available, however, as I have stated, it would be imprac- 



142 AM/BGED DEFECTS m VESSELS OF KAVY, 

ticable; the tendency of torpedo explosion would be to crush in iBTgb 
areas of such thin armor as could be pro\'icled, 

Mr, Roberts. You spoko sometime ago about the distribution of 
armor on the Royal S&mreigji. and her class. Has there been any 
chanj3:e in the English navy since that time, in their theory of armor 
distnbution? 

Admiral Capps. So far as can be judged by their designs, the dis- 
tribution of armor on later Britisih ships has been a development of 
that first adopted on the Royal Saverei^n. Ever>^ single ship of 
which we have data up to the time of the Ureadnowghi has from 5 feet 
to 5 feet 6 inches of the main water-line-armor belt below water at 
the designed load draft of the vessel, and it is well to remember that 
this dej^ree of immersion of the lower edge was considered, at the 
time of the Roi^al Sot^ereign design, as little as could be permitted 
with prudence. The recent attacks on the materiel of the American 
Navy have been from the opposite quarter; it has been alleged, ia 
substance, that we placed too much armor below the water line, 

Mr, Roberts. Has there been any change in the thickness of the 
armor? 

Admiral Capps. Tliere have been many changes, in all services, 

Mr. Roberts, It has increased, has it not ? 

Admiral Capps, No; the tendency has been to decrease the thick- 
ness of water-line armor and increase the thickness of the upper belt. 
You know the resisting quality of armor has also improved very 
much. The 9 inches of face-hardened armor of to-day is about as 
effective as the 18-inch compound armor of the Royal Sovereign's 
time, 

Mr. Dawson* In our newest ships, what is the average difference 
in thickness of the main armor belt and the next belt above iti 

Admiral Capps, Just 1 inch. A very small difference indeed. If 
we had had ample weight at our disposition we would have made the 
upper belt thicker, but the extra weight was nmch more advanta- 
geously utilized elsewhere ; incidentally, the upper belt armor of the 
South Carolinas and Delawares is thicker at the bottom than the main 
water-line belts of all the British ships which followed the Royal Sov- 
ereign except the Lord Nelson and Dreadnought classes. 

Mr. Padgett. How high does the upper belt extend above the 
water line ? 

Admiral Capps. More than 10 feet above the normal water line, 
and 8 feet or more above the deep-load water line. 

Mr. Butler. Ai\d it is 8 inches thick? 

Admiral Capps. Eight to 10 inches thick on the South Carolina^ 
Michigan, Delaware, and North Dakota. 

I would like to say now, if the chairman will pardon me for a mo- 
ment, that I am at your disposal now or at any other time, and if 
you can not get all the information you desire to-day I can come 
before you to-morrow or at any other time. 

(The committee thereupon adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, 
Januarv^ 22, 1908, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.) 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 143 

THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS. 

Wednesday, January 22, 1908. 

The committee this day met, Hon. Oeorge E. Foss in the chair. 

STATEMENT OF WASHINGTON LEE GAPPS, CHIEF CONSTRUCTOR 
AND REAR-ADMIRAL, CHIEF BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND 
REPAIR — Continued. 

The Chairman. We >^411 proceed with the subject-matter under 
discussion when the committee adjourned yesterday. 

Admiral Capps. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I desire to 
make brief allusion to the most important conclusions whose truth 
was so fully demonstrated vesterdav, especially with respect to free- 
board and water-line distribution oi armor as determined by officers 
in our own Navy, the British Board of Admiralty, and distinguished 
officers of the British navy. 

It was shown at some length that the Royal Sovereign^ which is 
more or less a typical ship, had a freeboard of 18 feet to 19 feet 6 
inches, as stated by the designer. Sir William White, in a paper read 
before the Institution of Naval Architects in April, 1889; also a dis- 
tribution of water-line armor which involved a submersion of the 
lower edge of the belt annor 5 feet 6 inches at designed load draft, 
leaving 3 feet of the heavy belt armor above the water at designed 
load displacement, at which displacement there was 900 tons of coal 
on board. 

It was also demonstrated conclusively by documentary and other 
evidence that the designs of the Royal Sovereign class had been deter- 
mined upon only after the most exhaustive consideration by the 
British Board of Admiralty and by distinguished officers of the Brit- 
ish navy. I also made allusion to the fact that in the United States 
Navy there had been various boards, exclusive of the board on con- 
struction, which had considered battle-ship designs, and that one 
board in particular, convened by the Secretary of the Navy in March, 
1896, unaer the presidency of the late Rear- Admiral John G. Walker, 
U. S. Navy, had gone at length into the general question of battle- 
ship design, and had stated the seagoing reauirements of battle ships 
ana the proportion of coal, stores, etc., which should be on board 
when the vessel was in the best condition for battle. 

Allusion was also made to the fact that in more recent times, in 
our own Navy, a board, whose opinion in such matters should be 
treated with the greatest consideration by everyone, and especially 
the seagoing element of the service (being composed wholly of sea- 
going officers and under the presidency of Admiral Dewey), had 
stated, in an official report under date of October 17, 1903, this state- 
ment being reaffirmed subsequently, that battle ships should have 
certain characteristics, among others ''a high freeboard forw^ard,'' 
adding that **in this respect, the Iowa type impresses favorably;'' 
the ** freeboard forward'' of the lowa^ be it understood, is a Uttle less 
than that of any of the battle ships now in the Atlantic Fleet, with 
the exception of the Kearsarge ana Kentucky, This same board also 
stated specifically that an armor distribution in general conformity 
with that previously adopted for the Maine would be desirable for 
the new battle ships. After discussion, however, the General Board 



144 AIXEGID 0BFECTS IN TESSEI^ OF KAVY, 

entirely modified its views as to armor distribution, and concurred 
in the recommendation submit teiJ by the board on construction as 
to the greater da^irability of the armor distribution on the Vermont, 
MoreoveFt &s a matter ot fact, with tlie sole exception of the New 
Hampshire^ which is of the Vermont class, the battle ships of the 
Unite^l States Navy designed during the past four years nave had 
^reaier armor protection than the Vermont class. 

It was also pointed out that thp Tarious featuring of American 
battle ships hao, since 1889, passed under the immediate supervision 
of the board on construction* and that all matters relatin|f to fret*- 
board, armor distribution, magazine arrangements, turret ammuni- 
tion hoists^ etc., had been known, considered, and approved by 
seagoing members of that board. The names of the seagoing aria 
other naval ofticers who have been members of this board since its 
inception were given chiring ^^esterday's hearing, annmg them being 
easily recfignizcd those of some of the most distinguished officers 
of our XavT. Therefore when our critics of the present day make 
sweeping and unqualified statements in condemnation, not only of 
the policy of the United States Navr of to-day, but also that of 
many preceding years in our own and some of the principal foreign 
navies, they must not be surprised to find themselves in a very 
weak and insignificant minority and to be classed with those whose 
information is superficial and imperfect and who have made no 
serious attempt to increase their knowledge of subjects upon which 
they give such definite opinions with such complete and reckless 
irresponsibility. There have also been prepared, as previously noted, 
for tne information of the committee, cross sections of t>^icai Ameri- 
can, British, French » Russian, German, and Japanese battle ships, 
indicating the freeboard and tlie distribution of the armor of the 
vessels &s designed; also profiles of the same ships, indicating tha 
elevation of tT*^ miTic Trt'i'} boards, etc. ^<' ^m^ j^- ^^ one-ems battle 
ships of the American Aav>% the data is ai^soiutely exact. So far 
as concerns vessels of foreign navies, the plans have been based upon 
information of a vers' reliable character, gleaned from ever\^ available 
source. The authorities consulted were given in yesterday's hearing. 

With respect to those battle ships of the Japanese navy which took 

Eart in the battle of the Sea of Japan, it is of ver\^ great interest to 
now that the particulars with respect to those ships appeared in 
great detail in an exhaustive article prepared by the director of naval 
construction of the Japanese na\^' for presentation to a technical 
society in Japan. This article was subsequently translated and pub- 
lished in a well-known London engineering paper. 

With respect to some other foreign battle ships whose particulars 
are given in the plans of cross sections and pronles, the information 
is quite accurate, and for all the rest ever}' effort has been made to 
obtain the most complete and reliable information. And after 
examination and comparison of the armor protection, freeboard, 
heights of battery, etc., of our own and typical foreign battle ships it 
is very gratifying to be able to state (and I am not at all responsible 
for any of the ships indicated in the plans, except the Delawares and 
South Carolines and the Xeiv Ilarnpshire) that our battle ships are not 
only equal to, but, in my judgement, rather better than foreign battle 
ships of the same period of design. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 145 

As a matter of general interest to the committee, there have also 
been prepared tables giving particulars of the various Russian and 
Japanese ships which took part in the battle of the Sea of Japan, and 
how they fared in that battle ; also complete details of our own battle 
ships, including heights of freeboard, gun axes, etc., and distribution 
of armor. I may also note right here that the reference in the article 
we were discussing yesterday to the alleged fact that all of our broad- 
side gims were so low that they could not be fought in any seaway 
and that the broadside guns of roreign ships were two and three times 
as high is either false or else misleading, since it can only be made true 
by comparing the heights of the lowest guns in our ships with the 
heights of the most elevated guns on foreign sliips, the height of the 
lowest tier of the broadside secondary battery guns of all of our battle 
ships being from 14 feet to 15 feet 2 inches above the designed load 
water line instead of 11 feet, as stated in the article. As a matter of 
fact, 11 feet more nearly represents the deck height and not the^un 
height of the lower tier secondary battery guns. 

Mr. Roberts. When you speak of the deck height you mean the 
protected height? 

Admiral Capps. No, sir; I mean the height of the deck on which 
the gun is mounted. Guns mounted 14 to 15 feet above the designed 
load water line would be on the gun deck. Guns on the next deck 
above would be about 22 feet above the designed load water line. 
In some French ships the secondary battery mounted on the highest 
deck would have a gun height above the water line of about 36 feet: 
but in the same ships the height of the guns on the lowest deck would 
be only 11 feet above the water line. The misinformed critic in this 
statement, as in many others, has made most improper and unfair 
comparisons. If a supposedly weU-educated technical man should 
make such comparisons, his reputation for knowledge and veracity 
would suffer severely; for an artist, however, the ''license of the 
brush'' must be considered in extenuation, I presume. 

Criticism, as we all know, is desirable and helpful when under- 
taken by those who have intimate knowledge oi the subject and 
make their criticisms openly and fairly and through proper channels 
with an evident desire to build up and not destroy. I know of no 
case in which careful consideration has not been given to such criti- 
cism; but it is also evident that those who criticise openly and over 
their own signatures must ultimately stand sponsor tor their state- 
ments and must accept full responsibility therefor. 

Attacks of the kind which have recently been made on our naval 
materiel are made periodically, not only m our own service, but in 
those of nearly every other naval power. The British navy has had 
just as much of it as any other navy, and, judging by newspaper com- 
ment and the proceedings of some of their technical societies, prob- 
ably a little more even than our own. In Brassey's Naval Annual of 
1904 there is an exceedingly interesting article prepared by Sir Wil- 
liam Henry White, a most eminent naval architect, who for nearly 
twenty years was director of naval construction of the British navy 
and who now, though on the retired list, takes an active interest in 
professional work and was the principal consulting naval architect 
in the preparation of the designs of the Mauretania and Lusitania. 

In the article referred to Sir William, after brieflv reviewing the 
''principles and methods of armor protection in modern war ships,'' 

30584— S. Doc. 297, 60-1 10 



in which he alludes to some of the discussioiLs and criticisms 
British naval mat^rielj he makes the following comments; 

I tnist tliat the time may never come when deidgns of the ships of the Royal navy 
will be lar^ly infliiencetJ by the rerattrka of amateur criticii, imperfectly infonued sm 
to what is involved, and judging the merita of designs aimply or chiefly by what naval 
wrchitecte have hi en able to accoLopIish on reputed or tabiirftt"Wl diepkcement tono^gee. 
Repeiif.edly and pu)diely I have expressed tne opinion that ^methiug much lai^ u 
involved in theee debates than the credit or discredit of a pArticuIar naval architect- 
Mv belief is that when working under the same conditions of spe^* coal endurance, 
offemie, and def**nse the ekill and inventive power of naval architects in thia and other 
countries » applied to a particnlar problem at a given dale. m'iU ahnost always remdt in 
the production of vessels of pract it-all yJd en tical dii^placement. Wlien exfp^rdinaiy 
resfulti are said to be achieved on relatively email di^pla cements, and certain features 
have been ua^isually developed in a design, it is well to inquire closely, What hoa 
been sacrificed as compared with othej deeigna? 

The foregoing oonmients are applicable to much of the foreign and 
domeatic criticism which has been recentlj^ directed at the thor- 
oughly well considered designs of American and foreign battle ships. 

Sirf Dawson, What is the caliber of those guns w hich are mounted 
on the French ships 11 feet above the water? 

Admiral Capfs. Sl\ and four-tentlia inches, I explained ^^ester- 
day that the French School of Design for many years has tencled to- 
ward elevated emplacement of the main and portfons of the secondary 
battery and complete water-line belt armor i^rotection; but they 
have fiad to sacrifice to a definite degree stability under damaged 
conditions, and the more complete jirotection given by British, 
American^ and Japanese designs to their turret foundations, ammu- 
nition hoists, etc. 

Mr. Padgett, You were speaking a moment ago. Admiral, of 
criticism, and welcoming criticism from Intel ligently informed 
sources, I notice in the Wajshington Post of January "21, 1908, a 
publication: ''May warn na\y officers— President displeased at 
criticism of battle *ship fleet — Example likely to be made of promi- 
nent officer if discussion is not stopped/' T want to inquire ii there 
is any truth in the statement or insinuation there made that officers 
of the Na\y are not to be allowed honestly and intelligently to express 
any opinion or criticism which they may entertain, and if the Navy- 
is to be held down by orders and their honest opinions suppressed? 

Admiral Capps. Of course I would not presume to speaK for any- 
body but myself in these matters, and I should be loath to have con- 
sidered as accurate evei^^thing which appeared in the public press 
concerning naval materiel or naval policies; but, in order entirely 
to disabuse the mind of any gentleman present of the idea that the 
Department is reluctant to receive or consider criticism, I beg to 
refer you to two general orders, one issued in 1898, just after our 
war with Spain, and another issued bv the present Secretary of the 
Navy in 1907. 

In the order of November 7, LS9S, there was contained a specific 
direction to all officers who had served on board ships during the war 
with Spain to make reports in detail as to the operation of all parts 
of the ship and her fittings, etc. There was thus afforded the most 
perfect opportunity to submit re^port and criticism concerning every 
portion of the ship and its fittings. This order was as follows: 

^ Coinmanderp in chief oi station?, commandants of Ptations, and commanding officers 
of vessels acting sinely will direct tliose ofllcers under their command who serv^ed 
on board ship (lurine the present war to make reports in detail as to the operation 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 147 

of all parts of the ship and her fittings, her armament, her e<][uipment or equipments, 
as were under their charge or came under their immediate observ^ation. These 
reports are to be made in detail, a separate report in regard to the matter comine 
under the cognizance of each bureau concerned. They must cover specifically with 
respect ^o each fitting or appliance, machine, or gun with which they deal: 

1. The good points. 

2. The Dad points, defects, or breakdowns. 

3. Suggestea improvements. 

These reports are to be forwarded to the Department through the Bureau of Navi- 
gation. 

The above order was issued at the direct instigation of the Bureau 
of Construction and Repair, and that Bureau expected to receive a 
substantial amount of helpful and other kinds of criticism of its work 
as a result. The following quotation from the report of the Chief 
of the Bureau of Construction and Repair for the fiscal year 1899 
shows the result: 

In response to Special Order No. 79, the Bureau has been furnished with a large 
mass of criticism and comment as to matters under its cognizance. This criticism 
is the result of experience under war conditions of seventy-five officers and covers 
twent^r-five vessels of various classes. It's independent nature and wide range, when 
taken in connection with the knowledge gained from the condition of the vessels on 
their return to the various yards, have made it of sufficient value to warrant here a 
brief mention of the most important points touched on. 

"With regard to the strength, stability, seaworthiness, and maneuvering powers of 
the vessels of the various classes, the war experience tended to confirm the favorable 
opinions previously arrived at, and the general success of the designs in these respects 
may be said to be thoroughly demonstrated. 

Turning now to the question of detail, the comment and criticism naturally cen- 
tered on such features as were most intimately connected with war service, and which 
were, under the conditions, severely and thoroughly tested. 

The various engagements afforded ample tests of the arrangements installed for the 
supply of ammunition to the batteries, and the Bureau is gratified to be able to state 
that these portions of this important feature under its cognizance have given very 
general satisfaction. 

More recently — on June 20, 1907 — the Secretary of the Navy issued 
General Order No. 49, which was as follows: 

The necessity for mutual effort toward improvement being greater than ever before, 
the Department invites officers to submit suggestions which in their judgment would 
tend to promote the efficiency of the naval service. The suggestions should be con- 
cerning things or methods and not a criticism of persons, and should in all cases be 
accompaniea by a well-digested scheme for improvement. 

The Department will refer these suggestions to competent authorities for considera- 
tion and recommendation. When suggestions of an officer are approved and recom- 
mended to the Secretary for adoption, an entry to that effect will be made on the 
officer's record and the officer notified to that effect. 

The above order is quite self-explanatory and is, in effect, a most 
cordial invitation to suomit criticism, the only limitation being that 
it should be well considered and should deal with facts and things 
and not with men and methods. Under this invitation many sug- 
gestions and criticisms have been received, some of them carefully 
considered, others quite the reverse. It is obvious, however, that 
any criticism, to have value and to receive proper consideration, 
should be made squarely and fairly through proper channels and 
after some degree of careful investigation and personal experience on 
the part of the critic. 

Mr. Padgett. I knew in a general way of the orders that had here- 
tofore been issued. What I want to know is whether there has been 
any change of policy or whether there is any suppression now of 
criticism; and if there is none, I want it officially stated and to go into 
the hearings. 



AUJSGEO DBFfiCtS TK VESSELS OF KATT. 

Adtilird C\ipps. I lliink it is perfetlly obvious that anybody 
who hft« naytltiiig proper to say can say it with perfect freedum now 

Air ljoiTt>. In iJie pi^.ss or to the Depttrtmentf 

Adtiiiml CArr*^, To the I^purtiiictit* 

ilr. Paikjett. ^Iliat 1 would itke to ktwm is whether or not there 
ii Aiiv di^iH^tioii to .^upprt*ss just mmi pn»pcr criticism uf the Nftvj! 

Adntlnu CAl'r*, 80 fax as I am aware, aot Ihe s^%htest. 

ilf, Lijm* Criticism, where I 

Mr, pADOETf, .Iny where ihat the pttblic may be taken into the 
conOtlettce. 

Admirai Capps* So far ai^ I am awAit\ the Department is detddedly 
tiLlai^ted in re^eivin^ can^fiiL well-i-onsidpriMl, and hone^ criticism 
of anything in the aaval lier^-ire, esperially when it is coupled with 
rectMnniemTatiikiis for improveinent which evidently bear the impress 
ot eanifui tliuught, considenilJOQ, and knowledge' of the subject in 
hand. 

Mr. HoBSOX. Can ytHi stale whetlier or not there is a di^pi^i^itioB 
to grmnl authority to'ofiicers to present fully views bearing on criti* 
timn to the Soiuelv of Navid Architects and Marine Engineers ancd 
Other scientific lioJie^ when they have their meetings and through 
Ihem to open to ftdl di?§<cus&ioii tfy the puhUc t 

Admiral Cafps, For very many years the fX^partment permitted the 
preparation of papers^^ with plansand data very c^>mpletely descrip- 
liTc of the ghips of the NaTii% these paper^^ bein^ presented for dis^ 
cuj^ioQ bifiire the S^Mricty itf ^aval Architect* anti Marine EiisiDeeTs. 
The ptibGa^ied prot-eedinin? of this isoeietT are ia most large librariee, 
and ihey ate othenri^^ readily aceesisible. The member^p of tiie 
Society of Xaval Architecl^ and Marine Ei^iiieei^ tnctndes Iho 
majority of the pfoiBtiiefit naval arehileets and engineers ol this 
oounliy* also maav froro foceicn eountries^ and a large ntimber of 
offict^ns of the I'mted States ??av^-. The meeting are quite open 
to the public aiui anybvxiy can attend and participate in the dis- 
cussion, and usually, where pers^mal attendance is iiii practicable, 
written communications coverm.^ the subjects discusseii are wel- 
come«.i and ai>^ aftenvarvis incorp;* rated in the printeii prtx-eedings 
of the Sivietv. 

Mr. Daws<.>\. The pniblic cnild buy the r^^ports f 

Admiral Capps. Yt^. sir. 

Mr. Mrpp. You spv>ke m the past tenst^ f 

Admiral Cjlpps. Ihe custom of preparing and prt^entini: such pa- 
fH^rs des<.'riptive of our battle skips obtained up t.' about sLx years a^ 
and the pa{.>ers c^'Utributed up lo that time includevi i^eneral plans and 
dt*S4.Tiption> of everv" battle slup now in active st^r^'ice. includino: thi.i«se 
o f t he i \» ' ; ru ctu- '*t A ass . 

Mr. MuDD. Has ther\^ Invn anv chaiure of p>*^licy smce that time? 

Admiral Capp^- IXiniu: the past sl\ years the Department has not 
peruutttH^i the publication of such complete details as heretofore with 
r^^ixvt to its materiel for reas*uis which, after careful consideration, 
appvanxl to Iv fv^r the K^st inrer^^ts r.f the Na\-A-. But it is quite ob- 
vious that tlie dt^uriis whicii have lately b^:Vii subje<.'tevl t«:» such crit- 
icism wen:* pveu wide publicity at the time of their complelit»n and 
werv* uuxst favorably coiumenttH.! upv.m br'th m this country and 
abrv>ad. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 149 

Mr. HoBsoN.'Has the change in policy in any way affected the 
legitimate opportunities for scientific criticism ? 

Admiral Capps. No. 

ilr. Roberts. I notice that this order of November 7, 1898, seems 
to be limited in its scope to inviting criticisms concerning the ships 
engaged in the Spanish war. Was that order taken in the service 
since that time as a general invitation to officers to send in any legiti- 
mate criticisms they may have ? 

Admiral Capps. That order was issued immediately following the 
completion of the Spanish war when even^thing of a favorable or un- 
favorable character was fresh in oflBcers' minds, and was intended to 
obtain for record the actual experiences of our officers with our naval 
niat^riel during the period named. tS 

Mr. Roberts. The object was to get ^11 the information they could 
about defects, etc. ? 

Admiral Capps. Yes, sir; about conditions then existing. The 
very points now being brought up could easily have been raised con- 
cerning the ships then in commission. In fact, the Indiana , Massa- 
chusetts j and Oregon have from 8 to 10 feet less freeboard forward than 
any battle ships attached to our battle ship fleet, with the exception of 
the Kearsarge and Kentucky. The ammunition hoists installed on 
those vessels and the Iowa, the New Yorky and the Brooklyn w^ere 
similar to those so severely criticised recently, but they did not have 
the safety automatic shutters now installed. The eflBciency and ex- 
tent of the armor protection of the water line of our later battle ships 
is also greatly superior to that of the Oregon class, and yet serious ad- 
verse criticism does not appear to have been made in response to the 
order of November 7, 1898. 

Prior to and since the Department's special order of November 
7, 1898, officers have had and have exercised the right to submit, 
over their own signatures, reports concerning the character or be- 
havior of ships under their command or any part of naval mat6riel 
which came under their observation, and many communications of 
this character have been received and have been considered. 

General Order No. 49, of June 20, 1907, was really a cordial invitor- 
tioUy subject only to the ver>^ reasonable condition clearly set forth 
in the order. Although many communications have been received 
in response to this invitation, the majority of those which affect 
matters under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Construction and 
Repair are, I am sorry to say, of httle value, having been obviously 
not well considered, or else relating to subjects A\ath which the officers 
submitting the criticism were not entirely conversant. 

After all, complete and extensive training and experience are 
requisite in order that the battle-ship designer may produce a satis- 
factory design of battle ship ; and, while the expert artillerist, engineer, 
and seaman should be freely consulted and their views concerning 
their specialties given most serious and careful consideration, the 
naval architect, in the last analysis, must inevitably bear the heaviest 
burden of responsibility for success or failure of the design as a whole. 
Such is the history- of design not only in our own but in foreign navies, 
and the unfortunate navalarchitect is often unjustly blamed for incor- 
porating in his design the too strenuously enforced ideas of those 
whose ^^ntentions^^ were doubtless good but whose insufficient 
knowledge and experience in battle-ship design rendered the utiUza- 



tion of their '4d^as'' hazardous to say the least. In^this coanection 
it must not be forgotten that the American naval constructor receivea 
the same academic training as the seagoing officer of the Une, includ- 
ing courses in ordnance, ^nnei^. seamanship, and engineering; also, in 
aculition to practice cruises while at the Naval Academy, he usually 
spends two years in seagoing vessels of the Navy subsequent to 
grail uation and then, after being specially selected on account of the 
high average of his attainments, is afl'orded opportunity to take a 
complete course in naval architecture— all this preparation taking 
place before hcginmng his actual professional work as an assistant 
naval constructor in the Navy. Ir, thereforej with his large subse- 
quent experience, he fails to bring to his professional work as a naval 
constructor adequate knowledge of the ne^^ds of the naval service, 
it can not possibly be for tack of proper preparation, 

Mr* Roberts, I understood you to say that last year an order was 
issued covering the subject of suggestions or criticisnis by line officers, 
la that in your report? 

Admiral Capps/ I referred to General Order No* 49 and stated that, 
in reality, it was an invitalion to submit criticism, A copy of this 
order will accompanv tbe revision of my testimony {this order has 
already been quoted). In the report of the Secretary of the Navy 
(p* 31) for the fiscal year ending June SO, 1007, there" also appears^ 
under the caption of **The methods of designing naval vessels," 
the following language: 

" Trnm time to timp^ in thf> public pre», and even amonig naval officerB, criticism 
ia mad«^ concerning our naval materiel. iDvestigatioD h&B almost invariably devel* 
Qped the fact, however, that such aritieisni L» bafled larvi?lv upon miainfofniation, 
and in most cflS4?# re^ta upon th^ atlf^rapt to compare tli(? designs of ten or more ye^m 
ago with what mi^ht havt- Iwc-en acfompliBhed bad the deei^eis of the earlier period 
ftie^ia able to anticipate and take advantage of all BubS^qucnt devdopmetita in 
naval mat^rtr^L Cnticiam of thb character i^ unfair, without reaultant ad^'antafep 
asd may be dinsmiaeed without comment, 

Anotber 5p43cieB of criticism occasionaliy heard ia worthy of mor^ attention. It is 
the suggestion that seagoing officers do not have enough to say in the construction of 
vessels of the Navy. If such officers were in any way ignored in this matter the 
situation would be grave. But it is not the fact. On the contrary', the Department 
has earnestly desired to avail itself of their valuable practical experience, ana, accord- 
ingly, June 20, 1907, by General Order No. 49, a formal invitation was addressed to 
all officers of the service, asking them Uy submit suggestions which, in their judg- 
ment, would tend to promote efficiency; and the assurance was given that such sug- 
gestions would receive consideration, and that, if they were approved and recom- 
mended for adoption, an entry to that effect would V)e noted on the record of the 
officer who made them. The only limitations placed upon this invitation were, first, 
that the critici.snis should concern methods and not persons: and, secondly, that they 
should be accompanied in all cases by a well-digested scheme of improvement. 

The object of this order was clearly to give the Department the benefit of the expe- 
rience of officers in all branches of the service. Nevertheless, it was well understood 
that all suggestions could not be adopted: that there would be differences of opinion; 
and that, ultimately, there must be some established method of sifting the wheat 
from the chaff. A responsible court of reference was. therefore, absolutely indispen- 
sable. So far ivs concerns all matters relating to the design of .ships, their armament, 
armor pn)t(Mtion, motive power, equipage, etc., the D<-partment has, in the lx)ard on 
construction, a logically c<nistituted 'board on d«-sign." The individual members 
of this board are dirftinctivelv representative men in the several branches of their 
profession, and have und«T their immediate control officers specially selected from 
the service, having to «io with mat^'Tiel in all its varied forms. Moreover, the nature 
of their administrative duties is such as to keep them constantly informed regarding 
developments in materiel, not only in our own but in foreigh services; and, finally, 
they bring to their exacting duties as members of a Ix^ard on design large experience, 
definite knowledge, and conservative judgment, coupled with a sense of the crucial 
re8[>onsibility resting u]>>n them for the success of tne completed ships when fully 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 151 

equipped. The Department, therefore, relies with confidence upon the determina- 
tions of this highly competent board for the final arbitrament of technical questions 
relating to the materiel of the Navy. 

I again invite attention to the fact that General Order No. 49 
was an invitation. Both before and since the issuance of this order, 
however, the right of criticism and recommendation was absolutely 
unquestioned and frequently exercised. 

Mr. Roberts. Will you please put in the record a copy of General 
Order No. 49? 

Admiral Capps. I will. (Order previously quoted.) 

Mr. HoBSON. Instead of this policy to-day tending to suppress and 
discourage criticism, I would like to ask whether, as a matter of fact, 
the inviting of it and placing it on the officer's record does not create 
an incentive to criticise ? 

Admiral Capps. It does, unquestionably. 

Mr. HoBSON. And gives him precedence and prestige? 

Admiral Capps. Unquestionably, if his criticism is timely and 
valuable; and that fact is clearly indicated in the order. 

Mr. Roberts. Why was it deemed necessary or expedient to 
issue that invitation; was it because of criticisms in the papers that 
officers had no opportunity to present this information, or was it 
because of complaint in the service that officers did not have the 
opportunity, or their criticisms were not considered when presented? 

Admiral Capps. You must address that inquiry to the Secretary of 
the Navy, because I did not know anything about the order until it 
was^ printed. In its practical appUcation there are difinite and 
obvious disadvantages, for the simple reason that many people have 
a much higher opinion of their technical ability and knowledge than 
is warranted by the facts. Many officers apparently have ample time 
to write and make suggestions — much more time in fact tnan the 
highly trained and experienced officers who must give their sugges- 
tions consideration. 6ut the time expended in the consideration of 
such suggestions is not in the slightest degree unwillingly accorded, 
provided the suggestions are clear-cut, apt, and evidently the result 
of experience and careful thought. 

Mr. Roberts. You say that you do not know why tliis order was 
issued. Do you know of your own knowledge whether there have 
been complaints from officers in the service that their suggestions 
have not been considered — have been pigeonholed? 

Admiral Capps. There has doubtless been some complaint of that 
character. As a general rule, in all walks of life, those whose ideas 
are not followed are apt to complain to some one or other. However, 
official complaint, if any has been made, has not been brought to my 
attention so far as I can now recall. 

The Chairman. We will pass on to some of the other criticisms. 
I wish, Admiral, you would take them up, as you have them in 
your mind. 

Mr. Roberts. Please take up the ammunition hoist. 

Admiral Capps. That is a question which could best be considered 
by that branch of the Navy Department which is especially charged 
with the desi^ and construction of turret ammunition hoists, these 
appliances being under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ordnance, 
the installation only being under the comizance of the Bureau of 
Construction and Repair. Of course aU structural work on the 



152 ALLEOEP DEFECTS TTT VESSEI3 OF ^AYY, 



el connected with the installation of turret amniunitiori boistS; 
includm^ adaptation of the hull structure ^ turret, etc., to the par- 
ticular iy\}e ot hoist supplied by the Bureau of Ordnano? is also under 
the Bureau of Construction and Repair. While I could possibly 
satisfactorilj" answer your tjuestion, it seenis to me more appropriate, 
if I might so suggest, that iufomiation conceruiog turret ainmuBition 
hoists could be more satisfactorily obtained from the Bureau charged 
with such matters. 

Mr. Roberts. I understood from your talk yesterday tliat a plan 
had \>een adopted for some specific change in the present system of 
auutmnition hoists, and you were describing to us how the present 
hoist was arranged, what safeguards there were put in, and I under* 
stood you were going to teli us what was proposed to be done to 
correct the conditions* 

Admiral Capfs, The meaning I desired to conrey was that |>lans 
for a different type of hoists were now under consideration with a 
riew of t>ermitting the hull structure to be adapted to a two-s^tage 
ty|>e of turret ammunition hoist, and that a change in type of turret 
ammunition hoists had been under consideration (or some time past 
by the Btu^au of Ordnance. 

Mr. RoBEBTs. The Bureau of Ordnance wotild not go on and design 
plans for ammunition hoists mthout consulting you I 

vVdmiral Capps. Certainly not, so far as concerns matters in which 
the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Ordnance are mutually 
interested. We are in constant ana daily consultation on all sucK 
matters. 

Mr. RoBEBTs. Tou know what tliey have in mindt 

Admiral Capps, I do: not only that, but the two Bureaus hare to 
coo]>erate to the fuUest extent in all such matters in order to get sat- 
isfactonr results. There Are eight types of battle ships to oe con- 
sidered, and in order to get the most efficient and economical arrangE^ 
ment on the ships now built the proposed chanjtres must 1>e thoroughly 
considered for each one. 

Mr. Roberts. In a general way. what change will ho made? You 
spoke of an interrupted hoist. 

Admiral Capps. The essential difference between the anununition 
hoist as now installed in the turrets of our battle ships and those pro- 
posed to l>e installed is that instead of the ammunition ^oing directly 
from the magazine handUng room to the breech of the gim it goes 
from the handling room to a platform located at some convenient 
stage between the magazine hamlling room and the turret chambers. 
At this intermediate platform it is transferred laterally and is placed 
in another hoist, by which it is carried to the breech of the gim. 
Tliis is called the * two-stage" or ••intcrru]ned-hoi>t " system. In 
other words, instead of one direct and continuous hoist, there are 
two shorter hoists entirely separated from each other. At first 
thought, one might say that such a system was c>scniially much 
safer than the direct hoists: in fact, entirely safe. As a matter of 
fact, however, as I told you yesterday, and as the reci^rds of investi- 
gations indicate, not one of the liisasirous accidents we have had in 
turret chambers through the iiinition of powder charges before entry 
into or just after cnxry into the guns resulted in a magazine explo- 
sion: and only in one instance was powder in the handhng room 
isnuted through burnincr crpains faUim: from the turret chamber into 



» 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 15S 

the handling room, and subsequent to this particular accident auto- 
matic shutters were installed which separated the turret chamber 
from the handling room, such shutters having previously been ordered 
or provided for in the specifications of battle ships under construction. 

Mr. Dawson. Which explosion in the handling room was that you 
referred to? 

Admiral Capps. The Missouri. In the "interrupted hoist '^ 
system, if it is assumed that there will never be any ammunition 
accumulated in the intermediate handling room, and also that 
rigid precautions are taken so that the upper hoist is always empty 
until the previously hoisted charge has been inserted into the cham- 
ber of the gun, and the breech closed, and also that there is no 
accumulation of ammunition in the lower hoist, or handling room — 
then, of course, there is a very complete isolation of the turret cham- 
ber; in practice and under service conditions, however, it will be 
impracticable to obtain the required speed of supply of ammunition 
to the turret, unless the next round of ammunition is at the bottom 
of the upper hoist, by the time the preceding charge is being loaded 
into the gun. It is, also, most probable, m order to obtain ade- 
quate speed in supplying ammunition to tne turret guns that it will 
be necessary to nave a considerable supply of loaded and fused 
shells in the turret chamber itself, or in the intermediate handling 
room. In other words, it will really be a case of transferring a sub- 
stantial part of the contents of the magazine from its completely 
protectea location below the water line to a higher and more vulner- 
able level. 

I have been informed by a most competent and experienced ord- 
nance expert, one who has given the subject of turret ammunition 
hoists much consideration, that, in his judgment, turret hoists as 
now installed in our battle ships are not only as safe, but possibly 
safer than the "interrupted hoisf system (so much in favor among 
critics), when the "interrupted hoisf is being operated at highest 
speed not only under the conditions of target practice, but, also, those 
of battle, if anything like the speed of supply of ammunition usually 
required during target practice should be attempted. 

Mr. Butler. This fu bject has been heretofore considered ? 

Admiral Capps. Yes, sir; very often. 

Mr. Butler. It is not new? 

Admiral Capps. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Please tell us what sort of hoists the other navies 
have in their ships and what they are using to-day? 

Admiral Capps. The majority of 12-inch turrets in the British navy 
are, I believe, fitted with interrupted hoists. 

The Chairman. Wliich navies ? 

Admiral Capps. The British navy and, so far as I am aware, the 
Japanese navy have both types. I am also informed by liigh 
authority that all British armored cruisers have turret ammunition 
hoists direct from the handling room to the turret chamber. 

Mr. Roberts. How about the French? 

Admiral Capps. The French began with the continuous hoist and 
still have it on many ships, I am informed, although it is of a differ- 
ent type from ours. Some of their latest turrets may have the 
interrupted hoist. 

Mr. Roberts. Why did they make the change? 



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AULiEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 155 

turret ammunition hoists, informed the Bureau of Construction and 
Repilir officially that it intended, as soon as practicable, and as soon 
as the vessels were available, to install '* two-stage" or interrupted 
ammunition hoists in the turrets of all battle ships, armored cruisers, 
and monitors, and requested the Bureau of Construction and Repair 
to take such action as might be necessary to provide the necessary 
funds to make the structural changes consequent upon such pro- 
posed changes in turret ammunition noists. 

Mr. Roberts. This recommendation does not come through your 
initiative? 

Admiral Capps. It does not. It comes in the manner just indi- 
cated. 

Mr. Dawsox. Is it proposed in this two-deck hoist to carry the 
ammunition up in a trunk, so that each shell will be protected as it 
goes from the nandling room? 

Admiral Capps. There will be two trunks. The first one goes 
from the lower or magazine handling room to the upper platform or 
intermediate handling room; it is tlien transferred nonzontally to 
the upper hoist and then goes to the turret chamber itself. 

Mr. Dawson. Is the cnarge protected from sparks until it is 
inserted into the guAs by means of the trunks; are they separated? 

Admiral Capps. The trunks are separated. 

Mr. Dawson. Is not that the way it is handled now? 
— Admiral Capps. It is now handled in an ammunition car which goes 
direct from the handling room to the brooch of the gun. .The car 

E asses throughan opening in an intermediate platform, this oj)oning 
eing closed automatically after the car passes. 

Mr. Dawson. This criticism points out that our ammunition goes 
from the handling room up to tne brooch of the gim apparently abso- 
lutely unprotected, while in the hoists and turrets oi foreign navies 
the charges are transferred Iti a trunk which protects them against 
sparks. Is that a fair comparison of the actual condition? 

Admiral Capps. It is not. In the turret annnunition hoists of our 
battle shij)s there is practically complete separation by moans of 
automatic shutters between the turret chamber and magazine hand- 
ling room. Also the ammunition car itself allords some protection 
to the inclosed ammunition. Also the annnunition hoist, turret sup- 
ports, and all turret tnochanisms are protected from the turret floor 
to the protective deck by means of armored })arbottes, thus making 
the protection of ammunition hoists, turret supj)orts, etc., against 
the effects of an enemy's fire distinctly su|)ori()r to that of the French 
battle-ship turret. 

Mr. HoBSON. We still use the long copper tank to carry the charge? 

Admiral Capps. In the magazine, yes. That tank does not go in 
the hoist with the charge, however. The charge is removed from the 
copper tank wliile in the magazine, then j)asse(l through a scuttle in 
the magazine door (which scuttle is automatically dosed })y a (lap), 
and then placed in the carrier of the amnumition car, which is itself 
fairly well closed in and j)rotected from falling s|)arks or burning 
grains of powder. 

Mr. Dawson. A trunk 

Mr. Roberts. That corresponds to the trunk in some other navies? 

Admiral Capps. No; it is a direct but unindosed hoist with sej)ar- 
ating platform between liandliTig room and turret chamber. I under- 



156 ALLEGED DEFECTS IK VESSELS OF KAVT, 

stood Mr. Dawson to be referring to a continuous ammunition trunk 

from handUng room to turret. 

Jlr. Dawsox. a trunk that inclosed the powder, so that no sparks 
eould get at it in transit. 

Mr. Roberts. In the interrupted hoist we are profjoeing now, iu the 
ammunition on a continuous carrier from the magazme to the gnni 

Admiral Capps, There will be two carriers. 

Mr. Roberts. Two carriers? It is interrupted absolutely, not 
only by going along laterally on one deck, but by being taken off 
one carrier and put on another? 

Admiral Capps. The passage from handling room to turret is com- 
pletely interrupted, two hoists being employed in the transfer of the 
ammunition from the magazine to the turret chamber, 

Mr. Roberts. Does the shell come up through the same hoist as 
the powder I 

Admiral Caffs, By the same hoist. 

Mr. Roberts. Onthe same carrier? 

Admiral Capps. On a section of the same car; but the '* two- 
stage'' or interrupted hoist system, for greatest efficiency, involves 
the storage of a considerable supply of shell at the base or the upper 
hoist or in the turret chamber itsell. 

Mr. Lorn. The shell and powder are transferred from one carrier 
to another. 

Admiral Caffs, Yes? ; they are transferred from the lower to the 
upper hoist. 

ilr. LotD. The powder is not taken off^ and the shells are not 
taken off the carrier, but the carriage itself is moved over? 

Admiral Caffs. No, In the interrupted hoist, it is necessary to 
remove the charge from the carriage of the lower hoist and actually 
transfer it to another carrier in the vipper hoist. You have two 
distinct hoists and two distinct carriers in the interrupted hoist 
system. 

Mr. Loud. On the hoist you have a carriage on which you convey 
the ammunition? 

Admiral Capps. Yes. In the turrets of our battle ships there are 
two continuous hoists from the handling room to the turret — one 
for each of the turret guns. The ammunition car is loaded in the 
handling room, which is adjacent to the magazines, and is then 
hoisted on its continuous rails until the section of the car containing 
the projectile is opposite the breech of the gun. The projectile is 
then rammed into the breech of the gun. After this, each section 
of powder is rammed home. As before stated, the automatic shutters 
close as soon as the car passes up or down and thus effect practically 
complete separation between turret and magazine handling room. 
With the interrupted hoist, the first or lower hoist brings the ammu- 
nition up to the intermediate handling platform. It is then trans- 
ferred to the ammunition car of the upper hoist, which carries it to 
the breech of the gun; from that time on, the operation of loading 
is completed in the manner just described for the continuous hoist. 

Mr. Lamar. AATiere it is transferred on the interrupted hoist does 
that work automatically or does it require men? 

Admiral Capps. It requires men. 

Mr. Roberts. Please give us some information concerning that 
portion of the criticism relating to turret ports. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 157 

Admiral Capps. The turret ports specifically spoken of were appar- 
ently those of the Kearsarae. Here, again, improvements in mate- 
riel have greatly modified the earlier arrangements of gun mountings. 
The turret gun mounts of the Kearsarge were the first in our service 
which involved the use of the spring recoil system, which was the very 
latest thing in gun recoil systems. In locating and installing the 
four cylinders containing the recoil springs much greater space was 
required for the gun mount than was formerlv necessary, and the 
trunnions of the guns were located some little distance from the 
turret port plate, which in the case of the turrets of the Kearsarge 
(as in practically all turrets up to that date) was curved and not 
flat as m later vessels. This ooviously necessitated a much greater 
vertical height for the turret port opening, in order to get the requi- 
site elevation and depression of the gun, than would have been the 
case if the trunnions of the guns could have been placed closer to the 
front plate of the turret. But, so far as I am aware, similar condi- 
tions prevailed in foreign turrets which had the same type of gun 
mounting, especially French ships of that date. 

Mr. Roberts. Does that apply just to the Kearsarge or to the Kear- 
sarge type? 

Admiral Capps. To the Kearsarge and Kentucky^ the only ones of 
that class. In later designs the ports have been decreased in size 
to the fullest extent permissible with the type of gun mount used, 
and I believe that the gun ports of our later ships are no larger than 
those of contemporaneously designed foreign battle ships. In later 
designs, we have still further increased the protection of the interior 
of turrets by inserting shields inside the gun ports. 

Mr. Roberts. The Kearsarge has changecl the recoil system of 
her guns? 

Admiral Capps. No; but for ships designed since the Kearsarge 
there has been provided a more saitsfactorv' arrangement of gun 
mounting. 

Mr. Roberts. To-day there is no necessity by reason of the type 
of gun on the Kearsarge and Uer class to have those large openings? 

Admiral Capps. The large openings on the Kearsarge are necessary 
so long as that vessel has ner present type of gun mounts. In other 
words, there has been great development in the character of gun 
mounts since the Kearsarge guns were installed, but the Kearsarge 
mounts still require the opemngs orginally provided. 

Mr. Roberts. The guns now on the Kearsarge can be operated 
with a smaller turret port ? 

Admiral Capps. Yes; but only in the event that you had an entirely 
new mount ; but that of course would involve ver^' extensive altera- 
tions, and the vessel would have to be placed out of commission. 

Mr. Roberts. Have they changed the mount ? 

Admiral Capps. No, sir. 

Mr. Roberts. For the advantageous handling of the present gun 
and mount we must still have the same size turret opening? 

Admiral Capps. Yes. The gun mounts on the Kearsarge can not 
be changed without involving extensive changes in the turret. 

Mr. IfonsoN. Does the shield you have placed on the inside of 
turrets come close to the turret wall ? 

Admiral Capps. It is just as close to the turret wall as it can be 

S laced without fouhng the turret wall when the gun is elevated or 
epressed. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IlT rEBSELB OF NAVY, 

Mr. IIoBSOBf, Could you place it on the outside of the turret? 

Admiral Cafps. That scheme was fully conisidered and rejected, 
first, becauisG it entirely changes the balance of the gun^ and second, 
because it is more apt to damage the gun if struck by a projectile. 

XIr, Loud. Are the turret ports in English ships smaller than in the 
Kmrsargef 

Admiral Capfs. Those of later ships; yes. But the earlier English 
gun mountings were on the barbette principle^ and it was only in 
more recent years that the English barbette mounting with '*gun 
faous^'' has closely approached our ''turret" arrangement. 

Mr, IjOUD. The*i=^ize of the turret ports in our later ships is larger 
or smaller than the English? 

Admiral Capps, Just about the same, I should say. 

Mr. LotTJ. The criticisms in the magazine articles have already 
been coirected ? 

Admiral Caffs. In designs subsequent to the Kexxrsarge the turret 
ports are smaller and as small as the mounts will permit. The criti- 
cism of the gun ports of the Kmrmrge class is, however, most exag- 
gerated, since the port opening could not possibly be '* 10 feet square;" 
such an area would include both gun ports and the greater part of the 
port plate, and is obviously- a gross error. 

Mr. Roberts. There is a further mention in the article about an 
opening for the broadside guns? 

Admiral Caffs. The broadside gun porjts of our battle ships are 
Tery similar to the broadside ports of vessels uf the same date in other 
navies. 

Mr. KoBERTS, Are they larger? 

Admiral Cappj^. The size of broadside gun ports is absolutely con- 
trolled by the amount of train, elevation and depression of gun 
required/and the proximity of the pivot of the mount to the side of 
the ship. The port, opening is made just as small as possible after 
providing: for the necessary elevation, depres^^ion, nm\ Xvvtm. In for- 
eign navies, tlie size of port opening is controlled by identical con- 
ditions, so that there can hanlly be anv great variation in size. 

Mr. Loud. Have you put shields on broadside guns? 

Admiral Capps. In some cases; yes. I can give you a rather inter- 
esting bit of information concerning the variation of sentiment as to 
the vahie of shields on broadside guns. In some pubUc comment, I 
do not recall just where now, it was stated that the officer in command 
of one of our battle ships, through personal influence, succeeded in 
having shields put on his broadside guns; also that this grave defect 
had not previously been noted. 

The Bureau of Ordnance, which authorized and installed the 6-inch 
gun shields of the vessel referred to, also installed shields on the 
corresponding guns of other ships of the same class. In due course 
of time the commanding officer first referred to was detached and 
another commanding officer assigned. Within a very short time 
the new commanding officer made formal request of the Bureau of 
Ordnance to land his 6-inch gun shields and put them in the store- 
house. The commanding officer of one of the sister battle ships 
(there were only three) took the matter in his own hands, dismounted 
the shields and stored them* in the hold ready for use by his successor 
if he should, perchance, prefer shields. At the present time there 
are many who advocate no armor protection whatever for the sec- 



AT.TiEGED DEFECTS IN VESSELS OF NAVY. 159 

ondary battery guns, those holding such opinion contending that it 
is safer to give the shell free entry and possibly thus prevent its 
bursting than have its course interrupted by a shield or light armor, 
thus insuring its bursting and doing much greater damage. It is 
thus quite evident that, so long as individual oflBcers have individual 
opinions, there can scarcely be unanimity of sentiment upon any 
important question concerning which there is reasonable opportunity 
for diflFerence of opinion. 

Mr. Roberts. If I recall, there is a still further criticism with 
regard to the manner in which the secondary batteries of our ships 
are installed — that is, on the broadside, with no armor to keep a pro- 
jectile from coming in fore or aft? 

Admiral Capps. I presume you refer to the alleged absence of 
screen bulkheads. As a matter of fact, every battle ship of the 
United States Navy since the Iovm, and including every battle ship 
in Admiral Evans's fleet, has screen bulkheads between the guns of 
the secondary battery. 

Mr. Loud. What thickness ? 

Admiral Capps. They are from an inch and a half to 2 inches thick. 

Mr. Loud. That would not keep out heavy shot? 

Admiral Capps. It will prevent the fragments of a bursting shell 
from entering adjacent gun compartments. In fact, experience 
indicates that transverse screen bulkheads 1 J inches thick will confine 
the fragments of a 12-inch shell which has been exploded in a case- 
mate with screen bulkheads of such thickness. 

Mr. HoBSON. Suppose the projectile had come in at high velocity, 
how many screen bulkheads would have stopped the projectile's 
flight? 

Admiral Capps. The screen bulkheads are of no use in stopping a 
large projectile or considerable fragments of such projectile when 
travelmg in the line of flight of the projectile. To install thin screen 
bulkheads for such a purpose would be useless. 

Mr. Roberts. There is no effort to prevent the projectile itself 
from coming in except by means of the armor? 

Admiral Capps. Tne outside armor is the principal protection of 
the gun and gun's crews. 
^ Mr. Roberts. Armor to prevent a projectile coming in fore and aft? 

Admiral Capps. There are usually armor bulkheads at forward and 
after ends of superstructure of same thickness as the side armor. 
Possibly you are alluding to a small unprotected area of superstruc- 
ture bulkhead just forward of after turret and just abaft the forward 
turret on vessels of the Kearsarge^ Alahama, and Maine classes. That 
matter was gone into fully yesterday. I then stated that in order 
to distribute the weight of armor at their disposal to the best advan- 
tage the board of ofiicers responsible for the designs of those ships 
apparently considered it advisable to take the remote chance of a 
projectile coming in at those particular points, since the areas in 
(question were fairly well protected by the turrets. In vessels de- 
signed during the past nine years, however, the superstructure armor 
has been made continuous. It is especially worthy of note, however, 
that in discussing our most recent designs there was a strong tend- 
ency among well-informed ofiicers to omit all armor protection for 
the secondary battery, on the principle that since it is quite impos- 
sible to give such a battery adequate protection against guns of 8-inch 



AIXEOED DEFECTS IN V15SSELS OF NAVY, 

caliber and above, it would be wiser to omit all armor protection 
Cor such portions of the battery and to apply the weight so saved to 
more completely protect other portions of the hull 

Mr. Roberts. As I undei^tand the criticism it goes a little further. 
It says, as I recall it, that foreign navies are installing secondary 
guns so that the guns themselves have adequate armor protection, 
and that one of the defects in our ships was the installing of guns in 
the manner you have described. 

Admiral CIapps. Curiously enough, the Aniericans took the lead in 
^ivnng effective armor protection to f^ins of the secondar}^ battery^ 
(if we treat as secondary b at ter>" all guns less than 10 inches in caUber), 
the 8-ihch turrets of tlie Indiana, class, being among the earliest of 
their kind. The French and Kussians extended the turret style of 
mount to their 6'inch guns. The EngUs*h, Americans, and Japanese 
have continued to mount their li-incb gtms in liroadside. It is obvi- 
ous, then, that the method of mounting the secondary batter}' is only 
another one of tbr^se niatters of opinion in wliich there m always ample 
ar^iumentative ground. 

Mr. Robert?!. Coming back to the Kearmrge, there are five of those 
shi|>s f ^ 

Admiral Capps. Xo; only two. 

Mr. Roberts. Wlmt you were saying in regard to turret ports 
applies to this class? 

Aiimiral Capps. There are only two in the class, the KEursargt and 
the Kfintucky. 

Mr HoBSON', Do your remarks apply to the AMmma class? 

Admiral Capps. They do not; not in so great a degree, at least. 

Mr. Roberts. The kmrsargt and KevMcky are in a class by them- 
selves ? 

Admiral Capps. They are. 

Mr. [(oriEnT^^, ^Miat \voijld it po^t to change the mounts of those 
guns and reduce the size of the turret ports on those ships? 

Admiral Capps. If anything whatever was done toward changing 
the turret mountings of the Kearsarge and Kentucky, I would recom- 
mend nothing short of an entirely new turret and a new arrangement 
of gun mounting. The Kearsarge' s and Kentucky's turrets and 
mountings are not up-to-date and should be completely rebuilt when 
the vessels are laid up for a general overhauling. 

Mr. Roberts. How much would that cost? 

Admiral Capps. It would be quite expensive. For armor, guns, 
mounts, and structural work, I should say possibly S800,000. 

Mr. Roberts. For each ship? 

Admiral Capps. Yes, sir. 

Mr. IIoBsoN. Would it not be practicable to simply remove the 
front armor plate and replace it? 

Admiral Capps. No, sir. The Kearsarge and Kentucky, as you 
recall, have the superimposed turret arrangement. They were the 
first designs of that kind in our service. The weight or the upper 
turret is utilized in counterbalancing the whole turret structure, and 
the front plates of both upper and lower turrets are vertical and have 
curved surfaces instead of being inclined and having flat surfaces as 
in recent designs. New mounts and guns in the lower turret would 
be advisable, and the upper turret should be removed if entirely sat- 
isfactory results are to oe attained. 



ATiTiEgEP DBFE0T8 IK YBSSBLB OF NAVY. 161 

Mr. RoBEBTS. Right on that point, the AUbama class, do they have 
superimposed turrets? 

Admiral Cafps. No. 

Mr. RoBEBTS. They have a turret, but it is different? 

Admiral Capps. Yes; entirely different. 

Mr. RoBEBTS. Woula it not be feasible to take off the superimposed 
turret on the Kearsarge and Kentucky and put on the type of the turret 
on the Virginiaf 

Admiral Capps. The Virginia also has superimposed turrets. So 
faJ: as I am aware, opinion is wholly against supenmposed turrets at 
the present time, and successive cmef constructors have persistently 
and continuously opposed such a type of turret installation from the 
very begiiming. 

Mr. RoBEBTS. The Department to-day would not recommend 
superimposed turrets? 

Admiral Capps. So far as I am aware of the views of the Depart- 
ment, that type of turret moimting is wholly out of favor. 

Th6 Chaibman. The superimposed turrets was a recommendation 
of the seagoing officers? 

Admiral Capps. It was, as fully set forth in the last annual report 
of the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair. 

Mr. RoBEBTS. To change the turret system on the Kearsarge and 
Kentucky and to put on a new turret would involve a structiu-al 
change in the hull of the ship ? 

AcunJral Capps. It will involve a verv considerable change in the 
structural arrangements of the ship, including an entirely new turret 
structure. 

Mr. Rdbebts. Serious changes? 

Admiral Capps. Serious changes. As stated, there would be exten- 
sive changes in the hull structiu'e and a new turret structure, with a 
rearrangement of magazine stowage if the best results were to be 
attained, 

Mr. RoBEBTS. Getting at the element of cost, what would that be? 

Admiral Capps. About $400,000 for each turret; $800,000 for 
each ship. 

Mr. RoBEBTS. That would be outside? 
' Admiral Capps. I should say so. 

Mr. RoBEBTS. Admiral, have you ever heard in any official way, 
or in any unofficial way, any statement from line officers that they 
put up some canvas and painted it to simulate armor on some of our 
ships on a foreign station, because they did not want the foreigners 
to see that certain parts of the ship were not armored? 

. Admiral Capps. 1 think some allusion was made to such an in- 
cident in an oflScial communication, but I am not positive. The 
first time I ever saw it unofficially was in the magazine article here- 
tofore alluded to. It may or may not have happened. I do not 
know from personal knowledge whether it did or not. 

The Chaibman. There appear to be no further questions from mem- 
bers of the comipittee concerning alleged defects in our battle ships. 

Admiral Capps. In this connection I desire to repeat my former 
statements that any information in the possession of the chief 
constructor with respect to our battle-ship designs, or criticism 
thereupon, is at the disposition of the committee, and I hope they 
will call upon me for any further information which may be desirea. 

O 
30684-H8.Itoc. 297, 60-1 11 



eOxH CoNGBESS, ) SENATE. (Docujcent 

l8t Session, f | No. 298. 



STATEMENT IN REFUTATION OF ALLEGED DEFECTS OF 

NAVAL VESSELS. 



Mr. Hale presented the following 



STATEMENT OF BEAB-ADMI&AL CONVEBSE IN BEFX7TATION OF 
ALLEGED DEFECTS IN DESIGN AND CONSTBXTCTION OF CER- 
TAIN NAVAL VESSELS OF THE UNITED STATES. 



Fbbbuart 19, 1908. — Referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs and ordered to be 

printed with illustrations. 



Navy Depabtment, 
WasMnffton, D, C, February 6, 1908. 

Sir: In compliance with your verbal instructions I have the honor 
to submit the following statement in regard to certain criticisms which 
have appeared from tmie to time in the pubUc prints and elsewhere 
purporting to describe matters connected with tne Navy and which, 
from their character, would seem to have been prepared by persons 
whose knowledge of the subjects discussed was Umited and mcorrect. 
These articles have undoubtedly caused wrong impressions, which a 
statement of the facts may in a measure correct. 

In investigating this matter recourse has been had to the official rec- 
ords of the Department; to the reports made by officers of our Navy 
and of foreign services well qualified to pass upon the subjects handled : 
to professional and other publications of aclmowledged authority ana 
him standing, and to other sources also recognized as authoritative. 

The records and correspondence bearing upon the designs of our 
earlier battle ships are voluminous and complete; and it is apparent 
that the subject was thoroughly considered and discussed during the 
preparation of the designs of these vessels, and although decided diflFer- 
ences of opinion appear, there seems to have been ample justification 
for the designs whicn finally received the approval of tne Department 

It is not claimed that mistakes have not been made or that our 
ships are without faults; but in view of the then state of the art of 
battle-ship building, this fact is not to be wondered at. It is re- 
markable that the mistakes were so few and that none were really 
serious. In this respect our record will compare most favorably with 
that of foreign services. 

BATTLE DRILLS. 

Battle drill is the exercise or drill of the ships of the fleet individ- 
ually or collectively for the purpose of training to meet the enemy 
under the conditions probable or liable to occur in battle. These 
8 J>-6()-l-Vol 32 13 



2 ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 

conditions are varied and numerous, and no human being can foresee 
or foretell them. The training should, therefore, be along those 
lines which are deemed most favorable to us for meeting and defeatii^ 
an enemy under the circumstances upon which we consider that he is 
likely to make his attacks. To this end oiir Navy has for some years 
past, so far as possible with the ships available, endeavored to solve 
practically problepas of attack and defense of oiu* coasts, and in car- 
rjdng out this policy has worked alone, at other times in cooperation 
wdth the Naval War College, which has devised and studied these 

Eroblems, and still at other times with the Army and MiHtia. It has 
een the practice in our Navy in the conduct of fleet and sauadron 
operations to have a special board of officers devise and outline the 
contemplated scheme, out the carrying out of the details imder the 
general plans has been left to the wisdom and discretion of the com- 
mander m chief and the commanding officers under him. The fol- 
lowing extract from an order of the Secretary of the Navy will give 
an idea of the instructions and the manner of execution: 

The object of the maneuvers is to gain experience useful in war and it is therefore 
desirable that all drills and exercises during the winter shall be carried out under the 
conditions pertaining to actual war. 

Squadron and fleet operations have, in accordance with the above- 
quoted instructions, been consistently carried out, so far as practicable, 
under war conditions. Scouting expeditions were sent to get in touch 
with the enemy and report his movements to the heavy battle fleet; 
simal stations were established at prominent headlands and on 
islands along the coast; torpedo attacks were made by both surface 
and submanne torpedo vessels ; forts were engaged ; ana at temporary 
naval bases guns were landed and mounted, mines planted, picket 
boats kept patrolling, guard ships estabUshed for protection or mine 
fields against attacks by an enemy, and many other details incident 
to war conditions, which aro too numorous to attempt to mention. 

Drills ])y divisions (four ships) and squadrons (oi<rlit sliips) have 
been carried on whenever ships could be assembled for tlie purpose; 
but in a small navy such as ours, with shi])S required virtually at 
all times to guard our varied interests in widely scatten^l parts of 
the globe, the assembling of the necessary numl)er of ships for drill 
has been frequently and much hamjXTcd. In the spring of 1(K)3 it 
was j)ractical)l(* for the first time since the construction of the "Xew 
Xavy" to obtain a squadron of eight battle ships — tlu^ least number 
necessary for })roperlv })erforming squadron drills — and since then 
those eight l)attle ships have been so far as possible kept together 
for drill purposes. In the spring of 1907, by the com})letion of new 
vessels, this numl^er was increased to sixteen ]>attle ships, thus 
completing two squadrons, which wlic^n united formed a lleet. It 
tlien, for the first time, became possible to hold and carry out fleet 
tactics, which was begun in July and August last. In September 
it became necessary, on account of target practi(M> and needed re- 
pairs to separate the ships temporarily, and later on to fit them for 
iheir voyage to the Paciiic coast, upon which they are now engaged. 

Before the eight battle ships were availabl(» (in the spring of 1903) 
fleet drills assimilating war conditions were carrie(| on with cruisers, 
gunboats, torpedo boats, and siicdi other vessels as could be brcjught 
together and used, and frequently the necessary number of vessels 
for conducting operations were obtained by assigning steam launches, 



ALLSGKD DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. S 

by doubling the distance between ships and supposing vessels in the 
intervening vacant spaces, and in other similar ways. 

Owing to want of similarity in size, speed, handiness and other tactical 
qualities of the vessels employed, drills of this nature were most 
unsatiirfactory, and productive of little benefit either in training 
officers to handle ships or in developing tactics. 

In addition to the hundreds of times when ships were drilled at 
sea and in port in tactics, as shown by the reports of officers engaged 
therein ana bv the entries in the log books, the following instances 
of "battle drills,'' that is, drills such as would be useful and perhaps 
necessary in battle, have been conducted since the summer of 1900: 

September, 1900. — ^The North Atlantic Fleet, in cooperation with the Army, carried 
out a series of maneuvers in Narragansett Bay, and also submarine l>oat operations in 
comunction with the fleet. 

Summer^ 1901, — ^Extensive maneuvers were held in and about the waters of Long 
Ldand Sound. 

AuguH, 1902, — A fleet-search problem assimilating the search for a hostile fleet 
attempting an attack upon the New England coast was carried out. 

August and September, 1902, — Combined Army and Navy maneuvers for the attack 
and ^fense of the south coast of New England were carried out. 

December, 1902. — ^The combined North Atlantic, European, and South Atlantic 
squadrons carried out search problems for assumed hostile fleets in the vicinity of 
Cmebra. 

December, 1902, and January, 190S, — The Asiatic Fleet operated in the attack upon 
seizure and defense of Subig Bay, Philippine Islands. 

July and August, 190S. — ^The North Atlantic Fleet conducted another search prob- 
lem for a hostile fleet assumed to be operating against the New England coast. 

Auguet, 1903. — The fleet held joint maneuvers with the Army on Portland, Me. 

February and March, 1903. — Fleet maneuvers were carried out in the vicinity of 
Culebra. 

June, 1905. — Joint Army and Navy maneuvers were held in Chesapeake Bay and 
Potomac River, the ships attacking and the Army defending. 

Juljff 1905. — Atlantic Fleet carried out a search problem for a hostile fleet, assumed 
to be intending an attack along the New England coast. 

January, 1906. — A fleet-search problem between assumed hostile fleets were con- 
ducted in the Atlantic Ocean between Hampton Roads and Culebra. 

February, 1906. — ^^Vnother fleet-search problem between assumed hostile fleets was 
carried out in the Caribbean Sea. 

March, 1906. — Fleet tactics using tentative tactical signals were carried out in the 
vicinity of Guantanamo. 

July, 1906. — ^Tactical drills were (conducted with the fleet operating along the New 
England coast. 

January and February, 1907. — ^The Atlantic Fleet conducted fleet tactics in the 
Oaribbean Sea and vicinity, and the Asiatic Fleet similar tactics in far eastern waters. 

July, August, and September, 1907. — The Atlantic Fleet conducted fleet tactics off 
the Atlantic coast. 

In addition to and not included in the foregoing Hst of exercises 
and operations are those conducted during the past several years 
by the three torpedo flotillas and the submarines, wliich have acted 
at times independently of the battle ships and at other times in 
conjunction tnerewith. At present there are four torpedo-boat 
flotillas and two submarine-boat flotillas in service, and it is antici- 
pated that excellent results will be obtained from the exercising and 
operating of these flotillas under the plans and schemes contem- 
plated. 

It may be added in connection with the foregoing partial list of 
battle drills, that the squadrons of vessels taking part therein were 
commanded during the various years above referred to by Rear- 
Admirals Farquhar, Iligginson, Sumner, Barker, Evans, Sands, and 
Sigsbee, all of whom saw active service during the civil war, and the 





AliEGED DEFECTS OP NAVAL VESSELS, 

commanding officers xmder them in aloiost all eases had similar 
experience during that war or in the war with Spain. It is on\j 
natural that such men as these ^ having gone through active hostih- 
ttcs themselves, would conduct battle drills with the ships under 
their command on the practical hues which their ovm experience 
and study had taught tnem. Whether considered of any merit or 
not by amateur critics in our own country, foreign navies and foreign 
publications of acknowledged professional standing have not failed 
to note and pay attention to these exercises. 

It has been stated that there is no navy in the world which haa 
had so little battle drill as ours and that since the Spanish war m 
1S98 the American Navy has had only ''ten days of actual battle 
maneuvers— about sixtv or eight v hours — in nine years/' The asser- 
tion that no narj' in tlbe world lias had so ht tie drill as ours isr in 
view of the actual fact^ of tlie case, as above showTi, very erroneous 
and misleading. In regard to the assertion that since 1898 only ten 
days of actual battle maneuvers have been carried out by the Navy, 
attention k invitetl to the foregoing list of principal squadron and 
fleet exercises since IHOO, wliicH were cameu out under conditions 
aasimilating, so far as practicable, those to be expected and antici- 
pated to occur in actual war and w ere conseauently battle maneuvers 
or drills in all respects^ based upon careftdly stuclied plans of what 
an enemy might attempt and how best such attacks might be met 
and repulsetL Considering the force available, it uas not possible 
in pt^ace times to have had more effect ive or realistic battle driUd 
than such as these* 

Now that we have an assured fleet of sixteen battle ships, consisting 
of two sauadn>ns of eight vessels earh^ it will be possible to cany^ ou^ 
practtcalJv, systematically, and continuousJv schemes of fleet tacttCL 
and naval operations; but it is necessary that every effort be madB 
Id keep not less than this number of vessels together at all times^ if 
that state of efficiency wliich our Xavy is now rapidly tending toward, 
and which the people of our country have a rignt to expect, is to be 
maintained ana fostered. The personnel of our Navy in ambition 
and professional knowledge is second to none in the world, and now 
that the opportunity — heretofore denied us, by reason of lack of the 
requisite number of similar ships — has been reached we should make 
every possible endeavor to mamtain this favorable condition, and in 
a comparatively short time the results from study, practice, and exer- 
cise of^our fleet will leave us, perhaps, Uttle to be criticised or desired 
professionally when compared with other navies. 

FREEBOARD OF AMERICAN SHIPS. 

Since the designing of our first battle ships of the Indiana and Eear- 
sargf classes, which, by the way, were more properly considered as 
coast-line battle ships as distino;uished from tnose of succeediDg 
classes, which were seagoing batt^ ships, it has been the poUcy with 
increase of speed and length of vessel to add to the height of the free- 
board, until in our latest ships now under construction the forecastle 
deck has been given a height above a load water line of 25 feet 9} 
inches. Some criticism has been made from time to time because our 
earlier ships were not as high out of the water as some foreign vessels, 
but this is not a disadvantage so great as might appear or as many 






ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 5 

have tried to have the public believe. The Indiana and Kearsarge 
classes are too low forward for elFicient fighting at sea in fairly heavy 
weather, but the remainder of our battle ships could without doubt 
give a good account of themselves in a fight at sea in any weather in 
which it is at all likeljr for fleets to engage. Our later designs of ships 
are fully the equal m regard to desirable or effective freeboard as 
foreign vessels. 

In a recent magazine article criticisms were made of our ships with 
respect to their freeboard which, in some respects, to say the least, 
were hardlv in accord with the facts. The statements of the heights 
of the freeboard made in this article, so far as regards vessels of our 
Navy are approximately correct, but the claim made by the author 
of the article referred to that — 

All modem battleships in foreign navies have forward decks from about 22 to 28 
feet above the water. 

is very far from the truth, as the following table, made from the most 
reliable data obtainable of representative battle ships of the navies 
named will show, which gives the freeboard abreast the forward 
turret: 



Name of veaael (claaa). 



Dnodnauffht _ 

Klnff Edward 

mumph 

Doncan _ 

Majeatlc 

Benown.. 

Boyal Sovereign 

AU 

Kashlma 

Mlkasa 



Number . Height of 
Nation. I of vessels | forward 
Icompleted. < deck. 



Bepubllqao. 

Jauregufbery __ — 

SufTren. 



Great Britain.. 

' Japan 

France. 



Gaulols _ 

Oonnectlcnt - 

Virginia - 

Maino- 

Alabama 

Kearsarge 

Iowa 



—do 

.do.... 



-do. 
United Stfttes- 

do 

do 

-do 



do. 

—do. 



Ft. Jn. 
28 
18 
18 
18 
20 
18 
18 
li) 
18 
18 
20 
23 
22 



18 2 

18 9 

18 6 

13 3 

18 2 



Of the above type ships taken as representative of the British, 
Japanese, French, and our o^v^l navies, it will be noted that but one 
has a freeboard as high as 28 feet, as stated by the writer of the 
article, while the vast majority have a freeboard less than the mini- 
mum height fixed by this critic. On the whole it would hardly be 
claimed, after an examination of this table, that the freeboard oi our 
ships is so woefully short of what it should be or below the standard 
set by foreign services. It might be added as a question for serious 
consideration in connection with the matter of liigh freeboard and 
high gun positions that the Russian battle ships Borodino , Kniaz 
Suvaroffj Oslybia, and Alexander III, approximating 27 feet inches — 
higher than any of our own ships now in service or any of the type 
ships shown in the above table, excepting possiblv the I)readnaug1it — 
capsized or were otherwise sunk in the battle of the Sea of Japan, and 
this after only a comparatively short fight. 



There is but one real justification for yeiy high gun pcsitIoD3 and 
that is to achieve efficiency for fighting in heavy weather at sea. and 
this single advantage is not onh^ not Ekely, but is in all probability 
extremely unlikely to occur. To obtain this rery slim advantage^ 
improbable of realization— amateur critics would have us kno^^ingly 
build our ships with such decreased protection or staliiiity that 
injuriea by shell, admitting water to the hull, may seriously eocianger 
if not actually cause the capsizing of our vessels, as in the cases above 
referred to. The question of high gun positions as against that of 
moderate height is one worthy of the very gravest consideration. Is 
it wisdom to adopt the former in the hope of attaining a condition for 
a lone advantage which may, and in all probabihty will, never be 
realized, and even at that time, as in all other times of the life of the 
ship, be subjected to the greatly overmatching disadvantage of neces- 
sary loss of stability — the one element above aU others upon w^hich 
the" safety of a vessel depends? 

In discussing Ireeboard the fact should not be overlooked that it 
always has been the pohcy of our Navy to have our vessels alw^ays 
armed better than our possible opponents, and when it becomes a 
question of choice between Ughtlv armed and armored vessels with 
comparativelv liigh freeboard and more powerful and heavily armed 
and annoretf ships of moderate but sufficient freeboard we have 
always striven for the latter, and in the instances where our ships 
have less freeboard it will be found that they, as with the rest of our 
veasels, more than outweigh this slight disadvantage by the more 
weiglity and telliog advantage of armor and armament, which fact 
will be amply shown from a comparison of our ships and batteries 
with vessels of other navies of the same date of design. 

It mav not be amiss^ w bile dealing with the subject of gun heights 
and freeboard, to add that the Japanese in their most recently designed 
ships have^ notwithstanding an increase of speed and length of vessels, 
not raised their gim positions nor the freeboard, which is one of the 
results gained from their experiences from their recent war, and which 
seems to uphold the good iaea of our system of building ships without 
the excessive heights deemed to be necessary by some critics. 



HEIGHT OP GUN POSFFIONS. 



The following table, compiled from what is considered the most 
reliable authorities available, gives the height above water at the load 
water line of the main battery (forecastle) . and broadside battery guns 
of our own ships and those of Bntish ana French vessels of the same 
relative year of laying down: 



Vesaels. 


Nation. 


Main 
battery. 


Broadside ffona. 


1891. 
Indian* 

Boyal Soverelffn 

Jaiincalbery 


United States.... 
Great Britain .... 
France 


Ft. in. 
17 9 

23 

96 6 


Ft. 1m. 
( 8 ffuns at 25 0. 
\ 4 ffons at 11 101 

1 6 guns at 22 
\ 4 guns at 14 

j 8 guns at ft 
I 4 guns at 19 



I 



ALLEGED DEFSOTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 



VeBsels. 



Nation. 



Main 
! battery. 



"I 



189G. 



1803. 
Iowa United Staten.. 

BflDOwn _ Great Britain . 

Bouvet Prance - 

Kaanarge.. 

Alabama _ ' Unlte<i States.. 

Hagnlflcent ■ Great Britain . 

Gaololii _ ' France 

1809. 



!• 



P iin<»mn 

Suffren 



Georrls- 



1901. 



I United States. 
I Great Britain _. 
I France. 

United States.. 



BApubllque 



Franco . 



1002. 



Swiftsure Great Britain .. 

1903. 

Connecticut.-. -. Unltoil States. 

Klnff Kdward VII - . Great Britain . 

LJbert6-_- — — France — 



1904. 
Idaho '- United States. 



I 
Lord Nelson - - Great Britain — 



NJcbiffan- 



1906. 



United States.... 



DellerophoD - '. Great Britain 

Danton - - j Prance 



Delaware 



1907. 



.1 united States.-.. 



gt. VInosnt.. 



I Great Britain 
France 



Ft. tn. 
25 Gi 

25 9 

27 6 i 



Broadside guns. 



Ft. in. 



/ 8 guns 



guns 



Oguns 
guns 



..! United States.-.. 20 24 



2G 8x 

27 

29 
26 109 

24 6 

30 

25 3ft 



25 

26 5 
23 a 

33 7i 



guns 
guns 



at2;'> 
at 14 



at 10 
at 19 



at 15 
at 21 



I at 29 4i 

I at 27 11 



2 guns I 
2 guns f 
.14 guns at 15 2| 



at 15 3 
at 22 111 



at 14 
at 22 



at 20 
at 28 



at 15 
at 23 



at 13 
at 21 



at 23 
at 15 



6 




|10 guns 
) 4 guns 

f 8 guns 
\ 4 guns 

8 guns 
2 guns 

ri2guns 
1 4 guns 

f 8 guns 
I 4gun8 

f 6 guns 
{ 4 guns 



4 guns at 35 

4 guus at 25 4 

.12 i^ms at 14 8| 

{R guns ut 27 K^ 

4 guns at 29 10 

2 guns at 19 8 

4 guns at 11 7i 

flOgunsatlS 8 

\ 4 guns at 21 6 

f 8 guns at 26 6 

,12 guns at 15 Oi 

10 guns at 12 10 

4 gtms at 27 lOi 

2 guns at 29 10 

2 guns at 19 8 

2 guns at U 7| 



20 3 / 8 guns at 20 2 



8 guns at 14 
10 guns at 23 



2 guns at 33 5 

2 guns at 25 6 

2 guns at 17 6 

10 guns at 21 11 

{ guns at 29 5 
8 guns at 37 



2 




Heights not ob- 
tainable, but 
probably not 
greater than 
our vessels of 
same date. 



' 2 guns at 39 
2 guns at 32 
4 guns at 24 
4 guns at 14 4f 



Heights not ob- 
tuinable. but 
probably not 
greater than 
our vessels ol 
same date. 



8 ALLEOED BEMJOTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 

In the foregoing the guns on the forecastle are classed under the 
head of ''main battery, and under the headii^ of ''broadside guns" 
the heights of the intermediate battery guns ming on the broadside 
are given. 

From the above table it will be seen that compared with the British 
navy our "main battery'' guns, with the exception of the/ndianaand 
Kearsarge classes (which were designed and built rather as coastwise 
than as seagoing ships), are about as high if not higher, and that our 
broadside guns are considerably more elevated than in corresponding 
British ships, and the same may be said with regard to Japanese ships, 
as they are built almost on British lines. 

The data for coniparison with vessels of the German navy is not 
available, but it is hardly probable that the e^uns of their ships are 
any higher above the water than corresponmng British ships. It 
"Vill be observed that the heights of guns on French naval vessels are 
considerably higher than our own or tne British. This policy of adopt- 
ing high-gun positions is a practice which the French have earned 
out for years, but which has not been followed by other nations, except- 
ing the Russians. The wisdom of this practice of high-gun positions 
is open to serious question, and it is quite probable that there are 
more resultant disadvantages than advantages when engaged in 
actual fighting and damages permitting the entry of water into the 
hull have been received, in wnich case the vitally important element 
of stability is a matter of the gravest danger m highly built ships 
and much less so in those not so nigh. 

After careful examination of the plans and data available, compiled 
from the most reliable sources, it is found that with respect to the 
height of freeboard forward, height of main gun axes, and heights 
of broadside gun axes our battle ships with the exception of the 
Indiana and Kearsarae classes, are as nigh, if not higher, than the 
British and Japanese battle ships of the same period of design. These 
hoicrhts have been refjcanled as quite satistartorv by British and 
American ()(Iic(Ts of wide experience. We have never deemed it 
advisable to follow the French idea of great height of freehoard, but 
in our latest desio:ne(l ships, with increiised speed, lenf!:thof hull, and 
fine water lines, it has been thou«:ht wise to add to tlu* freehoard. 
This, however, does not appear to be the Japanese ])ractice, as in their 
latest battle sliip, the Alci,o{ approximately 20, ()()() tons, they have 
still held the freeboard forward (lown to less than that of our ('onnec- 
tici/t class. 

Inasmuch as hi<^h freeboards in sliips of moderate Ienf2:th involves 
an enormous increase in weight without correspond insr increase in 
mihtary elhciency, it may he regarded that our ])ractice of the past 
ten years or more, supported as it has been l)y that of (Ireat Britain 
and Japan, with respect to freeboard and height of guns, has been 
wise and productive of good results. Moreover, the behavior of the 
Japanese battle ships in the fight of the Sea of Jaj)an, should be con- 
clusive testimony as to the a!)ility of such vessels to light canabljr 
under rough weatlier conditions, were such additional ])racti('al evi- 
dence necessarv^ Finallv, it may be added that to ofiicers who have 
commanded our battle sbips there seems unaninuty of opinion that 
they can, with the possible exception of the Indlaivi and Kearsarge 
classes, fight their batteries in any sea in which naval actions are at 



ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 9 

all likely to take place. These opinions of officers who have actually 
commanded our ships are, it would seem, entitled to greater weight 
than the critics, among whom the loudest and most bitter have never 
commanded a ship, and therefore can have little, if any, practical 
knowledge upon which to base their erroneous criticisms. 

TORPEDO DEFENSE GUNS. 

One of the lessons deduced from the Russo-Japanese war was that 
the 3 and 6 poimder guns, theretofore regardea as part of a battle 
ship's defense against torpedo boat attack, were insufficient in power 
to effectively stop a modem torpedo boat imder ordinary circum- 
stances. Furthermore, since the range of the torpedo has recently 
increased greatly, guns of larger caliber and greater power and longer 
range have become necessary to prevent torpedo attacks. The 5-inch- 

fun is now considered the smallest caUber effective for this work and 
as been adopted by us. All our battle ships now carry intermediate 
batteries of 5-inch or larger caliber, and those vessels still having 
3 and 6 pounders on board are to have them replaced bv guns of 
larger caliber as fast as the heavier guns can be provided. In the 
meanwhile our vessels are by no means improvided to beat off hostile 
attacks of torpedo boats, as it is a well known [fact that the inter- 
mediate batteries of rapid or quick firing guns carried by our ships 
are amply able to meet the necessities, and, on the whole, are also 
more numerous than are carried by battle ships of other navies, of 
approximately the same time of design. 

BATTLE SHIP ARMOR. 

The armor of a battle ship is divided into two general classes: 

First. That used for the protection of the gun positions. 

Second. That used for the protection of the hull. 

It may be assumed that the armor for the protection of the guns, 
positions of the vessels of our Navy is distributed satisfactorily, as 
the criticisms which have recently appeared have been almost 
exclusively confined to the distribution of the armor used for the 
protection of tlie hull. 

The weifijht which can be devoted to armor protection is hmited: 
and hence it becomes necessary to distribute sucn armor as is allowed 
to the best possible advantage. 

The object of the hull armor is, generally speaking, twofold: 

1. To protect the vitals of the ship — engmes, boilers, and ammuni- 
tion. 

2. To preserve the buoyancy and stabiUty of the ship itself. 
"The above are distinct functions. A shot may penetrate the 

vitals and disable the machinery or explode a boiler or magazine, thus 
disabling or destrojdng the ship, while the buoyancy and stabiUty 
have sustained little or no damage.'' 

"Again, if there is inadequate protection to buoyancy and stability, 
a number of shots between \v4na and water may sink the ship bodily 
or throw so much of the plane of flotation open to the sea that the 
ship loses stabiUty and capsizes, while the vitals are absolutely un- 
hurt." 



10 ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 

For convenience the armor used for protection of the hull may be 
designated as ''belt armor '' "side armor/' and ''protective deck.'' 

The "belt armor" usually consists of a narrow belt (varying in our 
ships from a minimum of 7 feet 6 inches to a maximum of 9 feet 3 
inches in width) sufficiently thick to resist penetration by the heaviest 
projectile, located with reference to the water line of the ship and ex- 
tending sufficiently far below the water to preclude all possibilty of a 
shot entering the side or bottom of the vessel — ^unless, indeed, through 
an excessive roll or a listing of the ship due to wound or injury re- 
ceived, the side should become exposed below the belt on the raised 
side. 

The "side armor" is thinner than the belt armor, but as thick as 
the limited weight available will permit, is placed on top of the belt 
armor and extends to varying heights — generally to the deck above. 

The "protective deck" is — as its name implies — an armored water- 
tight deck, completely covering the vitals of the vessel and is usually 
at the level of tne upper edge of the belt armor extending flat to the 
sides in some vessels, and in others having its outer edges curved down 
to join the side at the lower edge of the belt. 

A " cofferdam" several feet high filled with cellulose is built at the 
junction of the belt and protective deck as a further protection for 
the preservation of buoyancy and stabiUty. 

If the function of the belt armor was simply to prevent a projectile 
from reaching the vitals of the ship — engines, boilers, and magazmes — 
evidently its position would be nxed wnolly by the internal arrange- 
ment of the ship, and would be entirely independent of the vessel's 
draft. Further consideration of this function of the belt may be 
therefore omitted and its function as a means of preserving the buoy- 
ancy and stability of the vessel, the qualities witn which we are prin- 
cipally interested, considered. 

The piercing of the hull under or below the belt, would almost cer- 
tainly be fatal to the vessel. The compartments here are large, the 
pressure of the water great, and it would be almost impossible to make 
use successfully of any appliance to stop the inflow and repair damage. 
Very probably, also, the projectile entering below the belt armor 
would meet with little resistance and would penetrate into the central 
portion of the ship, and if it exi)loded there, very possibly put the ship 
completely out of action. On the other hand, even should the upper 
edge of the belt be at the water line, the entrance of a shell above the 
belt armor, would also be above the protective deck, and so long as the 
latter remains intact (i. e., not pierced by either the shell itself or by 
its fragments) no disastrous results would be entailed, as the parts of 
the hull above the belt and protective deck are subdivided by water- 
tight and other compartments in comparatively small sections, and the 
inflow of water into these small compartments detached from one 
another w^ould be checked by the cellulose cofl'erdam and by the filled 
coal bunkers. Furthermore, the amount of water which would enter 
a vessel through a hole but a few inches above the water line would not 
be materially greater than the quantity which would enter through an 
exactly equal hole 2 or 3 feet above that line in the case of a ship mov- 
ing at speed in a seaway. 

In 1895, the late Rear-Admiral Sampson, then Chief of the Bureau 
of Ordnance, Navy Department, wrote: "There must be a fixed 
de^in t)f t^eiarmor below the water for ships of the same beam which 



ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 11 

would best fulfill its use and this depth should always be maintained 
in action." * * * ''The depth shoidd be whatever theory and 
observation may establish." It appears as the residts of study and 
observation that at about this time the depth of armor below the 
water necessary for the protection of the hulls of our ships was fixed 
at 4 feet for vessels having approximately 70 feet beam. 

The belt varies in width, dependino; on thickness (as affecting 
weight), and other considerations, and in our service has been from 
7i to 9J feet in width. The lower edge of the belt is approximately 

4 feet below the designed normal w,ater line on our earlier vessels and 

5 feet on some of the more recent, and the upper edge is from 2^ feet 
to 4J feet above that line. 

As the lower edge of the belt armor, in order to achieve the best 
results, must be a given depth below the water when a vessel is in 
action, the question which naturally presented itself was: What 
would be the probable draft of a vessel when in action? Woidd it be 
the vessers deepest draft, its Ughtest draft, or some intermediate 
draft? 

A board of which Rear-Admiral J. G. Walker, U. S. N., was presi- 
dent, on May 18, 1896, reported. 

A battle ship's "normal " draft should be her " fighting draft "—otherwise the tenn ia 
inaccurate and misleading — not her maximum draft with all the ammimition, coal, 
and stores that she can carry, but her draft with a largo percentage of these supplies — 
not less than two-thirds of her full capacity of each on board. And the position of the 
armor belt should bear its proper relation to this actual load line, not to a fictitious 
load line seldom realized under service conditions. 

The above definition of a vessel's ''normal draft" practically ob- 
tains to-day, the only exception being in regard to the amount or coal 
carried. This is somewhat less and in our service corresponds to 
foreign practice, thus permitting a more accurate comparison to be 
made with vessels of other nations as regards speed, maneuvering 
qualities, freeboard, height of gun positions, etc. It is with this 
normal draft" as a standard mat vessels of our Navy have been 
designed. 

It is, however, unfortunately a fact, not only with respect to our 
own but with respect to all other naval services, that the actual draft 
of men-of-war at completion is frequently greater than that for which 
they were designed, the principal reason for this discrepancy being 
due to changes of a military character made after the designs have been 
approved and sometimes after actual construction has progressed 
for several years. This was notably the case with respect to the 
Indiana class of vessels, where an additional water-tight bulkhead 
was added after the unfortunate Victoria disaster, and in the Fir- 
ginia and Connecticut classes, where radical changes in the turret 
and battery foundations were necessitated by improvements in the 
battery, which had been developed subsequentl}^ to the approval of 
the desigri but before the completion of the building of the vessel. 
The visiole effect of this increased displacement is most apparent 
in the decrease in the height of the upper edge of the belt armor above 
the line of flotation of the vessel, this decrease amounting in some 
cases to 6 or 6 inches, rarely more than 9 inches. This tact, how- 
ever, does not materially affect the defensive qualities of the vessel. 

Much of the criticism which has been made in regard to the distri- 
bution of the belt armor of vessels of our Navy seems to be based 



12 ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 

upon the assumption that vessels will always strive to go into action 
at their deep load draft, as is shown by the following quotations: 

To get into action with everything on board possible in the way of ammunition, 
stores, and coal will be a prime object of all good strategists. Therefore the water line 
about which the armor should be distributed is not the normal line. (Naval critic.) 

No ship (battle ship) ♦ ♦ ♦ has yet been planned to have a water-line protection 
reaching more than 6 inches above the water when she is ready to fight. The con- 
dition of our armored cruisers is almost the same. (Civilian critic.) 

Notwithstanding ,'the above assertions, many of the most distin- 

fuished and experienced officers of our own and foreign navies still 
old the opinion, expressed in 1896 by that board of distinguished 
officers, of which the late Rear-Admiral J. G. Walker was president, 
that " the fighting draft of a battle ship would not be her maximum 
draft with all the ammunition, coal, and stores that she can carry 
* * * and that the position of the armor belt should bear its 
proper relation to this actual load line; not to a fictitious load line 
selaom realized in service conditions." 

In view, however, of the very marked increase in the rapidity of 
gun fire since the above was written it is undoubtedly desirable that 
a vessel should carry her full, or even an excess, supply of ammuni- 
tion when in condition for battle, instead of the two-thirds supply, 
as above stated. This amount of ammunition carried would, of 
course, tend to increase the displacement and to give greater draft; 
but at the same time many articles carried in peace times would be 
sent ashore as being unnecessary in war time and would largely, if 
not entirely, compensate for the increased supply of ammumtion 
taken on board, and the final result would very probably be httle or 
no increase of draft, the "normal draft" remaining practically undis- 
turbed. 

One of the principal causes of the defeat of the Russian fleet in the 
battle of Tsusnima Straits in May, 1905, is attributed to the fact that 
the vessels of that fleet were overloaded with coal and stores of all 
kinds; and it is asserted that his subordinates w(Te unal)le to under- 
stand the threat desu'e which Admiral Kozhdestvinsky always seemed 
to have to carry immense amounts of coal — his vessels having on 
board at this battle^ enou<rh to steam a distance of more than 3,000 
miles, while the actual distance recjuired to be traveled was but 900. 
His ships were similarly overloaded with stores and supplies. This 
overloaded ccmdition of the liussian fleet, let it be understood, was 
while [)assin<j: through the waters and in immediate proximity to the 
naval bases of a hostile fleet of n^latively their own strength and with 
the probability of mc^eting the enemy's fleet in battle so great that it 
might have been n^garded as almost a certainty. On the other hand, 
it is stated on reliable authority that the Japanese fleet, in anticipa- 
tion of meeting the liussian fleet, had been completely stripped by 
removing ev(Ty thing possible* in the way of weight (equipment, super- 
fluous stores, etc.) from the vesscds and that they had on board at the 
time of the battle provisions suiiicient to last only ten days. It may 
be reasonably assumed because of their lightness these vessels were 
near what we would call their "normal draft." Togo's fleet was in 
fighting trim; Kozlidestvinsky's fleet was not. The result could 
easily have been forecast. Still the critics of our Xavy would have 
us believe that ships should always, as a preparation for battle, put 
themselves in the condition of those that met defeat. 



ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 18 

The newly organized ''battle-ship fleef proceeded to sea for ''tac- 
tical" drill on August 26, 1907, and continued at sea, exercising daily 
until the afternoon of September 5. An officer noted for his profes- 
sional attainments and accm'acy of judgment, who was detailed 
especially as an observer upon the drill and upon the behavior of the 
ships, reported as follows: 

Armor 6«Zt.— There was little or no seaway to judge of its effect in exposing the annor 
belt of the battle ships. But the combined result of the sea and heun was observed 
at times to make a cufference of 1 to 2 feet in the amount of the belt exposed. The 
amount of coal in the fleet during these exercises may be considered as normal — ^that 
is, the submergence of the armor belt was about the average. In all cases the top of 
the belt was exposed above the water and in some cases upon arrival at Rockport the 
belt was exposed 3 or 4 feet. 

This is the height of the armor belt above the water line after the 
arrival of the ships in port after the drills, even while the majority 
of them had considerably more than 1,000 tons of coal on board, and 
one only of the entire number had less than 750 tons, which is shown 
by an examination of the log books of the various vessels at the time. 
It may be further stated that with only one exception all the vessels 
composing the fleet above mentioned began the drills with bunker 
coal much in excess of their normal supply, several having from 1,500 
to 1,800 tons on board, and at Rockport the majority still had from 
900 to 1,600 tons remaining — that is, had about or more than one- 
half their total bunker capacity filled and still available for service — 
and vet the height of the armor belt above water was as stated above. 
Evidently under these conditions, which are said to have been nor- 
mal, the expectation of having the armor belt above water when the 
vessels are at their designed "normal draff and ready for ellicient 
service seems reasonably well borne out in practice. 

Again, when this same fleet sailed for the West Indies last winter 
the ships were so loaded down that the upper eds;e of their belt armor 
was near the water line; and similarly when the fleet sailed but a short 
time ago for the Pacific their draft was even greater than on the other 
occasion. Both these cases, however, were exceptional, in that the 
fleet was making a ^'stragetic'' move, and carried with it everything 
necessary for its own consumption on the cruise and everything possi- 
ble in the way of supplies and ammunition for use at its future base, 
conditions which would not obtain in case of anticipated or imminent 
fleet action. 

Notwithstanding, however, the low position of the top of the main 
armor belt upon the two occasions above mentioned, which were, as 
above stated, exceptional and unlikely to occur in the event of hostili- 
ties, still the safety of the vessels was in no way jeopardized thereby, 
as in our ships the protective deck is about on a level with the top of 
the belt armor. Any projectile striking against that part of the oelt 
armor still above the water line would, m all probabiUty, be cither en- 
tirely broken up or in any case rendered practically harmless so far as 
any injury to the protective deck is concerned. Were a projectile, 
however, to strike underneath the belt armor, it would pierce the thin 
plating of the slup and perhaps destroy the motive power as well as 
latallv affect the flotation or stability oy the large amoimt of water 
rapidly entering the laro:e compartments of the vessel. As the belt 
is at its maximum depth below the water line, it affords an unusual pro- 
tection to the bottom of the slup, and therefore there need be Uttfe or 
jio apprehension of an injury in that region. On the other hand, a 



14 ALLBGBD DEFECT8 OK NAVAL V1«8ELB. 

SUce the sUp's Side and cai^^^^ The result , aside 

Samage wUl not extend ^fi^^^^i^^^^^^ be that water wiU flow in. 

frW^e local effect of ,t^|,f S?]^^^^^^ to the height of 

^d may, unless checked, fill f^\^"l^^^ that extent This will be 
the hole and affect the ves^^^^^^^^^^ ^^ ^t the water's edge or 2 

the result whether the top ^f J^^^f^^ be evident that a sheU en- 

or more feet above it. It, H^f J^^ while one entering 

SiSg below the belt armor ,^^^*^^^^^ "S^Sicomparably less serious 
S^ the belt even if ^^^^jSokS 

vTnRllv as weights in the construction oiu ^:^ considered that 

MtTrmof to from about J to J^e^^^^^ 

ihout 5 feet below \l^n ^^^'^^i^^^, ^^^^^ of the belt vanes at 

-^•'^i^ ^^ ^nlc conditions. But as suDmerg ^^ have the 

^^'-v^MiKi — '-"•^^t bear in inincl ttiat i^/» " • ^ ^hat- 

tionlof oac^.. liii:, .t. t'!i.. submerged than to run any nsKjvi 
times several fe?t, w6 im*4i4lV''i^H't,oo high-that is, too near the 
top of the belt awash or eveflN-- , , ««riflA 

ever of getting the bottom of the T:)?*ftA*.'' " '- print and otnerwwe 
surface of the water. "^ :^ -^^u?"^^lv suK 

Referring to statements frequently made I'i .,, w r ot be 
from persons whose ioformation upon the subject 'i-'.„^]^^y J^nasra- 
the effect that the main armor belt of our snips ift • ■/'^^- n^u- 
merged or awash, a word in explanation of this en ; ,.. ^^^ 
amiss. In some of our ships the main armor belt protecting t » . ^ . 
zines, engine, and boiler spaces — the vitals of the ship — extti' jy^^ ' 
ally from 2 to 3 feet or more above water when the ship has .. 
ammunition, coal, and stores about in condition for active servici 
and this belt is, after covering the portion of the ship containing the 
vitals, narrowed down 15 inches and continued to the bow and to the 
stem where protection is not so vital. There is reason for believing 
that in some instances commanding officers have by filUng or empty- 
ing the trimming tanks, the shifting of weights, the use or coal exclu- 
sively from forward bunkers or other perfectly legitimate means, so 
trimmed their respective ships that tney arc down (when loaded) 
from 1 J to 2 or more feet by the stem. This depression or trimming 
by the stem of course causes a like depression of the after end of the 
narrowed-down armor belt, and in some instances it may be true that 
the extreme after end of this belt has been thereby submerged or 
awash, but a corresponding rise of armor necessarilv follows from the 
extreme stem to the extreme bow. Tliis condition of trimming by 
the stem is an entirely personal preference of the commanding officer 
of the individual ship, and may be due to the possibility of the ship 
steaming or handling easier in squadron: but it is hardly at all prob- 
able that she would oe trimmed thus in time of war or preparatory to 
going into action. Even if so trimmed, the main armor belt — that is, 
the part protecting the vitals, the primary reason for its existence — 
would be still well above water and in no instance would it be sub- 
merged. 

It is possible that persons unfamiliar with battle ships may take 
the top of the (usually red) painted water line C'boot-toopping''), as 
representing the upper limit of the armor belt. This, however, can 
not be taken as a proper guide, as the position of the painted water 
line is variable, at times being possibly 2 feet or more oelow the top 
of the armor belt, and may have no relation or connection with its 
actual position. It is therefore readily seen how easily incorrect ideas 



ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VE88EL8. 15 

of the height of the armor belt above water may be formed if judged 
from the position of the painted water line. 

Those who advocate tnat the 'Mecp-load draff is the '* fighting 
draft" claim that the belt armor should be disposed with reference 
to this water line so far as regards the submergence of its lower edge. 
As has been stated hereinbefore, the minimum depth to which the 
belt should extend below the water in order to afford proper protec- 
tion, has been fixed approximately 4 feet for our earliest ves^ls and 
5 feet for the latest. Assume the belt armor to extend 5 feet below 
the deep-load line. As coal, stores, and ammunition are consumed 
the depth to which the belt extends below the water is constantly 
decreasing; and when these stores arc reduced to what is considered 
the normal supply — which condition in the opinion of manv officers 
is the proper fighting trim — the lower ed^e of the belt will be con- 
siderably less than 3 feet below the water in many of the ships. The 
most important part of the vessel (that containing the vitals) is thus 
left unprotected, and it is gravely proposed by these critics to bring 
the ship back to its deep-load draft (and thus submerge the belt to 
its proper depth) by the admission of water to the double bottoms. 
Were tnis theory carried out in our large ships of recent design the 
amoimt of water necessary to accomplish the results would be ap- 
proximately 2,000 tons; but the structure of the ship will not permit 
of so large an amount being admitted to the double bottoms. 

If the admission of the required amount of water were possible, it 
would mean: 

a. A loss of the protection which the double bottom system is pri- 
marily designed to give a vessel. 

b. An increase of draft amounting in some cases to more than 2 feet. 

c. A decrease of speed due to increase in draft and displacement 
amounting to from a knot to a knot and a half, or even more. 

d. Decreased handiness of the ship, due to the great draft. 

e. A decrease in freeboard of approximatelv 2 feet. 

y. A decrease in the height of gun positions by approximately 2 feet. 

Certainly a vessel whose fighting efficiency has thus been impaired 
by artificial means is not in condition to meet an eneniy who has 
taken the usual precautions deemed necessary to '* prepare and clear 
his ship for action.'' 

On the other hand, if the belt armor was disposed with reference 
to the *' normal draft'' of the ship, its lower edge would then be at 
least 5 feet below the surface of the water at all drafts between the 
"normal" and the ^'decp load" draft, and it would not be neces- 
sary to compensate for the consumption of stores or reduction of 
weights by an}- artificial means; the under-water body of the ship 
would be protected so far as is contemplated by belt armor and the 
double-bottom system, and in this respect always ready for battle. 
The additional weight of armor nccessarj^ for this disposition of the 
belt would be, approximately, 225 tons, which would not under any 
circumstances increase the draft of the vessel more than 3 inches. 

As the object of the bolt armor is to prevent projectiles from enter- 
ing the hull of the vessel at or below the water Imo, its thickness must 
necessarily be made to depend upon the quality of the material used. 
In our early days of battle-ship construction it was found that in order 
to prevent the' penetration of the heaviest projectiles (13-inch), at a 
distance of 1,000 yards, a thickness of 18 inches was necessary in the 



j-fic"-:^-'^?^ 



^^^^': 



16 



A£U»ia> raarBciB of kaval TSBSKm. 



then state <rfili0 art of anoormaki^ As the water itself would offer 

some resistance to a striking pr4.>icctile, plates were made thidcest at 
the upper edge and tapered gradual^ toward the lower. Of course; 
it was necessary to make the belt as narrow as possible to fulfill its 
essential requircm^^nts in vessek of that date^ on account of the great 
weight involved. Of necessity the side armor was made thin; in 
some of the early ships only 4 inches. Improvements in armor mak* 
ing have been constant but gradual, and at the present time, without 
decreasing the resisting power of the belt armor, it has been possible 
to gradually reduce its thickness and the saving in wei^t has been 
partially applied to increasint^ the thickness of the side armor, until 
at the present time^ in our latest designed ships, the difference iH 
thickness of the belt and side armcnr is but 1 incn, and it is probabto 
that even that difference will disappear in the near future, so that 
there will be no distinction between the two. While preserving full 
protection below the water, equal protection can now he afforded to 
the hull for a considerable height aboTe. As the protective deck in 
still retained J it should be apparent to CTcn the most oiased critics tJhiat 
the protection thus afforded will ocmq[>are most favorably with that 
of the ships of other nation.^. 

TOBBKT PWBSini WIfH JUBSFBOT TO JJOnmmON HOISTS AND MAOA^ 

ZENX SmBTT. 

QamtimB comymii^ the numerous mechanical devices and detail 
anangeoieiita whieh go to make up such a complicated machine as a 
battfe shm require considerable knowledge of details before discussions 
rdatin^ tjiareto can be readily understood bv those not technically 
infomied* 

Hiis observation applies with more or leas force to the subject of 
turret design and to tne criticisnis relative to the open sliaft direct^ 
ammunition hoist system employed in our battleships as compared 
with one of the systems used in England and known as the two-stage 
hoist with a second handling room lUst beneath the turret floor. 

The unfortunate accidents w hich nave occurred in four of ou ^ 
have more than ever forcibly called attention to the danger^ 
a ship's magazine may at times be exj>osed am! to the 
usually employed in turret designs both in this country- 1 
avoid such a possible dbagter. A description of the pra 
in the turret aesign^ of our own ships and those of foreij 
ing the general arran^tMoent umially adopted will illv 

AHISIUOAN DESIGN. 




The Araerican turrnt dmmi with re^])ecfc to it 
may be described a*( nt the all-around loadiiu,' d^ 
type. Tliat in. tlie ^um can be loaded a i anj 
their train and wliili^ in motion, an iiklkv 
former EngliiJh cuntorn of hanng to Ar*, 
position for loading nfl^^ oarh time ttie [ 

The ammunition in huUteA fn>ia wH 
room" up a c^mtral hiii^st in tt 
directly to tlie bre4*< h of the ^ 
ammunition hoist revolve with tl^i 



18 ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 

was a compromise, but it is interesting as showing the process of 
evolution by which the "fixed'' loading position was finally aban- 
doned. This design of turret was placed in only a limited number 
of ships (7) of the Majestic class, built between 1895 and 1898 and 
included the Magnificent, Mars, Hannibal, Jupiter, Victoria, and 
Prince George. (Fig. 3.) 

The next step is shown in fig. 4, which was nlaced in five vessels 
of the Canojms class — the Caesar, lUustrUms, Ocean, and Goliath — 
built between 1897 and 1900. This design abandoned the fixed 
loading position and in a natiu'al mechanical evolution attached 
the upper part of the fixed loading hoist to the revolving part of the 
turret and used this portion of the hoist in connection with the cen- 
tral tube hoist. This resulted in what was called a relay chamber or 
a working room beneath the turret platform, where the ammimition 
was transferred from the lower hoist to the upper hoist. This 
arrangement has also recently been designated as '^The two-stage 
hoist. In these ships it did not prove entirely satisfactory due to 
hand loading and detail arrangements. 

The next mechanical development toward simpUcity would nat- 
m-alljr result in a combination of the upper and lower hoists into 
one single hoist, and this we actually find!^ to be the case, as shown 
in fig. E. which was installed in the English battle ships Glory and 
Albwn, Duilt in 1901, and in several foreign ships built by Armstrong 
and Company. This design shows the ammunition hoist enclosea 
in a trunk leading from the handling room abreast the magazine 
direct to the breecn of the gun. This design of turret is character- 
ized bv a writer in a recent number of the Naval and Military Record 
as '^liie cleverest piece of workmanship and design that had yet 
been seen in naval turrets, but the two ships as a whole were never 
a success." The ammunition was a long time going up the long 
hoist, and nothing was gained as expected. 

The next design was mstalled in the English ships Centurion^ Bar- 
jleur, and Renoiim in 1903. It was a return to tlie Canopus type of 
1900 witli a relay cliambor beneath the gun making the two-stage 
hoist. Steam and electricity were introduced as part of the motive 
power. 

Following these vessels came the nine vessels of the Formidahle 
class, completed between 1902 and 1904. These also had the Canopus 
type of turret with a 4° loading position supplemented by a 1° hand- 
loading position and a chain-foldmg rammer. 

The four vessels of the Prince of Wales class, 1902-1904, had a 
similar type of turret, but a further improvement was made by the 
introduction of a rammer that enabled loading to take place at any 
angle of elevation as well as any angle of train. 

In 1904 the Triumph and SmifUmre were completed in England. 
Their 10-inch turret mounts had central ammunition supply from the 
handling room direct to breech of gun. The design is similar in all 
important respects to that of the American turret design, except 
that the guns can be loaded at any angle of elevation. 

The eight vessels of the King Edward VII class of 1905-6 and 
subsecjuent vessels have 12-inch turrets of the Canopus type of 1900 
\\ith improvements in details, some ha^nng a chain rammer enabling 
the guns to be loaded at any angle of elevation as well as at any angle 
of train. This has become the standard type of the P^nglish i2-inch 
turret mount and is shown in fig. 6. 



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to ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS, 

Some of tbe more modem French txirretSj instead of having the 
amnmnitiQn go direct to the breech of the jjun, as shown m the 
sketcbj have it delivered direct from the handling room to the turret 
at the side of the gun, from which position it is carried around the 
gun to rear and loaded by hand. Mr, Canet, the eminent French 
ordnance officer, stated in a recent lecture : 

The typical Englijsb pr&ctke as regards ammtmition hoiata is to make them in two 
BecUonj, the lower to bring tho aiaifl unit ion from the magayane to a relay chamber, 
where it is taken upward a^m to the guo by another hoist , Tliw syatjem alio we of a 
mora rapid firing, oi ther© ie a larg^ supply of ammatiitioG under tlie gun; beeidec, 
there ia less danger in the case of a Siell bursting in tbe turret. Hence it appears b^t^ 
terthau the use of a single hoiat direct from the magazine, sta 19 tbe cuBtora in Prench 
battle ahipe, * * * j^^ turrets for tlie thipa now building will embody oil the 
bnprovemetita I have noticed above, such sta relay chambers loading in any poeitioa 
and duplicate sights, so that the rate of fiie may be miaed to two rounds per mmut*. 

In some of the secondary turrets the base of the hoist is com- 
pletely luiiB&fiked, going do\*Ti into the handUng room at quite a dis- 
tance from the magazine very much like otir own system. In some 
modem cases the ammunition hoist for other guns m undefended at 
the basej although going directly in the middle of the niaj^azine. It 
is customary in Uie rrench service to carry a few rounds of ammuni- 
tion in the turret. This was also formerly a practice in some classes 
of English sliips^ but it appears that the present custom of the English 
is to carry shells only in the turrets or underneath the turret floor. 

TURRET DESIGNS OF OTHER COTJNTBrES. 

In ship constmction and design of naval vessels nearly all seo- 
ondary powers have followed the practice of the English or French, 
in which countries most of their ships have been built. The Japan- 
ese have in general followed the English and the Russians have fol- 
lowed both the Enghsh and BVeneli. Tlie latest English design of 
Vickers's turret mounting is almost an exact duplicate of tlie American 
design of turret having direct one-stage anmfiunition hoist, spring 
return, with electric power throughout for handling and control. 
(See fig. 9, from ''Engineering/' Mar. 22, 1907.) 

SUMMARY. 

Reviewing the practice of the diflFerent naval powers in respect 
to the design of turrets and the method of suppmng anmiunition, 
it will be seen that the differences are not radical departures from 
any general idea but refer principally to the detail mechanical arrange- 
ments. In all there exists an armored revolving gun platform to 
which ammunition is conveyed from the powder magazine and shell 
room on the lowest deck directly beneath the guns. Hydraulic, 
steam, pneumatic, electric or hand power may be used to perform 
the vanous operations connected with serving the gun. Partitions, 
doors, and flaps separate the magazine from the turret over the 
route of the powder in its passage to the gun. 

In this last respect the difference which has recently attracted 
most attention is that between the direct open-shaft ammunition 
hoist of the American turret and the two-stage closed-shaft hoist of 
the English 12-inch turret with their safety arrangements. 



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i 



ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 21 

Taking the practice in the English Navy we find there are two 
standard types of turret mounts, one with a two-stage hoist and the 
other with a direct hoist. 

The two-stage hoist is appUed to about 56 turrets on battle ships 
mounting 12-inch guns. 

The direct hoist is applied to 8 turrets on battle ships moimt- 
ing 12-inch guns, and to 18 turrets mounting 9.2-inch guns, and to 
about 136 turrets on armored cruisers mounting 9.2-inch guns or 
less — that is, a total in the British navy of 162 turrets fitted with 
direct, as against 56 fitted with the two-stage hoist. 

In all other navies the direct hoist is most frequently installed. 

In regard to the safety of the magazine it would appear from this 
practice that the Question of a one or two stage hoist is inmiaterial. 
Safety more directly depends upon the nimiber and security of door 
protection or flaps and the isolation of the powder in transit. 

The English adopted their two-stage hoist because they found by 
practical experience it gave greater rapidity of loading and the ques- 
tion of safety did not enter into the discussion at the time or its 
adoption. In both types of English turrets the safety devices 
would appear to be equally eflFective whether with a broken hoist 
or direct lioist. To insure equal rapidity the broken hoist requires 
more charges of powder to be en route between magazine and gun 
and in case of accident the confined space of the relay chamber 
and inclosed trunk would cause the powder to bum with greater 
violence than with more open arrangements. The closed trunk of 
the direct hoist would also confine the gases more and requires the 
doors and flaps to be eflFective. The English practice of carrying a 
large number of explosive shell within the turret has not heretofore 
been adopted in this coimtrv, nor that of carrying an emergency or 
ready supply of powder within the turret floor or relay chamber, as 
practiced m some designs of foreign ships. 

After an examination of the designs of turrets in foreign navies 
it can not be said that the practice abroad in general is any safer 
than that in this coimtry, and if the great majority of foreign turrets 
were to be subjected to four such severe ordeals as ours have passed 
through it is difficult to say that they would have fared any better 
or oven as well. 

There remains no question, however, but that eflFective screens 
should be interposed to isolate the powder charge after passing out 
of the mat^azine and whether we aaopt the more comphcated two- 
stage English hoist to gain rapidity or adhere to the simpler direct 
hoist of American design, it is independent of the Question of safety 
devices wliich can be made equally eflFective for botn. 

AMMUNITION HOISTS. 

Of each of the battle ships of the Navy now in commission and 
buildino; it is known that at the time of their design the ammunition 
hoists were fully able to supply more than the quantity of ammu- 
nition then considered necessary for the most effective use of the 
guns under battle conditions. 

Within the past few years the rapidity of gun fire has undergone 
a most surprising increase, and in consequence in some of our ships 
the ammunition hoists are by reason of their earHer design unequal 
to the demands now required to supply the guns imder the condi- 



22 ALLEQHD DEFECTS OF NAVAL VKSSKLS. 

tions laid down for conducting our present gystem of target prac- 
tice, which may be considered in the main as theoretical and mis- 
lestlirig and not in the least likely to be met with in war. The 
apparent deficiency in the supply by the present hoists as shoT^ii 
under target-practice conditions would ^ however, not be by any 
means so great in battle as is apparently considered bj; some of the 
critics, as it is extremely doubtful if in actual fighting as much 
ammunition would be required or could be used as is now the case 
under present target-practice firinp. As an instance of the very 
marked change in times in sec-onds between fires of the various cali- 
bers of guns which Avere considered good and efl'ective firing by the 
Department between the years 1897 and 1903, when compared with 
the rapidity of fire as shown by the same calibers of guns in the 
record target practice held during the year 1907, the following table 
may be interesting: 

Dtparimmil** %nMifuctitm$ uMiv^ to targei prtn^iice, Juljf Sit 1897 > 

BecoDdfl 

13-indiB. L, R... - , ^ ,.. Zm 

I2-iiirh B. L. R- _-_....„_.. ,,-- -.-. , .,, 300 

104achB. L. R_,., _ 2^0 

S-inch B. L, R ,„, , .-„-....,...., 120 

fi-inch B. L, R_^. ,_,______ 90 

5'mcb ll.h. R. __.....,. ...,.......,., 70 

4-inch B. L, R .,.,...,..., 60 

6-inc!i R. P ......,..........^^.,. _._-- _ 40 

&*meb R. P.. ...,..„,- 25 

4-mtb R. F, — . ,.,,-.„ , ..-- 20 

6'pounder_.,..,.,..,,,.,., .^...,^ ,.. ..», ^^. II 

3-pDUBder .,„„, ,,-.. .-,„..., 10 

HamlU obtained at rtxord target pmcticf, JiW, 

13-inch (Alabama class) 40 

13-inch (Indiana class) 61 

12-inch (Maine class) 45 

12-inch (Iowa class) 51 

8-inch (Uolorado class) 24 

8-inch (Kearearge class) 30 

8-inch ( Indiana class) 32 

8-inch (Iowa class) 33 

6-inch 50 caliber 7. 9 

6-inch 40 caliber a 2 

5-inch 40 caliber 5. 5 

3-inch 50 caliber 4. 8 

6-pounder semiautomatic 3. 9 

6-pounder rapid fire 5.2 

3-pounder 5, 

From the above table it will be easily seen that ammunition hoists 
fully capable of meeting all demands anticipated at the time of their 
design a few^ years since may not now be capable, nor could they 
reasonably be expected to be capable of supplying the largely in- 
creased demand (an increase of from five to eight fold) made iipon 
them by the surprising development of rapidity of gun fire. It is 
expected that recently designed and coining designs of hoists will 
fully meet present demands, but it is quite probable that the devel- 
opment of the next few years may render aesigns now equal to all 



ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 23 

demands liable to the same faults the critics observe in our earlier 
designs — that is, imequal to meet a future imknown increased re- 
quirement. In some of the ships necessary changes have already 
been made to bring the hoists up to the present reauirements and 
it is hoped, as circumstances permit vessels to be witndrawn tempo- 
rarily from service, the remaining hoists may be changed to meet 
the mcreased demands. 

IN AND OUT TURNING SCREWS. 

Until 1895 it had been the practice in our NaVy to build all twin- 
screw ships with out-turning screws, notwithstanding the fact that 
other navies, noticeably the British, had for some time been designing 
vessels with in-turninff screws. Experiments were carried out, ana 
after much research tne conclusion was reached that the in-turning 
screws gave a slight gain in speed without loss in maneuvering quah- 
ties so long as the vessels were under way; but with no way on, the 
in-tiuning were not quite so efficient as out-turning screws. The 
arrangement of the machinery in vessels fitted with in-turning 
screws, however, was considered more desirable. The advantages 
were supposed to be somewhat in favor of the in-turning, and in 1895 
they were adopted for some of our vessels. Since then there have 
been constructed 7 battle ships, 8 armored cruisers, 6 cruisers, 2 
gimboats, 12 torpedo-boat destroyers, 7 torpedo boats, and 4 moni- 
tors having in-turning screws. 

After considerable trial and further experiment with the vessels 
built with in-turning screws it was decided that their supposed advan- 
tages did not compensate for the disadvantage of maneuvering when 
in squadron and under certain other circumstances, and the Depart- 
ment on April 15, 1903, decided to design all future vessels with out- 
turning screws; and furthermore, to change from in to out turning 
screws all vessels then building, provided the condition of the work 
on vessels under construction permitted this to be done without 
excessive cost. All of our vessels designed since April, 1903, have 
out-turning screws. 

THE '^KEARSARQE" AND ''KENTUCKY.'* 

The act of Congress of March 2, 1895, authorized the construction 
of two ** seagoing coast-line battle ships,'' subsequently named the 
Kearsarge and Kentucky. These ships were to be larger and more 
powerful than any of their predecessors, the Indiana, Massachusetts , 
Oregonj and Iowa. 

The records of the Department show that during the preparation 
of the plans for these vessels the opinions of many officers of high 
professional standing were sought on the various military and other 
features involved; and it is believed that the designs, at the time of 
their approval, twelve years ago, embodied as far as practicable all 
the improvements and best ideas relative to battle ships then known. 

Among other new features introduced into these two ships was an 
improved method of controlling the recoil of the heavy 13-inch turret 
guns. In previous vessels this recoil had been checked by two hydrau- 
lic cylinders located under the ^n. This system had not given satis- 
faction. A new type of carriage was designed having four recoil 
cylinders, two on top and two below the gun, but the center of oacilW 



24 Ald^EGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 

tion of the gui^ itself was necessarily changed so that the distance 
between it and the side of the turret was about 14 inches greater than 
before. This change necessitated a somewhat larger port opening, 
in order that full elevation and depression might te given the guns. 
In all cases it had been customary to provide for a clearance of 1 inch 
on either side and above and below the gun and its port when the 
former was at extreme elevation or depression. 

At the time of the desi^ of the Kearsarge the port area was known 
to be slightly greater than that of previous snips, and was fully 
considered and recognized as a disadvantage, but was thought to 
be more than compensated for by the advantages derived from the 
new type of moimt and also by the knowledge that a chance shell 
entering the port and damaging a recoil cylinder would not — as in 
all previous turret moimts — put the eun out of action, as the remain- 
ing two or three recoil cylinders woind still be sufficient to push the 
gun back into the firing position, which is not the case in prior battle 
ships, where the gun might be completely disabled by a small frag- 
ment of shell or perhaps even by a shock rupturing one or more of 
the several hydraulic or steam pipes operating the gun. 

For the reasons above stated, in addition to others, the best opinion 
inclined to the view that the turrets of the Kearsdge and KerUucJcy 
were, notwithstanding the increased areas of their ports, much more 
reliable and effective for heavy gun service than those of any of 
their predecessors. This view is mlly borne out by the twelve vears 
of excellent service performed by these guns, and they are still effi- 
cient weapons. 

It has Deen stated that "the openings above and below the guns 
in the turrets of these ships are 10 feet sguareJ^ If this were the case 
the exposed area would be 100 square feet. As a matter of fact it 
is by actual measurement 9.12 square feet. 

Tiie accompanying sketch, drawn to scale, shows the outside face 
of the 13-inch turret ^m ports of the Inrliava, Iowa, Krarsarge, 
and AJahmna classes of battle ships, and represents the actual a})pear- 
anre of the turret ports with the ^iins level, the hatchcHl portion hvuv^ 
the ^rction of the gun at the outer face of the ])ort. It will he seen 
that tfic relative sizes oi the areas exposed to hostile shot do not difi'er 
so ^^reatly in varv'inor types of ships, as some critics woidd have the 
puhhc l)eli(»ve. In the case of the /r/i/'a the guns arc ll2-inch instead 
of l.'')-infh and the range of elevation is only 18° instead of lo^ as in 
the other types, which accounts for her turret (openings heing smaller 
than tlie others shown in the drawings. 

Thr chances that even one heavy shc^ll would enter liie sjnice above 
the port in action are very remot(^ inder-d : hut the piieuomenal 
a(l\ance made during the ]>ast few years in rapidity and accuracy of 
fir»^ of the interme(liat(* and seconrhirv ])atteries of war-hips has 
accciituatecl the recognizcMl importance of HMhiciuL' the purl area t«> a 
ndniinum and of providing a suitable j)rot<'ction. Stcj)- w < re taken 
to accompli-^h this result in 1003; and all vessels ci»m{'h tcl ^ince the 
bet/inning of 1004 ^except four cruisers of the ('nh*rtuln c!a--. havini: 
S-inch gunsi have been iitt(Ml with shutt(Ts or shi( i<l- .:- -liown in 
the sketches following |>age 24. Similar protection i- t., be iitted 
to th(* older vessels when circumstances p<'rmit of their l.)eing with- 
drawn from service sufliciently long enough to enable th(^ change to 
be comj)l<'ted. 





I 



L 



ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 25 

As has been previously stated, there was probably more discussion 
over the preliminary designs for battle ships Nos. 5 and 6 (Kearsarge 
and Kentucky) than over any others which have been built for our 
Navy. The general questions of the battery, armor, speed, etc., were 
fully discussed. The proposition to use superposed turrets was 
novel and the views of many officers were sought. The relative 
merits of the r2-inch and 13-inch guns were duly considered, and the 
caliber of the intermediate battery was fixed at 5 inches, because that 
was considered the largest that could use '^fixed^' ammunition, then 
deemed essential to any gun deserving the name of *^rapid fire.'' 
Whether these 5-inch guns should be mounted in pairs in small 
turrets, or be boxed in, or simply separated from one another by 
splinter bulkheads, was fully argued, and conclusions reached only 
after mature deliberation. 

It is worthy of note that at the time these vessels were built our 
Navy was still using brown powder in its heavy guns, and on account 
of the residue left after firing it was necessary to sponge out the bore 
of the gun after each roimd. Accordingly the Chief of the Bureau of 
Ordnance stated that the rate of fire of the batteries of these vessels 
would be as follows: 13-inch guns, one shot every 300 seconds; 8-inch 
guns, one shot every 120 seconds; 5-inch guns, one shot every 20 
seconds. 

The guns and mounts were designed to meet these requirements. 

At the recent target practice the maximum rate of nre for the 
guns of the Kearsarge was given as follows: 13-inch guns, one shot 
every 35.5 seconds; 8-incn guns, one shot every 22.9 seconds; 
6-inch guns, one shot every 4.24 seconds. 

The adoption of smokeless powder did away with the necessity 
for sponging out the guns after firing, as it left no residue in the bore, 
and nence it became possible to greatly increase the rapidity of fire. 
This powder also gave increased velocity, and consequently greater 
range and penetration to the projectiles, and by the adoption of 
new sights increased accuracy of fire has been obtained; but tne guns, 
being shorter than those of more recent construction, are much less 
powerful. While the offensive powers of these vessels have been 
greatly improved, the defensive qualities still remain the same as 
when the ships were designed, nor can they well be changed until 
the vessels are withdrawn from active service for a general overhaul- 
ing and remodeling. 

It is claimed that these vessels are "not fit for service in battle 
line against really modem vessels.' ' No one would claim that these 
ships could engage in battle on terms of ecjuality with the most 
modem battle ships, as they are inferior in size, armor, and arma- 
ment to the latest vessels of our own and foreign navies, and to assert 
otherwise would be tantamount to denying that there had been any 

Progress made in the art of battle-ship building for twelve years, 
[o commander would hesitate to take these vessels into a fleet action, 
and it can not for a moment be believed but that, with their heavy 
battery of 13 and 8 inch guns and good armor protection, they would 
give an excellent account of themselves, not only against ships of 
about their own date of desi^, but also against any other vessel 
falling within the range of their guns. They are good and effective 
ships, but we do not claim they are as efficient as more recent vessela 



36 ALLEGED DEFECTS OF ITAVAL VKBS£:L6. ^^| 

GENERAL NOTES. ■ 

Criticisins have been frequently iBade of the fact that a few of otir 
large vessels are not fitted witli aut^smobi]^ tomedoesj and at the 
present tinic it is recognized that the absence or these torpedoes is 
somewhat of a disadvantage. At the time of the design of the large 
vessels, which are not fittcil with torpedoas, the question of the 
advisability of |^\Tng them a torpedo outfit received careful and 
thci rough tUscussion and consideration, and the outfit was omitted 
for what were deemed very eood and sufficient reasons. At the time 
these vessels were designed (from about 1900 to 1902} the torpedo had 
an eilective range of about 1,000 to 1^200 yards, and it was not 
eocpected that hostile sliips would engage in action within that dis- 
tance, the toi^edo became a weapon of secondary importance, and 
it was not thought that the installation of this comparatively secon- 
dary weapon in large vessels would longer justifj' tne assignment of 
the necessary space, which could be used to so much more effective 
military purpose otherwise. As late as 1905 a most distinguished 
admiral of the British navy, writing of the use of the torpedo during 
the naval operations of the campaign of 1904, in the war between 
Japan and Russia, stated: 

IV U not too much to my that ei|>eriei^ce of the late c^unpai^, conhnmug aa it doee 
tUo aiK^netitB of sludentaof tactics m these days of loug-raiigre j^utia, jiiitt:gei a demand 
thfit torpedoes Bhould be withdrnvn from the armament of cfuiaem and battle ahips. 

Since our large cruisers and battle ships not fitted with torpedoes 
were designed the efTective range of the torpedo has undergone a 
great increase, and it is now claimed to be efficient up to 4,000 yardy. 
This improvement htis rendered them again^ as in former days^ a 
weapon to be reckoned mth,and consequently we readopted them, and 
all our large yessels designed sinc^ this improvement carry torpedoes, 
as do also all of the other vessels originally so designed wherever it 
has been practicable to so rearrange their underwater space as to 
enable the tubes and accessories to be installed. 

It may be stated that our f>olicy of temf>orarily abandoning the tor- 
pedo for battle ships and armored cruisers when it failed to keep pace 
with what was considered battle range for guns, and again taking it up 
when improvements made it once more a useful and effective weapon 
within the battle ranges, was not different from the policy pursued by 
foreign navies. 

Referring to some of the criticisms recently appearing in print, it 
may be stated in general terms that in our Navy sighting hoods were 
put on turrets, because no other practicable way of pointing the guns 
effectively existed. No criticism, however, seems to have been made 
by the critics to the fact that all other navies with turreted ships 
follow the same system, and for the same reason as ourselves. 

The test of battle onlv will decide a suitable type of conning tower. 
As experience is gained the towers of our ships are modified, so far 
as possible, to meet the conditions required, and towers for ships 
building are designed in accordance witn the latest reliable 
data. Changes of form, etc., have not been adopted simply because 
some foreign designers nave evolved a novelty out because it w^as 
not apparent that they were sufficiently superior to our own to justify 
such cnange imtil it had been demonstrated by actual test that they 



ALLEGED DEFECTS OP NAVAL VE88EL8. 27 

possessed merit. But we have never hesitated to adopt an idea that 
promised increased efficiency. 

It is not advisable to adopt as fulfilling service requirements ideas 
evolved solely from the results of target practice, as such may be in 
many respects misleading. Ships fi^t m the open, rolling sea, at 
fast and varying speeds, constantly changing ranges, with always 
* some pitching or rolUng motion, and requiring for efficient sighting 
a large field of view for the gun pointer, much of whose light is shut 
off by reason of his protected, position behind armor, and who fires at 
a target the speed and direction of which may be also constantly 
changing; whereas at target practice it is the invariable custom to 
choose a smooth sea, ideal weather conditions the firing ship moves 
at a fixed speed, and fires at a stationary target generally at a known 
range ; onl^ one ship fires at a time, and be it remembered, with no 
shots striking or coming toward the firing ship to disconcert or excite 
the men pointing the guns. Battle conditions (that is, conditions 
under which we are likely to fight) should be the criterion and not the 
ideal conditions selected for target practice. 

It is noted that in one of the criticisms recently made in a printed 
article the author refers, in condemning the heights of our broadside 
batteries, to the disadvantage these guns would work imder in an 
engagement where the enemy is to windward, and states that the lee- 
ward position is to be sought inasmuch as the ship so situated is clear 
of her own smoke. The 'weather gauge'' was a primary advantage 
in the days of sailing ships and its advantage over the lee is greater 
to-dav than this critic seems to think. It is doubtful if any captain 
would select the leeward position, and particularly so if there was any 
sea running, as most probably would be the case. Modem gunpow- 
der gives out little or no smoke, and therefore the great advantage 
claimed by the critic above referred to falls; but instead, the leeward 
ship has the greater and more important disadvantage of the smoke 
from his antagonist's funnels and of flying spray and moisture obscur- 
ing the glass of the telescopes which will seriously interfere with the 
aiming and firing of the ^ns. The question of the direction of the 
sun is also one of much importance, and if it is a case of choice of 
windward position with the sun at his back or leeward position with 
the sun in his face, there is little doubt but that the critic above 
referred to would change his views. Practical experience is the best 
of all teachers, and it requires this as well as study to discuss profes- 
sional matters, otherwise in advocating a small and perhaps unim- 
portant advantage sight may be lost of the several more weighty and 
overmatching disadvantages. 

The question of the selection of an efficient or satisfactory range 
finder is one that we have been struggling with for years, and the 
fact of its not having been developed is due not to any lack of human 
effort or ingenuity. Other nations have experienced the same diffi- 
culty. Our ships are now supplied with the best range finder thus 
far known. The main difficulty lies in the physical impracticability, 
at the present stage of human knowledge, of being able to measure 
trigonometrically a distance of several miles from the necessarily 
short base line possible to be had on board the measuring ship. 
Many of the greatest minds of the world have been engaged on this 
problem for years, but unfortunately with no great success up to 
the present day. 



»8 ALLKOISB BiraCTS Or HAT At nS^HMi*, 

To the claim that we imTo no means of haadliiig a fleet m a fog. 
it may be said that at the present stage of human knowledge it htII 
ulways be a difficult problem to properly handle a fleet in a fog and 
in tKis respect our Isavy does not differ from others. We are pos- 
sibly neither behind nor ahead of other nations in thiB respect. 
When nature pemntsMis to see through a fog or science develops a 
means of penetrating itjs cloudy we can hope to overcome this dif- 

\ HcultT, hut until then we ^lU, like all other human beings, be com- 
pelled to struggle Hith the problem. 

The international re^ilations for preventing collisions at sea 
which have bt^en enacted by Congress into law require that the steam 
whistle or siren shall l>e so placed that its soimd wiJl not be inter- 
cepted by any obstruction, and consiequently our steam whistles and 

I sirens, m compliance with thiii taw, are placed forward of the smoke 
pipes. While it might be undoubtedly more convenient and less try- 
mg upon the hearing of the officer of the deck if the whistle were 
placed abaft the smokestack, yet so lon^ as the law remains as at 
present we can not place the wnistle where its sound uill be obstnicted. 
In a recently published magazine article severe criticisms were 
made regarding" accidents (the cJatcs of wliich were s]>ecificalJjr stated) 
which havtt happened in the turrets of three of our battle ships, and 
it was claimed that notwitlistanding these accidents, prior uiifor- 
tunate oxperienres, and of the reconuiiendatlons and reports of 
varioiLs ollicers thereon, nothing was done to remedy the defects 
complained of. It is inconceivBble that a person would jeopardize 
his reputation for veracity by making such specific statements upon 
matters of the character referred to without verifying Ins data or 
satisfjdng himself a:ri to the rehabihty and trustwortliineas of the 

.source from which his information was obtained. 

1 The official records of the Department amply and clearly disprove 

-the statements matle as to nothinj^ having Wn done to remedy 
the defects alleged tn < xist in our direct leading ammunition hoists, 
as prior to the unfortunate accident on board tlie Alissovn in April, 
1904, both the Bureaus of Ordnance and Construction and Repair 
had endeavored to obtain a satisfactory form of shutter doors 
designed to close the openincr in the turret floors after the passage of 
the ammunition cars to the guns. A desim developed at the 
Washington Navv-Yard in March and April or 1904 was authorized 
to be constructed with a view to its apphcation to the tmrets of the 
Virainia class of battle ships then under construction, as well as 
to all other vessels as far as practicable. Before, however, this shutter, 
which was attached to the ammunition hoist rails, was completed, a 
satisfactory shutter attached to the turret itself was perfected and 
has since been applied in all turrets. 

As early as January, 1904, the Bureau of Ordnance took up the mat- 
ter of the design of a two-stage ammunition hoist with a company well 
known as manufacturers of ordnance and ordnance material, m connec- 
tion with a model subsequently exliibited by them at the World's Fair, 
St. Louis. Every effort was made to put an ammunition hoist of 
this type in the U. S. S. New Hampshire, and contracts were actually 
made m August, 1905. It was found, however, that the design was 
too heavy, involving a total increase of structural weight of the tur- 
rets of more than 1^ tons, and that it could not be installed without 
greatly exceeding the weights allowed for ordnance outfit. 



ALLEGKD DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 29 

Modifications of this type of hoist were subsequently made, by 
which its weight was greatly reduced, and the adoption of this hoist, 
or a hoist of similar nature, was detennined upon by the board on 
construction prior to the accident on the Georgia, The report of the 
special turret board simply confirmed the action of the board on con- 
struction, but was not received until months after the type of turret 
above referred to had been decided upon; and did not therefore 
cause the adoption of the turret, as has been claimed by the incor- 
rectly informed persons alluded to. 

It is needless to add that all criticisms made from time to time 
concerning any detail of our ships which have reached the board on 
construction have received its careful attention and consideration; 
whether the criticism was important and well based or whether it 
was, as the majority have proved to be, lacking in merit, no differ- 
ence was made in taking them up, for all have been carefully weighed. 
When the conditions and circumstances seemed to merit action by 
the board such has been invariably taken. 

To criticise is human nature, and men interested in a subject or 
its development are generally much given to making suggestions or 
criticisms regarding changes which in their opinions would be improve- 
ments. Particularly is this the case where Uttle or no responsibility 
lies with the critic, and perhaps more so even when one nas a pro- 
fessional interest in the subject under consideration. To the person, 
however, charged with the responsibility of the adoption of the 
changes suggested by the critics, and particularly so where such 
changes may seriously affect the public welfare and involve the 
expenditure of large sums of Government money, it is only natural 
that he, having this great responsibility, should require that the 
advantages claimed for the alterations be satisfactorily proved before 
the time, labor, and money necessary to carry out the suggested ideas 
are expended. This very proper requirement is in many cases 
resented by critics, some or whom are prone to publish their grievances 
because or the not immediate acceptance of their ideas, and to claim 
that inventions and improvements are not adopted as they should be, 
that those in authority are too conservative, and to make various 
other allegations. 

If such critics were to investigate they might find that in many 
cases their own ideas were not entirely original, that perhaps others 
had been working along the same or similar lines and had perhaps 
evolved a more completed project, or even, perhaps, that experiment 
had prov(»d their schemes not suitable for naval purposes. It is this 
cjuestion of investigating and demonstrating the usefulness of an 
invention, suggested change, or alteration, before adoption and 
before authorizing the expenditure of large sums of public money 
which protects the Government but at the same time affords the 
critic, who has no responsibility toward the country, the opportunity 
so many avail themselves of, to criticise unfavorably and perhaps 
im justly the person upon whom the direct responsibility for the pro- 
tection of the interests of the Government really lies, and who, insofar 
as the Navy is concerned, and about whom I feel qualified to speak, 
are faithful to their trust. 

In concluding this report, which has been made after a thorough 
consideration or the defects kno\vn, as well as claimed to exist in the 



so ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VES8ELS, 

battleships of our Navy, and using the most reliable and authentic 
data obtainable, the foliomn^ facts may be regard(>d as established ; 

Battle drills. — In recent years our Nav>' has paid much attention 
to war drills and exercises', and the tendency has been to continue 
to increase and widen our experience in this respect. These tl rills 
have been, however, necessarily carried out with the limited number 
of ships available which unfortunately did not make a homogeneous 
fleet, but now, vdth sixteen practically similar battle ships m com- 
mission, we hope to gain great advantages from the continuatiou of 
the battle fleet driUe oegun with those ships lastyear as soon as the 
fleet could be withdrawal from the Jamesto\vn Exposition* 

Freeboard of our ships.— Kxn,mma.iion of the plans and other 
rehable data concerning our own and foreign sliipa of the same date 
of design shows clearly that in the matter of freeboard we comparep 
with the exception of the Indiana and Keniuchj classes (the first 
built battle ships of the Navy), most favorably. With reference to 
the British and Japanese battle shipSj wluch have given good results 
under service conditions, our vessels have in the main more freeboard, 
and in the instances where they exceed us it is only by such few inches 
as may be, for any practical advantages, ignored. 

Height of gun pojritiori^.— Here again, excepting the Indiana and 
Eentucty classes, our sliips carry their fonyard turret guns , 



as high or even higher above wkter than similar shipa of the Britisii 
and Japaneae navies, and in the heights above water of guns firing 
on the broadside we are noticeably in the lead. Everj'thing con- 
sidered our gun heights are amply sufficient to meet the necessities 
of battle^ second to those of no other nation in effectiveness, and can 
be itsed efficiently m any sea fighting in which naval actions are at 
all hkely to take place. 

Armor.—A comparison of the height of armor belts of our sliips 
with those of foreign ships of same date of design, shows that in gen- 
eral our armor belt is somewhat higher above water, and further- 
more that the armor of our ships is usually thicker and fully as well 
distributed both above as well as below the water line. In the 
matter of the main armor belt, about which much criticism has ap- 
peared, when our ships are brought into actual combat we have 
nothing to fear from any alleged superiority of foreign vessels of the 
same date of design. 

Turret designs, — The turret designs of our ships are in the main 
very similar to those of the French and to the great majority of ships 
of the British and Japanese navies. The general arrangement of the 
magazines about a handling room" into which the anmiunition 
hoist leads, is also similar in all navies. The dangers which we, and 
others, have principally to contend with are those of liabilith to flare 
back at the breech of the gim and the accidental ignition of grains of 
powder. The remedy is twofold: by preventing the escape of all 
gas from the breech of the gim into the turret; and, second, by the 
mterposition of partitions or screens fitted with doors and flaps along 
the route of the powder charges from the handling rooms to the gun. 
by which means the flame from the b^uming grains would bepre vented 
from coming in contact with the ppwcier in transit. Devices to 
accomplish ooth of these results har^ been installed in our ships. 
The advantages of the two-stage ammdl^ition hoist in the matter of 
safety are not manifest, nor have they b^n fidly established over the 



/ 



ALLEGED DEFECTS OF NAVAL VESSELS. 31 

straight lead hoist which we have heretofore used in our service. We 
are in our latest designed ships installing the two-stage hoist, pri- 
marily because it affords a more rapid supply of ammunition to the 
guns, but its adoption as our future standard has no^ yet been decided 
upon. 

Supply of ammunition, — It may be stated with certainty that no 
navy has as yet ammimition hoists capable of supplying ammimition 
to the guns at the rate called for by our modem target practice con- 
ditions; nor will the guns, in all probability, in action require ammu- 
nition at those rates. Our hoists are not mferior to those of foreign 
ships, and with the changes to be made or already made in them wUl 
meet all the necessities of our ships. 

In and out turning screws, — We built some vessels with in-turning 
screws, because of their supposed advantages and because also foreign 
navies with larger experience were domg the same. We ceased 
building such vessels when we had" satisfied ourselves that the advan- 
tages were supposed rather than real. 

The Kearsarge and Kentucky,— The exposed openings of the gun 
ports of these vessels are recognized as being larger tnan desirable. 
The two ships, however, are efficient and serviceable vessels and are 
in no sense of the word the failures some persons have alleged. The 
enlarged port area was a necessity due to improvement in the effi- 
ciency of the gun mounts and was but a small factor of disadvantage 
when compared with the several advantages which made the guns of 
those two ships superior as weapons of war to any which we had 
theretofore constructed. These two ships were, however, designed 
more than twelve years ago and do not, of course, embody all the 
improvements of up-to-date ships, and on this account it is tne inten- 
tion to give them a general overhauling as soon as the funds are 
available. 

Torpedoes. — ^At the present time our supply of torpedoes is less 
than it should be. This fault, however, is due to the inability of our 
manufacturers to build them and not to any lack of effort upon the 
part of the Navy to procure a sufficiency. It is hoped in tne near 
ruture this present difficulty may be overcome. The output of tor- 
pedoes will be materially increased by the torpedo factory now build- 
mg at the Naval Station, Newport, K. I., and which will soon be in 
fim operation. 

Gun sights and range finders, — In these respects our ships are in no 
manner second to those of other navies. 

Finally. — Our ships are not inferior to those in foreign services. 
We have made compromises in our designs of battle ships, because 
it is impossible to construct a perfect battle ship; such compromises 
have, perhaps, detracted from the desired perfect ship m some 
respect, but at the same time have made it possible to improve upon 
some other existing disadvantages, and, on tlie whole, the compro- 
mises, each and all, have tended toward a nearer approach to the 
desired perfect finality. Other nations have laborea and will, like 
ourselves, continue to labor under this same difficulty in endeavoring 
to approach as near as possible to that impossibility — a perfect 
battle ship. In making compromises in the building of our ships, 
I am satisfied that in every instance all concerned in tlie work have 
acted honestly and patriotically, and only with the desire to produce 
the best ship possible. The result has been in each case, ship by 



32 



ALlLEGED DfiFECra of naval VE88ELB. 



ship and year by year, an improvement upon aU that have preceded, 
and no ship has been built by us inferior to those of any nation 
designed at the same time. 

Toe quality of the material of our Navy m inferior to none; in 
quantity of vessels alone are we lacking. With an increase in num- 
ber of ships the American Navy will have been supplied the only 
feature necessary to make it second to none in all that tends toward 
fighting eiliciency, and when the stress of actual combat, if euch 
should ever unfortunately come, brings the only really practical test, 
our country need have no misgiv ings or fear but that our battle 
ships will rive an excellent account of themselves and prove them^ 
selves all tliat we have designed them for and know them to be. 
Very respectfully, 

G. A* CoNVEnsE, 
Rmr-Admiralj V. S. Namf (Retind), 

The SECRETAItY OF THE NaVT 



60THCONOBE88, ) SENATE. (Document 

lit Session. X 1 No. 808. 



SUPERANNUATION IN CLASSIFIED CIVIL SERVICE. 



MESSAGE 

FROM THE 



PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 

TRANSMITTING 

A BEPOBT BY THE COMMITTEE ON DEPABTMEKTAL METHODS 
ON THE SUBJECT OF SX7PEBANNTJATI0N IN THE CLASSIFIED 
CIVIL SERVICE; ALSO A DBAFT OF A PROPOSED BILL WHICH 
PROVIDES FOR THE PAYMENT OF ANNUITIES TO EMPLOYEES 
UPON RETIREMENT. 



FxBRUART 21, 1908. — Read; referred to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered 

to be printed. 



To the Senate and House of Representatives: 

I transmit herewith for the consideration of the Congress a report 
by the Committee on Department Methods on the subject of super- 
annuation in the classified civil service; also a draft of a proposed bill 
which provides for the payment of annuities to employees upon 
retirement. 

Theodore Roosevelt. 

The White House, Felruary M, 1908. 



Washington, February 18 y 1908. 
The President: 

The Committee on Department Methods submits herewith a report 
by the subcommittee on personnel on the subject of superannuation in 
the classified civil service, and also draft of a proposed bill which pro- 
vides for the payment of annuities to employees upon retirement. 
We are in accord with the recommendations contained in the report. 
Yours, very respectfully, 

Lawrence O. Murray, 

GiFFOUD PiNCHOT, 

Committee on Department Metliods. 



Washington, D. C, Fehruary 18^ 1908. 

Gentlemen: Your subcommittee on personnel has the honor to 
submit the following report on the question of superannuation: 

Suitable provision for the retirement of aged civil employees of the 
Government is desirai)le on two grounds: 

(1) As a means of improving the public service, since the possible 
loss to the Government througn the superannuation of its employeea 

S I)— 60-1— Vol 32 15 



S 8UP£RAMN0ATION IN CLASSIFIED CIVIL 6KEVICE, 

b eetimated by the Nfttiotml Civil Service Keform L^i^e to be about 
$iC»0,(H:«j in tbe EJepftTtfflaeiits at Wa^hinijton and about $800,000 out* 
side of Washington; or, m the whole classified scrviee of the United 
States, $1,200,0(H), 

{2) Afl an act of jasticf^ to the faithful emplojrees. 

The salaries paid air« seldom suiEcieot to admit of laving aside any- 
thing for old a^o. espt*cittUv in Washington, where the expenses of 
Uvtngare now out of ail proportion to the compensation received. 
The average salftiy paid by the Government, aoc<:»rdin^ to Census 
Bullelin No* 18, is otdj $1,072^ a suiii sufficient perhaps for celibates 
that cherijsh but a paltry ambition, but most assuredly not adequate 
for i>er!*onij of commemlable su^pirations or encumbered with tbe 
t^puntsibilitit.'S and obligations of family ties- 

And your subcommittee believes that a provision for retirement can 
be made efficient, just, and successful only by reserving to the Govern- 
iDent it4^elf the administration of the plan. 

It has been ureed that the Government keep clear of aasoctation 
with any undertaEing of retirement on the ground that a measure for 
that purpose would be used as an entering wedge, or its ruins would 
form a stepjjing-stone, for the establishment of a civil pension law^ 
and because the Government ought not to engage in the insurance 
bu^ma"^ But retirement would lie iraposj^ible except by Federal law. 
and we do not discern any likelihood whatever that a well -formulated 
plan of retirement upon a proper basis would ever lead to or pave the 
way for the pensioning of its employees by the Government, and we 
do not see any reason why the Government shoidd not, in furtherance 
of its own interci^tii!, assume supenision and intimate control and man- 
a^ment of those features of the affairs of ita employees that so directly 
affect its own welfare and are inseparable therefrom. 

Many efforts have been made to devise a mea^uru which would afford 
the necessary relief at once to the service and tJje employees, and 
scores of bills on the subject have t»een iutrodiiotH^ in Con<]fress. None 
ha^ succeeded, boc^u^e each tmd everv oni^ j^hows on amil vsis that it is 
unfair either to the employer or to the taxpayer, or else that it 
discriminates unjustly k)etween dilTerent classes of employees. 

The bills that have been presented may be tiivided into two classes: 

(1) Those proposing that annuities be paid out of the Federal 
Treasury. 

(2) Those providing for a uniform deduction of a given percentage 
from all salaries for the creation of a general fund from which all 
employees on retiring at the age of 70 jshall receive annuities, payments 
to begin a certam number of years from the passage of the bill. 

These bills generallv provide that an employee must serve for at 
least ten years before he may be entitled to an annuity on retirement. 
Some provide for a uniform deduction of a given percentage from all 
pay and the payment of annuities based on length of service. 

In view of the public sentiment a<^ainst a civil pension list, it is not 
necessary to discuss the bills of the first class. Those of the second 
class are open to the serious objection that they are unjust to the 
younger employees, since they re(juire them to set aside a much larger 
percentage of their salaries in order to create a fund for the older men 
than would be necessary to provide annuities for themselves alone. 
The defect in all such plans is apparent to every student of the subject 



SUPERANNUATION IN CLASSIFIED CIVIL SERVICE. 8 

and is very clearlv explained in a report treating of this subject by 
the National Civil Service Reform League, as follows: 

In general, any plan of uniform or ** flat-rate" assessment, to begin practically at 
once to take care of the aged» is a great injustice to the younger employees. The 
old will receive support after they have paid but a few years, aud can p&y but a few 
years more, even if assessments are continued on the retirement receipts. The 
young will have to pay a much larger sum from their salaries than would be required 
for their old age alone. If, by any chance, the fund should prove to be too small, that 
would transpire «nly many years hence, when those now aged would have received 
their full allowances and passed from the stage. The others, the present younger 
employees, who would have borne the great brunt of expensive assessment^ would 
thus be the ones to suffer, unless the Government made up the deficiency. 

This argument 13 sound. It follows then that any plan for the 
retirement of superannuated civil-service employees, for which fhe 
approval of employees themselves and the public alike is desired, 
should contain the following provisions: 

(1) The funds necessary for the payment of the annuities should be 
furnished by the employees themselves without expense to the Gov- 
ernment other than the payment of allowances to those employees now 
in the service whose contributions would not be sufficient to provide 
for their own retirement and the payment of salaries to the clerical 
force required to keep the accounts and distribute the funds. 

(2) Each employee should contribute the amount necessary to create 
his own annuity without regard to payments by others, so that each 
employee may receive full return on the money contributed by him. 

(3) The annuities to be paid employees on retirement should be grad- 
uated according to length of service and in such manner that the 
monthly contributions required from employees for the creation of 
such annuitee shall be in no case excessive. 

The plan recommended ultimately meets these conditions. It is 
foundea on well-established principles, but they are applied in a new way. 

The general idea is that each individual shall provide the necessary 
fund for his own retirement. In presenting the plan it is well to divide 
the exposition into two parts: The first part makes provision for those 
whose services begin after the enactment of the law; the second part 
makes provision for those who have been in the civil service at the time 
of the passage of the measure for a longer or shorter period. 

It is proposed to pay every employee in the classified civil service on 
arriving at the age of retirement an annuity equal to 1.6 per cent of 
his pay for every year of service. For the purpose of illustration, 
assume that an employee entered the service at 20 years of age and 
received a salary of §1,200 per annum through fifty years, when he 
reached the retiring age of 70. One and one-half per cent of $1,200 
is $18. This amount (§18) multiplied by his years of service, fifty, 
gives $900, which would be the amount of his annuity for the remain- 
der of his life. In actual practice, the employee's compensation is 
usually increased from time to time, or may be decreased, but this 
does not interfere with the operation of the plan, for the deductions 
from his salary are increased or decreased in such an amount that the 
annuity upon retirement will still be 1.5 per cent of his salary for 
each year of service, regardless of the changes in salary or when they 
are made. This is a simple calculation, easily understood, and is fur 
ther simplified by reducing the deductions from various salaries to a 
set of tables. 



4 SUPlEASNtJATION IN CLi&SIFIED CIVIL SERVICE. 

In order to provide the fund from which to pay the proposed 
atiDinty of 1.5 per cent of the employee's salary for each year of 
service, a deduction should be made from the monthly salary of the 
employee that would be sufficient^ with interest at 4 per cent per 
sunum compounded annually; to purchase such annuity on arrival of 
the employee at the age of retirement* This sounds complex when 
stated m the abstract, but in practice the operation is simple. In the 
above illustmtion it was found that the annuity to be provided for at 
70 wasJItKiO per year for the remainder of the emj>loyee's life. The 
next step is to ascertain the cost of an annuity uf $1*00 for life, be- 
g-innioff at the age of 70. The cost of an aunuity is based on the 
probable length of life from a given age and interest at a given rate 
on the pun base price. The amount charged by inj^iimnce companies 
for an annuity of $100 on tlie iionparticipating plan, iM^Lfirming at 70, 
IB $742. Therefore the annuity of $i*lX} desired in this illutitmtion 
would covst nine time^ *742, or ^^678, 

The cost of this unnuity bein^ ascertained, the next step is to deter- 
mine what sum nm>*t bo set aside monthly to accumulates witli 4 per 
cent interest, eonuxiunded aunually, $6,*j78 during the employ^Vs tiftj' 
years of service from *20 to 70. By reference to an inti*rc«t table ft 
'will be s^oeo that a dciiosit of |i per month fur lifly years, with intereiit 
compounded annually at 4 per ccnt^ amounts to $1,871<48. Tlie num- 
ber of dollars per month that would be necessary to accuruulat^* 
$4J,678 is ajitcertained by dividing $0,678 by $1,871.48. This givca 
$f><57 aa the amount to be deducted from a salary of tlOO f»er mouth 
for a service of fifty yeans in order to accumulate |v6,678| which is 
sufficient to purchase an annuity of $900 per annum beginnuig at the 
age of 70 years. The amount^ deducted from snlaries will vary with 
the age of entenng the service and with the amount of the .salary. 
Deductions do not increase with age, but only with the increase of 
salary. They will in no sense be an '^assessment," unjustly bui-dening 
the younger employees for the benefit of the older. Instead, they are 
sums set aside as savings in the United States Treasury by each indi- 
vidual employee and to be invested by the Government for his own 
ultimate be*ielit, or that of his family, and with the knowledge that 
under safe and wise management the total will, at the age of 70 years, 
be sufficient to purchase a reasonable annuity. He will in no way con- 
tribute to the retirement of other employees, nor will the savings of 
other employees be diverted to his use. 

A man entering the service, aged 45 years, at $100 per month, would 
have to put aside $6.53 a month in order to accumulate at 4 per cent 
compound interest $3,330, which is the cost of an annuity of $450 a 
year, beginning at age 70. It will be observed that this annuity is 
also 1.5 per cent of his pay for each year of service, the length of 
service in this case having been twenty-five years. 

These illustrations show one advantage of the plan to be its justice 
to the individual, since the annuity that accrues to the benefit of the 
man who gives many years of his life to the Government service is 
proportionally larger than that accumulated by the man who comes in 
at the same salary but too late in life to render long service. 

The plan contemplates two methods of settlement for the employee 
on arrival at the age of retirement. He may convert his savings with 
the increment of interest into one of the following options: 

(1) One cash sum. 

(2) An annuity payable throughout life. 



8UPBSANNUATI0N IK OLASSIFIED CIVIL 8EBVICE. 5 

These options are advisable, because the circumstances of employees 
vary so greatly that a settlement which would be desirable for one 
might not be wise for anothe/. 

It is not merely the employee that remains in the service until he 
reaches the age of retirement who will benefit by this plan. A person 
separated from the service in any manner before that a^ will have to 
his credit a sum of money which he will be free to withdraw. In case 
of his death in the service, the amount of his savings with interest 
will be paid to his estate. 

The argument that *'any retirement scheme which provides for 
refunds is objectionable, because it puts a cash premium upon resigna- 
tion," is predicated upon the theory of the flat assessment of 6 per 
cent, or some such rate, upon all salaries, and has no applicability to 
the plan of accumulated individual savings here described. 

This brings out another advantage to the service under this plan. 
Under present conditions sheer humanity makes civil-seivice rules 
difficult of enforcement in very many cases. It is not only the super- 
annuated who become inefficient. Clerks are sometimes incapacitated 
in one way or another, or are habitually careless. A rigid enforce- 
ment of rules would result in their elimination from the service; but 
more than one chief of division has retained men and women whom 
he would be glad to dismiss, except that he knows they are absolutely 
penniless save for their monthly stipend. 

On the other hand, a provision for retirement would undoubtedly 
be an additional hold on many of the Government's most valuable 
men. There are men of attainment, especially in scientific lines, who 
would like to work for the Government if they could afl'ord to. The 
universities tempt them away, however, not merely with offers of 
larger salaries, but with the promise of some old-age provision. A 
university professor may possibly be a beneficiary of two retirement 
funds, that estahli»hed by the university itself and that founded by 
Mr. Carnegie, whereas a Government official has no such prospect. 

Still another way in which the personnel of the service would 
undoubtedly be improved is through the retirement, under these con- 
ditions, of many employees before the retirement age. They would 
prefer to accept less annuity and be relieved from the cares of office 
at an earlier day, and in many cases the service would be improved by 
their retirement. 

It might not always be desirable to retire employees at the retire- 
ment age. Their s(»rvices might be of great value to the nation and 
they them.selves might be averse to retiring. Take the case of a Gov- 
ernment scientist engaged in research work. As long as he is 3-oung 
enough to carr}' on his experiments satisfactorily he should be per- 
mitted to do so. Therefore the arbitrary retirement of all who have 
reached the retirement age is not contemplated; but provision is made 
for considering the cases of those who may care to remain in the 
service after that age. 

This finishes the first part of the plan and the basis on which 
Government employees will be retired after about fifty years, when 
practically all the employees now in office will have passed away. If 
this were all of the plan, it would be open to criticism as unjust to the 
older employees, who are too advanced in years to provide funds for 
their own retirement. 

If these aged employees are entitled to any assistance at all in con- 
sideration of their past services, or if the service y«\VV Vi^ vox^^qn^Ws^ 



6 SUPERANNUATION IN OLABSIFIED OTTIL BEBVIOB. ■ 

their retiremeot, the Government should provide the fimds for their 
annuities. Proceeding on this premise, a scheme i^ propoaed which 
contemplates the treatment of all employees alike that are now in the 
da^^sitied sarvice, in proportion to tlieir years of service, by giving^ 
every employee, at Government expense, an annuity, on arrival at 
retirement age, equal to 1,5 per cent of the total compenaation he 
received for services prior to the ©naetment of this retirement 
measure, provided he remains in the service until he re^iches that age* 
To illustrate; An employee now 70 yesr?^ of age, who has been in tlie 
Bervioe fifty years, would be entitled to retire at once on an annuity 
equal to 1.5 per cent of hin total compensation during those fifty years 
of service* 
L An employee 40 years of age, who has been in the service fifteen 
r years at the time of the enactment of this plan into law would on 
retirement thirty years hence be entitled to receive an annuity from 
the Government of 1,5 per cent of hi? total compensation for service 
up to the passage of such a law, or 22.5 per cent of his avei*age annual 
salary during that time, plus the amount of his own savings from the 
tiiue the law weot into efl^ect until his retirement, after thirty years, 
at the age of 70. Suppose that this employee receives a salaij of 
$1,200 per annum throughout the whole term of hm service. On retiring 
at the age of 70 he would be entitled to an annuity of $810 for the 
remainder of his life, $^70 from the Government, as 1.6 per cent of 
his total compenaation during the fifteen years he served prior to the 
passage of the retirement law, and $540 as an annuity from his own 
savings; that is, L5 per cent of his salary for every year of servi(^ 
after the passage of the law. The annuity from the Government (the 
$270) would have do cash surrender value. It could be taken only as 
an annuity, never in a lump Rum, and could only be oiitained in case 
the employee remained in tiie service until he reached the retirement 
age* Thr > ]' i^ on the other hand, which represents his own savings, 
plus intt 1 -I. ■. -ndcl he converted into the cash sum necessary to buy 
that annuity ($4,007). He can always, on leaving the service, with- 
draw his own money, but the contribution by the Government for 
services rendered prior to the passage of this act must always be taken 
in the form of an annuity. None of these funds, whether the savings 
of the employee or the contribution of the Government, should be 
subject to attachment or any other legal process. 

The plan provides that the period of service upon which the annuity 
to be paid by the Government is based shall be computed from the 
original employment, whether as a classified or unclassified employee. 
This may include service in one or more departments of the Govern- 
ment and periods of service at different times. 
The question naturally arises, How much will the adoption of this 

f)lan cost the Government? From the time of the passage of such a 
aw all employees would begin to provide for themselves, so that ulti- 
mately the plan would be no expense to the Government beyond the 
payment or salaries to the necessary clerical force to handle the 
accounts. In the meantime, however, the Government would have to 
take care of the old employees as they reach retiring age, for services 
rendered prior to the aooption of the plan, until about fifty years from 
now, when the last one would have been paid off. The sum required 
to do this annually would gradually increase for a few years, reaching 
its maximum about thirty years after passage of the law. From the 
twenty-Sfth to the thirty -second year after the adoption of the plan 



8UPEBANNUATI0N IN CLASSIFIED CIVIL SERVIOB. 7 

the amount each year is about the same. After the thirty-third year 
the amount each year drops ofif very rapidly until in fifty years the 
plan would be self-sustaining and there would be no more need of 
making appropriations for the superannuated. 

In 1904 the Bureau of the Census made a report on the Executive 
Departments, which is the latest authoritative infornoiation that we 
have regarding the personnel of the civil service. It is known as Bul- 
letin 12 and covers the service as of July 1, 1903. In order to ascer- 
tain definitely the maximum amount of money that the Government 
would have to pav during the next fifty years or so if this plan of 
retirement should be adopted, tables based on Bulletin 12 were pre- 
pared for all ages at which people are employed in the classified civil 
service, showing the annuities payable the year of the adoption of the 
plan and each vear thereafter until all present employees are dead and 
their sum total, or what it would cost the Government to put the plan 
in operation and carry it through to completion. They show that the 
maximum cost of this retirement plan to the Government will be as 
follows: 

Maximvm amount of annual appropriation by the Federal Oovemmeni necessary to prO" 
vide a monthly annuity to each person in its classified civil service July i, 1908^ upon 
attaining the retirement age of 70 years {the amount of annuity to he 1.6 per cent o/thi 
employes salary July i, 190S, for each year of service completed prior to that date). 



YeftT. 


AmoQQl of 


Yt^i. 


Amoutit of 


Yeaf. 


UOQ. 


1»07. ♦♦---..... 


•72&,110 ' 
S1U&40 

l,lEft,2S» 
l,157,Wl 
1,25S*725 
J, 8711, 710 
X 466, 434 
1,62«,651 

I,57&,132 
1,5^4,974 
l,fiS0,742 
1,.S34,S3<J 
],A31,^1 
3,5l2,la9 
l,5M,€79 
1,&46.8€0 
1,650,718 

1,571, €82 
1,589,167 
1,617,803 


1930 

1931. .„„,,...^.,,.. 


I.flfi3,98l 
l,69g,S?4 
1,713,036 
l,734,3*i5 
l,734,60a 
l,7:ifi.047 
1,744,.')12 
U7-ia,661 
1,73^974 

ijja,54a 

1,6^4,723 
1,^5,128 

hm,m 

1,492,830 

1,314,000 
1,211,837 

i,ioe,isa 

990,683 

'7T-i,73& 
GEO, 126 
672,770 


19S8.„... 


484,091 


1906k *.,.,., P-^^,,„., 


iSMvJ 


403; aS 


1909..-.-. 


laaa .> *. 


it»5a „„. 


mi,w 


1910 


1933 ^,, 


1966 


269, S80 


1911* 


lyai..... ,. 


1967 


216,044 


1912... 


l^ftfS 


1^^.,.. 

1959 


170.^41 


1918 ...... .........* 


1930... ,....,, 


133,347 


19U. „.„„,_.„.„.. 


1987., 


I9ti0 -„, 


102,450 


19||i „„ ,..„ 




19fll 

1962.„,.,, .,. 


77 S 


I9l# 


m% 


m,4m 


1917^ ^,^ 


i V4U . ........ .. . . ■ I . . 

IIMI................. 


liiea..,, , 


41,884 


1918 ,_„ 


lf»4..,....„..*.^... 


2fl»*7T 


1919,,, ,..,....,. 


1942 


Itfti. 


:m.m 


1930. .,♦.„....,...... 


1943 ...._,*...... 


iy<]a„. ...... ........ 


14,153 


1921 ,.,,.,„ ,. 


1W4..-,. ,,„.,„.... 


1B67 


9,364 


1922 


j&46.,..: .,... 


IfltiS..... ,-., 


6*^71 


11123. „„.,. 


IMS... 


1869... 


%em 


1924... 


1947........ 


l&TO...... 


s!i9a 


lBa& 


IMS...-.,.... 


leTt .... 


1.261 


isaa. 


1&49...... ♦..., 


IW2 


*wi 


ifla7 


19M 


1973 , 


Mi 




I9flt 


1974 


161 


1V89 .„-, 


iflca 













It should not be.forgottcn that this is a maximum cost, and that the 
real cost will probably be greatly less, since many employees who 
enter into this competition will leave the service before reaching the 
age of 70. Compare this maximum cost of considerably less than 
$2,000,000 annually for a terra of forty years with that of anv other 
other plan ever proposed, and it will be seen how little is askea of the 
Government. 

It is interesting to note that one of the valuable features of the plan 
is the array of reliable statistics concerning a large body of represent- 
ative people that will gradually be collected if this retirement plan 
be adopted. In handling the accounts of the employees under this 
plan, records will necessarilv be kept showing the mortality ene- 
rience of the employees in the various branches of the service ana in 
different localities throughout the C9untYy^ t\i^ Ta\j^ oi V\>QcAxv^^ 



8 SUPEEAimUATlON m OLASSIFIED OIVIL 6EHV10E- 

from the claeaified civil service, and mucb Bimilftr informatiDn that 
may be of value and serve as a guide in future valuations and adjust- 
ments of any retirement plan, and in reducing the cost not only to 
the employees but to the Government as well. The records will 
eventually become of great interest to every individual in the United 
States who contemplates taking out a life-insurance policy, for the 
Government expi&rience will prove conclusively whether the rates 
charged by inMirance companies are just and reasonable or the reverse. 
At present it h impossible to mj absolutely. They are usually Inised 
OD a table known as the **Ameriean experieiice table of mortality," 
compiled by the Mutual Life Insurance Company, of New York, 
which was made up from observation of about 60, (MX) selected lives. 
The proposed retirement plan for Government employees will secure 
a record of at least twice as many lives at once and* probably three 
times that number before long, under varied but claM^ified conSitiona. 
The value of such an authoritative record would in itself justify the 
eicpendittire of the moderate sum necessary for the conduct of such 
an office. 

The bill originally drawn was referred to the Nationjil Civil Service 
Eeform League, and has been modiiied in thi,^ draft in several particu- 
lars to conform to suggestions made by its officers. 

In making this draft the subcommittee has l>een favored with the 
advice and coopenitioo of the United States Civil Service Ketirement 
Association, represented^ bv Mr, Pickens Nagle, president of that 
association, ana Mr. S. E* ^aunce, vice-president. 

The subc4)mmittee desires to give full credit to Mr. Herbert D, 
Brown for originating the central idea of the plan, and for a large 
amount of painstaking expert labor in workiBg out the details and 
figures. 

In conclusions we beg leave to say that your committee has taken 
pains not only to study the details of this pfan^ as well as many others, 
but to submit it to the examination of recognized actuaries, Messrs. 
Hiram Messenger and Benedict D. Flynn, of the Travelers' Insurance 
Company, of Hartford, and to have tne necessaiy computations made 
80 that nothing may be left to the imagination. The details have been 
thoroughly worked out and are embodied in the accompanying bill, in 
proper form for submission to Congress. 
Very respectfully^, 

Arthur P. Davis, 

Chairman. 
Chas. Lyman, 

Treamiry Department. 
Bayard Wyman, 

Post- Office Department. 
John W. Holcombe, 

Interior Department. 
A. Zappone, 
Department of Agricultxcre. 
Geo. W. Leadlet, 
Department of Commerce and Lahor. 
G. R. Wales, 
GiviL Service Commission. 

The Committeb on Department Methods. 

[NoTK.—The sigoature of Mr. John C. Scofield, War Department, is lacking on 
Mccoant of his absence from his office^ due to aicknesa.^ 



BUPEBANNUATION IN OLASdlFIED OIVIL 8EBVI0B. 9 

A BILL For the retirunent of employees in the elasifled cItII seryice of the Ooyerament. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled, That, beginine with the first day of July next folio winj^ the 
passage of this act, there shall be deducted and witheld from the monthly bbIsltj, 
pay, or compensation of every officer or employee of the United States to whom this 
act applies an amount that would be sufficient, with interest thereon at four per 
centum per annum, compounded annually, to purchase from the United States, under 
the provisions of this act, an annuity for every such employee, on arrival at the age of 
retirement as hereinafter provided, equal to one and one-half per centum of his annual 
salary, pay, or compensation for every full year of service, or major fraction thereof, 
between the date of the passage of this act and the arrival of the employee at the age 
of retirement. The necessary deduction hereby provided for shall oe based on such 
annuity table as the Secretary of the Treasury may direct, and interest at the rate of 
four per centum per annum, compounded annually. Such deductions shall be varied 
to correspond with any change in the salary of the employee. 

Hec. 2. That the amounts so deducted and withheld from the salary, pay, or com- 
pensation of each employee shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States 
and shall be invested from time to time by the Secretary of the Treasury in State, 
municipal, railroad, or other bonds approved by him. The interest on said bonds 
shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and shall be reinvested in the 
same manner as above described. The earnings shall be annually credited to the 
individual accounts of the employees from whose salary, pay, or compensation the 
deductions have been made, and' the moneys deducted, together with the interes't 
added thereto, shall be held and invested by the Government while the employee 
remains in the service, and after retirement as required for an annuity payment if he 
selects such option as hereinafter provided. 

Sbc. 3. That upon retiring at the age of retirement the employee shall withdraw 
his savings with the increment of interest as herein proviaed, under one of the 
following options: 

Option I. In one sum. 

Option II. In an annuity pavable quarterly throughout life. 

The annuity herein proviaed for shall be based on such mortality tables as the 
Secretary of the Treasury may direct, and interest at the rate of four per centum 
during the first two years of the operation of this act. After the act shall have been 
in operation two years the interest assumed shall be the averajre rate the retirement 
fund shall have been earning during the two years prior to the first of January pre- 
ceding the date of retirement. Upon the death of an annuitant his estate shall be 
paid the proportional part of the current quarterly pavment. 

Sec. 4. That u\K>n absolute separation from the civif service prior to the retirement 
age, and only upon such separation, there shall be paid to the employee or his estate 
the amount of his savings, with the increment of interest credited thereon, in one 
sum: Provided, That any employee who shall voluntarily withdraw from the service 
before the age of forty- five vears shall forfeit the accrueci interest on his savings, and 
only the ainountfl deducted from his salary shall be returned to him. In case of 
death after-reaching the retirement age and before deciding up<)n an option the sav- 
ings with the increment of interest credited thereon shall be paid to the estate of the 
employee. 

Sec. 5. The retirement ape herein referred to shall be sixty years for Group One, 
which shall consist of employees whose duties re<]uire great physical activity; sixty- 
five years for Group Two, which shall consist of employees whose duties require a 
moderate amount of physical ai^tivity; and seventy years for Group Three, which 
shall consist of employees whose duties are mainly intellectual. And the President 
of the United States shall designate the branches of the service to be included in each 
group. 

Sec. 6. Every employee to whom this act applies shall be entitled on reaching the 
retirement age, or, havmg already passtd that ajj:e, to retire from the service under 
the provisions hereinbefore contained, and also in addition to the annuity herein pro- 
vided for by his own contribution from his salary to receive from the Ignited States, 
during the remainder of his life, an annuity equal to one and one-half per centum of 
his total comjKjnsation during service prior to the taking effect of this act, and the 
Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized and directed to pay such annuity 
(juarterly upon certification of the retirement of such employee by the proper appoint- 
ing officer under whom he last served: Prondfd, That after* having serveo the United 
States twenty years an employee may be retired by the proper appointing officer by 
reason of disiability not due to vicious habits, or by rea-on of exigencies of service but 
without fault or delinquency on his part, or on his own application after forty years* 
service, and upon such retirement shall be entitled to the benefits of this act 



10 SIIPEBAKKUATION tN OLASSiriED OtVlL 8EBV10B, ^ 

Bmx 7. The provi&iftns of this act ehall apply only to tho dasalfied civil service^ 
which m hereby delink to include^ all officers and employees in the executive civil 
Bervice of the buitecl States, except pereonB appointed by the Pr^ident and contim^ed 
by the Senatej and mere unakillea laborers. No person serving in a position excepted 
from examination or regihtmtion asdetioed in the civil -service mleeabail be included 
within the provisions of thia act unless be has served in a comfjetitive portion lor at 
lesfit one year. Whenever aoy person iieeomes separated frona the classified eerdoe 
by reason of appointment In the uncla^aiBed eervi(^i such separation ^hall not operate 
to take him out of the provisioni of thia act The Prejitlejit shall have power, in hia 
discretion, to exclude from the operations of this act any ;? roups of employeea whose 
tenure of office is necessarily intermittent or of uncertain duration. 

Hbc S, The perirni of service niton which the annuity to be fmid by the TTnited 
States is based shall be ctimpute^l from original employment, whether m a daaslied 
or unctaasitied employee, and shall include perio<l9 of eervii^e at different times and 
service in one or more departmenta, branches, or independent othces of th© Ooverfi^ 
ment, the 8i^al Corps pnor to July first, eighteen hundred and ninetv-one, and the 
General Service in or under the War Department prior to May sixth, eighteen hundred 
And ninety-six*. 

Sbc. 9, The Secretary of the Treasury shall prepare and teen all needful tabletj 
records^ an d accou n is req ai red fo r carryings on t th e pro viai ona of thia act The reeordi 
to be kept shall include data, showing the mortality of the ecnployees in the various 
branches of the service and indifferent locaJitiea throuj^hout the country', and the rate 
of withdrawal from the clasisiJied service, and any other information tl^at may b© of 
vatue and may serve as a guide for future valuations and adjustments of the plan for 
the retirement of 6nit>loy6eB. 

Sbc. 10. \Vithin thirty days before the amval of an employee at the ngQ of retire- 
ment the proper appointing officer shall certify to the Secretary of the Treasu^ 
repirding the efficiency of such employee, with a statement wnether the (»ul>lio 
interest requiree hia continuance in the service or h La retirement, and such certLficate 
and statement shall be conclusive. If he certifies that by reason of the efficiency of 
any employee who has reached the retirement age, and is w^illing to remain in the 
service, his con tin nance therein would be advantjigeous to the public service, such 
employee may be retaine^l for a term not excec^ling two yearsi and at the end of the 
two years he may by aimilar certificatiou l>e continued for an additional term of two 
yearm, and so on. Upoa the failure of the proper appomting officer to make tbe 
ab*>ve-d^exibed certibcato, it stmU be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to 
place Bach employee up-m the retired lij^t in at^cordance with ttie provisions of this act. 

Sac. 11. None of the tnojioys mentioned in ibis act riliall be assignable either in 
law or equity or be subject to execution or levy by attachment^ gaxniabjnentj or 
other legal process. 

Sec. 12. For the clerical and other service and all other expenses necessary in car- 
rying out the provisions of this act, during the fiscal year nineteen hundred and 
nine, including salaries and rent in the city of Washington, there is hereby appro- 
priated the sum of fifty thousand dollars; and also the amounts necessary for the 
annuities to be paid by the United States, under section six of this act, from year to 
year are hereby appropriated ont of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise 
appropriated, to be available until expended. 

Sec. 13. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized to perform or cause to 
be performed any and all acts, and to make such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary and proper, for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this act into foil 
force ana effect 



60th Congress, ) SENATE. (Document 

M Session. ) \ No. 326. 



DISTKICT SUPEKINTENDENTS IN LIFE-SAVING 

SEKVICE. 



Mr. Fryb presented the following 

STATEMENT OF THE GENEBAL SXTPEBINTENDENT OF THE LIFE- 
SAVING SEBVICE RELATIVE TO DISTKICT SUPEKINTENDENTS 
IN SAID SEBVICE. 



Febbuaby 26, 1908.— Ordered to be printed. 



STATEMENT OF THE GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT OF THE LIFE- 
SAVING SERVICE RELATIVE TO DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENTS 
IN SAID SERVICE. 



The Life-Saving Service is divided into thirteen districts, each of 
which is under the immediate supervision of a district superintendent. 

The first district embraces the coasts of Maine and New Hamp- 
shire, in which there are fourteen stations, located at exposed points, 
widely separated as a rule, along a stretch 255 miles in extent in a 
direct line along the coast, although following the indentations the 
distance is more than doubled. During the winter and the inclement 
portion of the year the coast is bleak and frigid and exposed to severe 
snowstorms, and the superintendent in making the quarterly trips 
which are required of him encounters great discomforts from the lack 
of traveling facilities, there being no railroads along the coast line, ex- 
cept for a very short distance, and is subjected to great hardships and 
exposure, for the most part having to make his way by private con- 
veyance and frequently through the fiercest snowstorms. These trips 
necessarily consume consideraole time. 

The first superintendent of this district was Capt. John M. Rich- 
ardson, who, previous to his appointment, was an experienced ship- 
master. He was appointed when the Service was first extended to 
that coast in 1874. He served until his death at a hotel while making 
one of his official trips, his period of service covering nearly twenty- 
two years. Dr. Charles W. Bray, of Portland, his family physician, 
says in an affidavit: 

He was in good health, apparently, until the latter part of 1895. I then 
noticed that he was quite nervous and was looking tired and careworn. I In- 
quired into his condition and found, as I anticipated, that he was overworked 
both physically and mentally. He seemed to be perfectly infatuated with his 
work, and his sole thought and interest appeared to be to bring his section of 
the Life-Saving Service up to his idea of a high standard. Notwithstanding 
an that I said to him concerning the care of his healthy he continued worklni^ 



S BUPERINTENDENTS IN LIFE-SAVIKO SERVICE, | 

very bard, Diirlag the winter and sprlag of 1896 It was very evident that bl« 

work was rapidly undermining lil^ beoUli, 1 saw him May 25- At thiK date be 
was Quite po<:Jrly, and I feit confident tbat he was nuflt to attend to his diitlee. 
Under treatment he fmiiroved for a few days and tJien Insisted tJiat it was tU 
dntj' to yjsit the statlone at once* and h% left borne Jime 1 and died June 13* 
after vlsittng a few stationa. His devotion to his work and what lie belteved 
to be bis duty caused blni to break down both phj-sically and raec tally, and, in 
my opinion, thiB was tlie direct cause of bis deatb. 

The loss of this supermtendent's life was as certainly due to the 
labors and hardships incident to his duty bm if he had perished in an 
attempted rescue of the shipwrecked. 

His successor was Capt, Silas H, Harding, the present incumbent. 
Captain Harding was promoted from the position of keeper of the 
Jerrys Point life-saving statiou- which he had held nine years, during 
which time he led his crew in many enterprises for the rescue of 
imperiled life and propi^rty, some of which were distinguished for the 
fertility of expedients displayed by the keeper and for valorous deeds 
performed by himself and crew. For their splendid heroism in one 
instance— the occasion of the wreck of the schooner OUoer Dyer^ on 
Kovember 26, 1888— the k&eper and his entire crew were rewarded 
with the gold medal of honor. One man of the vessel's crew was lost, 
being washed away by the sea from the main rigging, 40 feet above 
the deck of the vessel* It was only by the mos^t extraordinary sMU 
and heroism on the part of the life-saving men that the remaining 
four were saved. The officer who investigated the circumstances of 
the loss of life in this case closes his report as follows : 

Thufl have 1 recounted the details of this disaster and told of the nervtee ren- 
dered by the Jerrys Point life-savJng crew* Within thirty minuter from the 
BtrandlQg the four mirvirors were safe at the station and cared for* That the 
afth man of tbe Dyer's crew was lost was owing to no fault of the Ufe-savlng 
creWt but solely due to a power that b»man endeavor could not ntn^ nor mortal 
man combat It \a not often that IJfo-snvin^' crews are called iifKin to perform 
lervlce under such circumstances aseoTlroned this esse* but ti (Hi\m] 

to the emergency, and under the able leadership of Keeper Harding performed 
prodigies of heroism seldom equaled. Every man In this crew came within an 
ace of losing his life, from the keeper down, so that while they were doing their 
utmost to save the crew of the wreck, they were in turn saving the lives of each 
other. Harding was washed from the rock and saved by Randall ; Amazeen and 
Randall were washed from the ledge and dragged almost lifeless from the seeth- 
ing smother; all hands were tumbled from the rock by the merciless breakers 
and rescued each other. Every time they went to that sea-combed rock upon 
their errand of mercy it was a forlorn hope, but they led it and conquered. 

The second district embraces the coast of Massachusetts. That 
portion of the coast upon which life-saving stations are located is 
much less extended than that of the first district and the stations are 
much easier of access on account of increased traveling facilities. 
The amount of commerce passing this coast, however, is much greater 
and the dangers to which it is exposed more numerous. The number 
of stations in the district is 32. 

The district was until June, 1904, presided over by Capt. Benjamin 
C. Sparrow, he having been appointed upon the organization of the 
district in 1872. He was a thorough beacnman, and no man on Cape 
Cod was more familiar with the snores of that dangerous projection 
than he, a fact to which he probably owes his life. He resided in 
East Orleans, near the shore, and I believe that no wreck occurred 
during the thirty years of his incumbency within a distance which 
would admit of his reaching it that he did not attend. At such 
tixDes his skill and advice have been of the greatest value. On some 



SUPERINTENDENTS IN LIFE-SAVING SERVICE. 8 

of these occasions he endured the severest hardship's, and in one in- 
stance nearly lost his eyesight and barely escaped with his life. 

This was at the wreck of the Calvin B. Orcutt^ on December 28, 
1896, which occurred some 7 miles south of his residence and between 
the towns of Chatham and Orleans. At 11 o'clock in the night he 
was awakened by some one calling him out of doors, whom he found 
to be a merchant from the town some 2 miles distant, who informed 
him that a telegram had been received at the Orleans office about 4 
o'clodt p. m. addressed to the Orleans life-saving station, stating that 
a four-masted schooner was in distress which could not be reached 
by the Chatham crew, and that the storm was so fierce that no one 
could be found willing to undertake to carry the dispatch either to 
the Orleans station or to the superintendent's office. He, the mer- 
chant, Henry K. Cummings, however, had finally determined to 
undertake the journey, which he accomplished by the aid of a lantern 
during one of the severest of New England snowstorms, driven by a 
heavy wind, over a road covered with snow and through drifts waist 
deep. 

Superintendent Sparrow at once telephoned to the keeper of the 
Orleans station, who without delay made preparations and started 
for the wreck. The superintendent immediately dressed himself and 
set out for the scene, calling on his way upon several of his neighbors, 
where there were five or six able-bodied men, whose assistance he 
hoped to obtain. He did not stop for them, however, but proceeded 
alone through the drifted snow toward the life-saving station. Upon 
arrival there at 1 o'clock a. m. he found the crew had gone. He 
waited some twenty minutes, hoping that the younger men whom he 
had notified of the disaster would overtake him. It appears, how- 
ever, that none of them deemed it prudent to turn out. Had a boat's 
crew arrived from the people he had called it was his design to pro- 
ceed in one of the station boats down the inside waters to a point 
near where the wreck was supposed to be, but none appearing, and un- 
willing to wait longer, he struck out through the marsh on the inside 
of the beach. In his statement he says : 

Here the storm again broke out with renewed violence, and I stopped a few 
minutes for observation, in order to determine the extent of my vision. I was 
completely enshrouded by an impenetrable mist of driven snow, so thick as to 
interfere with respiration, through which I do not think I could have distin- 
guished a person 20 feet distant. The situation was thoroughly bewildering, 
and but for a perfect knowledge of every foot of ground about nie I would have 
easily lost my way. The snow filled the meadow grass to a depth half to one's 
knees. The lower portion had absorbed the salt of the marsh and become wet 
and clinging. I proceeded thus until the tide overflowed the entire depth of 
snow and rendered travel so difficult that I turned toward the outside of the 
beach, and found that a slight ebb of the tide there rendered it possible to walk 
below the beach cliff by closely watching the waves and scrambling up the face 
of the sand banks on '* all fours " when the heavier surfs ran up. 

After continuing on his journey a while he climbed the bank for 
better observation, as the snow had in a measure ceased to fall. He 
says: 

I consulted my watch in the uncertain light and decided that it was 3 
o'clock a. m. (December 24). I was just proceeding southward again when I 
saw the glare of a torch on the shore in that direction until it grew dim, and 
another was lighted. The second torch still looked far distant, and I was 
speedily surprised to see the full form of a man paiss between me and it. Just 
at this time I discovered offshore from the torch the four masts of the stranded 
vessel. 



i iUPEBlKTEFDBirre TSf LlFE-QAVraa SEEFIOB. 

He then took charge of tte operations of the life-saving creiv *t 
the wreck, during which they disco vered that there was rirj one on 
board the vessel- As to what became of the vesael^s crew different 
theories exist. Some think they were lost in an attempt to leave the 
Tessel in tlieir own boats ; others that they were swept overboard be- 
fore the vessel came ashore, where she struck bottom at low water, 
pounded out her bottom, and filled with watar. 

The investigating officer says : 

How and when the erew lost thdr lives wiU probably never be known. The 
theory of Capt Benjamin Mai low es^ tinder writer's agent, appeara very prahn- 
ble. He tliliibs the echooner ancliored rigttt on top of tbe y^treme end of tUe 
nortii bar, and at low water, abf>ut 8 o'clock, she pouuded bottom and ftlled 
wltb wnten Then the hatches wusliod away^ and the Inside of the CJibIn, nlso 
the boat, and tLat the erew were washed overboard tben and drowned. If the 
crew had been od bonrd, alive or dead, at the final brealsop of the hull fiome ol 
their iHidies ought to have come on shore with tiio wrecknge. 

Although the life-savera patrolled their beaches faithfully for up- 
ward of a week in search of the bodies none were found in that 
vicinity. 

The superintendent started for home at 4»40j reaching the Orleans 
station at 7.15 and his own house at 9.30, much exhausted and his 
vision so seriously impaired that all objects were dim and indistinctp 
The distance he traveled that night under such terrible conditions was 
upward of 14 mUeSj not taking into accountj as he expressed it, " the 
various zigzags to and fro*'' 

The investigating officer, speaking of the journey of the superin- 
tendent from nis home to the wreck, says; 

It appears almost Incredible that h% made that Joarney of 7 mOea Iq the bUnd- 
Ing enow a J one and iw3ald*.*d, and can only bo accounted for by tiie tact that he 
was thoroo^'hly acqnainted wUJa overy titt of the ground ti'a versed and that the 
wLnd was behind him* As it waa, the journey about need blm up, and whaa 1 

8a w him he was stiU suffering severely from Its effects. 

Captain Sparrow never recovered from the effects of that night's 
work. He came near losing his eyesight and his vision is still very 
seriouslv impaired, while his general health was irrecoverably under- 
mined by the exposure. He also gi-adually lost his mind until, in 
June, 1904^ it became necessary to relieve him from the duties of dis- 
trict supermtendent. His loss of mind and consequent removal from 
the Service is attributed to that night's suffering. 

His successor, Capt. George W. Bowley, served as a surfman 
nearly ten years and as a keeper nearly four years, during which 
time he rendered brave service on numerous occasions of shipwreck. 

The third district is under the superintendence of Capt. Herbert M. 
Knowles. This district embraces the coast of Rhode Island, includ- 
ing Block Island, some 15 miles off the coast, and Fishers Island, New 
York, in Long Island Sound. The extent of coast is comparatively 
small, but is very dangerous. Most of the stations are difficult of ac- 
cess, and in the rigorous weather of the active season the trips to the 
islands which the superintendent is required to make are imcomfort- 
able and sometimes hazardous. 

Captain Knowles entered the Service originally as a surfman in 
the Point Judith life-saving station, from which position he was pro- 
moted, after several years service, to that of keeper of his station 
in 1878 ; then to the position of assistant superintendent of the then 
third district, of whicn the present third district was formerly a part. 




I 



SUPERINTENDENTS IN LIFE-SAVING SERVICE 5 

and, finally, to his present position when the new district was formed 
in 1900. Altogether he has been in the Service some twentjr-eight 
years. As surfman and keeper he has seen much perilous service. 

In 1885 he and the crew which he led were for three days given 
up as lost. They had started out on Christmas day, in the midst of 
a furious gale, to make a hazardous trip to two wrecked vessels in the 
ofling several miles from shore. In attempting to return they tugged 
for half an hour at the oars against wind and sea without gaining 
anything, but, in fact, steadily losing ground. The station being 
miles away to windward, it was impossible to return to it, and their 
only hope of safety lay in attempting to reach Block Island, some 8 
or 10 miles out to sea. It was a perilous undertaking, but after many 
hairbreadth escapes they finally succeeded in making the island. As 
the gale continued, reaching at times a velocity of 60 or 70 miles an 
hour, they were compelled to remain on the island. In the meantime, 
with the telegraphic cable between the island and the mainland 
out of order and not working* the gravest fears were entertained on 
shore for the station crew's safety, it being generally supposed that 
they were lost. 

The assistant superintendent of the district who, by law, at that 
time performed the duties of district superintendent, Capt. John 
Waters, of Newport, sharing in the general anxiety and stimulated 
by the grief of the despairmg families of his men, determined to 
ascertain their fate if he could charter a vessel for the purpose. He 
finally secured a small schooner, the Mystery^ of 10 tons, the only 
vessel he could get, and on December 27 set out in quest of them, 
although the gale showed no signs of abatement. He reached the 
island after an exceedingly rough passage, where he was gratified to 
find the statipn crew. 13eing anxious to report their safety and 
return them to their station, he engaged for the trip back a larger 
vessel, the Arabella^ of 17 tons, the party starting with the surfboat 
in tow at half past 11 o'clock, the gale being still ahead. They had 
scarcelj^ started when the schooner's bobstay parted and she was well- 
nigh crippled. 

With much difficulty, however, the bowsprit was secured by attach- 
ing to it stout tackles led through the hawse pipes, and the little craft 
kept rallantly on. She was knocked on her beam ends several times, 
and all parts of her out of water were literally covered witlj ice, but 
the men stuck to it, and after a perilous trip reached Newport in 
safety at about 6 o'clock in the evening, where they were given a 
heartj^ reception. Their great gallantry elicited universal applause. 

I will omit for the present the fourth and fifth districts and pass 
to the sixth, which comprises the coasts of Delaware, Maryland, and 
Virginia from Cape Ilenlopen to Cape diaries, inclusive, an ex- 
tremely dangerous stretch of seaboard with outlying shoals which 
have been the scene of many pitiful wrecks and heroic rescues. 
There are at present 18 stations located on that coast. The district 
was organized in 1875, at which time Capt. Benjamin S. Rich was 
appointed district superintendent. He was a surfman with a record, 
having begun the life of a seafarer at 9 years of age on the coast of 
Cape Cod, where he was born and where he often participated in 
rescue work at shipwrecks under the direction of his father, who had 
charge of a lifeboat station established by the Massachusetts Humane 
Society. 



6 SUFKRlHTEJSfDBNTS IK L1FE-9AVING SEHVIOII. 

For their heroism in saving the lives of 21 persons at the wreck of 

the ship Franklin in 1849^ both father and son were awarded medals 
of honor by the society. The son settled in Virginia in 1857, and 
when the Life- Saving Service was extended to that coast he was 
cl)asen as the proper man to take charge of it He died in hospital 
at Bitltimore, June %% 1901, his deathoeinf]? the rcsnlt of an injury 
received while engaged in making a quarterly tour of his district in 
181^6. He wae thrown frfim a road cart— a two-wheeled skeleton 
affair on the plan of a sulky, with a wide seat, to which was har- 
nensed a ha If -wild horse— tiiis being the only means of conveyance 
obtainable at that time- He was on his way from the Popes Island 
station to the Assateague Beach station, accompanied by the keeper 
of the former station, a distance of 12 miles, when the norse became 
suddenly frightened, shied, and started off on a run, throwing the 
superintendent out of the vehicle j while the keeper, after falling 
partly out^ regained his portion, although he was badly wounded 
in the hand. 

The superintendent fell in a strange, ungainly position, striking 
the lower end of hi^ spine and thi^h on the hard strand, sustaining 
injuries that coutiiied him to his bed for some time, and whidi licces- 
sitated an operation in the hospital soon afterwards* The operation 
was succesj^rul to the extent of giving him partial relief, but the sur- 
geon stated at the time that another operation would be necessary in 
two or three ^rears, a prediction which proved true. A second opera- 
tion became imperatively necessary, from the effects of which he 
diedj as above stated. 

His administration as superintendent was a remarkably successful 
one. During his incumbency there were more than 800 disasters in 
his district, involving the livas of 6^292 persons, of whom only 45 
were lost, while of $12,104,157 of property imperiled $8,588,876 was 
saved, 

Cuptain Rich made it a point to be present at every shipwreck in 
his district whenever it was possible, and his presence always inspired 
his devoted crews with confidence and enthusiasm and sometimes, 
without doubt, led to success where otherwise there would have been 
failure. I will mention one case: 

On the night of February 22, 1892, the Spanish steamship San 
Albano went ashore on the outer shoals of Hog Island, some 5 miles 
distant from the Hog Island life-saving station. The steamer's light 
was discovered by the patrolman about half past 4 on the morning 
of the 23d. Being so far offshore, the patrolman thought the vessel 
was simply passing too near the shore for safety and burned his 
Coston signal. The steamer's light disappeared soon afterwards, 
and the patrolman concluded that his warning had been effective and 
that the vessel had gone on her way in safety. 

Upon arriving at his station at the end of his patrol at sunrise he 
reported his action to the keeper, who ascended the lookout and 
sweeping the horizon with his glass discerned the mast and smoke- 
stack of the vessel. The weather was misty and a northeast gale 
prevailed, which carried the tide over the marshes of the land and was 
swept in swift currents to the southward. Against this storm the 
life-saving crew worked their way up the coast with the beach appa- 
ratus, arriving abreast of the stranded ship at 9 o'clock, after two 
hours of laborious exertion. They at once began operations for the 
rescue of the crew, but the vessel was so far from the shore and the 



SUPERINTENDENTS IN LIFE-SAVING SERVICE. 7 

conditions were so adverse that, although they tried every resource 
with beach apparatus and boat, at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 
24th they had been unable to ett'oct communication with the vessel. 

In the meantime the superintendent, who lived some 35 miles dis- 
tant, had heard of the disaster and put in an appearance, lie at 
once assumed direction of I lie work, and by an ingenious expedient 
the rescue of all on board was etfected. He caused the gun to be 
lashed upon the a])paratus cart, while the shot-line box was secured 
on the forward axle of the boat carriage. The cart was pushed into 
the water as far as possible, the men following the receding surf, 
wading waist deep, and at the right moment the gun, heavily loaded 
for this final trial, was discharged. There was a moment of breath- 
less suspense, but the result justified the most hopeful anticipations 
of the life savers, for the shot landed just over the rail, fairly fall- 
ing on the ship's deck. This gave the desired communication and 
brought salvation to the shipwrecked. The keeper and members 
of the crew subsequently received the thanks of the Spanish Govern- 
ment, with a medal of honor and a diploma for each. The superin- 
tendent's expedient had proved the turning point upon which hinged 
the success of the entire operations. 

Captain Rich was succeeded by his son, Capt. Newell B. Rich, the 
present incumbent. He originally enlisted at the Wachapreague 
station as a surfman, in 1882, and was promoted to the keepership 
of Parramore Beach station in 1884, which position he resigned in 
1891. He subsequently enlisted again as surfman at Wallops Beach 
station, in 1895, and was promoted to keeper of Assateague Beach 
station in 189G. As keeper of the two vStations he made the remark- 
able record of officiating at 54 disasters to vessels without the loss of 
a single life. 

Time will not permit me to narrate the details of the incidents 
which I shall mention in connection with the experiences of the 
superintendents of the other districts, althou/Grh could I do so they 
would prove fully as interesting as those given in the preceding 
instances; and in some cases more tragic and pathetic, while always 
attesting the loftiest self-sacrifice and devotion. 

On November 25, 1877, Capt. John J. Guthrie, of the seventh dis- 
trict, was drowned by the pitch-poling of a surfboat Avhile proceed- 
ing to the wreck of the ill-flited U. S. 8. Huron, The history of that 
catastrophe and the shock which convulsed the nation are well re- 
membered by everyone who was at the time old enough to remember 
anything. The widow and children of Captain Guthrie were granted 
a pension at the rate provided for a deceased captain of the Navy by 
the act of May 25, 1878. 

On February 15, 1893, Capt. Joseph AV. Etheridge, superintendent 
of the same district (sevonlh). died from pneumonia contracted while 
making a tour of his district under the requirements of the regulations 
of the Service. The coast of which he had charge was an extremely 
wild and desolate one, to traverse Avhich, especially in winter, involved 
great privation and hardships. I think in this case I must take time 
to quote from an affidavit made by Joseph Gaskill, the keeper of the 
Ca])e Lookout station, who was accompanying him from the Ocracoke 
to the Cape Lookout station. He says: 

On or about the 20tb day of January, 1803, I made harbor at Ocracoke, N. O., 
where I met Capt. J. W. Etheridf;o, superintondoiit of the sixth (North CaroUna) 
live-saving district, on his way south, paying ofiC [and inspecting] the crews of 
S D-60-1— Vol 82 16 



8 BITPERINTENDEJITS IN LIFE-SAVUSTQ 8ERTICB, 

tbe several etatlonfi of hla aiBtrlet HETtug gotten that fv and flndlDg tlie~ 
weather so severe, and there being so much ice he could sot proceed^ beJng 
iiitable to procure a tK>at Betng anxious to proceed he hired me to attempt to 
take htm to Newbem, >', C, In niy scboooer. We tried, and got a short distance 
through the Ice, and were blocked* We then drifted back with the tide* I pur- 
ebaaed a pony and ro»d cart, taking pony and cart in boat across Ocracoke 
Inlet, the Ice In the Inlet being broken by the current We landed at Ports- 
mouth, N, Cv, on the afternoon of January 23, and made a start on tbe beach for 
Cape Lookout statlos. We corered 10 miles of our Journey that afternoon. 
Before night we stopped at the only dwelling on the route of 46 miles, took 
dinner, and then prepared to make a Btart Our borse got away from us, with 
cart attached- 

We ©ecu red tbe horie, bat the cart was brokeB and we could not use It 
further. Our horee was al&o m much disabled that we were compelled to re- 
main over night We then tried to procure a boat to croea over to the mainland^ 
hot it was ImpoBsLble to cross, the sound being fro^iL Falling in th^s, we 
hitched our horse to an ox cart and proceeded, one walktug while the other 
rode, the weather being so severe it waa necessary for us to exercise to prevent 
freezing* Night overtook «s abont 10 miles from Cape Lookout, and we were 
compelled to stop at a deserted flah camp on the beach. Having no wood, we 
had to tear the side from the camp for firewood. Tbe camp bad no floor. We 
built a fire on the dirt and cut rushes to protect us from the froten ground* 
We bad one blanket, which Captain Etheridge covered with, while I kept up 
the fire tbe best I could. 

Captain Etberldge» being veiy tired and worn out from exposure, dropped to 
Bleep about 8 o'clock. At 9.40 tbe (^ptatn awoke and asked the time. Wben ba 
learned that it was so early he complained that he was sick and that we roust 
more, declaring that he would not live until daylight if compelled to stay where 
we then were. Soon after he had a chill, followed by a severe headache and 
feFer. However, It was compulsory for ue to remain, there beLog no other place 
of refuge which we could reach* When morntng came we started for the 
station and arrived there about IQ a. m., being compelled to walk a distance of 
10 miles, as our horse was worn out and imable to puU either of us. Wben we 
reacbed the station Cajitain Etheridge was exhausted. At the station we were 
supplied with food and then taken in a cart to a small settlement on the banks 
near Beaufort, N. C, Tbere we procured a boat and arrived at Beaufort on the 
2&th day of January, at 5 o'clock p. m. 

Captain Etheridge continued sick all the way over from the station, and died 
In a very few days after his arrival home. 

Capt. Hiram B. Shaw is superintendent of the eighth life-saving 
district, which position he has neld since 1889. His district contains 
an extensive coast line, reaching from the northern boundary of South 
Carolina to Kev West, Fla., a distance of about 800 miles. On ac- 
count of the mildness of the climate, however, the nature of the coast, 
and the comparatively small amount of shipping which passes in 
proximity to the shores, serious shipwrecks are rare and are uncom- 
plicated with the severe conditions which usually accompany such 
disasters north of the South Carolina line. But few stations are, 
therefore, located in the district, being only nine in number, and these 
chiefly houses of refuge. Consequentlyj all in all, it is the least im- 
portant district in the Service. Yet it is necessary that the superin- 
tendent should make his stated tours of the stations, a portion of 
which has to be made under conditions involving hardships and dan- 
ger. As chief officer of the district he is looked upon as the person 
responsible for the efficiency of that portion of the Service under his 
charge. 

On one occasion a serious wreck occurred near Ormond, Fla., when 
the schooner Nathan F. Cobb went ashore on December 5, 1896. 
There was no station within many miles of the place, but Captain 
Shaw resided in the town and was looked to as the proper person to 
take charge of an attempt at rescue. An independent attempt, how- 



SUPERINTENDENTS IN LIFE-SAVING 8ERVI0E. 9 

ever, was made by a couple of brave men to carry a line to the 
stranded vessel. The sea and surf were violent, and the weather was 
severely cold for that climate. The wreck had been ashore for some 
time and was rapidly pounding to pieces. Shaw had no boat, nor 
could any be obtained by him, except a small one, which was in bad 
order and needed some repairs and cleaning from barnacles. This 
he borrowed. "While he was engaged in repairing it the two brave 
men before spoken of had found another and better boat*, and shot 
out with a line toward the stranded vessel. They had not gone far 
when the boat capsized and one of them was drowned. Shaw saw 
the drowning man as he went down with his hand uplifted as if 
calling for help. 

The superintendent had previously asked Capt. Edward De Courcy 
to accompany him in an enort to rescue the vessel's crew, and he had 
agreed to do so. The two men stripped themselves, jmnped into the 
boat, unsuitable as it was, and started out, taking with them a long 
line. Having seen the fate of the other two, they expected to be cap- 
sized, and their plan was to then swim for the vessel with the line. 
They reached the remaining man upon the capsized boat just in time 
to seize him and get him into their own boat alive. They then pur- 
sued their way, and fortunately succeeded in getting a line from the 
vessel, which they brought ashore, by means of which, using an ex- 
pedient which the superintendent had been taught when he entered 
the Service, they succeeded in rescuing the vessel's crew. It was a 
desperate undertaking, and his daring on that occasion, in which 
every one on shore expected he and his comrade would perish, was 
warmly applauded throughout that section of the country. 

Capt. William A. Hutching, of Galveston, has for many years 
been superintendent of the ninth life-saving district, which com- 
prises the Gulf coast, from Key West to the Rio Grande River, a 
distance of about 1,400 miles, although with one exception the stations 
are located entirely upon the coast of Texas, which is subject to 
destructive storms and hurricanes, from which the remainder of the 
Gulf coast is comparatively immime. He has been a most efficient 
officer and has on several occasions taken the leading part in rescue 
work in his district. 

His services in July, 1899, when the whole country was made 
aware of impending disaster in the vicinity of the Brazos River, 
which had overflown its banks and threatened to cause an immense 
loss of property and probably of human life, was particularly con- 
spicuous. Without going into the most interesting details of his 
efforts on this occasion, which would consume much time, let it 
suffice to say that he organized and led an expedition of four boat 
crews who were out five days engaged in rescuing people from high 
knolls on which they had gathered and from the upper chambers and 
roofs of houses nearly submerged and conveying tnem to places of 
safety, and subsequently carrying them supplies of food, which had 
been provided by subscription and stored at designated depots. Cap- 
tain Hutchings completed his very exhaustive report of this enter- 
prise in the following words : 

The work was laborious in the extreme, either rowing under the burning 
heat of the July sun or when not exposed to its debilitating influence, cutting 
and breaking the way for the boats from one stretch of open water to another, 
ttirough thick vines and branches of trees and poisonous shrubs, often encoun- 



10 SrrPKRTWTITPmENTS TH LIFE-BATING 8KBVICE, 

tering reptili^R wbl*:b liail fouiul t"<ifui^> iiliove the wiitor&. The opemtSons cov- 
ered mme IfiO tiillea^ ovor n ctmntry totaJly d^vaatated by the greatest over- 
flow the Si>utiiwt*^t has €*^tT knowir, Thow^inJ^ of r**'0!-1*? wt»i-e renderM 
homi^Jcfti*, ttttti lilt* tTiJim of tht* ridioBt m?ctU«i i>f this gvmi smte w **!■*? mostly 
_4f*wl roy*xl* fpmplrtf: n'ltisw t>f inilUmi* of rtfiUurs* By a syxirTimiU? mt*thfMl of 
Vperfoniilwg tlie labors aasiiini>d. ftnU by tlogK*^ perHlBtenee^ Uje Ufe-8aver» were 

It fihoiild l>e rejiinrkcd thi*t this enttirprise was not without its 
Jan^^erH, ^Tbc men oftuntitne^ lind to |Jtill against fitronir currents, 
id tlmir bnats w«ri* liable ti) ptMK'tiir** by coming in contat't with 
ierge<l obi^feructioiis iiiid of Ibeiiig dashed against trees »nd ide- 
ograph T>o!«*s by swift cun*ents. In liict, one of the crew^ came near 
ht^iKg (irowiied from the Miiviiig of n iiolc in the bilge of the boat by 
ru subfuDrgtid obHtiH*]**^ the boats not being in company* but widely 
wepiirjiti^, luid minble to roiiflpr flR^i.sLanc4* to <?ach other. In the 
wnstanco reft^red to* the boat was siived only by skitlfid riuinagf*ia«nt 
'The r*^si"iierj^ weiv abo exposed to the liability of contracting danger- 
ous f*WiTS. 

In the eknx»nth district, covering the jVjiiericmn shores of Lakoa 
IIui*on and Superior, Snpt, Jo?ef>h Sawder was drowned on Lake 
Huron off Rogers City while luakiog a tour of his di^trictT on Octo- 
ber 20, 1880* The only means of conveyance over that portion of his 
district was a sailboat belonging to the keeper of one of the ^jitiotis, 
fThe keeper who accompanied him wns also drowned. 

His successor was Capt* Jerome G* Kiah, the pre^nt incumbent 
Captain Kiah originally entered the Servic>e as keeper of the Foitite 
aux Barques life-saving station, and upon the death of Captain 
Sawyer waj^ promoted to district superintendent On April 23, IBSO. 
Captain Kiah barely escaped drmvrnng, brdng the only survivor or 
|l»*s crew of which fie was keeper, the otJieni having lost thdr lives 
from the lifeljoat which was capsized in an attempt to go to the relief 
of a vassel in distre^. Captain Kiali reached the shore in an un- 
cr^n^cioug condition, where he was found by his neiglibors, bhick in 
the face, unrecogiiizahle and hc^reft of his reason. The sad details 
of this event are of the most pathetic nature. 

Superintendent S'lwyor and several of the lost station crew left 
widows and siuall chihh'en behind them to whom the Government 
has never given any assistance. 

In the twelfth district, covering the sliores of Lake Michigan, Capt. 
Nathan Kobhins, superinteiuk^nt from April, 1S^2, to the date of his 
death, August 2. 181J8, k)st his life from overexeriion on his last tour 
of inspection. lie arrived at Plum Island late in the previous day, 
after a hard day's work, and while examining into the conditions of 
the station affairs he found reason to mistrust tliat the patrol of the 
island had not been faitlifully kept throughout its entire course, and 
to satisfy himself followed the sliores of the island over an exceed- 
ingly rough pathway, ()l)structed with crags, fallen trees, and under- 
brush, in pursuit of evidence as to his susi)icion. Tlie journey was 
exceedingly difficult and toilsome, and when completed Captain bob- 
bins was nnich exhausted. During the night he suffered severely, 
and died early the next morning. 

It w^ill be observed that one or more of the incidents related oc- 
curred in each of nine districts out of the thirteen. The districts 
omitted are the fourth and fifth, embracing, respectively, the coasts 
of Long Island and New Jersey, on the Atlantic, and containing, 



SUPERINTENDENTS IN LIFE-SAVING SERVICE. 11 

respectively, 30 and 41 stations; the tenth, embracing Lakes Ontario 
and Erie, containing 11 stations, but having about 500 miles of coast 
line, and the thirteenth, containing 16 stations, embracing the entire 
Pacific coast, a distance of about 800 miles. A station at Nome, 
Alaska, has just been added. 

In the first two of these districts the stations are closer to each other 
than elsewhere, and the facilities for visiting them are much better 
than in any of the other districts, but the duties of the superintendents 
are extremely onerous, the office work alone keeping them constantly 
engaged when they are not obliged to be on the coast. They have 
both, however, been in attendance on several occasions of shipwreck. 

The tenth district was organized in 1876, Capt. David P. Dobbins 
being appointed superintendent. Captain Dobbms was a well-known 
shipmaster on the Lakes, and his experience repeatedly afforded him 
opportunities to aid in the rescue and succor of the shipwrecked. Per- 
haps the most notable service of this kind was a rescue made imder 
circumstances of great difficulty and danger in 1853. In recogni- 
tion of the heroism displayed on this occasion he was rewarded by 
the citizens of Buffalo with a gold watch, suitably inscribed. He 
died in August, 1892, from disease (pneumonia) said to have been 
contracted in making a tour of his district. 

His successor, Capt. Edwin E. Chapman, entered the Service origi- 
nally as a surfman in one of the stations of the district, was subse- 
quently promoted as keeper of another, and upon the death of Cap- 
tain Dobbins was made superintendent of the district. His record, 
both as surfman and keeper, was of the best, and as superintendent 
he ranks with the first. 

The thirteenth district was organized in 1877, and until 1882 was 
under the charge of Capt. John W. White, of the Revenue-Cutter 
Service, as acting superintendent. Capt. Thomas J. Blakeney was 
appointed in 1882, and has occupied the position^ in which he has 
served faithfully and efficiently, until the present time. His official 
tours extend over a coast line of about 800 miles, which probably in- 
volves over 900 miles of travel, owing to the lack of traveling facili- 
ties along the coast and consequent necessity of several long detours 
inland, involving many hardships and discomforts. His duties in 
his office are also arduous and trying. In addition to those pertaining 
to the general superintendence of the district, he has charge of the 
distributing depot of the Service, receiving, storing, and distributing 
all supplies of every kind for the Pacific coast. 

It will be seen from what has been said that since the organization 
of the system seven of the district superintendents have died, and of 
these seven but one has breathed his last at home and among friends, 
and his death is said to have been from pneumonia contracted on one 
of his official tours. 

In this connection attention is called to the fact that seven of the 
thirteen persons who now hold the position of superintendent attained 
their office by promotion from the position of keeper, and that here- 
after none can reach the rank of superintendent except by promotion 
under the civil-service rules, after a competitive examination in which 
every eligible keeper in the district is invited to participate. Hence, 
if retirement is to be granted to keepers and surfmen, and district 
superintendents are to be excluded, those of the latter class who have 




8UPESIKT£NBSKT& Hf LlFE-SAVrSG SEBVICB. 




rcaiched ilmr pasitioe br promotion will be cot off from the benefits 
to whidi thej would otherwise be «iititIecL 

Tha SBven who would be thus Affected served in the capocity of 
mrfmen and keepers, previous to promotion to their ptiesent grade, as 
fioUows: The EuperiiitexideDt of the first district, eight years; of the 
seocmd district, thirteen years; of the third district, eleven years; of 
the sixth district, fourteen years; of the tenth district, eleven years; 
of the eleventh district^ two years, and of the twelfth distriet, six- 
teen years. All attamin^ the grade of ^perintendent in the future 
woul3 likewise be cut on, as would also the two other supermtend- 
ents not promoted from the ranks (Superintendents Sliaw and Hutdi- 
iti^ of the ei^i and ninth dkmcts), incidents from whose dis- 
tingoMied services hare been briefly iwonoted. Under such drcura- 
stances many of the keepers would doubtless be nnwilling to accept 
the positioii of ^perinteodenti among whom would pnrfiaMy be thorn 
best fitted by experienceu 

The incidents relatied show same of the perils, sufferings, and pri- 
vatioas to which the superintendents have objected thanselvos, and 
tlie gaOa&t adueffanents which they bare sooompliEhed. They aie 
indjcadTe of Hia ipirit which anima'tes these oScers, and illu^rative 
of the tadm they ooo^dcr innimbent upon them on occ^on; and 
althotig^ no nrntixement of the kind is officially impo^. they feel 
that they lia mmer an obligitioo as peremptory and impeniti^ &s if 
the duty were prescribed by law and reguUtiona^ To them the oc- 
euion is a command^ as aaumritative mb the ukase of the Czar, to do 
thi^ir ntmo^ whatever danger or self-sacrifice may be involvi^ eveo 
though it be death itself. It b weU for the Semee that mA, m the 
ca^. and it is to be hoped that it will long continue bo. 

We all know how necsessaij it m that le^dei^ of meo, howimr brave 
the latter may be, ^homld be inspii^ with eamesi derotiae, md that 
tiMr example and enthustasn^t the pacae for their follrrwers. If they 
become nesrliir^^t erd easv-going, it ukes b^t a lude whiie for demor- 
R ^ n tlie rants. The^ - have displayed an 

unparalleled interest and love for their work, and they have assi-tei 
in maintaining an esprit de corps that has stimulateti the men ur. i-r 
their command to accomplish mLnicles, until tod^v their derhi^ < :f 
heroism have become as familiar to the Am.eriean public is ho :sv?h jid 
^Nords, while thev have elicited frc^m foreign oo'irtries th- ackr.' -^1- 
e^isment that the United States Life-Saving Service standi pre^nii- 
ner-t among all kindred institutions in the world. 

I: is re^pect^dIiy submitted that to make di^rimination in th- 
m^r-^r of granting r^tir^ment against these diftrict 03m:r.ind'=^rs 
w: :ii be both unjust and impolitic, and utterly at variance with i^e 
pr^-^ents of the Army and Xavy. 



I 



60th Congress, ) 
Ist Session. ) 



SENATE. 



Document 
No. 337. 



PUBLICITY OF ELECTION CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
EXPENDITURES. 



Mr. Tillman presented the following 

ABSTBACT OF lAWS BEIATING TO THE PX7BLICITY OF ELECTION 
C0NTBIBX7TI0NS AND EXPENDITXJBES. PBEPABED BY THE 
NATIONAL PXJBLICIT7 BILL ORGANIZATION. TO ACCOMPANY 
S. 6777. 



February 27, 1908.— Referred to the Committee on Privil^es and Elections and 

ordered to be printed. 



The laws of the following nineteen States and Territories contain 

?rovisions for the publicity of election contributions or expenditures, 
he date given is that of the original enactment, the abstract being 
of the law as amended to January 1, 1908: 



Nebraska 1897 

New York 1890 

Pennsylvania 1906 

South Carolina 1905 

South Dakota 1907 

Texas 1906 

Virginia 1903 

Washington 1907 

Wisconsin 1897 



Alabama 1903 

Arizona 1895 

California 1893 

Colorado 1891 

Connecticut 1895 

Iowa 1907 

Massachusetts 1892 

Minnesota 1895 

Missouri 1893 

Montana 1895 

The laws of the three following States, which contain no publicity 
provisions, forbid corporations to contribute in any manner for 
political purposes: 

Florida 1897 

Kentucky 1897 

Tennessee 1897 

In the following six iStates publicity measures have been adopted 
and subsequently repealed: 



state. 


Adopt- 
ed. 


Re- 
pealed. 


Kansas 


1893 
1H91 
1897 
1895 
1896 
1S86 


1908 


Michigan 


1901 


Nevada 


1899 


North Carolina 


1897 


Ohio 


1902 


Utah 


1887 







2 ELETstlOH COKTElBUTlOKfi AND gXI'£^DF^ORl^ 

in tJie ffitlowiog 8tiiie^, in wbtdi no publicity law h now in force. 



IdiiliQ ..,.,. ,. .-,.-_..-*•„,., _...„.-- 1905 

Mftn/tlQil (Ci^rviTiUif WxrikM; a boiblidlr MU hm it*5*m intrwliirckt ifilhelegi»- 

ktimialtSU^) :. _,-_ i9fW 

K«nr j*i*Qr {*^ ")*<•..•* mn 

Ohk>t60'*«ni' ,--,--,-. .,....--,,,.„,, ,,. liW 

OreprOQ fOiHPfefi. . ,-....,.. rUinJ , .,. „, 190S 

W<^ ViJipam (aov<?nior White)..-.*. 1IAP5 

Tlic fu^t provides tliitt within thirty day^ nfter a primaiy el^ttoiT 
candidaU>H whall file aworn .HtatemantH of the expenses of their can- 
rfi^t*n. It h prfivirlcd that a tmndidato **mfty" htu^o a tHrnjmiirJi 
inHUH;^t!r or c-otiHiiittyc, in wbicb event tbo bitt<^r arc abo njquinad to 
fill? HI [111 la r §tat4?inuf3t8i 

TIm> m:i h very brief and defetstive. 

Ail in youth Carol tria, tbo publicity legUktion of Abibatna is directed 
to th*^ regulation of primtiry elei tton and not be* that of election;* to 
public oflnte^* Tbo obvioin miimn h tliat in uiany Sf>utliern rii*t(> » 
Uiu i^1ei:ti(fnt$ to |nibltc otiices are rarely the subject of >it?rioua eoiile*-!, 
and iircaniou in tberef or© seldom pre^Hented for HUt-b tunploytnent of 
dinipaiicn fund^ in cornK'ction witli t^kHiionw m re^piiro the adoption 
of publicity nii*aMurGa atfocting oth( t than primary elections^ 

ARIZONA. 

[Adopted Mar. 11, 19()5. Chflp..20, Laws of 1905, Title IV. sec. 66. Penal Code, R. S. 1901.] 

This act provides that every candidate shall within thirty days of the 
election file an "itemized statement sliowing in detail all the moneys 
contributed or expended by him, directly or indirectly * * * 
in aid of his election." Such statement must give the names of the 
persons who received the mon(!y, '^the specific nature of each item 
and the ])urp(>se for whicii it was expended or contributed." 

Candidates for ofh'ces to l)e tilled by the electors of any distri<t 
greater than a county mu>t Hie their statements in th<i otiicc of the 
scci'etary of the territory; other candidates with county, town, or 
city clerks. 

\Vithin thirty days '^the chairman and secretary of the territorial 
county and city central commit t(3c of each * * * |)(>litical ])arty 
shall make and lib' a stateunMit" of all sums of money received "from 
whom received and to whom and for what purpose such money was 
paid." 

Violations of the provisions of the act are punishable as mis- 
demeanors. 

CALIFORNIA. 
[Adopted 1893. 8tnt. 1893. p. 12, amended (hip. 41, L. 1906; amended chap. 350. L. 1907.] 

The act as originally passed followed the English law with some 
degree of closeness and was perhaps more complicated and detailed 
l/jan that of anj other State. The amount which could be legally 



ELECTION CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES. 3 

expended was determined by the amount of the salary of the office to 
fill which the election was held. A sworn statement of expenditure 
was re(iuired from all candidates, a failure to file which was punisha- 
ble by forfeiture of the oflice. 

An election court for inquiry into alleged violations of the law could 
be set in motion by any elector. In 11K)5 (Ch. 41) the provisions of 
the treneial law were made applicable to primary elections as well as 
election to public oliice. In 1907 the act was amended, chapter 350, 
L. WOl. As at present constituted it provides: 

That every candidate shall file an ite.mized statement within fifteen 
days of the election showing in detiiil all moneys contributed or 
expended by him, certain candidates to file their statements with the 
secretar}^ of the state, others with the clerk of the county in which 
the election was held. Vouchers must be filed for all sums in excess 
of S^oOO. Every committee shall appoint a treasurer, who is required 
to file an itemized statement. Legitimate expenditures are defined 
and limited to certain ])ercentages of the salaries of the offices for 
which the elections are held, or if there be no salary to a maxinuun of 
$100. The time within which claims against connnittees must be pre- 
sented is limited. A person oflending against the provisions of the 
act is made a competent witness against another person so olFe riding, 
and shall not be excused on the ground that his testimony is liable to 
incriminate himself; but he is exempted from subsequent prosecution 
for the otf(Mise with reference to which his testimony was given. 

The elaborate and complicated provisions of the act of 181)3 were 
apparently found impracticable of enforcement, and were in substance 
re])ealed by the act of 1907, a comparativel}^ simple law being substi- 
tuted. 

COLORADO. 

[Adopted 1891, pages 170, 171, sec. 6, Laws of 1891; Ann. Stat., sec. 1655f.] 

The act provides for the filing of itemized statements by candidates 
and by the ^'chairman and secretary of State, county, and city central 
coramittees," showing the amounts expended by the committees and 
candidates and the names of the persons contributing to and the 
amounts received by committees. 

The form of the act, which is very brief, i^ substantially similar to 
that subsequently adopted by Arizona in 181)5. 

It has not been amended or repealed to date. 

CONNECTICUT. 

[Adopted 1895. Adopted public nets 189'), vhn\K 3:;s (G. S., sec. lOOVieP"*); amended public acts 1903, 
chup. 5; amended public act>> 190.'), eluip. 2>U.J 

The act of 1805 provides that ever}^ candidate shall file with the 
town clerk of the town in which he resides an itemized statement of 
his election expenditures and of the contributions thereto under a 
penalty of not more than ^1,000. Treasurers of political committees 
are re(|uired to file an itemized statement with the secretary of state 
wilhin ten days after the election under similar penalty. 

The amendment of 1005 constituted a new and sweeping enactment. 
It was made applicable to caucuses and primary elections, defined 
"political committees," 'treasurers," ana "political agents," and 
provided that no person should act as such treasurer or politica 



4 ELBorroK OONTBIBIITIONS akq uxpekdituees. 

agent uoleBs before the election, caucus, or primary he dbotild file a 
written designation as such with the secretary of state, or in certain 
cases the town clerk. 

The law further provided that coDfcributioos duriDf^ a period of mx 
months prior to the election should be made only to an authomed 
** treasurer" or "election agent," and that no person other than a 
treasurer or agent should pay any election expenses, except that can- 
didates mu,y pay for postage, telegraph, telepbonej etationerj, print- 
ing^ ©xpreas, and traveling expenses. All other payments must be 
made through the election agent, who Is limited to certain prescribed 
elates of er[)enditurcs. The act further provides that every can- 
didate, treasurer, and political agent must file a Bworn statement, 
containing alt Items of expenditure and indicating from whom all con- 
tributions are received and to whom and for what puri^jse all expend- 
itures are made. Failure to make nuch a stiitement is penalised by 
forfeiture of the emoluments of office, during the term for which the 
candidatje i^ elected* If the candidate he gnifty in person, the election 
is invalidated and the offender disqualified from holding office for four 
years* If only the agent be ^ilty or the offense is shown to be ''of 
a trivial, unimportant and limited cbaructer," ineligibility doe® not 
follow. Inquiry may be instituted on complaint of the Staters attor- 
ney, by any Stiite referee, judge of the superior court, or judge of 
any court of common pleas; or inquiry may be made on complaint of 
any elector or voter* No person elected to oflSce shall receive any 
salary for the period during which he shall have failed to file a state- 
ment 

The act was amended io 1907, chapter MQ^ so as to provide that 
"do contributions or payments or favors of any kind shall be made or 
extended by or solicited from any private corporation or judicial 
ofiicer, etc.*' The amendment provicles for certain additional classes 
of lei^itimate expendituree and Omits the number of persons in a vot- 
ing (iLstrict or precinct to whom liability can be incurred in certain 
respects. Political treasurers are required to account for unexpended 
balances. It is provided that twenty days after an election the secre- 
tary of state or the town clerk, as the case may be, shall notify the 
proper prosecuting oflScer of any failure to file a statement "and within 
ten days thereafter such prosecuting officer shall proceed to prosecute 
for such ofl'enses." Every delegate to a nominating convention is 
required to file an itemized statement of his expenses within fifteen 
days after such convention. Provision is made in the act for an 
inquir}^ in aid of its enforcement. 

This act, of which certain salient features only are referred to in 
the above summary, is one of the most complete and well-coiusidered 
acts of this character, ranking in this respect with the provisions for 

fublicitv of election contributions and expenditures of tne New York, 
ennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts acts. 

FLORIDA. 
[Adopted 1897.] 

Chapter 4638 of the laws of Florida (No. 24 of the act of 1897, page 
72 of the laws of that year) provides: 

Sbction 1. No foreign or nonresident corporations or corporation organized under 
the laws of the United States, doing business in this State, nor any domestic corpora- 
tion, aha)} pay or contribute or offer, consent or agree to pay or contribute, directly 



ELECTION CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES. 5 

or indirectly, any money, property or thin^ of value to any political party, oi^ganiza- 
tion, committee, or individual, for any political purpose whatsoever, or for tne purpose 
of. influencing legislation of any kind, or to promote or defeat the candidacy of any 
person for nomination, appointment, or election to any political oflBce. 

Sbc. 2. Any person, employee, agent, or attorney or other representative of any 
corporation, acting for or in behalf of such corporation, who shall violate this act 
shall be punished upon conviction by a fine of not less than one thousand nor more 
than ten thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the State prison for a period of not 
less than two nor more than ^\e years, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the 
discretion of the court or judge before whom such conviction is had, and the corpo- 
ration, if a domestic corporation, is dissolved if after a proper proceeding upon quo 
warranto, in either the circuit or supreme court of the State to be prosecuted by the 
attomey^eneral of the State, the court shall find and give judgment that section one 
of this act has been violated as charged, and if a foreign or nonresident corporation, 
its right to do business in this State ceases. 

Src. 3. The violation of this act by any officer, employee, agent, attorney, or other 
representative of a corporation, shall be prima facie evidence that sucn officer, 
employee, agent, attorney, or other representative of such oorporation is acting for 
ana in behalf of such corporation. 

Sbc. 4. Any person or persons who shall aid, abet, or advise a violation of this act 
shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be punished as in section one of 
this act 

IOWA. 

[Adopted 1907, chap. 6a] 

Candidates at both primary and general elections are required to 
make sworn statements of their election expenses within ten days 
thereafter, and, "to the best of their knowledge," of the expenditure 
in their behalf of other persons. 

Such statements are required to "show the dates, amounts, and 
from whom such sums of money or other things of value were received, 
and the dates, amounts, purposes, and to whom paid or disbursed." 

No person is excused irom testifying in prosecutions under the act 
and immunity is granted to such witnesses, statements are also required 
of the chairmen of each party central committee for the State, district, 
or count3^ All such statements are made permanent public records 
open for inspection. Violation of the provisions or the act are 
punishable by a fine of from $60 to $300, or by imprisonment of from 
thirty days to six months. 

KANSAS. 
[Adopted 1898. G. S. 1901, sec 2734-40; repealed March 18 1908, chap. 280.] 

The Kansas act of 1893 (repealed 1903) provided for detailed state- 
ments by candidates, and that any committee, "club, organization, or 
association designed to promote or engaged in promoting the success 
or defeat of any party * ♦ * should have a treasurer and keep 
and file detailed accounts on receipts and expenditures." 

Any person not a member of such committee who should collect or 
expend more than $5 was also required to keep and file an account. 

Any member of a committee who should receive or disburse any 
funds" for political purposes was required to either file a statement 
with the treasurer of his committee or file an individual statement, 
and no member of a committee was permitted to receive or disburse 
any money for political purposes prior to the appointment of a treas- 
urer. The penalty was a fine of §^10 to $500, or imprisonment from 
ten days to one year, and for candidates forfeiture of oflice» 

There is no publicity law now in force in this State. 



ELEOTIOK C0NTinuU110H8 AN0 EXPENDITURES, 

KBKTIjCtKT* 

This act made it liukwfn) for snj uorpomtion it*iplf, ar hj or thmugh 
it8 ag^rit^nttnrncy or any <*m|>ioyii, or olUisi^r Uun-eof^ to "^u^isi-rilx^ to, 
givu, procure for, or to fiirhi>ib any money, privilege^ fnvor, or other 
thing of value to any politii-al or tjim^ipoiiticsl orifaiiization or party^ 
or any ollicer or m<*inher tben^of. U* be aiinl by s?iiioli polirk^al or i|tiH>«!- 
political jjarty or or^auixatioa for any purpose or purposi?!* whatever, 
or aft^rwaniw to reiiubuiiijii^ or ciiinjWMiMitt* iti any way <*r rtmnncr any 
piM'soD or per.soiis who shMll have sab^i*ribod, i^iven^ procured or fur- 
nifihed any 8u*h money, privilege, favor, or otber Uiinjst of value to he 
usiid by slicb politicalor qua^i-polUlcai (mrty or or<*aiiiziitiou for any 
purpose whatever. And any corporation which i^ball viohite any of 
tlie provisions of this a*^t ^hall be gruUty of a inlsdenif^anor, and Nhall 
upon iK^nvmtion bo tinod not la^m iimxi^^^M or niorts tbtm $5^000 for 
each offense, and its charter or authority to do biuiincHs in thiB State 
Bball upon »uch conviction be ni]>itrih*d, revoked, and hehi for naught. 

Any o(Bc«r, u*»t*nt^ attoniey, servant, or employe of any corporationj 
or any person whatever acting for or representing any such corpora- 
tioQ who 8b all disbur?<e, distribute, pay oat, or in any way handle a«y 
niooev, funds, or other things of value that belonj;^ to or hai^ be<^n fur* 
niahc^ by «uch corporation or agent, attorney, employee, or servant 
thereof, to be u.^td or employed in any way for the purpose of aidinpr 
or n.ssist]Te2: ^>r rtth tinchvj: tbi> caii.^t^ f>f imv pnliisc sd or riunsi-pnliijcul 
party or ortraiiizjition, or of any candidate for public oilice in any way 
whatever, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall upon conviction 
be fined not less than S250 nor more than ^1,000, and imprisonment in 
the county jail at hard hibor not less tlian three months nor more than 
twelve months for each offense. 

MASSA('Iirsl<:TTS. 

[A(l.»{.ttd l.sy2. Chap. 11 Rev. Laws.] 

The ^lassacliu^etts act has ))ioved to be an etl'ectixc^ and pi'actical 
measure, and many of its pro\'isions have been ad()[»ted in th<' New 
York act. It i>rovides that every candidate for nomination or ehM> 
tion to a public ollice sliall, witliin seven days after tlie election or the 
last dtiy of lilin;^'' noniinations, tile a statcMuent of lii- ])oIitical «'X|)<'ii'li- 
tui'cs, except as to certain ''personal (^x])enses," and the ii;nne of t!ie 
political conunittee to which the contribution or ])roniis(^ wa^ made. 

'^Political committees" are delined in the act and rcijnircd to liave 
a treasurer, who must keep detailed accounts of all contril)utioi!^ and 
disbuT'sements. No money can be received by or on behalf of the 
committee luilii the ap])ointment of a treasurer. 

Persons making di>burseun*nts on account of a committee nuist 
make a detailed statement thereof, to be filed with such conunittee. 

Treasurers of conmiittees receivin^r or disbursing over Sl^o mu>t, 
within thirt}' days aft^u'an election, tile a detailed statement similar to 
that required under the New York act, and whoever expends or re- 
ceives more than $20 for election purposes must make the statement 
required of treasurers. 

No persons may make contributions or payments in any name other 
than his own, ana committees may not knowingly receive contributions 
under Bctitioua names. 



ELECTION CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES. 7 

The sccrctarv of the CommonweHlth and the clerks of cities are re- 
c|uired to iii.spectall statements filed with them within sixty days after 
llie election to wliich they relate, and if it appears that any statement 
has not hcen tiled or is incorrect, or upon complaint of tive voters, 
the secretary or city clerk shall in writinc^ notify the delinquent peison. 

Upon failure to tile a statement within ten days after receiving such 
notice, or if the statement be defective, the secretary or citj'^ clerk must 
notify the attorney-general, and the attorney-general is required to 
examine, within two months thereafter, every case, and if cause appear, 
institute appropriate civil or criminal proceedings. 

The courts may compel the tiling of sufficient statements upon the 
petition of the attorney-general or district attorney or petition of any 
candidate voted for or of any five qualitied voters. 

Statements must be preserved for fifteen months and all payments 
exceeding ^5 must be represented by vf»uchers. Blanks must be fur- 
nished at public expense. The provisions of the act are not applica- 
ble to town elections. 

Provision is made for inquests into violations of the election law 
upon complaint sworn to by any person. 

No person is excused from testifying upon such inquest, but wit- 
nesses are granted innnunity from prosecution in respect to an}^ mat- 
Un* concerning which they may testif}^ 

Violations of these provisions are punishable by imprisonment for 
not more than one year or by a fine of not more than $1,000. 

MICHIGAN. 

[Adopted 1891. Chap. 190, see. 44, C. L., sec. 3054; repealed Apr. 12, 1901; chap. Gl.] 

The act of 1891 required both candidates and the chairman of [)olitical 
committees to file within twenty days after an election a statement of 
the amount of money expended * * * in connection with such 
(lection. No statement of contribution or of the details of expendi- 
tures was retjuired. 

This act was very limited in scope. 

Since its repeal in 1901 there has been no further legislation of this 
character. 

MINNESOTA. 

[Adopted 26 April, 1896. Chap. 277, K. L. 1905. sec. ;M8-358; amended 1905, chap. 291.1 

The act of ls\K) was nearly identical with that of Missouri, a full 
al <tract of which is given infra. No officer can take offic(* or receive 
>;'';iry until the recjuired statement is filed. The lawap])lies to ])rima- 
rics but does not a])})ly to town, villnge. or M'hool-district elections. 

By the ameruhnent in 1905, chapter 291, it was made a felony for an 
officer of a business cori)oration to vote money to a campaign fund. 

MISSOURI. 

[Adopted 1893. p. 15.3: amended 1897. p. 108: amended 1807, p. 173: R. S. 1899. Act. VI, rliMp. 102.] 

Many of the* provisions of the Missouri act have been adopted in 
other VVcv^tern State.s and they are therefore given here somewhat at 
length as representative of a typical act. 



S ELEOTlOir 0ONTB1B0T1ON8 AND EXPENDIXUBM. 

The act is also interesting as one under which prosecutionii have been 
had. 

S»o. 7179* AmoufU to be ea^pended by amdidom^How deiermvned.^l^Q candidate 
for Ckjngresa or for aoy public office in this Slate, or iu any cotmty ^ district or muni- 
dpality therefif, whicn office is t« be filled by popular election, aliall, by himself or 
by or through anjf ag^ent or agents, committee or origan izatioUt or any person ot per- 
ioufl whHte4>*]jver, in the agi^regate pay oat or expend^ or promiB© or agree or offer to 
par, contribute or expcQfl aoy xi>oney or other valuable thinsc in omer to secure or 
aid in eecnring his nomination or election, or thf* nomination or election of acy other 
peraon or persons, or lioth suc-h nomination and election, to any office to be voted for 
at the Earae election, or in aid of any party or measure^ in exteee of a Bum to be deter- 
mined unoin the following basiaf namely: For five thon£«and votere or Ic^, one bun* 
dred doltaifl; for each one hundred voters over five tbougand and ander twenty-five 
thousand, two doUarB; for each one hundred voters over twenty -five thousand and 
under fifty tbouiand, one dollar; and fore^ch one hundred voters over fifty thouaandj 
fifty cente— the number of voters to be ascertained by the total number of votee cast 
for all the candidates for suoh office at the l&^t precedini^ regular election held to fill 
the same; and any payment, contribntioD or expenditiiref or promtae, sgro^ent or 
offer to pay, contribute or expend any money or valuable thing in exoeee of said eum 
for such oKjecte or purpose^ \b hereby declareli unlaw fuL {Laws 1893, p. 157. J 

Baa 7180. 8taienm)l of money e expended to be made ^ filed, etc.— Penult jf for faUuft, — 
Every pei^OQ who shall be a candidate before any caucus or convention, or at any 
primary election, or at any election for aoy Stale^ county, city, township, district, or 
municipal offices, or for senator or reprei?pntative in the general asseinbly of Miseonri, 
or for Senator or Hcpfestfntative io tlie Congrese of the United States shall, wttbin 
thirty days after the election held to fill such office or plaoe^ make oot and file with 
the o'fficef f^m powered by law to iai^ue the certificate of election to such office or place, 
ftnd a duplicate thereof with the recorder of deeda for the county in which such can- 
didate reaidee, a statement in writing, which statement and duplicate ahall be sab^ 
icribed and awom to by euch candidate beJore an officer authorized to administer 
oaths, setting forth in detdl mil gums of money, except all sums paid for actual trav- 
eling expenaea, including hotel or lodging bills, contributed, disbumed, eipended, or 
promised b^ him, and to the b«^ of his knowledge and belief by any other person 
or persons in his tiehaH, wholly or in pari; in endeavoring to secure or in any way in 
connection with bis nomiuatioa or election to auch office or place or in connection 
with thie election of any other per^ins at said election, and fihowing the datefi 
when and the persons to whom and the purposes for which all such sums were pwd, 
expended, or promised. Such atatement shall also set forth that the same is aa full 
ana eicplicit as affiant is able to make it. No officer anthorizt-d by law to i!?sue com- 
miasions or certificates of election shall issue a commission or certificate of election to 
any such person until such statement shall have been so made, verified, and filed by 
such person with said officer. (Laws 1893, p. 157, amended laws 1895, p. 173.) 

Sbc. 7181. Failure to comply with preceding section — Penalty, — Any person failing to 
oomply with the provisions of section 7180 of this article shall be liable to a fine not 
exceSeding one thousand dollars, to be recovered in an action brought in the name of 
the State by the Attorney-General, or bv the prosecuting attorney of the county of 
the candidate's residence, the amount of said fine to be fixed within the above limit 
by the jury, and to be paid into the school fund of said county. (Laws 1893, p. 157. ) 

Sbc. 7182. Statement of expenditures to befiledj when. — No person shall enter upon tlie 
duties of any elective office until he shall have filed the statement and duplicate pro- 
vided for section 7180 of this article, nor shall he receive any palary or any emolu- 
ment for any period prior to the filing of the same. (Laws 1893, p. 157.) 

Section 7183 provides that at any time during the term of office of 
any public officer elected under the laws of Missouri or the charter of 
any city therein, the person who has received the next highest number 
of votes for such office at the election at which such public officer was 
elected, make application in writing to the Attorney-General, setting 
forth one or more of the following charges against such public officer: 
That at the election at which such public officer was elected, the total 
amount expended, contributed, or incurred by such officer exceeded the 
sum allowed by section 7179 of the Revised Statutes; or that votes 
were obtained for him or withheld for the applicant by reason of 
various corrupt practices; and further setting forth that the applicant 



ELECTION CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITUBE8. 9 

desires the attorney-general to brin^ an action to have such public 
office declared vacant on account of said violations of the laws concern- 
ing elections. It is further provided that such applications shall be 
accompanied by a bond to the State of Missouri in the penalty of 
11,000, conditioned for the payment to the State of all taxable costs and 
disbursements for which it may become liable on account of such 
action. (Laws 1893, p. 157.) 
Section 7184 provides: 

It shall be the daty of the attorney-general, within ten days after the receipt of 
Buch application and bond, to begin an action against such public officer or to instruct 
the prosecutiu^ attorney of the comity in which such public officer resides to bring 
such action, within ten days after such notice, to have said office declared vacant, 
and for such other or further relief appropriate in an action against the usurper of 
any office or franchise. Such action shall be deemed to be conducted according to 
the rules prescribed bv law for an action against the usurper of any office or fran- 
chise; and it shall be the duty of any prosecuting attorney to bring such action within 
ten days after the receipt of such notice from the attomey-genentl. (Laws 1893, p. 
167.) 

Section 7185 provides that in case the attorney-general and prose- 
cuting attorney shall neglect or refuse to brin^ such action within the 
time limited in section 7184, it shall be lawful for the applicant to 
bring such action in the name of the State, at his own expense, and by 
his attorney or attorneys, and in any action so brought by said appli- 
cant no recovery for costs and disbursements shall be haa against the 
State, provided that if at any time the bond required to be given shall 
be found inadequate, the court may order the amount to be increased 
to cover the costs accrued or likely accrue in the cause, and upon 
failure to comply with any such order of the court, such action may 
be dismissed at the cost of the applicant and his sureties. (Laws 1893, 
p. 157.) 

Section 7186 provides that such action shall have preference on the 
docket of any court of the State in which the same shall be pending, 
over all other civil actions. (Laws 1893, p. 157.) 

Section 7188 provides that in such an action the applicant, upon his 
own motion or that of the defendant, shall be made a party plaintiff, 
and in any case in which such applicant shall be a party, if judgment 
of ouster against the defendant shall be rendered, such judgment shall 
award such office to said applicant, unless the plaintiff is himself guilty 
of a like offense. 

It is a defect which seems common to most of the acts in this country, 
that sufficient incentive and initiative is not given to the candidates or 
political organizations whose interests are adversely affected by a vio- 
lation of the election laws. The provision in section 7183 that in case 
of the disqualification of a candiaate elected to office, the candidate 
receiving the next highest number of votes for such office at the elec- 
tion shall, if the appropriate charges are sustained, obtain the office, 
Srovides a very practical inducement for the enforcement of the law. 
he constitutionality of such provisions may, however, be open to 
serious question. 

Section 7190 defines what shall be deemed to be a political committee 
within the intent of the act. In effect, every two or more persons 
elected, appointed, chosen or associated for the purpose, wholly or in 
part of raising, collecting or disbursing money tor election purposes, 
and every two or more persons who shall cooperate to that end and for 
the furtherance of the election, or to defeat the election to public 



Bt^enOlf OONTBIBUTlOlfS AND E^FENDITTmES. 

olKce of any person or rluK^ or numher of oprKonH, shall be deemed & 
pulitioal commiUsK* within Urn m^tnriiitj^ uf (lv*3 artido. 

Section 71^U pr<JVi<l*is> that evei'y pulitital curnititttec ^jhaU anpniDt 
and con^itantly maintain a trRjwurer t^ reeeive and diKbuj^ci all j^unis 
of iiHjnf\v wlikh umy lu* collected hy ^uuh t^-oinmitUjO or nuy of its 
rat*i!iljem. siinI that iinlf?-^ s^ucb trea>ittri*r jb fir??! appoinNHi arid there- 
after mainiained. it ^hall be nnlinrfut and a violation of thin article for 
a politiaii eonnjdtt**o or any of itti m**inbers to colltct or di.slnirse 
luonyty i'or iJoHticMl p(iq>i>8eii. AU niiiii4\v§ collectwd and disbursed 
ahall pawh through the hands of tlie trtmMun*r of the t^oaioiittee, and it 
i<hriil be unlawful for a in.i»niiith>e or any of Us members to ditibur^o 
or expend iuon*?yj; for any poHtieal inirpose (8p*?cilied hi t^cetion 7100) 
until the money disbursed or expeaaed shall have pastied throu|fti the 
hnn^i^ of the trea^ein*r of the poll t teal coinaiittee^ 

Section 1VJ2 provides that maeh treasurer shtdL whenever he reeeivea 
or diKlmrHnH money for the politiml purpo>*e8 ^pi^( i(ied, immediately 
etiter iti a prfjjwr Inmk or Wmks a detailed >?tateiJK*Tit of every sum of 
taoney received or di^^bursed by him, *'tiettin^ forth in niieh siVatement 
the sums ho received or disbursed, as the cfus^e may be, and the diite 
when and the person fruta wliotii received or to whoia paid, as the 
ci^e may be, and the otijet t and purixwie for which such aum waa 
received or di8tiur?*ed." (Ijiiws 181+3, p. 151.) 

trraj^iircr ^f a jiolHicnl *^onnriilf#»f, aw iletiinjd In this article^ and every jwr«*jii who 
ebitlJ aiiltui Nudi tpeaaiirer, hhtiW, within thirty dn^'s alter faub and i?verv t?It*i'tiot3, 
whetbtur Btatt*, <'mintVj t^ifv* inuait*i|jaliti% towai-hip «r ^listrict dc£;t(on/iti f^r ca>n- 
c^Tfiing or in jTmmu^tfon wJtti whidi hti ^t^ali have rer©ivtd or dlalvin^ii any tr*i.in<<y 
for an V o! the Mhjet.-t& or jHU|iC8t« aientkintd: 'm sectiyn 7UWJ oi thl* itrtiilt*, prfpar© 
and tlfu m tht> oilive of the n*rard(T of dt*edjii of tht*^^*^!^ in which stich trc.&?nrer 
fvahli's^ & inU, trufTftnd rtHnili'*! aorotmt and fitftt4'tn*»nt, ji^nb>rfthr(J and Hi^orn to by 
him \mkn'v An atfln*r sniThmizfrJ to ftdmiidntor tkaihs* > ■' rh©adj and every 

BUirj of inuney n?irivid nr dir-lnust^d bv hriii (urauy (*f h jr pariMifics iTu*n- 

tioni^d in ?^ectio« 7h*H nf this artifh* with hi th<* jjonnd t^'^^mmn^^ rsjnrty imyp before 
mwU i'le< tion, and t.-iniini? on thr iliit^wui wbirh ^\u\i HtrttcmtTit wn^ tWni, Ur^ d^iii' of 
eiiih rect'ipt and each di-l»ur.-eiiMnt. tln^ name of {\\v jvTson from wliom i«<-»'iv<Ml or 
to whom paid, an<l thr ol.jiM-t rtr purixist* lor which the same was receixe*!. and the 
ohjcct or purpose for wliich di-lairscd. Such statement nhail also s«'t l't>rth tlie 
unpaid debts and ol)H'_:ati')ns. if an v. of such eonnnittcc, with the nature and amount 
(A each, and to v. Iiom owiuL'. in detail, and if there are no unpaid deljis or obli'ja- 
tious uf such conuiiilice. such statement shall state such fa<'t. (Laws ]'<'X^, ]>. l.')7.) 

Section 710 1 pi-o\ ides th;i'. cNery olliciM" rfMjuirod hy l:iw to issue 
(TM-tilicati^s of eh'etioii OI' co'nniissions as the result of elect ions shall 
rev'cive and keep on iile foi* four years all the statements and accounts 
re«|uircd by the act, and that all siicli stati^nients and accounts .shall be 
oi)en to public ins])cction. (Laws of 1893, p. 157.) 

Section 71ib3 piovides that — 

Every treasurer of a political eoinmittee, as defined in this article, who sliall wilfully, 
fail to c<»m|)ly with this law sliall be guilty of a ndsdemcanor, and upon c<.n\ idion 
Bhall l)e lined not lesj? than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars. (Laws 18'.)3, 
p. 157.) 

Section 7196 provides that — 

Every treasurer of a political committee, or the person who shall receive any money 
to be ai)plied for any of the purposes sj)ecilie<l in se<'tion 7190, who shall ne<:lcct to 
kee)) a c(jrrect book or books of ax*count as contemi>lated in sections 7192 and 7193, 
witli intent to conceal the receipt or disbursement of any su(di sum received or dis- 
bursed by him, or any other i)erson for him, and the purpose or object for which the 
same was received and disbursed, or to conceal the fact that there is any unpaid debt 
or obligation of such treasurer or comndttee and the nature and amount thereof, or 



ELECTION CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES. 11 

to whom owing, or who mutilates or distorts any such book of account with intent 
to conceal any fact which would otherwise be disclosed, or who fails to file the state- 
ment or account contemplated by section 7193, witl^ ^\e days after he shall receive 
notice in writing, signed by five resident freeholders of the county in which such 
political treasurer or person resides, requesting him to file the statement and accoumt, 
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be imprisoned in 
the county jail for not less than two nor more than six months. (Laws 1893, p. 157.) 
Sec. 7176. Corporations using threats or moneys etc. — Penalty, — It shall not be lawful 
for any corporation organized and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of 
this State to directly or indirectly, by or through any of its officers or agents, or by 
or through anv person or persons for them, influence or attempt to influence the 
result of any election to be held in this State or procure or endeavor to procure the 
election of any person to a public office by the use of money belonging to 8U(;h cor- 
poration, or by subscribitig to any campaign fund of any party or person, or by dis- 
charging or threatening to discharge any employee of such corporation for reason of 
the political opinions of such employee, or to use or to offer to use any power, threat, 
influence, or other means whatsoever to induce or persuade any employee or other 
person entitled to register before or vote at any election to vote or restrain from 
voting for any candidate or on any (question to be determined at any issue at any 
election. Any violation of the provisions of this section by a corporation shall be 
deemed and held as a forfeiture of its charter or franchise as granted or derived from 
the State, as for willful misuser thereof, and such corporation shall be enjoined from 
transacting any business in this State, and such forfeiture or injunction may be 
adjudged by any circuit court of any county in which such corporation is located in 
a suit instituted for that purpose in the name of the State of Missouri by the prose- 
cuting attorney of any county and in the city of St. Louis by the circuit attorney or 
by the attorney-general. 

This provision is limited to such corporations as are organized under 
the laws of Missouri. This section was first enacted in March, 1897 
(p. 108, laws of that year), as an amendment to the corrupt-practices 
act of 1893 (p. 157, laws of that year). 

MONTANA. 

[Adopted 1896. Sec. 8&-104.] 

This act is quite elaborate, and follows in ^neral the provisions of 
the Massachusetts act, which are abstracted in greater detail (supra). 
Candidates are forbidden to make expenditures except for certain 
specified '^ personal expenses" and through political committees. The 
amount of the contributions by candidates is limited, a feature which 
is not present in the Massachusetts act. Many sections are substan- 
tially identical with corresponding sections of the Massachusetts act, 
and the scope of the two acts is similar. There is a provision for 
special judicial action in aid of the enforcement of the act. The act 
is made applicable to caucuses and conventions, but elections for town- 
ship officers are excepted. 

NEBRASKA. 

[Adopted 1897, chap. 19; amended 1899, chap. 29.] 

The act of 1897 resembles the Missouri act in many particulars. It 
prohibits contributions on the part of corporations. The act of 1899 
was a comparatively elaborate and complicated measure. It limited 
the contributions oi candidates and specified maximum sums based on 
the number of votes. Candidates before caucuses, conventions, and 
primaries were required to file detailed statements of expenditures 
within ten days, and no certificate of election could be issued until the 
statement should be filed. Any elector was authorized to make charges 
of violation of the act, upon giving a bond for the payment of costs, 

S D— 00-1— Vol 32 17 



13 ELEOTION OOrfTEIBUTTONS A^B EXPENDITCJRE9. 

and the attonievi^etipral was tbereupon required to begin action* An 
upplitant could ai!<a hvmg hh own action by his own attorney, and 
8nvh uctione are preferred on the culer»dHr. If the clmr^esi lie hih*- 
tained tho c^lection isdeclar^td void. No person is exeit^ed from tx.>sti- 
fyiag, Politicrtl comniittiM^w are defined and reqinred to tnatiitaia a 
treasurer who h required Jo (Ui^hurse all moneys on account of tbc 
commit t*.»«» He is required aliio to keep an aceount of sueb moneys 
and to lile a detailed 3tateDienL Every treasurer violating this pro- 
vision is made guilty of a misdeineanon 

ITEVADA* 
[Adoptea 1SSI6 (ebap. ItS); RTOended um (chui^.mh repealed U9&.1 

The act of 1895 provided that a certificate of nomination could not 
be tiled unless the name of a ^'dit^bursing" committee with their writ 
tan consent should also be filed. 

This committee was required to file a detailed stittement of moneyi 
received and expended. The candidate was also required to file a state- 
ment. V^ouchers for all expenditures over $500 were aJso required to 
be filed, 

A candidate was made ineligible for office if convicted of a violation 
of the act. 

Legitimate expenditures were defined and lioiited in amount 

Only candidates and committees were permitted to expend moosj 
for political purpoties- Any elector niijj:ht contest the right to office 
of (t candidate violating the act and othce. 

The act wm detailed and elaborate and was amended in 1897 to pro- 
vide in greater detail for the amoUTvt>* and character of lawful expendi- 
ture. It was repealed in 1899, and there ia no provision of this character 
now in force, 

NEW YORK. 

[Adopted 1890; amended 1906 (chap. 502); amended 1907 (chap. 696).] 

The New York act was drafted after a careful examination of those 
publicity measures which had prov^ed most effective in opoi-ation and 
avoids impractical and burdensome features which, as in Ohio, have 
sometimes tended to render such acts inoperative. 

It defines political committees and provides that any person who, to 
promote the election or defeat of a candidate, contributes or expends 
money other than throu^fh the agency of a political committee or can- 
didate shall file the statement required of political committees. 

Every political committee is required to have a treasurer who shall 
keep detailed accounts of its contributions and expenditures. No 
money may be received by or on behalf of such committee until it shall 
have chosen a treasurer. 

Within five days after the choice of such treasurer there must b(^ 
filed a statement of his address signed by three members of the 
committee. 

Whoever receives any money on behalf of a political committee 
must give to the treasurer of the committee a detiuled account of the 
same. Every payment in excess of 5?5 must be vouched for by a 
receipted bill and every voucher must be kept fifteen montlis. 



ELBOTION CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES. 13 

Treasurers of committees must witliin twenty daj^s after election file 
a detailed statement of the receipts and expenditures of the committee. 

In « ach case it shall incln<le the amount received, the name of the j)ei*son or com- 
mittee from whom received, the date of its receipt, the amount of every expenditure 
or disbursement exceeding five dollars, the name of the person or committee to whom 
it was made, and the date thereof; and unless such expenditure or disbursement shall 
have been mode to another political committee it shall state clearly the purpose of 
such expenditure or disbursement. 

No person is permitted to contribute to a political committee in any 
name other than his own, nor can such committee knowingly receive 
any contributions under fictitious names. 

All statements must be filed and preserved for fifteen months in the 
office of the secretary of State, who must provide blanks. 

If any person or committee fails to file a statement, or if it be 
defective, or if there be failure to comply in any other respect to the 
recjuirements of the law, the supreme court, or any justice thereof, 
n)ay compel, by order in proceedings for contempt, the tiling of a 
sufficient statement or other compliance with the act. 

Application for such order may be made by the attorney-general, 
district attorney, a candidate, or five voters. 

The petitioner must give an undertaking for costs, and the court 
shall thereupon issue an order directing the person or persons named 
in the order to show cause within ten days after it is issued why the 
statement reciuired should not be filed or amended, or such information 
as the court may require be furnished. 

Such petition shall be filed within fifty days after the election to 
which it relates or sixty days after the filing of the statement. The 
court must then conduct an inquest into tlie facts alleged in the peti- 
tion or which may be deemed relative " to any contribution or expendi- 
ture made in connection therewith," which at any time * * * may 
be deemed necessary to secure compliance with the provisions of the act. 

The judicial proceedings thus provided for are given precedence 
"over all other actions and proceedings." 

No person is excused from testifying or from producing any paper 
upon such judicial inquest, but immunity is granted witnesses in 
respect to such testimony. 

failure to file a statement or the making of a false or incomplete 
statement with "willful intent to defeat the provisions" of the act is 
punishable by a fine of not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment for not 
more than one year or both. 

The provisions of the act are not applicable to the election of town 
or village officers or to persons or corporations engaged in the pub- 
lication or distribution of newspapers in respect to the ordinary con- 
duct of such business. 

NORTH CAROLINA. 

[Adopted 1895, chap. 169, sec. 72; repealed 1897, chap. 186.] 

In the act of 1895 consolidating the election laws there is a short 
provision for the filing by candidates of itemized statements of their 
election contribution and expenditures. 

Failure to file the statement is punishable by forfeiture of office. 

This provision was repealed 1897, chapter 185. 



li ELECTION COUTBIBUTIONS A Nil EJtPENDlTtJEES- 

OHIO. 
fOHglnallr Adopted (Laws 18%, p. J23^ H. B.. vna. SO'iS). I^penled 1aw« 1903, p. Tf.] 

The Obio law, known su^ the **GRrfieId corrupt practice law/' was 
adopted in 1890 (p. 123). It cont*imed no definition of legitimate and 
illegitinmte ex^nditures but in other respects was as coojplete as any 
Bimilar legislation then in force. 

Those of iU provisions which wore direetfd to the purpose of secur- 
ing the publiLity of election contributions and expomlitures required 
that canaldates Ijefore a convention or primary iov nomination to pub- 
lic office should file statements as well as candidates for election. 
Political comu]itt€*es were detined and required lo have a treasurer* 
Ifc waa further provided that every peraon receiving or disbnrsing sums 
aggregating more than S^20 should keep detailed account. Treasurers 
of politicral coniniitti*es were requirid lo tile statements of their receipts 
ana expenditures with the county clerk. 

The act coutainexi no detinitionof legitimate and illegitimate expendi- 
tures but the ex[jensi*s of a candidate were limited to a maximum of 
SC50 and to SlW for 2, WO voters or less. This law was held to be 
constitutional (Mason v. State et aL, 5S 0» S,, 30) in the State courts, 
but it« provli<iuns were in some respict*?* impmctlcable and proved to 
be too drastic in operation and the law wm repealed, (L. 11*02, p* 77.) 

DirijiiONH urfD&H thk onto 4cr« 

In State ex ml v. Good, B Cir. a, 401; 15 C, C, 386, it wa^i held 
that if an agent of a candidate exceeds the limit of expense allowed by 
the statute the election of the Candida I e U ^ oid* 

In State ih MoFillan it was held that the only person entitled to 
apply to the ftttoniey-geneml to bring .^nit for the fine (section ^) 
was one i?n titled to vote upon the candidtite attet^ted. 

'f'|n> M'*f \VN- Ii.LI i,a»t f.> }n> i^TiTiTJ-n^'lc to fl^ K('Mn?i^ for l?f*pre<ientA* 
tives in Congr*'>s, as it^ effect was to impose Qualifications, conditions, 
and obligations on candidate for that oliice additional to thotic imposed 
by the Fe<leral Constitution in article 1, section 2, clause 2. (State v. 
Russell, 10 Law D, 255; 8 N. P., 54; Aff. 20, C. C. 551, 11 Cir. D., 
299.) 

It was held in State ?;. Jaquin 11 Cir. D., 91, that under the pro- 
visions of the act imposing a penalty for the failure to file a statement 
of election expenses within ten days after the election did not require 
the forfeiture of office. 

There is no provision for publicity of election expenditures now in 
force in Ohio. 

Governor Pattison in his message to the legislature January 8, 1906, 
recommended the enactment of a publicity law providing that candi- 
dates and political committees ♦ * * ghoula be required to file 
* * * a statement containing the sums which have been expended 
and the purposes for which the expenditures were made. 

PENNSYLVANIA. 

[Adopted 1906, chap. 17.] 

The Pennsylvania act is one of the most complete and efT(»ctive of 
the publicity acts, resembling in many respects the New York act. It 
provides for statements by political committees as well as hy candi- 



ELECTION CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITUEE8. 15 

dates. It requires a statement from candidates for nomination in the 
primaries as well as from candidates for election. The terms "'ciin- 
didate," '^public officer," "political conmiittees," and "election 
expenses" are defined. Committees are required to appoint a treas- 
urer, through whose hands all money is required to pass. Individuals 
other than candidates or treasurers of committees are forbidden to 
incur election expenses. 

Corporations are forbidden to contribute towaixl such expenses. 

Every candidate or treasurer, if he has received or expended more 
than $50 for political purposes, is required to file a detailed account 
with vouchers for all sums exceeding §10. No anonymous contribu- 
tions can be received or disbursed. The oath of office may not be 
administered until the statement is filed. Accounts are open to inspec- 
tion for two years. Within twenty days after the last aay for filing 
an account any five electors may petitior for an audit thereof, which 
must thereupon be had. Provision is made for the vacation of the 
office of any ca,ndidate found guilty of making a false statement. 

Violation of the act is punishable by a fine of not less than $50 or 
more than $1,000, or by imprisonment for not less than one month or 
more than two years. 

SOUTH DAKOTA. 

[Adopted 1907, chap. 146.] 

Political committees are defined and required to appoint a treasurer 
and secretary. 

All funds collected by such committee must be turned over to the 
secretary who shall " record the same in books kept by him for that 
purpose," and turn them over to the treasurer. 

" The treasurer shall not disburse said funds except upon orders 
drawn upon him by the secretary, each order showing upon the fiu^e 
thereof the purpose for which the money is paid, and to whom paid." 
No moneys shall be collected until the appointment of a treasurer. 

"A record must be kept open to the public showing the names of 
the secretary and treasurer" and all money must be disbursed through 
the treasurer. No person except a candidate or treasurer may "pay, 
give, or lend, or agree to pay, give, or lend any money or other valu- 
able thing for anv election expenses except to a political committee 
or the treasurer thereof." 

The purposes for which payments may be made are limited. 

An account must be kept and filed. 

No person is excused from testifying, and immunity is granted in 
respect to such testimony. 

Violations of the act are punishable by fine or imprisonment or 
both. 

This act contains certain provisiops of a novel character. 

SOUTH CAROLINA. 

[Adopted 1905. chap. 473.] 

This act relates solely to primary elections and requires candidates 
to make a pledge that ^' I will not give nor spend money * * * for 
the purpose of obtaining or influencing votes and that I shall at the 
conclusion of the campaign and before the primary election rendev 



16 ELECTION OONTEIBUTIONS AKD KXPENDlTrBE&. 

• • * under oath an itemked statement of all moneys spent or 
provided by me during the campaign for ejimpalgn purposes '^ * * 
and <^ * *» I will inimediat»dy after the piimsiry election render 
an itemiajed statement under oath showing alf further juonevs spent: 
Prmnd^d^^ That a failure to comply with this piovi^iun shall render 
such un election null and void.'' 

Violation of this act was made punishable by impiis^Dmeni or fine 
or both. 

TEKNE38EE. 

[Adopted Ii97.J 

The legislature of Tennessee* April, 1897, passed the following act 
(p, 143, acts of Toonesaee for tuat year): 

AK ACT m prohibit the Uie ^i fundi Iredonslti^B: to corpora iloiu iui i^lc^tJuDt'trliigt political » orCAm- 
|>afiro pnn^'i&i!^, B^na lo punJ^ niJ rv|»r«HfiiUUvea of cvrr ijf»iioit« who uliall uw itt uoasant t& Uie 
uae of corfiontfi fundi fur tliii parpos«< 

Sue. h Be it miad€ii bii (he genttcd aunnhlif of th* Stfth of TrnncMiu^ That tt shall be 
unlawful for the expcutive oflvcere or otht^r roprc>i'Ti!ariv»»s of »ni? <3orporaiJon doing 
buaine^ within this 8tate, to uee any of Uj6 ftuj'l!i!<, tsiunt^VHj rjr rn?<Jite of the corpora- 
tion for the jmrjiofife of aiding tittjer iu tbii t^tertion or defeat of i^xxy candidate for 
offic6i flationai^ SLite^ f-ountv or muoidjml^ or for the purpose of ait Hug io th^ euo 
ceae or d^ft^at of any proiw^ition eiil>fiutted to a vott^ of the people, or in any way 
contribute to the campatgii fund of ariy political party for any pnrpoee whatever* 

^EC. 2. Be li Jttrihrr muded, Titat esyry exectuive officer^ Bgcnt, or oth*?r repre- 
sentative of any corporation, doing busLnesie within this State, who tihaJl knowingly 
corit^ent to, approve or aid in the use of the fiinti of a corporalion for any of the 
purposes raentionjed in tieetion 1 of this act, !*hall be tleemsn! imijty of a iiiiedemf^anor, 
and upon conviction shall be fined not Jej-* than live baridrfd dollars nor more thtin 
two thousand doUare, and ehall be impriMjtjed in the ouanty jail or workbuiiee not 
lees thiin two nor more than six months, 

E^\ :i Ki? itftitihtf enadrdf That the grand juriea of thii StatJti Iw given inqinai- 
torial p . ; hU violatiotia of this act, ami that the circuit ami critninRl tiDurt 
judgt^ri I ' I be Tequirt^d to give thia matter et*j>e(.'ial)y in char^i.' of the grand 
jury at ir^. . t .^. i^ of t }i r i r < -t - 

No general corrupt-practices act seems to have been passed in IVn- 
nessee; and no further legislation relating to contributiuns or the 
publicity of election receipts and expenditures. 

TEXAS. 
[Adopted 1906, chap. 11.] 

Chapter 11, sections 89-90, acts of 1905, provides that all persons 
expending money for election purposes shall, within ten days after 
the election, file an itemized statement of such expenditures and also 
state ^'whether he has been informed or has reason to believe that 
the person thus aiding or attempting to defeat a party or candidate 
was an otlicer, stockholder, agent or employee of, or was acting for or 
in the interest of any corporation, giving his name, and if so of what 
corporation." 

UTAH. 

[Adopted 1896, chap. 66; repealed 1897.] 

This act required candidates and committees to file a detailed state- 
ment of expenses. 

It was very imperfect and was repealed the following vear, chapter 
60, Laws of 1897. 



ELECTION 0ONTBIBUTION8 AND EXPENDITUBE3. 17 

VIRGINIA. 

[Adopted 1898, chap. 98.] 

The act provides that candidates for both nomination and public 
oflSce shall make a retuin of their expenditures, and to the best of 
their belief, of the expenditures of any person acting in their behalf. 
No provision is made for the filing of statements hj political commit- 
tees the purpose of which is limited to advertising and securing 
public halls. 

WASHINGTON. 
[Adopted, chap. 209, Laws of 1907.] 

Every candidate for nomination is required to file within ten days 
of the primary election an itemized statement of any election expenses 
paid or incurred by him or to the best of his knowledge on his behalf. 

Such statements become part of the public records. 

Any candidate failing to file the required statement, or filing a 
defective statement, is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a hne 
of from $25 to $200,, or imprisonment of from ten days to six months. 

No statement is required from committees, and the provisions of 
the act are very incomplete and defective. 

WISCONSIN. 

[Adopted 1897, chap. 358; amended 1905, chap. 602; amended 1907.] 

This act, which is one of the best-considered measures upon the sub- 
ject, provides that the election expenses of candidates shall be filed in 
detail thirty days after the election, the purposes and amount of each^ 
expenditure being stated. All statements so filed must be kept open 
for public inspection for a year. The penalty for violation of this 
provision is a tine of not less than $100 nor more than $500. Political 
committees are defined and required to maintain a treasurer prior to 
whose appointment it is made illegal " for a political committee or any 
of its members to collect, receive, or disburse money " for political 

Jurposes, and all moneys nuist pass through the hands of the treasurer, 
reasurers of political committees are required to keep detailed 
accounts of receipts and expenditures and to file sworn statements 
thereof. This statement must be kept one ye^r. 

Any violation of the provisions of the act by a treasurer is punish- 
able by a fine but not by imprisonment unless he fails to keep correct 
books of account with intent to conceal receipts or disbursements, or 
the person from whom or the object for which they have been received 
or expended, or to conceal the existence of an unpaid debt, or if he 
mutilates or destroys such accounts with intent to conceal, or if he fails 
to make the required statement within five days after he shall receive 
notice in writing, signed by five resident freeholders, requiring him to 
file such statement. Upon conviction of the latter class of offenses he 
must be imprisoned for not less than two or more than six months. 

This act was amended in 1905 (chap. 502), providing in greater 
detail for the filing of statements of expenditures by candidates and 
for blanks for that purpose. It was made tlie duty of officers with 
whom nomination papers or certificates of election are filed to publish 



18 



ELlOnON OONTBIBDTIONS AND BXPENDITUBKa, 



liBts of caodidflt^s failing to file statements and to transmit such lists 
to the attornej-general for prosecution under penalty of a line* 

In ISiU? (chap* 243) Ufe-ms^urance compaoies were required to make 
report to the comniistskner of insurance of all contributions made for 
political purpo)!ies, and corporationa were bj chapter 492 of the Lawg 
of L905 prohibited from making any contributions for that purpose 
under strin^^ent penaUica, making it a felony to aid, advise, or abet 
Tiolattons of this provision. 

(From the National Publicity Bill Organization, Perry Belmont, 
ehairmao^ Fmnk K, Foster, secretniy, Wajihington, D< C*, Feb- 
ruary 26^ lyoso 



60th Congress, ) SENATE. ( Do( um eni 

M Session. J / No. 349. 



EDUCATING CHILDREN AT MILITARY POSTS. 



Mr. BuRKETT presented the following 

DATA BELATINQ TO THE FACILITIES FOB EDUCATINQ CHILDBEN 
AT MTLITABY POSTS, ETC. 



FiBBUABT 28, 1908.— Referred to the Committee on Military Affairs and ordered to 

be printed. 



Washington, December 16, 1907. 

Sir: Last summer I visited some military posts and was con- 
fronted in one or two places with the difficulty of the educational 
problem for the children. Especially was my attention called to the 
children of the noncommissioned officers. The salaries of these officers, 
of course, are low and hardly permit of their paying tuition for the 
children in adjacent tpwn schools. I gathered the idea that at times 
it is the practice of the Department to have a school at the post. It 
has occurred to me that perhaps the Government could better afford, 
in many instances, to pay the tuition of the pupils than to have a 
school at the post, and it would probably in most instances be better 
for the pupils themselves. 

Will you please give me the facts with reference to this proposi- 
tion? What is the practice, and what, if any, legislation would be 
necessary? Also, if you can without too much trouble, I would be 
glad to know about the number of pupils at each of the several miU- 
tary posts and about what provision heretofore has been made for 
the education of these pupils. 

Very truly, E. J. Burkett. 

The Secretary op War, 

Washington, D. O. 



War Department, 

Washington^ February 24, 190S. 
Sir: Referring to your letter of December 16, 1907, with reference 
to facilities for educating children at military posts, 1 will state that 
reports on tliis subject have been received from the posts in the United 
States, Cuba, and Porto Rico, and a summary of these reports is 
inclosed herewith for your information. A copy of General Order 155, 
War Department, 1905, governing post schools for children is also 
inclosed. 




EBUOATINO CHILDBEIT AT MILITARY POSTS, 



The reports indicate t hat post echoola are maintained at about four 
teen posta; at tliQae posts attendance at oyt^de schools is generally 
iiupracticable* Usually these schools are not especiaitj satisfactory, 
as the ages of the chihireu vary considerably, and it is impossible to 
maintain proper grades for all of them. Moreover, it is not always 
possilile to find an enhsted man, who is suitable for the position of 
sctiool teacher. However, it is thought that govd facihtie^ for educa- 
tion exist at nmny of the points and at all posts aome provision for the 
ediiCJition of children has been made. 

It is true that in some few cases the cost of tuition for their children 
is a more or less serious drain on enlisted men, but it is thought that if 
provision is made for the payment of the tuition bv the Government 
that it mil result in a short time in most of the pubhc schools charg- 
ing tuition for them cltiidren, whereas now that tne Government does 
not pay the tuition no tuition is charged, except in a few cases. 

It is not thought tliat there is any pressing need for legislation m this 
matter. The summary mclosed gives full information in regard to the 
number of children at the several posts and what provision has been 
made for their education. 

Very respectfully, Bobebt Shaw Oliveh, 

Asmtani Secretary of War^ 

Hon. E. J. BuBKisTT, 

Vnikd Statm Senate. 



1 



No. 1&5. f WkMhingian, Sf^ptn/jha- SI, lOOS. 

1, The di)lhiii;> AJiowance tif the jfiiiLllgted 1&«ei of tlK' ririlippim? v^L^jutJ!, or^ikiiizfcl 
umler tbe \m\vUi'>uA uf s' riiiii ftC utUis act of Cottgrc^se appftivyd Fiihnmry 2^ ISK>1, ie, 
nndpt the i foUi>wi: 

Th^aUo^^ rate of 17 centap^f day, or$5.iaperjiioiitli, 

fur Ui^' first ^^L-t ;.ucjiUh.i uf v vn h i. hIl Isur ut or reenlistmentt Htiil th'Tf^Liflrr ut the rntp of 
9 cents per day, or $2.70 ptT nn^iitli, irrespective of grade. The articles of uiiiforin 
clothing allowed for issue will be designated by the commanding general. Phil i [(pint s 
Division. 

General Orders, No. 24, Ileadquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, 
March 12, 1902. and General Ordera, No. 105. War Department, June 30, 190j, are 
mcxiitied accordingly. 

This order will take effect in each organization on the date of its receipt. 

[1048959, M. S. O.J 

II. 1. Schools for the instruction of the children of officers, enlisted men, and civil 
employees of the Government, to be known as post 8chof)l3 for children, may be < siab- 
lished upon the recommendation of post commanders, approved by the division com- 
mander, at such military posts as have no school facilities near them. 

2. Instruct i'm shall be given under the supervision of ofhcers by teachers d< taihd 
from the enlisted men. The number of teachers shall not exceed one to ev«Ty t\v<nty 
pupils or fraction thereof. For Saturdays and Sundays and during vacations but one 
teacher at each sc^hool will Ik^ allowed exira-duty pay, and he will be required to rare 
for the school books and property, A school teacher is not entitled to extra-duty pay 
while absent or on pass exceeding twenty-four houia. 

(1053615, M. 8. O.J 

By order op the Acting Secretary of War: 

J. C. Bates, 
Major-Oeneralf Acting Chief of Staff". 
Official: 

F. C. Atnsworth, 

Jlte Military Secretary, 



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EDUCATING OHILDBEN AT MILITARY POSTS. 18 

The commanding general, Anny of Cuban Pacification, in forwarding the reports 
from the several posts of his commands remarks as follows: 

"No schools are maintained at Government expense in this army. Parents are 
doing the best they can at their own expense to meet the obligation of educating their 
chilofren. In the United States post schools are maintained under the auspices of the 
Government, but, as this island is not United States territory, it is not believed that 
the within applies.'* 

The reports submitted show that at 18 stations of United States troops there are no 
children and the question of schools has not been considered. A few reports indicate 
that children belonging to the posts could attend the municipal schools in the vicinity. 
At 3 posts cliildren are taught by their parents. At 6 posts children attend private 
schools, the tuition, which varies considerably, being paid by the parents. At some 
posts there are no school facilities. 

Reports have not yet been received from posts in the Philippine Islands and Alaska, 
nor from Fort Huachuca, Ariz., and the 3 recruit depots, viz, Fort Slocum, N. Y., 
Columbus Barracks, and Jefferson Barracks. 




1 



60th Congress, ) SENATE. j Document 

Ist Session. f | No. 351. 



INVESTIGATION OF CONDITIONS IN THIRD JUDICIAL 
DIVISION OF ALASKA. 



Mr. Nelson presented the following 

FINAIi KEPOBT OF THE GBAND JT7BY IX THE UNITED STATES 
COURT, THIBD DIVISION, ALASKA, AT VALDEZ, ALASEIA. 



March 2, 1908.— Referred to the Committee on Territories and ordered to be printed. 



Hon. Silas H. Reid, 

Judge of the United States District Court for tlie 

Territory of Alcu^ka^ Third Division^ at Valdes^ Alaska. 

We, the ^mnd jurj^, having been in session since January 20, 1908. 
and having finished our labors, respectfully report as follows: 

A number of cases have been presented to us for our consideration, 
and we have examined approximately ninety witnesses and returned 
to your honorable court eighteen indictments indorsed as "A true 
biir' and three reports indorsed as "Not a true bill." We have also 
investigated various othc^r matters that have occurred in this judicial 
division. 

THE EXISTING FISHERIES LAW. 

Your grand jury find that the new law relating to the rebate of 
license money to the canneries operating hatcheries provides for a 
rebate for 10 cases of salmon, equal to 40 cents for each thousand of 
red salmon frv liberatiul from such hatchery. The law places the duty 
upon the clerk of the court of issuing certificates, which are redeera- 
abh' in money for the payment of the former license. In other license 
mattc'rs, which are not of such importance as this, the court is called 
upon to pass upon thom; in this case, the most important in many 
ways to tlie int<M'est of the Territory", the court has no voice whatever. 
The first year of the operation of this law the Alaska Packers' Asso- 
ciation alone shows the release of about 90,000,000 fry. For the pa^t 
year this same company shows, through its paid accents, the liberation 
of sojhSOjiOO for the first and third divisions, and under the Inw the 
clerk was compelled to issue certificates at 40 cents for each thousand 
of red fry liberated to the fishing company. These certilicates are 
then turiu»d into the clerk's oflice in lieu of cash in paymeul ot l\\w: 
license tax on their output of canned salmoiu T\i^ u.vx\o\ui\. <^1 \\i>A^ 




THIED JUDICIAL DIYISION OF ALASKA* 



tax for the past year, according to their sworn statement of their oiat- 
put, was $Z2^212.d2. Of tbisi nmount (M.^rtt(icsit€3 were turned into the 
clerk of the court for the entire araount, with the exceptioQ of 32 
cents* 

The facte stated plainly are that last year the Alaska Packers* Asso- 
ciation alone took over 800,000 cases of salmon from the waters of the 
third judicial division; that they paid into the clerk's office thei^um 
of B2 cents in currency and certificates to the amount of ^Si,272 for 
an alleged amount of fry libt! rated, of which no iideqimte proof has 
been nmde that any court would admit as sutJieient evidence of the 
fact. 

The clerk of the court has no authority or opportnnity to investi- 
gate the^e etatcmeiitft aa to the lil>eration of salmon fry and no check 
on the production of these private hatcheries ia provided for. Thus 
the Ala-ska fund that was formerly received from the canneries for 
the maintenance of schools, care of the Insane, and the construction 
and maintenant'o of roads for the benefit of the people of Alaska, is 
reduced by thousands of dollars, to wit, over 1^0,000 for the year 
1907 and about ^i),000 for the previous year. 

The governor of the Territory is at the head of the public school 
system, and there is no way he can he advised of the amount of funds 
to be expected as available at any time, as the clerk can not estimate 
the income at all until afidavits of the canneries have been received. 
These affidavits of the cannery men stand uDquestioned^ as no appeal 
is provided for* 

Your grand jury, therefore, urgently request that the attention of 
CJongress be called to this matter, and that our Delegate in Congress 
be requested to work for the repeal as soon as possible of this law, so 
that the funds heretofore received from the tax on salmon may be 
available for schools, care of the insane, and the construction and 
maintenance of roads in the Territory ♦ 

We further recommend tliiit tish hatcheries be established in Alaska 
and maintained and supported by the Government. 

FISH TRAPS. 

We find upon investigation that on many of the streams and rivers 
where salmon canneries are situated, that the laws in retrard to placing 
fish traps at the mouths of the various rivers and streams are being 
constantly violated. These fish traps are so constructed that but very 
few fish can ascend to their spawning grounds. In consequence each 
year fish in these streams of Alaska are becoming scarcer, and in many 
places the native Indians of Alaska, who almost wholly subsist upon 
salmon, are in a half starved and destitute condition. 

We therefore recommend and urge that our Delegate in Congress 
endeavor to have a law passed making it unlawful to use fish traps, 
nets, or any other obstruction that will prevent fish from ascending 
streams and rivers to their spawning grounds, in any of the waters of 
Alaska. 

We also most earnestly recommend that a fish commissioner, or other 
officer endowed with the proper power to enforce the fishing laws, be 
stationed each year, during the nshing season, at the principal rivers 
where a cannery or saltery is located. 



THIBD JUDICIAL DIVISION OF ALASKA. 8 

DIFFICULTY OF APPREHENDING CRIMINALS. 

The third judicial division of Alaska has within its jurisdiction 
upward of 4,000 miles of seacoast line, which is more than equal to 
the entire Atlantic seacoast line extending from Maine to Galveston, 
Tex., on the Gulf of Mexico. The boundarv line of this division, so 
far as the coast line is concerned, begins at the line separating Alaska 
from British North America, thence running westerly and southwest- 
erly to the most westward island of the Aleutian group of islands on 
the North Pacific Ocean side; thence northeasterly on the Bering Sea 
side along the said group of islands and the Alaska peninsula to 
the Kuskokwim Bay on the mainland, where its jurisdiction ends. 
Within this division, along the seacoast, are numerous villages and 
small settlements estimated at about 60 in all, composed of law-abiding 
people, as a rule intelligent, thrifty, and working to build up the 
natural resources of the country. These people are entitled to the same 
consideration, protection, and encouragement that the strong arm of 
the Government can give them as is extended to the i)eople of other 
States and Territories. 

At times crimes against the law are committed, some revolting and 
horrid, but none more so than are committed in other sections of the 
country, with this difference, that in other Territories and States the 
machinery of the law is better equipped to apprehend and prosecute 
criminals than it is in Alaska. In some places along the Alaskan coast 
the need of additional United States deputy marshals to assist the 
United States commissioners in the apprehension of persons accused 
of crimes can not be too strongly urged. This is evidenced by 
specific cases brought to the attention of this grand jury where the 
commissioners of the precincts in which they reside have no deputy 
marshals to apprehend the criminals and bring them to justice. 

A REVENT7E CUTTER NEEDED. 

In order to suppress crime, or at least minimize it, which is liable to 
break out at any time at points remote from the immediate jurisdiction 
of this court, we, the grand jury, would recommend that a United 
States revenue cutter be stationed at Valdez, which shall be attached 
to this court, subject to its orders, and to be used solely in the cause of 
justice. A revenue cutter would be a strong factor in the suppression 
of crime alone this coast, aiding, as it would, the United States marshals 
and United btates commissioners in enforcing the law and pursuing 
criminals who have heretofore in many cases escap^ for the lack or 
governmental aid. With the aid of a revenue cutter persons accused 
of crime could be brought to the nearest court for trial and speedily 
disposed of. 

STATED TERMS OP COURT. 

In connection with this recommendation a fixed or stated time for 
the holding of court at Valdez — say, the first Monday of October of 
each year — should be made for the trial of cases, both civil and criminal. 
This nas not heretofore been the case. This recommendation can not 
be too strongly urged by the grand jury, for the reason that witnesses.^ 



THIRD JUDICIAL DIVIBION OF A LASS A. 

both in criminal and civil caj^es^ have had heretofore no positive knowl- 
edge wht^n the court of this division would convene at Valdea;* Con- 
frequently many suits at law have been continued and litigants put to 
much expeQBe and trouble. Id criminal ca^^es when arrests are made, 
the officers of the law are unable to serve sulTprjenas on material wit- 
nesaea for the people^ because no time can be staited when sueh 
witnesses are to appear in court, and, as a consequence, these witnessee 
when wanled to testify are scattered and difficult to locate. Thb 
leaves the prosecution without sufficient evidence to convict. Mean 
while the prisoners have languished in jail at the expense of the 
Government^ and finally di^^t-harged for the reasons stated. Thk 
could all be obviated and remedied by fixing a time when a term of 
court would convene, 

AN ADDITTONAT. JTJDOE NEEDED. 

No^ part of Alaska is being developed more rapidly than the third 
jndtcial division* Millions of dolbrs are invc^te^l in gold and copper 
mining, railroad building, and the tii^hing industry. The financial Int-er- 
ests invejhed tti*e so grimt, and the necessity foV prompt and expedi- 
tious sccei!^8 to tlio cLuirts so imperative, both m to civil and criminal 
mattii^r^, that the division of the third judicial division, or the appoint- 
Djent of an additional judgo^ it^ absolutely necessary. Under the pres- 
ent condtiiona litignnt^, witneBses, ancf jurors are obliged to travel 
great distances, involving a great loss of time and money to themselves, 
and a great expennu to the Goveroment. 

GOM^nsSlONRBa 

For the proper maintemmce of law and order in tlie varions sections 

and comriujiiities of Ala^ska it is absoluti.'ly necessary for the courts in 
Alaska to appoint commissioners and deputy marshals throughout tlie 
district. This has been done heretofore wherever practicable and 
necessary wlicn brought to the attention of the court. In all cases 
these conmiissioners receive fees only for their compensation. In 
many cases these fees are not enough to pay the living ex[)en-<es of the 
commissioner, and they are compelled to follow some other avocation 
in order to sustain themselves. In two of the most important com- 
missioners' precincts within this judicial division, to wit: Unalaska 
and Dillingham, or Nushagak, as more commonly known, it is alnio-t 
impossible to get a suitable person to act as commissioner. 

At Unalaska a man versed in law should be stationed, as matters of 
grave import to our Government often arise. This body desires to 
bring to the attention of this court that last year, while that p^ace was 
without a commissioner, some sixty-odd Japanese were arrested for 
seal poaching and in the absence of a commissioner there were brought 
to Seward for preliminary trial. The cost to the Government in this 
matter was over ^1*0,000. Had there been a commissioner at that time 
at Unalaska, these men could have been brought before him and given 
a preliminary trial at the cost of a few hundred dollars, and those 
found guilty bound over to this court. 

At Dillingham for the past five years assaults, felonies, and murders 
have beeu committed, and prisoners and witnesses have had to be 



THIED JUDICIAL DIVISION OF ALASKA. 5 

brought to either Sewtird or Valdez for preliminary trial, at great cost 
to the Government. 

We would therefore recommend that all commissioners be guaranteed 
a salary of $1,200 and additional fees to the amount they are now 
allowed. 

We would also recommend that, if possible, some immediate action 
be taken to provide a salary for the commissioner at Unalaska and 
Dillingham. 

A LAUNCH NEEDED AT NUSHAGAK. 

In the Nushagak precinct there are some 29 canneries and 8 salteries. 
These canneries and salteries are situated along the coast of Bristol 
Bay from Ugasfiak to Nushagak, a disttince of 200 miles. During the 
summer months, from June until September, from 6,000 to 8,000 men, 
mostly foreigners and a greater })art of them of the criminal element 
of the Pacific coast cities, work in these canneries. Lawbreaking in 
all its various forms, from assault to murder, is committed at these 
various canneries and fishing settlements. It is almost impossible for 
the deputy marshal for that precinct to get from place to place, as 
there are no regular boats running between them. His only means of 
travel is in small open row or sail boats, and when he heai*s of a crime 
being couunitted before he can reach the scene of the crime in many 
cases the })arties conmiitting such crimes have been gotten out of the 
country. The witnesses are scattered and the perpetrators of the 
crime go unpunished. We believe that the United States deputy mar 
shal at that place should be provided with a gasoline boat suitable for 
his use in Bering Sea and Bristol Bay. 

We therefore recommend to the Department of Justice that the 
United States deputy marshal for the Nushagak precinct be provided 
with a launch to be used in his oiUcial duties in his precinct. 

DEPUTY MARSHAL FOR THE KNIK PRE(^INOT. 

We ur<jfently reconunend that a United States deputy marshal be 
appointed for the Knik precinct. This is one of the largest precincts 
in this judicial division and is becoming more important each year, as 
a great deal of prospecting, mining, railroad building, and farming is 
now going on in that section. In the Cook Inlet country there are 
some twelve towns and settlements all without the protection of a 
United States marshal or other oilicer of the Government, with the 
exception of Knik, at which place there is a United States commis- 
sioner. A commissioner was appointed for the llliamna precinct 
August 1(>, 1907, but has only been in his precinct about six weeks 
since his appointment. Crimes are often committed in this section by 
both whites and natives. Some of those committing these crimes have 
bcM'ii apprehended and punished. The most of them have not even 
})ccn arrested. The excuse offered by the commissioners is that they 
ha\e no mai'shal to get proper evidence to secure a conviction in these 
various matters. A marshal appointed for the Cook Inlet precinct 
could also act at times for the llliamna precinct, and also for the 
Seward precinct, one half of which precinct borders on Cook Inlet. 



6 THmD JUDIOIAL DITISIQK UV ALASKA* 

OOI^DITIOK OF THE KATrVE& 

We find Upon inveatigation that the native Indians in many parts of 
thb division aro in a starving and deplorable condition. These condi- 
tions are brought about to a great degrot? by whit© and civilizM p^eo- 
pie. The fiah, on which they almogt wholly e*ubsist, are becoming 
scarcer each year, from the fact that the camiervmen are phicinjr Hsh- 
ing traps and nets at the mouths of the various streams and rivers, 
thua preventing the fish from ascending them. 

White men are now trapping all over the district and, with their 
improved traps and methods, are taking away from the Indians the 
furs that were once a source of income to them. 

White men are furniesbing intoxicating liquors to the Indians and 
are debauching the men, their wives, and daughters. Several instances 
have been brought to the attention of this body where dc^aths have 
occurred during the past year through drunkcnnej^s, but nothing can 
be done in this matter at the present time by tliis grand jurv* 

We therefore recommend that a law be passed making it a felony 
for the selling, giving, or furnishing of intoxicating liquors to any 
Indian in this territory. 

Also that a law be passed prohibiting Indians from entering, loiter- 
ing about^ or living in any saloon or plaoe where intoxicatbg liquors 
are sold. 

OABB AKD SUPPOET OF NATtTES, 

We believe that the natives of Alaska could In most locAlitiesbe made 
self -supporting. This we believe could be accomplished by grouping 
them ID various localities or communities under the direct care and 
control of a man and his wife, who t§houId have the power to compel 
them to work and provide for thenaselves the necessaries of life. If 
such were the case, they couM be taught and compelled to raise vege- 
tables), to salt and dry fisb and game, make snowshuci?, fur clothing, 
and curios for sale or barter, build suitable houses to live in, work 
in the various canneries, mining camps, on the trail, or other phues 
where they could secure employment. These things they can and would 
do if some one in authority were placed over them to teach and super- 
vise their actions. 

We urgently recommend that some immediate action be taken for 
the care of the Copper River Indians and those living on the headwaters 
of the Sushitna Kiver, who are now in a starving and destitute condition. 

RESTKICnON OF SALOONS. 

We respectfully recommend that no license for the sale of intoxi- 
cating liquors be granted in any Indian settlement where there is no 
United Stiites conuuissioner or United States deputy marshal perma- 
nently located. Many of the saloons in these places are conducted by 
unscrupulous persons, who conduct gambling and supply liquor prac- 
tically without restriction to natives and whites alike. In consequence, 
a demoralizing condition usually prevails in many of these settlements. 
Such saloons serve no good purpose and are a serious menace to the 
peace of the community. 

We also recommend that the law with reference to the granting of 
liquor licenses be amended and revised to include the above recom- 
mendations. 



THIRD JUDICIAL DIVISION OF ALASKA. 7 

PUBLIC MORALS. 

We, the ^rand jury, after investigating the dance halls of Valdez, 
believe that in all the incorporated towns that the town officials and 
taxpayers have the right to and it is their duty to regulate these 
matters. But in all unincorporated towns or settlements, that the 
judge of this court be requested not to grant liquor licenses to any 
party or parties where women are allowed in or about the premises. 

GAME LAWS. 

In many parts of Alaska wolves are constantly killing off the caribou, 
reindeer, moose, sheep, and domestic animals. These animals are of 
great value to the prospector, miner, and explorer who are opening up 
and developing this country; they are also of great value to the natives 
for food and clothing. 

We therefore recommend that these animals be rigidly protected from 
slaughter by strict laws, and that, in addition to tne present laws for 
their protection, that a bounty of at least $10 per head be paid by the 
Government for killing of wolves. 

COURT-HOUSE FOR SEWARD. 

We desire to call the attention of the judge of this court to the fact 
that there is located at Seward, a United States commissioner, deputy 
United States marshal, assistant United States attorney, and a deputy 
clerk of this court. There is no office or building provided for these 
officials, and we recommend that an immediate appropriation of at 
least $2,500 be made for the erection of a temporary court-house at 
Seward for the use of these offidals. 

We also recommend that a jail be immediately provided at Cordova. 

BANKING LAWS NEEDED FOR ALASKA. 

Upon investigation, your grand jury have ascertained tbfit there are 
no banking laws for Alaska. We beheve there should be a strict law 
governing the establishment and control of all banks in this Territory 
that do a general banking business. We have had drawn an act cover- 
ing this matter and the same is attached to this, report and marked 
' ' Exhibit," and we request that our Delegate at Washington be requested 
to have the same introduced in Congress and make an effort to have 
it passed. 

TRAVELING EXPENSES FOR DISTRICT ATTORNEYS. 

It is hereby respectfully recommended by the grand jury that by 
reason of the hardship worked on the officials of this division, by 
reason of their failure to receive from the Department of Justice 
money expended by them while traveling on official business, in obe- 
dience to mstructions from the Attorney-General, that a fund be set 
aside, subject to the control of the judge of this court, for the payment 
of such expenses when proper vouchers, as now required by the Depart- 
ment of Justice, are submitted to such judge for approval. 




THIBD JUDICIAL DIVISION OF ALAiKA. 
CARE OF SICK AND DESTITUTE* 

We believe that there should be mme provision made by the Gov- 
eronient fur the care of the indigetit sick, or of cripples, maimed, or 
fehipwrediedpeople in tlie Territory. No provision is made by the 
laws of the Territory for the care of such persons, and the only way, 
and whi*.^h if* often reverted to, ii^ for such afiHcted person to entar a 
plea of guilty of havint^ no visible means of support or some otlier 
inisdemetiDor of which they are not guilty, and f^t ing nent to jaiK We 
believe the Government able and that it ou^ht to c^ue for the very 
small number of persons who may becutne tempurarily out of funds 
through sicknasa, accident, or other caunes over which they may have 
bad no control. 

BALARIES OF OnflGtALS. 

Owin^ to the, increasing pontilation of this Territory, the rapid 

developtuent of the country, ana the consequent incrcjise of the duties 
of the various offieialw, we recommend to the Department of Ju^tiee 
that the gahir^ of the governor of the Territory Ix^ increat^ed to 17,500; 
that the salanea of the judges of the district courta be increa^ied to 
$7,600 each. 

We under«tiind that the United States attorney and his associates of 
this division and district are transacting civil businesg before the 
courts* We therefore very strongly ur^e and rec<jn!mend that the 
s*alarie8 of the United States district aH<>rncys in Ala^^ka be rncreas^Ki 
to $5,000 txsr anniim^ and that the Halaricti of aftsbtant United Htatea 
attorneys W increased tu H.UOO per aruuini, and that fiuvh otTicials be 
prohibited from engaging in the ijtucljce of law licforo the courts j or 
acting as counselor at law in this aistrict in any manner whatever out^ 
side of the duties of their ofli^e. 

Owing to the limited time we have boon nnjible to examine any 
offices outside this immediate vicinity. In the invcstiiiiitiori of munic- 
ipal offices, including the public schools, Federal and municipal jails 
at Valdez, we l)eg to report to your honoraf)ie court as follows: 

OFFICE OF CLKRK OF THE COURT. 

The office of clerk of your honorable court was irn csticrntorl and the 
deputy clerk, E. A. Henderson, was most courteous and (»hliL:!M'_i and 
enabled the grand jury to get a good idea of the amount of iafH>r 
entailed and responsif)ility placed on this department. 

We would recomuKMid that th(^ deputy clerk at Valdez be allowed 
an assistant to help him in his duties. 

Your grand jury wishes to call special attention to this office at thi^ 
time. In the office there are valuable papers and records which arc 
absolutely without protection from fire. These records repi(\s(Mit 
large and valuable interests, and the great majority of su( h pro[)erties 
are protected by no other record than that which is to be found in tlie 
records of this office. 

It is therefore recommended that a fire and burglar proof vault l>e 
constructed at an early date. 



THIRD JUDICIAL DIVISION OF ALASKA. V 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSIONER AND RECORDER. 

The United States commissioners and recorders of the various pre- 
cincts have made their reports for the year 1907, as the law requires, 
and at present are in the oflSce of the clerk at Fairbanks. The only 
office visited was that of John Lyons, the United States commissioner 
for the precinct of Valdez, who is also ex officio recorder, and found 
in that office there are about 60 books of record. This office is con- 
ducted by John Lyons, and in our opinion the duties of the same are 
administered in a careful and businesslike manner. Since the meeting 
of the last grand jury a large and carefully built fireproof vault has 
been installed in this office, so that the records of the same will be in 
the future fully protected from damage by fire. This vault was built 
at the recommendation of Judge James Wickersham in the month of 
August, 1907. It was also recommended by other grand juries which 
have convened at Valdez from time to time for the past five years. 
Your grand jury, owing to the distances, was unable to visit the office 
of any other commissioner. 

OFFICE OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT ATTORNEY. 

Your grand jury visited the office of the United States district attor- 
ney and was given every consideration and found the office conducted 
in a most thorough manner. 

We find the United States district attorney, N. V. Harlan, and his 
assistants, W. T. Scott and L. V. Ray, thoroughly competent, con- 
scientious, and fearless in the discharge of their duty. 

OFFICE OF THE DNITED STATES MARSHAL. 

We wish to commend the conduct of this department and make special 
mention of the fact that Deputy James M. Lathrop performs his duties 
in a thoroughly businesslike manner and maintains thorough disci- 
pline among the prisoners. It is due to his personal supervision that 
the Government has a thoroughly equipped place of confinement. 
Mr. Lathrop extended every aid to your grand jury in their 
investigation. 

MUNICIPAL OFFICES. 

We have made an examination of the condition and management of 
the various municipal offices and found the books and records accu- 
rately kept and the atiairs of each office properly conducted. 

PUBLIC SCHOOLS. 

We find the public schools of Valdez in most excellent condition, and 
commend the efficiency of the present staff of teachers. The school 
funds available are expended economically and lawfully. 

FEDERAL AND MUNICIPAL JAILS. 

Our investicfation of the federal jail in Valdez was thorough. The 
sanitary conditions are excellent, and the food furnished prisoners 



10 THTED JODiClAL DIVISION OF ALASKA. 

wholesotne* Tbe personnel ol the force cooneeted with this branch of 
the Federal Department of Justice is highly efficient. 

Inspection of the municipal jail showed it to be in good condition* 
It 13 only a temporary place of confinement and serves the purpose foi 
which it 18 intended, 

HEATING PLANT FOE GOUBT-HOUSE, 

We urgently recommend a steam-heating plant be installed in the 
cQurt-house at YaldeE as soon as practicable, believing that the heating 
of the building would be much more satisfactory, less expensive^ and 
tbe danger of fire greatly reduced. 

IK ooNOLirsioir, 

In eondusion, we desire to express our appreciation for the cour- 
teous treatment of this grand jury by the Hon, Silas H. Keid, the judge 
of this court, and to thank him therefor. We also desire to express 
our appreciBtioD to the United States district attorney's office, and the 
clerk^s and marshal's office for their assistance^ courtesy, and coopera- 
tion in our work, 

With but one or two exceptions tbe members of this grand jury 
have been residents and property holders of this Territory for many 
years. As grand jurora and ii^ citizens we have studied the conditions 
and needs or the country, and the sugge-stions and recommendations 
made in this report are made, having the best intereatd of the Territory 
in mind. 

John H. Burton, Ff^'eman, 
H* H. UiLDHETH, Olerk* 



EXHIBIT. 



AN ACT To augend an act entitled an act amending the Civil Code of Alaska, providing for the 
organization of private corporations, and for other purf)0«e8. 

That Chapter 37 of Title 3 of said act be amended by adding thereto the following 
sections: 

"6ec. 24. Any private corporation formed under this act in accordanre with its 
provisions may carry on a ^t'neral banking business in all its branches. 

"Sec. 25. Any organization so organized a.'* a private banking corporation, as 
amended in the last preceding section, shall, before entering into the transaction of 
any business in connection therewith, file with tlie secretary of the di^^trict ol Alaska, 
and with the clerk of the district court, for the division in which it is propose<l said 
banking business shall be carried on, the following statements, these statements to 
be in addition to those required by this act: 

"First. The amount of actual cash paid in by each stockholder of said corporation. 

** Second. The names, places of residence of the stockholders, and number of shares 
held by each of them. 

"Third. The description of any property, real or personal, otherwise than as above 
provided in subdivisions one and two of this section, which is the property of the 
cor])oration. A statement showing that the capital stock of said corporation is fully 
paid in in cash to the extent of three-fifths of the capital stock, but that the balance 
of said capital stock may l»e represented by real or personal property. An organiza- 
tion certificate shall be acknowledged before a judge of some court of record or notary 
public that the provisions of said private corporation act as amended by this act have 
been complied with in detail. 

"Sec. 26. That no banking corporation organized under this act shall incur at any 
time an indebtedness to an extent of more than one-third of the ca.«h value of the 
capital stock of said corporation; that the provisions of the act with relation to the 
formation of private corporations shall in ail other respects be complied with before 



i 



THIRD JUDICIAL DIVISION OF ALASKA. 11 

the commencement of doing business by paid banking corporation; that paid banking 
corporation shall at all times have on hand in lawtuf money of the Uniteci States an 
amount equal t-o at least twenty-five per cent of the aggregate amount of its notes in 
circulation and its deposits. 

**Skc. 27 (consequence of taking usurious interest). The taking, receiving, or 
charging a rate of interest greater than is allowed by the law, when knowingly done, 
shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest which the note, bill, or other evi- 
dence of debt carries with it or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. In case 
the greater rate of interest has been paid, the person by whom it has b -en paid, or 
bis legal representatives, may recover back in an action in the nature of an action of 
debt twice tl»e amount of the interest thus paid from the association taking or receiv- 
ing the same, provided such action is commenced within two years from the time the 
a«?urious transaction occurred; that suits, actions, and proceedings against any a<Jso- 
ciation under this title may be had in any circuit, district, or Territorial court of the 
United States held within the district in which such association may be estalilis-hefl, 
or in any Slate, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said asso- 
ciation is located having jurisdiction in similar cases. 

"Sec. 28. (Bank officer receiving deposits in insolvent bank.) Any president, 
director, manager, cashier, or other officer of any banking institution who shall 
receive or assent to the reception of deposits after he shall have knowledge of the 
fact that such banking institution is insolvent vr in failing circumstances, shall be 
guilty of felony and punished as hereinafter provided. 

** Penalty: Any person violating the provisions of the above-entitled act, upon 
conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a 
period of not less than two nor more than twenty years. 

"Sec. 29. That the books of account, records, and all matters pertaining to the 
conduct of a private bank or private banking corporation wittiin the provisions of 
this act shall be subject to tne inspection of the national bank examiners of the 
United States at such time and in such manner as the Comptroller of the Currency 
of the United States shall direct. 

"Sec. 30. That this amendment to the act aforesaid, approved March second, nine- 
teen hundred and three, with reference to private corporations shall be in full force 
and effect on and after the first day of January, nineteen hundred and nine." 



S D— 60-1— Vol 32 19 



r 



60th Congkess, ) SENATK J Document 

let Session. J 1 No. 369. 



ACREAGE OF LANDS EXAMINED AND CLASSIFIED IN 
MONTANA AND IDAHO, ETC. 



LETTER 



FROM 



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, 

TRANSMITTING,' 

IN RESPONSE TO SENATE BESOLXJTION NO. 106, INFORMATION 
RELATIVE TO THE ACREAGE OF LANDS IN THE STATES OF 
MONTANA AND IDAHO. 



March 6, 1908. — Referred to the Committee on Public Lands and ordered to be 

printed. 



Department op the Interior, 

Washington^ March 5, 1908. 

Sir: By direction of the President I transnait herewith the informa- 
tion re(|ue.sted in Senate resolution No. 106, dated February 28, 1908. 

There have been examined and classified in the States of Montana 
and Idaho, under the act approved February 26, 1895, 11,863,92.5.33 
acres, no statistics having been kept of the acreage in each of the 
States, respectively. Of this acreaj^e approximately 11,426,963.33 
acres have been approved and 436,962 acres are pending, awaiting the 
adjudication of protests and contests filed against the classification of 
such lands. The classification has been completed in the Coeur 
d'Alene, Idaho, land district and in the Hozeman land district, 
Montana. There remain to be examined and classified 795,420 acres 
in the Helena, Mont., land district and 805,060 acres in the Missoula 
and Kalispcll, Mont., land districts, a total of 1,600,480. 

It is impossible to determine the number of protests or contests 
filed in the General Land Office against such classifications subsequent 
to the expiration of the period of publication, as prescribed by the 
act, for the reason that no lists of such protests or contests have been 
kept, the cases being seimrately and individually adjudicated. It may 
be stated, however, that such protests or contests are comptiratively 



2 



ACREAOB: op lands examined in MONTAKA and IDAHO. 



few in number, and many of them arise in the ordinary adjudication of 
caiies in this odice where it i:* found that the land iuvolved hud pre- 
viouiily been cla-ssiried under said act. 
Very respectfully, 

James Rudolfh GAfirn?xD, 

The Pkesident of tile Senate. 



60th Congress, I SENATE. j Document 

1st Session. \ \ No. 370. 



ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES FOR WAR DEPARTMENT, 1909. 



LETTER 

FROM 

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 

TRANSMITTING 

A COPY OF A COMMTTNICATION FROM THE ACTING SECBETABT 
OF WAR SUBMITTING ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES OF APPBOPBI- 
ATIONS FOB THE SEBVICE FOB THE FISCAL YEAB ENDING 
JUNE 30, 1909. 



March 9, 1908.— Referred to the Committee on Military Affairs and ordered to be 

printed. 



Treasiry Department, 

Office of the Secretary, 

WaslnngtoT}^ Mdvch 5, 190S 
Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the consideration of 
Congress, copy of a comuiunication from the Acting Secretary of War, 
of the 4th instant, submitting additional estimates of appropriations 
for the service of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1909, as follows: 

For roads, wharves, and drainage $1 83, 750 

For water and sewers at military posts 100, 000 

Respectfully, Geo. B. Cortelyou, 

Secretary. 
The President of the Senate. 



War Department, 

Washington^ March Jf,^ 1908. 
Sir: I have the honor to forward herewith, for transmission to Con- 
gress, additional estimates of appropriations required for the service 
of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1909, as follows: 

Roads, walks, wharves and drainaj^c |1 83, 750 

Water and sewers at military po.sta 160, 000 

Total 343,750 



4 ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES FOE WAR DEPARTMENT, 1&09. 

The Quartermaster-General, IJ* S. Army, reports that the urgent 
need for the inereji^se of appropriation under the heads named only 
reached hb office during the past month, hence the impracticability of 
including the same in the annual estimates j^ubiiiitted for the tifical year 
ending June 30, lyOi), and that the maintenance of the efficiency of the 
service renders imperatively necessary the additional suniB estimated 
for. 

Very respectfully, IIobert Shaw Oijver, 

Aeting JSecT'durt/ of War* 

The Sechetart of tiie Treasdrt, 



Additional esiimnfa of aptfropnaiifm^ rtqn Wtd for the iervki of^Jt*eal year mdm^ June 
SOf JW&, by the QiiQTtermasttr'B Dgpartment, U, S, Army, 

War DjiPAHTMEMT, 

Roads, WttTkfl, wharves, *nd drainage^ 

For the ooDetruction by the QutirtermiLstigr'a Department of roarls and 
uharves, for payment of estra-iUity pay to enlisted tnt;n t^uiitloved 
in opetiin^ roa^l'} and in buildiug Wha^rvas^ and for the di^po^l of 

drainage {mimhtc^i) ....._.„_. .„ |18$p750 

Water nn«l sewers at military poBta-* 

¥or procuring and intm^tK-in^ water to bnildm|?B at auch EBilitary posts 
as friim their situation require it to be brouf^ht from a distance aod 
for thedi^jioaat of iwwajje (eiibmitt4fd) ,, ..,..** 160,000 

N<rrB.— In preparing the et^ti mates for appropriations for support of the Army for 
the tiscal year 191)9 this ctflu'e was gaid^a by t'xpt-iiiliJtirt'a for tbf fin^fil year 1907, 
as ehown b^ itii recotda. The totaltrMhiiatc* uiHlt^r thu iU'iiit»of tht^ old appropriatioa 
trafjftportatioa of tho Army for the Philippines kvhu $3,l4;t,:4i+H,71. The eetiiuat© 

rprri^.'rr1 frnrii ttu^ Jivi^iun iiiithr.n t ii'> (mIi^ fur :t tifT:i1 nijilf-r tiiin siuupi-iirint^hn af 
|;2,4()0,000. 

The bill (H. R. 17288), as reported to the House of Kepret^entatives from the Com- 
mittee on Military Affairs, divides the aj)pro|)riati()n transportation of the Army as 
it now existi^, and in accordance with theestimated needs of the Phili|»f>ine.s Division 
made by the division authorities, the estimates, as nuhmittcd by this ollice, are inad- 
equate under two of th(» new appropriations as follows: For roads, walks, wharves, 
and drainage, $()H,7.')0, and for water and sewers at military i)ost8, $75, (»()(). 

Information received from the l'hilij)pines Division is that the division requires in 
addition to the fore^oin<; for the fiscal year 1^M)9 the following;: For roads, walks, 
wharves, and draina^^e, $1 15,0'M), and for water and sewers at military |)osts, $>'),( i()0, 
making a total required in addition to that included in estimate a rea«ly submitted 
for the fiscal year 1909 of, for roads, walks, wharves, and drainage, :?Ih;^,750, and for 
water and sewers at military posts, $160,000. 

In further explanation of tliis estimate the following extract copies of cablegrams 
are submitted: 

Manila, June 13, 1907. 
The Adjutant-General, Win^hmriton: 

With reference to your telegram of the 23d ultimo, annual estimate fiscal year 
1909, as follows: •'Appropriation, transportation of the Army, $2,4(K»,0l)0, great 
care has been exercised in preparing estimates; there should be absolutely no reduc- 
tion. In the matter of transportation of the Army coming fiscal year, have effected 
economies this year amounting to in the neighborhood of $400,000 in straight trans- 
portation, land and water, and can meet re<luction to $2,400,000, in accordance with 
estimates. It will be very dithcult to nieet reduction amounting to 33 })er cent of 
that of previous year and do any of the nee es>ary work under transportation at per- 
manent posts, such as water, sewer, roads, etc. 

Wood. 



ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES FOR WAR DEPARTMENT, 1909. 8 

Manila, February 11, 1908, 
The Adjutant-Genkral, Washington: 

With reference to our telegram of June 13, 1907, "Army transportation 1909," 
should be, if possible, increased to $2,600,000, incident to construction of new post, 
Biliran Island. 

Wood. 

Washington, February 18, 1908. 
Wood, Manila: 

Reference to telegram from your office of 11th instant, how much of $200,000 
increase requested in arm^ transportation is required for roads, walks, and drainage, 
and how much forprocunng and introducing water to buildings, including plumbing, 
and for sewers. This information is necessary on account of rearrangement by Con- 
gress of army transportation, as provided in army transportation act fur the fiscal year 
1908. 

AiNSWORTH. 

Manila, February 19, 1908, 
The Adjutant-General, Washington: 

Referring to telegram from your ofiice of the 18th instant, of $200,000 increase 
requested under army transportation, $85,000 for water and plumbing, and $115,000 
roads, walks, drainage, etc. 

Wood. 

The urgent need for the increased appropriation under the heads named only 
reached this ofiice in the pa<t month, hence the impracticability of including the 
same in the annual estimate submitted July 27 last The maintenance of the effi- 
ciency of the service renders imperatively necessary the additional sums asked for. 
(jr. B\ AUskire, Quartermaster-General, U. S, Army, March e, 1908.) 



60th Congress, ) SENATE. J Document 

Ist Session. | ( No. 375. 



TRADE FOLLOWS THE FLAG. 



Mr. Gallingeb presented the following 

ABTICIiE FROM THE SUNSET MAGAZINE OF MABCH, 1908, EN- 
TITLED ''TRADE FOLLOWS THE FLAG," BY H. A. EVANS* 
NAVAL CONSTRUCTOR, UNITED STATES NAVY. 



March 11, 1908. — Ordered to be printed. 



TRADE FOLLOWS THE FLAG— THE IMMEDIATE INFLUENCE OF THK 
AMERICAN BATTLE-SHIP FLEET ON THE COMMERCE OF THE PACIFIC. 

[By H. A. Evans, naval constructor U. 8. Navy, from the Sunset Magazine, March, 1908.] 

Does trade follow the flag? Ask an Enorlishman this question and 
he will express surprise that there should be any necessity for the 
question. To him the answer is self-evident — of course tmde follows 
the flag. The history of his country proves conclusively that this is 
true, and it is an axiom in Great Britain that 'Hrade follows th^ flag.'^ 

The acceptation of this statement as an axiom in Great Britain, not 
only among the educated people, but also among the masses, has made 
it easy for the British (iovernmentto carry the flag to the ends of the 
earth, and the trade has always followed. This policy has made 
Great Britain commercially supreme. Germany has in the last few 
years been putting into practice the lesson taught by Great Britain, 
and is already reaping the benetits, and will soon be a. strong com- 
petitor for the conuiiercial supremacy of the world. 

The great majority of the citizens of our country have thought little 
on this subject and to these the statement that trade follows the fla^is 
not an axiom. It fact it is only recently that even a small proportion 
of the people of this country have considered this question. The 
country has been so prosperous and there have been so many oppor- 
tunities for the great mass of the people to invest their money profit- 
ably at home that thcv have thought little of the commercial future of 
the countr}^ and the possibilities of foreign trade. There are, of 
course, some who have realized the possibilities of foreign trade and the 
necessity for such trade, but these are few when compared with the 
great majority who have not given the subject a thought. Those who 
have had the opj)ortunity of reading the report of the House and 



2 TEADB FOLLOWS THE FLAO. 

.Senate Merchant Marine C<jqi mission can intelli^f^otly answer the ques- 
tion^ ^* Does tmde follow the t!ag?" but the great majority of the peo- 
ple of thiy country are not prepared to answer the que:!>tioii. 

It seems etmiige that on the Pacific coai§t^ where this question is of 
such gretit importance, that there should be so little interest taken in 
it, and that there arc so few who realize that it is of vital impotltmce 
in the future development of the Facific coa.'^t. In fact, the efforts 
miide in Con^res^a to revive the American merchant marine has met 
with but little encouragement on the Pacific coast and there has been 
no little opposition to the remedy proposed. This is indeed strange 
when the people of this coast have an example so near their doors of 
a nation that is taking advantage of Great Britain's example, and is 
extending her trade in every direction. After Japan htts extended 
her steamship lines to every port on the Pacific and has built up a 
magniHcent trade with every country bordering on the Pacitic, and 
even beyond these limits, it will be very difficult for the Pitcldc coast 
to secure its share of the tntde, which can now be had with but little 
effort. Japan some vears si^o realized the importance of a merchant 
marine and began itii development by granting liberal subsidies. The^se 
subsidies were repaid many fold in the war with KussiiL It was with 
these 8ubsjdt?ed shi|)9 that the Japanese troops were transported and 
it was from these subsidized ships that the naval crews were drawn to 
defctit the liussmn fleet. After the war the efforts to establish a great 
merchant fleet were redoubled- All ocean steamship lines were subsi- 
di/ed and a subiHiidy was also i^rantcd her shipyards. The result was 
the establishment of many magniticent ahipyaidg which were immedi- 
ately tilled with new construction work and to-day Japan is increasing 
her merchant tonnage faster than any other nation in the world. 

Why not now accept the teachings that Japtin has accepted and at 
once teke our share of the world's commerce '< Unless thia is done 
Japan will tiT ;i few vcurs cnntrnl thf^ cornmorcf^ nf fhr* PhI^mMc as her 
share. Will this be satisfactory to the people of the I'acilic coasts 

Und^- the existing circumstances it is strange that there should be 
one dissenting voice on the Pacitic coast to the proposition to aid the 
American merchant marine, for a great shipping means more to this 
Pacific coast than to any other section of the country. San Francisco, 
Portland, Seattle, San Diego, San Pedro, and Tacoma are not great 
manufacturing cities. The foundation for the greatness of these cities 
is their commprce. If their commerce is great or small, just so will be 
these cities. These cities are the gateways to the Pacitic commerce of 
the entire country and this is what has brought them their present 
greatness. 

Look at the great strides made by Seattle in the past few years. 
What has been the controlling caused Does not everyone know that 
it is the great increase in commerce with Alaska? What would be the 
result to these cities if the commerce with the Philippines, Australasia, 
China, Japan, South America, Central America, and Mexico were 
doubled or trebled if Does not every business man in these cities 
realize that it would nearly double the importance of the cities and 
greatly increase their population? With our possession of the Philip- 
pines we have an enormous advantage in securing the trade of this 
country. At present it amounts to almost nothing. The exports from 
San Francisco to the Philippines for the twelve months ending Novem- 
ber 30, 1907, amounted to but $1,470,000, while the exports to little 



TBADE FOLLOWS THE FLAG. 8 

Hawaii for the same period amounted to $10,270,000. This trade can 
be built up and made of great value to the country as a whole and of 
enormous value to the Pacitic coast. 

The trade of the Pacific coast with South America amounts to next 
to nothing, the total exports from San Francisco to all the South 
American countries for tne past year being less than half a million dol- 
lars. With a regular line of steamers under the American flag run- 
ning from San Francisco to the South American ports this trade could 
be made very valuable. Our trade with China, Japan, Australia, and 
New Zealand is of much value now, but will anyone assert that it is 
half what it should be? Will anyone assert that it can not be enor- 
mously increased? There is no doubt that this can be done, but how 
can this best be done? It can best be done bv carrying our exports 
to these countries in American ships, manned by American officers 
and sailors. The establishment of new lines of American steamers to 
these countries with frequent regular sailings and with sufficient aid 
from the Government to enable them to compete with the cheap foreign 
ships manned by poorly paid crews will be a great impetus to the 
trade of this coast with these countries. Furthermore, the establish- 
ment of these lines, the ships of which would be built and repaired in 
the Pacific coast ports, will revive the shipbuilding and repairing 
industries on this coast. 

These industries were once great and gave work at good wages to 
thousands of skilled mechanics, but are now reduced to small repair 
establishments. Foreign ships repair in our ports only when it is 
impossible to return to their home ports for repairs. American ships 
by law follow the same rules, and the docking and repair of the fleet 
that we should have on the Pacific would in itself create an industry 
which would furnish employment to thousands of skilled men. 

Without aid to American steamships from the Isational Government, 
the establishment of new lines or even the continuance of the present 
lines is impossible. Unless such aid is given, the country wul turn 
its commerce over to foreigners to do with it as they will. Shall we do 
this and rely on them to find new markets for our products and adver- 
tise and push our trade in these markets? Do we believe that we shall 
get the best results in this way, or do we expect to even obtain fair 
treatment? Will, for instance, the Japanese agents in Australia of a 
Japanese steamship line advertise and push the sale of American prod- 
ucts, or will the agents of a German line push the sales of American 
products in preference to German products? Will these foreign lines 
and their agents even give American products a fair showing? There 
are some products, such as food stuffs, in which we have a monopoly. 
It is not difficult to sell these, as the world must have them or starve; 
there are others produced by German}'^, England, Japan, and other 
countries, and it is to these that particular reference is made. Do we 
believe that the foreign steamship lines will give the same treatment 
to the products of this country as they will to their home products, 
and can we expect these lines to build up markets for our goods to the 
exclusion of their home industries? If we do, then we believe that 
trade does not follow the flag. The industrial history of England and 
the recent histoiy of Japan proves, however, that trade does follow 
the flag and that the establishment of new lines of steamers to foreign 
markets brings new trade to the country which flies the flag over those 
steamers. 



4 TRADE FULLOWB THE FLA0, ■ 

In the report of the Merchant Marine Commission, presented to 
Contrrciig in iUOo, this subject 13 interestingly preacntesd in the fallow- 
ing words: 

Not only is an A men can ship itself the uif^st efficieot carrier of AmerttTan com* 
Dior^-f*, l>irt th*i ollii'-en* 0/ ttiat »hip, the American pflsaengvra \^ ho tread its dtrfks, 
aitt.l pariifuiarly i\m Aiiierif*uii merchants who ^0 out ti> represent the eteam«Iiip 
corn jifiny ami Ui'rrtjj^h \tM Uviifje'^ft, areinewtahly f pionoeri? and dminmerwof Amftrk^in 
tradt? in foreij^^n inuds. Fur ve-Arg onr minister* and cuni^tiband Ammi-an traveler* 
abrt.a^l have TOmpUintHi ihat Uiere wtfro no American mercantile bousi^ss in forei^'U 
eonntriee, and that Ainerit-ttn jarfiodB, therefore, hud to be handled by foreipn llnuft 
which preferreii to ^*M their own ec»titjtry'a nierdmndis*^. But why eh on Id ti:i**re Ite 
any American honsies in SSoutli Ameri^-^/or Aftia, or Africa, or eWwlii re where there 
are no Ait)erii.^n ehij:it<? Everywhere in the worlct's experienoe it hai be«jn found 
that the firfeit merchant? whn j»o out to fori^i^n einin tries go as »t'enifi of shipping. 
Boon goods frora the home (fjuntry are cofigi|^nt*il to them^ they develop a commis- 
sion bnt^inefts; they branch out into general mercttiitiie trade and growing et runner, 
demand banking taeilili«?fi. 

There were once American housjes in China, India, and South AmeHc-a, hot that 
was when we had American sbipw on whose tnMle their fonndaiion^ n^wted. When 
these ships van shed the boLif^^e.!^ thentaelves soon dl*^|*pe;irtii. When American 
Bblps return, there will a^ain be American meri^antile eaitaldi*sJimfnts tu all porta 
of I he world to (iai?h the sales of Ameritun ^ochIs aUroad with ilit: «ame shrewd fleoae 
and indomitable energy that have built up our enc*rmoua donie&tie eommerce. 

Tbe Pitcific coast k more interested in the tnide of the Philippines^ 
Asia^ Central America, South America, AuHtrnknia, and Japan. Tbe 
fij^^t fiv^e of these have no ^Jiipf* of their own uad must depend on 
foreign ships both for their exports and imports, The great maritime 
nations, Kn^laiid and Oermaay, pay liberal snbiidiew for ne^v line.s of ^^ 
stammers. The^je two nations have alnudy built u^^ » valmible trade ^H 
with these eountriesand Uiis trade U grwilly imrta*iing in value every ^^ 
year, Japan ho?* in the pa.^t few yearn foUowtni the mma policy and 1 
tbe. increase in her conunvvcG ha* been nmrveloui. Ottn tnc United I 
States fiXppet to inrtTM^' its tr:id<;' with thpnp eoimlrtcs, withont its 
own steamship lines, with other comimTcijilly aL'"J?fessive coimtiirs in 
the field, fully equipped with ade(iu;ite carry in<^- facilities^ If it does 
it will be tlie fiist case in the commercial history of the world. 

The inlhience of the fla<r on commerce is well shown by the increase 
in exports fi'om tliis count I'v to Australasia (hie to the Oceanic Line 
from San Francisco. The exports from the United Slates increased 
from §12j;(M),()(Hj in lS!iG to S27,4o(j.(i(i(i in 11)04. Now that this line 
to Australasia has been forced to tro out of business on account of lack 
of aid from our (lovernment, which would enable it to compete with 
foreign ships, it will be sad but interesting to note that the increase in 
this trade will soon cea>e or more ))robably actually decline in the 
next few years. 

Asi(l(» from the great advantages to the whole country of a great 
foreign trade, it is the very lifeblood of the Pacific coast ports. 
Without conunerce these great cities would b(» unimportant towns, 
with only local industries to support them. The greater the foreign 
trade the greater will these cities be, and the more this trade is cariied 
in American bottoms the more rapidly will the trade increas;-. 

What is to be the influence of the future great Pacific naval fleet on 
the trade of the Pacific? 

A great navy and a great merchant marine go hand in hand. Neither 
can long exist without the other. If a great navy is attempted with- 
out a correspondingly great merchant marine, it will be impossijjlc to 
provide trained men for the Navy. Even with our moderate .-izcd 



TRADE FOLLOWS THE FLAG. 5 

Navy of the present day there is the greatest difficulty in obtaining 
men. The ettort to obtain trained men has been abandoned long ago, 
as this was clearly impossible, as there was practically no mercliant 
marine to supply them. I'he effort is now being made to obtain men 
from the interior, the great majority of whom have never seen the 
8ea, and give them a short course of training at the training stations and 
then send them to the seagoing ships. This method is the only one pos- 
sible under the circumstances, but it is far from satisfactory. It makes 
practically every battle ship a training ship, and instead of having a 
seasoned crew brought up to the sea, many of the men — in some ships 
the majority — ai^ recruits. Even this method has not been able to 
supply the demand, and at the present time many ships are short of 
their complements and a number can not be put in commission for 
lack of crews. In time of war, when every ship would be needed, it 
would be impossible to man them. There would no doubt be many 
volunteers, but these would be of little or no value, as they would be 
absolutely without training and would be unused to the sea. 

Tliere are those who make the claim that a soldier can be made in a 
few weeks, even though this claim is unwarranted, but there are none 
who will claim that a seaman can be made in a few weeks or even in 
months. 

How little do the people of this country realize that one serious 
naval reverse in time of war would be irreparable. If even two or 
three of our battleships were lost with their crews, it would be impos- 
sible to get trained crews to man the new ships buihling. Or if the 
casualties in the fleet were considerable the places left vacant could 
not be tilled. If war were declared to-day and the auxiliaries required 
were manned and the ships now laid up were put in commission, all of 
which would be absolutely necessary, the trained men available would 
have to be divided among all these ships, and it would leave nearly 
half each ship's company to be tilled with recruits, and these would 
have no knowledge of the sea, and even less knowledge of the intri- 
cate details of a man-of-war. England, Germany, France, Itjily, and 
Japan have always regarded an efficient naval reserve in their mer- 
chant marine only secondary in importance to the navy. We have no 
reserve. In our little Spanish war the United States exhausted its 
entire maritime resources and put afloat in its first line its entire 
strength of officers and men, and had there been a single disaster 
which required the manning of a second fleet it would have been abso- 
lutely impossible to have obtained either the officers or men. 

Another great need of a merchant marine in time of war is for the 
transportation of men. The country is familiar with the dilHnulties 
attending the transportation of a small army from Tai!ipa to Cuba dur- 
ing the Spanish war. Those who, in defense of their country, were 
forced to make this trip in overcrowded tra!isports, unsanitary, poorly 
ventilated, and in every way unsuited for the purpose, will undoubt- 
ed h^ realize the importance— nay, the necessity, for proper transpor- 
tation. Is proper transportation possible with the present supply of 
transports and suitable merchant ships available? The transports 
available are only adequate for peace conditions. The number of mer- 
chant ships available on either cotist that could be used as transports 
could not carr}^ much more than a few regiments. In case of war in 
the Pacific we could do one of two things — let the enemy take, the 



6 TRADE FOLLOWS THE FLAG, 

Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands, and then wait until attacked, or 
we could attempt the defense of our possessions and att^iek the enemy. 
The first course will surcij nerer Dc satisfactory to the AiuericaQ 
people and the second aggressive con me will be insisted on. How m 
It to bo carried outl How is an army to be transix>rted^ It is known, 
of course, that foreit/n ahips could not be used, as neutral nations are 
not allowed to f urniah such aid to l>elligerent'§. The number of ships 
on the Pacific trying the United Slates tlag Is so gnmli that they are 
known to practically everj^jne on the coast. How long would it take 
these sbips^ together with the -small Heet of transport-s, to carry an 
army of 6O,00U men across the Pacific) It is recognized that this 
could not be done in one trip. Then, are our soldiers to be sent out 
in ^niall detach menta to fall an easy prey to the enemy? We could 
hardly expect the enemy to wait until we had taken our time to trans* 
port our whole force. 

An aga^resBivc campaign, which would undoubtedly be demanded br 
the people, and which, moreoyer^ is the proper one, could not l»e fol- 
lowed. No matter how great the importsuice of defending the Philip- 
pines and an aggres^iive campaign against the enemy, it would be 
absolutely impossible on account of lack of tranj^portation. If we had 
a navy suiBeiently large, the Philippines could be defended with the 
naval force by holding command of the sea and preventing the enemy 
from transporting troops to the Philippines. At the present time our 
naval force is not atiequate fur the defense of our home coast line, and 
against a powerful enemy it would be impoi^sible to hold the Philij»pines 
by means of the Navy and at the same time defend the home coasts. At 
tibe present time against a fKJwerful foe we would have to abandon our 
oversea possessions and act entirely on th^j defensive, waiting for the 
enemy to attack us. Such a war would be long dmwn out^ and tho 
injury to our tnide during this time would l>e incalculable. 

A war conducted in this manner would also effectively dispose of our 
boast of being a world power ! The enemy after taking the Philippines 
could well wait for the next blow to come from us, as a treaty of peace 
with the Philippines in the hands of the enemy would cost the country 
in money many times the cost to establish a great merchant marine. 
Will the country never realize these conditions? If once realized, there 
is no doubt tliat they will be immediately corrected. The necessity 
for a merchant marine is realized on the Atlantic coast and al>o on the 
Great Lakes, but is not realized in the Middle West, in the South, 
and not fully realized on the Pacihc coast. TIjc peo[)le arc beginning 
to realize the necessitv of the defense of the coast. With the coining 
of the great battle-ship fleet and later the establishment of a perma- 
nent Pacific fleet, will come a realization of the inmiediate need of an 
adequate merchant fleet to assist the naval fleet in the defense of tlie 
coast. 

This is the one great lesson that will be taught the citizens of the 
Pacific States by the coming of the fleet. They will be brouLrht into 
actual contact with a fleet that should be provided for the defence of 
this coast— they will think of the possibilities of a foreign war and 
the consequences — they will discuss with officers of tlie fleet the 
defense of the coast, and will be told that a nierchant marine is as 
important for the defense of the coast as the Navv itself; it will 1)6 
pointed out to them why this is true, and they will be convinced. 
Vhen convinced of the necessity of a merchant marine for the defense 
of their country their naturally alert business minds will at once 



? 



TRADE FOLLOWS THE FLAG. 7 

^asp the commercial advantages of the merchant fleet. They will 
then wonder why they have never before considered the possibilities 
of an adequate merchant marine, and in feverish anxiety lest it be too 
late, they will join with the east coast States and the Great Lake States 
to support, those Members of Congress who have so long seen the 
necessity for providing laws that would make a merchant marine pos- 
sible and have fought so hard in Congress to enact the necessary laws, 
but without success. 

The opposition to the measures that have been proposed has in a 
great measure been due to a lack of appreciation of the absolute neces- 
sity of a merchant marine for the defense of the country, and also to 
a misunderstanding of the methods proposed for remedying the defect. 
With the whole Pacific coast supporting the east coast and the Great 
Lake States in measures to educate the Middle West, first to the neces- 
sity of a merchant marine for national defense and, second, to the great 
commercial benefit that a merchant marine will bring not only to the 
seaboard States but the interior manufacturing States as well, the suc- 
cess of the movement is assured and a great merchant marine is only a 
question of a few 3'ears' time. If the coming of the battle-ship fleet 
accomplished but this one thing — the awakening of the people of the 
Pacific coast to the necessity of a great merchant fleet — the trip with 
the attending great expense and difficulties will not have been in vain. 

The merchant marine is a necessary auxiliary to the Navy. The 
Navy is also essential to a great merchant fleet, for without naval pro- 
tection such a fleet is not possible. With a large merchant marine 
there will be a great expansion of our foreign commerce. New mar- 
kets will be found and new lines of Americanvftusiness started in many 
foreign countries. An American merchant 'fliet and the new trade 
following such a fleet will carry the citizens of the United States to 
Asia, South America, Central America, and Africa, where heretofore 
there has been little American commerce. Not only must protection 
be afforded the merchant fleet, but protection must also be given to the 
American interests in these foreign countries. 

The establishment of American steamship lines to these countries 
will open up profitable investment for American capital. There is a 
great volume of American capital seeking new lines of profitable 
investment. The opening of these markets will enj\ble our business 
men to invest in railways, mines, building operations, foreign steam- 
ship lines, and many other industries. Some of these countries are 
semicivilized and are not willing to do justice to the foreign industry 
unless there is strong protection behind it. Capital will riot invest in 
these countries unless protection is given to the undertakings. Such 
protection can only be given by means of a naval force. In time of 
war it will be necessary to provide naval protection to the principal 
steamship lines, not only because these lines are American industries, 
but also to keep the lines of commerce open, so as not to paralyze 
during a war the manufacturing and agricultural industries of the 
country. 

The commercial history of the world shows the necessity of a strong 
navy to protect foreign trade both in peace and war. Without such 
protection capital will not invest in a merchant fleet nor engage in 
foreign commercial undertakings. 

No public event has ever before excited so much interest and enthu- 
siasm on the Pacific coast as the coming of the battle-ship fleet. All 
of the seaport cities are already demanding a visit of tJbe fleet ^v\^ 



8 



TEADE FOLLOWS THE FXAd. 



making: prepamtionst to handsomely entertaia it when it arrives. No 
doubt thoLisnnds from the interior cities and towrm will visit the netiv- 
*ftt tscaport rity thut the tleet viJ^its to inspect ttie JlowL*r of the United 
Stat^'a Navy. Opportunity will Ije afforded thf*st3 to visit the t>bipa 
and in**|R*ct tiiein and talk with the otficers ami men, 

Tiie sF'acoft^t cities will vie with each otiier in pnhlic banquets to 
the ollirers and in other fornix of entert^iininent. During all of f liefe 
pleasant er»tiTtHinpjent»J!, let there be learned a legj^on of much iinpor* 
tAncf* vo the Navy, and of paramount importance to the tmtioh— lliat 13, 
the ncces<sity for a njt*n Iiarit tnarine- Let tlm people of the Pacitic 
coast Jjt^come acquainted with the thinking otliwrs of the fleet; ask 
them if the necew^ity to the Navy of a merrhiint marirm ha?^ beini over- * 
staled in this brief article; discut*hi wiih I hem the iidvantage.H to be 
giiined commercially by a f;J"eat merchant tieet; ask tliem of the 
dillicidtiiw experienced in jTeltiri;jr n^ti" of any kind for the .^hips; a.sk 
them of the dillicuUies of training men; ask llieui if there arc any 
tniined men available to draw on in time of war; lonk over the crews 
carefully and note the youth of the j^rent majority; ask the men if 
the^' eX[MH"t to reenlitjt when their |j resent enUstmerlts expire. 

At public ban<|uets,when the bu^incstt men are gathered to entertain 
thi^ otlieers of the fhn^t, let one of the luunber speak on the ^ubjert of 
^'The Merchant Marine, its Intluent-e on the Commer* e of the Pacitic, 
and its Value to the Navy*" Let him ask for inforn;ation as to the 
value to tlie Navy of tlie nuMcliant marine both in peace and war. 
Then call on one of the oflieerh of the fleet in whom you have con- 
lidcnee— preferably to the cammandei in chief — to s|a^ak on the ^ame 
subject. If thi*i is dorte, the coming of the fleet will aci-umplish much 
for the commerce of the Pacilic, and this artirle will not have been 
written in vain, for the husinc)!^ men of the Pacific coasst will be a 
unit in dcnkJUNlinif Conjiressi<*nal legi-.hit ion which will mt;ke a great 
American merchant marine possible. 



o 



60th Congress, ) SENATE. 1 Document 

1st Session. J | No. 377. 



REINSTATEMENT OF SOLDIERS DISCHARGED FROM 
COMPANIES B, C, AND D, TWENTY-FLb^H INFANTRY. 



MESSAGE 

FROM THE 



PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 

RELATING 

TO THE EXTENSION OF THE TIME LIMIT FOK THE REINSTATE- 
MENT OF THE SOLDIERS DISCHARGED WITHOUT HONOR FROM 
COMPANIES B, C, AND D, TWENTY-FIFTH INFANTRY. 



March 11, 1908. — Read; referred to the Committee on Military Affairs and ordered 

to be printed. 



To the Senate: 

On December 12, 1906, the Secretary of War by my direction issued 
the following order: 

'^Applications to reenlist from former members of Companies B, C, 
and D, Twenty-fifth Infantry, who were discharged under the pro- 
vi.sion8 of Special Orders, No. 266, War Department, November 9, 
1906, must be made in writing and be accompanied by such evidence, 
also in writing, as the applicant may desire to submit to show that he 
was neither implicated in the raid on Brownsville, Tex., on the night 
of August 13, 1906, nor withheld any evidence that might lead to the 
discovery of the perpetrators thereof." 

Proceedings were' begun under this order; but shortly thereafter 
an investigation was directed by the Senate, and the proceedings under 
the order were stopped. The Senate committee intrusted with the 
work has now completed its investigation, and finds that the facts upon 
which my order of discharge of November 9, 1906, was based are sub- 
stantiated by the evidence. The testimony secured by the committee 
is therefore now available, and 1 desire to revive the order of Decem- 
ber 12, 1906, and to have it carried out in whatever shape may be 
necessary to achieve the purpose therein set foilh; any additional 
evidence being taken which may be of aid in the ascertainment of the 

S D— 60-1— Vol 82 20 



3 REINSTATEMENT OF SOLDIERS, TWENTY -FIFTH INFANTRY. 

truth. The time limit during which it wbb possible to reinstate any 
individual soldier in accordance with thfi terms of this order haa, how- 
ever, expired. I therefore recommend the passage of a law extend- 
ing this time limit, go far a^^ the soldiem concerned are affected, until 
a year nfter the passage of the biw, and permitting the reinstatement 
by direction of the President of any man who in his judgment shall 
appear not to be within the class whose discharge was deemed neces- 
«arj in order to maintain the discipline and morale of the Army, 

Thexjdorb Kooskvelt, 
TflE White House, March li^ 130S. 



> 



60th Congress, ) SENATE. j Document 

M Session. J ( No. 378. 



MEMORIAL REMONSTRATING AGAINST CONSTRUCTION 
OF FOUR NEW BATfLE SHIPS. 



Mr. Hale presented the following 

MEMOBIAIi OF STTNDKY CITIZENS OF NEW TORK CITT, BEMON- 
STBATINQ AGAINST THE GBEAT ADDITION TO THE NAVY 
INVOLVED IN THE PLAN OF AUTHOBIZINO AT ONCE THE 
CONSTBUCTION OF FOUB NEW BATTLE SHIPS. 



Mabch 11, 1908.— Beferred to the Committee on Naval Affaire and ordered to be 

printe<l. 



To the Bepresentatives and Senators in Congress: 

We, the undersigned, citizens of New York City, voicing, as we 
believe, the sentiments of many thousands of American citizens, earn- 
estly protest against the extravagant demand for an addition of over 
160,000,000 in the form of four new battle ships, cruisers, etc., to the 
naval budget of last year, inasmuch as no danger threatens the coun- 
try not known last April when President Roosevelt told the world: 
"We are no longer enlarging our Navy. We are simpl}^ keeping up 
its strength. The addition of one battle ship a year barely enables us 
to make good the units which become obsolete." 

Sixty-tive per cent of the national income is now expended on war 
past and present. The increase of our naval budget has recently been 
used in tne French Assembly as a reason for increasing its own; is 
largely responsible for the increase of armaments among Asiatic na- 
tions; and is well-nigh certain to retard that reduction m the arma- 
ments of the world for which we have so long been waiting. 

The growing discontent throughout the world at the appalling in- 
crease of waste of national resources must be heeded. We feel that 
this protest is the more necessary inasmuch as there are various new 
and effective methods now available for promoting international friend- 
ship and rationally settling difficulties, which these new demands seem 
to Ignore. 

Andrew Carnegie, Robert Fulton Cutting, Robert C. Ogden, 
George Haven Putnam, Oswald Garrison Villard, Horace 
White, Samuel J. Barrows, Fanny Garrison Villard, Marcus 
M. Marks, Anna Garlin Spencer, Hamilton Holt, Robert 
Erskine Ely, George Foster Peabody, Spencer Trask, John 
Martin, Prestonia Mann Martin, 15. Stillman Doubleday, 
Miriam Finn Scott, Leroy Scott, William G. Choate, Mrs. 
William G. Choate, Alfred J. Boulton, Francis Lynde 



AGAINST OONSTBUOTION OF FOUR NEW BATTLE SHIPS. 

Stetson, Morrill Goddard, A. Harport, jr., A. Lueder, 
Robt. Walker, Cecil K. Leavitt, Evelyn G. Leavitt, Isabella 
McDonald, Anna Benner, C. B. Smith, W. C. Demorest, 
William A. Smith, William Henry Knox, John W. McAvov, 
Joseph V. Land, P. B. Land, Sarah E. Gardner, John Ash, 
Martha Nixon, Melissa Sutton, Endora Ma/jill, E. A. Ekik- 
hardt, George S. Baldwin, Gudron Halmith, Sarah Potter 
Paine, Alice Burns, Lee W.Beattie, Mrs. Ferdinand Herman, 
Albert G. Lawson, Martha Knight Lawson, Albert Lawson 
Frost, Anna T. Frost, William M. Frost, Isaac Yankauer, 
Charles G. Ehrlich, Albert Dublon, Louis F. Denike, Kath- 
arine Donegham, Hannah L. Wingate, James Purdy, Susan- 
nah Jarman, Edith K. Purdy, John B. Bogart, L. R. Green- 
berg, Kate Daniels, Fannie Dublin, Meyer Greenberg, Max 
Scott, Martha R. White, A. W. Howells, A. E. White, 
Marion R. Tabor, Samuel H. Bishop, Richard P. Messiter, 
James Thornton, S. Pricster, Mrs. G. A. Harrington. 
George A. Dows, Annie Dows, Virginia Ostrom, Mrs. 
Francis J. Garrison, Janette Lylle, Mrs. Oswald G. Vil- 
lard, Alice Morgan Harrison, Ellen Theresa Morgan, 
Jessie M. de Gagarza, W. G. Kains, G. W. Wenner, R. G. 
H. Cooper, R. E. Smythe, Mrs. C. Smith, E. G. Arm- 
strong, H. Mason, Henry Mottet, F. D. Veiller, Mrs. W. C. 
Waters, Mrs. Leo Stein, James S. Dennis, Henry Feld- 
niann, Gustiv J. Voss, Frederick Kanter, E. F. l^ockmann, 
W. Pilgrim, Frederick Herman, William J. Meager, Miss 
G. Kendall, Angelina de Champlin, Joseph Reading, Mrs. 
L. H. Badger, Lucy Whitin, Blanch Lucas, Bertha Brooks, 
Anna G. Du Bois, Louise Whitin, John E. Nichollans, 
Alfred Bosson. 
Edward J. Oshorn, Raymond Dodge. Raymond Levy, Caroline 
Dcsi)ard, Flora Harrison, Margaret S. Sutton, Margaret 
Bates, Gwendaren Despard, Maria Barton, Kichard S. Col- 
lins, Sarah W. Collins, Stephen W. Collins, Sarah C. 
Isham, Annie Fellows Nokl, Edward A. Grossinann, Mrs. 
E. A. (iroysmann, Mrs. H. L Ostrom, Joseph Marx, Na- 
than Holtz, R. A. Th(M)dora Bliss, Mrs. B. B. Wilbur, 
M. R. Yost, K. Midler, Ruth Keir, Stephen S. Wise, L. J. 
Waterman, Louise E. Philips, Eniilie F. Leach, Laet-Ji E. 
Leach, Ludwig Rothenbild, Jacob J. Koch, John H. Haw- 
ley, P]dwar(i lleath, jr., Isaac H. Cohen, C. I. Hobson, 
Pollen Collins. Joseph E. Wisner, rlohn Bauer, Elizabeth 
Kewe, Mary Collins, R. B. Queinielt, Mrs. M. G. Preston, 
May Preston Slosson, Mary Hess Brown, A. J. Joffe, K, E. 
Olcott, Silas Gerkes, Edwin Donaldson, Solomon Schwartz, 
B. C. Hammond, William M. Schumann, George Marshall, 
Philip F. Nolan, David H. Scott, William Schmidt, Marv 
E. Crygier, Albert Crygicr, Arthur Constant, R. W. Dol- 
son, Jonathan Pierce, Thomas Locken, W. W. Passage, 
Percy Russell, William de Voce, George W. Waldron, 
Sydney H. Cox, rlose])li A. Wells, Herbert Vandebeck, 
John H. Washburn. Mrs. XL C. Havens, Miss C. Marsh, 
H. Collin Havens, Wiiliu<ire Marsh, Mrs. W. W. Jones, 



AGAINST CONSTRUCTION OF FOUR NEW BATTLE SHIPS. 8 

Albert Adler, Arthur B. Goodkind, Augusta L. Wetmore, 
Francis J. Potter, Etta Potter, L. D. Austin, Mary W. 
Somerville, Liela Chevalier, Clarissa V. Prescot, «Iohn E. 
Koeser, John C. Bliss, Mrs. L. C. Wagner, Dr. L. Lambert. 

Gottheil Pach, Francis Poch, Teresa A. Egan, toward D. Page, 
Homer G. Ostrom, Denis T. S. Denison, Camille Solomon, 
Robert C. Wey, Victor Baar, Mar}' R. Davis, Lillie Ben- 
edict, James J. Bixby, C. P. Bixby, John D. Long, John 
S. Festerson, D. J. Meserole, Louis W. Pfaus, E. V. Al- 
ford, A. M. Callender, William M. Jackson, Anna M. 
Jackson, Jane M. Carpenter, Louis E. Thompson, Edward 
Palmer, James Ferguson, William Stift, Mrs. William 
Stift, Mrs. James Ferguson, Helen Matthews, Harry C. 
Abbe, Hubert Howson, L. Lippmann, C. Schulhafer, 
Harry Samuelson, M. S. Perser, Paul J. Marks, Robert 
D. von Rentsch, Abraham Cofo, J. Budwig, Henry 
Dilg, Helen McDowell, Isabella Waters, Howard Brad- 
street, Henry Moskowitz, Robert Cabmovit, Lydia M. 
Storey, Dwight N. Graham, William K. Austin, William 
K. Austin, jr., Thomas B. Austin, William K. Austin, 
Henry W. Hardon, Cora Burr Hardon, Adolph Spiegel, 
Orrin S. Wood, Mrs. Orrin S. Wood, Matilda Woodrow, 
George Edgar, Thomas C. Edgar, Joachin Elmendorf, 
David Black, Dennis II. Cox, Florence Ida Hacket, 
H. E. Plover, C. B. Eaton, Isabelle S. Whitin, 
Jessie Morris., C. A. Morris, Harold A. Content, 
B. A. Sullivan, J. L. MicDonald, Stanhope Wheat- 
croft, Mnrjorie A. Content, Jennie D. Frank, M. 
B. Cleveland, Annette B. Collins, John W. T. Nichols. 

Horace J. Ja(iuith, Jas. C. Bany, Charles G. Bliss, Stephen S. 
Haight, J. J. Falvey, H. L. Clark, N. M. Nielsen, E. Oster- 
walder, A. D. Banston, Jacob Kopbach, Thomas P. Ryan, 
Michael Raphael, C. F. Watkins, W. B. Veneam, William 
Kranth, Charles Wiesman, William Bandom, George Dam- 
bert, Sophie Kranth, W. G. Creamer, H. C. Creamer, 
Joseph R. Dorman, Julius Libeman, Joseph M. Guinness, 
Cynthia T. Meeker, Maude Arundel Colli ver, J. A. L. Gard- 
ner, J. G. B. Heath, C. F. F. Hall, Mrs. Thompson, L. 
Srrachcv, G. C. Levis, M. A. Beament, George Boament, W. 
Stevenson, Mrs. R. A. Todd, R. A. Todd. Mrs. J. H. Blanch- 
ard, Margaret J. Sexton, John T. Sexton, Alice Catfrey, 
Alex Pargiter, \V. A. Steremun, John Mead Howells, Fred 
L. Stearns, Louise A. Stearns, Alberts. Bard, Charles Henry 
Davis, Uobert R. White, Michael Kiev, Bernard K^-sch, 
Anna A. Short, Charles W. Snow, Rosa Welt Straus, Nellie 
Straus, Josiah C. Punipellv, W. H. Straight, Robert G. 
Boville, William O. McDowell, William E. Stark, Percy 
Waxman,C. L.Armstrong, Katharine Dulx>isMcKnight, J, 
R.Winchester, W. D. Schaffer, Anna R. Brewster, ('ha rlotte 
PL Simpson, Florence Van Wyck, Robert Baker, Richard 
F. (ieorge, Edmund Corkill, Peter Aiken, John Fehner, 
S. Grace Royce, Florence H. Holden, Alice G. Raymond, 
Hannah D. Sharps, Mary Root, Fanny Finn Miller, William 



AGAINST 00N8THUCTI0W OP FOCE NEW BATTLE SHIP8, 



Miller, E. B. Graimis, a L. Kibbe, S. C. Hazeo, M. U 
Wondberry, Mrs, Raymond, Panouvota Alexandrakis, A. 
P. liazen,* Auf'U.stus ^Vhite, Stepln3n Lolnes, Henrj B. 
Hathaway, R, H, Loioes, Mary H. Loines, Oliver E. Say- 
ior, Mrs/ George Place, M, A, Livur, Frederick A. CHiiip, 
Lyon Camp, Arazi Camp, C, C. Mead, Kate C, Oirpenteri 
L- W. Robbinsj Bailey B, Buiritt, K, RlcbardB, M* L. 
Eeid, Arthar Dow< 



6dTH Congress, ) SENATE. j Document 

l8t Session. J ( No. 392. 



MEMORIAL OF PEACE ASSOCIATION OF FRIENDS OF PHILADELPHIA 
AGAINST BUILDING OF FOUR NEW BATTLE SHIPS, ETC. 



Mr. Hale presented the following 

MEMOKIAL OF THE PEACE ASSOCL^TION OF FRIENDS OF PHILA- 
DELPHTA KEMONSTBATINa AQAINBT THE GREAT ADDITION 
TO THE NAVY INVOLVED IN THE PLAN OF AUTHORIZING AT 
ONCE THE CONSTRUCTION OF FOUR NEW BATTLE SHIPS AND 
OTHER CRUISERS AND VESSELS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 



March 17, 190c». — Referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs and ordered to be 

printed. 



To the Congress of the United States: 

The Peace Association of Friends of Philadelphia respectfully enters 
an earnest protest against the authorization at this session of Congress 
of the building of four new battle ships, with cruisers, docks, etc., 
aggregating an expenditure in excess of Jf60,000,000. 

Your remonstrants urge the following considemtions in support of 
their protest: 

The unprecedented rapid growth of our Navy can be justified on 
grounds of grave national peril only. 

No such peril appears in anv direction. On the contrary, within a 
year the action of the Second Hague Conference did away with the 
bombardment of unfortified towns, and three-fourths of the countries 
of the world went on record as advocating the protection of private 
property at sea in time of war; assurance was given of the establish- 
ment of a Court of Nations at the Hague, and the cause of interna- 
tional ai'bitration treaties received renewed life. 

The relations of our Government with other countries are amicable 
and give promise of stable peace. Those in positions of authority and 
knowledge in America and in Japan assure us that the recent questions 
at issue have never threatened a break in the friendly relations of the 
two countries, but that the deplorable agitation of the public mind 
was created by misinformed persons and a sensational press. 

The vast and constantly increasing expenditure for naval purposes 
is adding to the burden of taxation in a time of financial uncertainty 
and busmess depression. 

Such expenditure diverts national revenue from useful and produc- 
tive projects of internal development and impi'ovement now urgently 
demanded by the needs of the country to facilitate commerce and pro- 
mote the general welfare. 



2 PEACE ASSOCIATION OF FRIENDS OF PHILADELPHIA. 

History teaches that the immunity from foreign wars and aggres- 
sion enjoyed by our country is due not to a great navy and an impos- 
ing military establishment, but to our national policy of friendliness, 
candor, and pure intent in international affairs. This policy has made 
"American diplomacy" a term of honor among nations. 

The policy of naval and military expantision is new to our country. 
It suggests a change of base from the principles of our fathers; an 
attitude of unrest, self-assertion, and display that is undignified and 
out of keeping with our national genius. 

A large and rapidly increasing part of our population has come to 
the United States to escape economic, social, and governmental condi- 
tions, created by military burdens and the inheritance of old wars. 
These citizens are not in sympathy with a movement to restore them to 
a condition from which they sacrificed much to be free. 

There is a growing sentiment, already widely entertained, that war 
is a barbarous method that settles controversies on a basis of mere 
phjsical force and not of justice and righteousness. Arbitration, on 
the contrary, appeals strongly to our people as a method based on 
equity and reason. 

By reason of the progress of recent years, and the facilities afforded 
at The Hague, international arbitration is as much a part of the 
world's government as the law courts are part of the national life. 
For two civilized nations to rush into arms over a controversy that 
can be settled rightly only by judicial action is regarded now as an act 
of criminal folly. 

Hence it appears that the naval force should be regarded only as 
national polic^e. Your remonstrants believe that our present navy is 
amply large for this purpose, and should not be increased. Any 
larj^-e addition to our present force is likely to become a menace and 
soni'ce of danger rather than a protection. 

Therefore your renionsti-ants uvgi\ upon you, as chosen representa- 
tives of the people, the defeat of this proposed legislation, because 
they ])elieve it to ])e inexpedient and unnecessary, wasteful of the 
national revenue, contrary to our historical development and national 
genius, at variance with the sentiment of a large proportion of the 
people of the United Statics, and contiary to the international policy 
of a Chiistian nation that has stood l)etV)i'e the world as a leaaer in 
peace and an exponent of justice and fiiiMidiiness. 

Signed by authority and on behalf of the Peace Association of 
Friends of Thiladelphia. 

John B. Garrett, Pre.9?dent^ 
Stanley R. Yarnall, Vice- President ^ 
Joshua L. Batly, 
Isaac Sharpless. 

Peace Assoctatton ob Friends of PiiiLADELniiA, 
20 S. Twelfth Street, 
H. W. Cadbury, Secrd((ri/, 

Philadelphia, TIdrd Mouthy 9th, lOOS, 



60th Congress, ) SENATK (Document 

Ut Session. J 1 No. 395. 



DRAFT OF BILL RELATING TO ADMINISTRATION OF 

INDIAN AFFAIRS. 



Mr. Clapp presented the following 

DRAFT OF A BILL RELATING TO THE ADMINISTBATION CF 

INDIAN AFFAIKS. 



March 19, 1908. — Referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs and ordered to be 

printed. 



Department of the Interior, 

Office of Indian Affairs, 

Washington^ March 3^ 1908. 
Hon. Moses E. Cl^pp, 

Cliairrnan^ Committee on Indian Affairs^ 

United States Senate, 

I have had compiled and embodied in the draft of a bill the various 
measures relating to the administration of Indian AHairs now pend- 
ing before the Congress, to which have been added two or three which 
have not appeared in print. 

I am handing you herewith the draft and will give a brief explana- 
tion of each of the subjects embraced in the bill. 

AUotmenU (H. Doc. No. 705). — The object of the provisions under 
this title is to amend the geneml allotment law so as to permit the 
allotment to each Indian of such area as may be for his best interests, 
not exceeding the quantity named in the bill— 40 acres of irrigable, 
80 acres of nonirrigable agricultural, or 640 acres of grazing land. 

The present law provides that each Indian who may be alloted 
under it shall be given 80 acres of agricultural land or 160 acres of 
gra^^ing. 

Where the agricultural land is irrigable — as is the case in most of 
the reservations yet to be allotted — 80 acres is too much to give each 
Indian. The maximum should not exceed 40 acres, and on some of 
the reservations 5 acres will be ample for each Indian. On the other 
hand 160 acres of grazing land is in many places wholly insufficient to 
sustain an Indian who may elect to engage in stock mising. 

The proposed amendment of the law will permit allotments in quanti- 
ties varying as the local conditions shall render advisable. 

Cancellation of allotments (H. Doc. No. 505).— There are many 
cases pending in the Office where the allottees feel under some moral 
obligation to members of their families or their divorced wives and 



3 BILL KELATINQ TO ADMINISTRATION OF INDIAN AFFAIK8. 

wish to relinquish part of their allotrrents so as to allow these obligees 
to select the lands relinquished for their own use. 

The object of the paragraph under the above title is to enable them 
to do this. 

Leasing Indian lands (H. Doc. No. 633; S. Doc. No. 72). — The pur- 
pose of the first paragraph under this title is to extend the authority 
for leasing Indian reservations, which is now confined to " lands bought 
And paid for," to all reservations for mining purposes and to place the 
length of the term for which tribal and allotted lands may be lea:scd 
for mining purposes — now ten and five years, respectively — within the 
discietion of the Secretary of the Interior. The reasons for asking 
this legislation are given in the Secretary's letter of February 6 (H. 
Doc. G33). 

The second paragraph provides for leasing irrigable allotted and 
tribal lands for not exceeding ten years for tribal land and for a term 
not exceeding the unexpired trust period for allotted lands for inten- 
sive farming. 

The Secretary has put it well "that Congress could enact no wiser 
law than legislation authorizing the leasing of all Indian lands sus- 
ceptible of irrigation, tribal or allotted, for farming purposes for a 
long term of yeai's." • 

The third paragraph authorizes the Secretary to lease the lands of 
^ny Indian, declared under State laws to be an habitual drunkard, hnd 
to use the proceeds for his maintenance in the State asylum. 

As the Indians for the most part pay no taxes, the local authoriti:^8 
:are loth to enforce any laws against them which will increase tl.e 
•expenses of the county or State. In order that I may be in position 
to ask the enforcement of the State laws in regard to habitual drunk- 
ards, and to remove the principal objection to such enforcement, I ask 
for the enactn)ent of the proposed legislation. 

Poicet' and reservoir sites (H. Doc. No. 707). — The paragraph under 
this title authorizes the Secretary to reserve power and reservoir sites 
on Indian reservations before the surplus lands are opened to settle- 
ment or entry, and to dispose of these for the benefit of the Indians. 

Under existing law such sites, when the lands are oponed, can be 
pi'otected only by proceeding under the reclamation act. That service 
IS engaged in so many and varied projects that it can not attempt many 
that would be feasible were it in a position to carry on the needed work, 
«,nd under that act the Indians would derive no benefits commensurate 
with the value of these sites. 

The proposed legislation will enable the Secretary to dispose of such 
valuable natural resources and to conserve the proceeds for the benefit 
of the Indians. 

Beinoval (^f rest Actions. — This authorizes the Secretary, in his dis- 
•cretion, to turn loose any Indian allottee who persists in violating the 
laws of his State or of the United States after he has been warned of 
the consequences of his acts. 

I do not believe that any Indian who refuses to obey the laws of State 
and nation, after due warning, is entitled to any further protection from 
the Government, but think that he should be left to tase care of him- 
self as best he can, like any other citizen. 

Rights of way (H. Doc. No. 201, 5J)th Cong., 2d sess.). — There is no 
•existing means b}^ which rights of way for various purposes can be 
^janted on an Indian allotment, except condemnation proceedings 
under State laws. The provisions under this title, if enacted, wrdl 



BILL BELATINQ TO ADMINISTRATION OF INDIAN AFFAIRS. 8 

remedy such defect and enable the Secretary to grant rights of way 
over allotments as well as over tribal lands. 

Sales of Indmn alhtmefnU (S. Doc. No. 61). — The law authorizing 
the sale of Indian allotted lanas, inherited or otherwise, is covered by 
a number of acts, more or less conflicting, the effect of wliich has been 
very unsatisfactory. To reconcile the conflicts and simplify as much 
as possible the formalities to be observed in conveying the lands of 
minors, insane, and mentally incompetent pei'sons, the Secretary, on 
December 9, 1907, submitted to the Congress the draft of an act "to 
authorize the Secretary of the Interior to issue patents in fee to pur- 
chasers of Indian lands under any law now existing or hereafter 
enacted." 

This draft has been revised by a subcommittee of the House Com- 
mittee on Indian Affairs and appears in the bill herewith under the 
above title as so revised. 

I believe the enactment of this legislation will simplify greatly the 
method of selling lands, and that the issuance of fee-simple patents to 
the purchasers will result in the Indians receiving a larger compensa- 
tion for their lands arid secure to the purchasers an indefeasible title. 

Sale of timber (S. Doc. No. 66; S. Kept. No. 175).— A draft of a bill 
"to provide for the sale of timber on allotted and unallotted Indian 
lands, and for other purposes," was submitted to the Congress by the 
Secretary on December 9, 1907 (S. Doc. No. 66). 

A bill with that title (S. 4548) passed the Senate on February 11, 
which provides for the sale of timber on allotted lands only, the pro- 
vision relating to unallotted lands having been stricken out on the 
recommendation of the Senate committee (S. Kept. No. 175). The 
report does not mention any objections to the provision, and I am not 
aware of the reasons which influenced the committee to make its 
recommendation. 

There is now no law under which timber on lands within Indian res- 
ervations, except in the States of Minnesota and Wisconsin, can be 
sold, other than the dead timber, standing or fallen, which may be sold 
under the provisions of the act of February 16, 1889 (25 Stat. L., 678), 
with the consent of the President, and not otherwise. It is well known 
to this Office that on many of the reservations there is a large amount 
of matured timber which should be cut and its value saved to the 
Indians. This is also true of timber on allotments on reservations in 
States other than Wisconsin and Minnesota, and there should be some 
general law applicable to allotted and unallotted lands alike, under 
which the matured timber on any Indian reservation could be sold. 

Th<> paragi-aph authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to call upon 
the Forest Service for assistance was stricken out in the Senate. 

For these reasons I have incorporated the original draft in the ac- 
companying bill and trust that it may be enacted in that form. 

As to this, the Department of the Interior and the Department of 
Agriculture have entered into a cooperative scheme by which the For- 
est Service will take charge of the general supervision and sale of 
timber on Indian allotments, although the Forest Service is under the 
Department of Agriculture. The scheme has been in force for about 
eignteen months in Wisconsin and has worked very satisfactorily, and 
the Department of Agriculture has in no way interfered or attempted 
to direct what sh\ll be done, but has left it entirely to the Interior 
Department, the Indian Office, and the Forest Service. The Interior 



It BILL RELATING TO ADMINISTRATION OF INDIAN AFFAIRS. 

DepartQient and the two Bureaus mentioned have been working in 
entire harmony. I think this paragmph should be retained. 

Sale of timber of Choctaw and Ckicmsaw coal and asphalt lands. — 
Under the law the segregated coal and asphalt lands in the Choctaw and 
Chickasaw nations can not be leased or sold, and the timber can only 
be disposed of under the same circumstances as the land on which it 
stands. When the lands were segregated about 107,000 acres were 
under lease. Much of this leased land has been and is being devel- 
oped, and it is absolutely necessary that the mine operators have 
timber for props and other uses in connection with their mines. A 
draft of a bill to authorize the Secretary to sell the timber on these 
segregated lands was prepared and submitted to your committee on 
Februaiy 19. I have incorporated its provisions in the accompanying 
bill, under the above title. 

Transcript of records of Indian agents (H. Doc. No. 353). — ^The 
object of this paragraph is to obviate the necessity of encumbering 
the records or the Oifice and entailing additional and useless woik 
upon the agency and school clerks. 

Patents to Santee Indians in Nebraska (S. Ddc. No. 68). — For rea- 
sons assigned in the Secretary's letter of December 9, 19 >7, printed in 
said document, a number of the Santees were unable to coinply with 
the requirements of the treaty of 1868 (15 Stat. L., 637) and the lands 
assigned them are unpatented. The Indians can not acquire title and 
no one can enter the lands. Hence the need of this legislation. 

Citnveyance to the United State-^ hy Pa<ihlf> Indians of Ian Is in New 
Mexico (S. Doc. No. 67). — ^The Pueblo Ind'ans hold their lands in 
common by an indefeasiljle title, therefore these can not be allot;ed 
in severalty. The present communal life of t'lose Ind ans is detii- 
montal both to them and to thesurroun ling |)e )pl3, but m ist continue 
unless some way is found by which thrir i;. nets can le all )tted. The 
object of the le<^isl:ition proposed undiM* this u;le is to jiutliorize the 
Pueblos to convey their lands in trust to the Un.tod St ites to be rec on- 
veyed to the individuals composing the pueblo. Under such a law 1 
think much can be done to bi'ciik up the conditions which now keep 
these Indians under a dwarfing despotism. 

Pat mis to Turtle ^ fountain ('hijtpewas in North Dal'ota (S. Doc. 
No. 71).— Under authority conferred by the act of April 21, 1904 (33 
Stilt. L., 181)-1J)4), the lands in the Turt!e Mountain Reservation have 
been allotted to 32<) Indians, heads of families, and some 650 selections 
have been made on the public domain. No provision is made in the 
act for the issuance of a trust or fee patent or other conveyance of 
title. The legislation proposed in the accompanying bill will give 
them trust patents of the same form and effect as allottees under the 
general allotment no's. 

Neq(diatio)\s v)'dh Turtle Monnfain Indinnfi^ North Dah)ta (H. Doc. 
No. 47).— The act of April 21, 11)04 (?>'6 Stat. L., 194), permits the 
Turtle Mountain Chippewas who may be unable to secure land on 
their reservation to take homesteads on the })ublic hiTuls, and some GoO 
have done so. There remains, however, a large mnubcr who have not 
made selections. 

The available lands on whieh they could make selections for homes 
are those parts of the public domain in North Dakota and Montana, 
the character of which is not siiital)le for Indian homes; but, notwith- 
standing this, protests a^rainst Indians taking up so much of the public 
domain ot these States have been made. 



BILL RELATING TO ADMINISTRATION OF INDIAN AFFAIR8. 5 

Considering these conditions, I am of the opinion that some other 
provision should be made for these Indians. I have therefore embodied 
a provision in the accompanying bill authorizing me to negotiate with 
them to ascertain how many will relinquish their rights under the act, 
and on what consideration, the result of such negotiations to be 
reported to the Congress at its next session for its action. 

Removal of ref^trictUms on alienati<m of allotted lands^ Quapaw 
Agency^ Olia. — The Indians of this agency are particularly advanced 
in their ability to manage their own affairs, and it is believed the time 
is ripe for the removal of all restrictions from them. Owing to the 
opposition which has developed, however, the Office has expressed its 
willingness to accept a partial removal, as indicated in the proposed 
legislation under the above title. I would prefer the enactment into 
law of U. R. 16500, but if that is impossible 1 urge the adoption of the 
provisions in the accompanying bill. 

Segregation oftmciisltes in the Choctaw and Chichimw nation.% (A'la- 
homa (Si. Doc. No. 73). — The reasons for this legislation are set out 
fully in the Secretary's letter of December 9, 1907, printed in the above 
document. 

Survey of the unsm^veyed lands of the Five Civilized Irihes^ Olda- 
homa (S. Doc. No. 84).— It has been discovered that in surveying the 
Indian Territory the Geological Survey omitted to survey and plat 
certain islands in the Arkansas, (irand, and Red rivers. Citizens of 
the tribes are applying to take these islands in allotment and it is 
necessary that these be surveyed befoi'e such allotment can be made. 
The item carries no additional appropriation. 

Seminole. Council^ OJdahoma, — Under the Seniinolo laws, town 
chiefs also are members of the national council and as such receive 
$350 each per annum, and other members receive ^1^50 each per 
annum. No session of the Seminole council has been held since the 
passage of the act of April "2(5, liM)r>. Seminole warrants have been 
issued in payment of salaries of the nn»mbers of the council for the 

{rear 1907, a<4gregating in amount $12,112.35. The members of the 
egislative bodies of the other Five Civilized Tribes receive compensa- 
tion based on service performed. It is believed that the Seminoles 
should be paid on the same basis. 

Addition ofjntrt (f Warm Springs Indian Reservation^ Oreg,^ to the 
Cascade Forest /i\'^erve. — In May last Superintendent Covey repre- 
sented to tlie Office that there was a large body of timber on the Warm 
Springs Reservation, most of which was of no present benefit to the 
Indians, but that the western half was a constant menace to the 
remainder of the timber and also to the forest reserve adjoining it on 
the west. 

He recommended that the western half be added to the Cascade 
Forest Reserve, the proceeds to be used for irrigating the agricul- 
tural lands of the reservation, any residue to be expended for the 
purchase of stock or in such other ways as might be agreed upon. 

The Forest Service was consulted, and reconnuended that the whole 
timber belt be added to the forest reserve, to which the superintendent 
acceded, on condition that the rights of the Indians be fully protected. 

It is believed that the legislation proposed under the foregoing title 
will do this, and by having the timber disposed of under the rules of 
the Forest Service the Indians will receive greati^r compensation than 
under any other plan. The description of the part to be added to the 



6 BILL RELATING TO ADMINISTRATION OF INDIAN AFFAIRS. 

forest reserve is compiled from a map furnished by the Forest 
Service.^ 

Restrictions in Stockhridge and Mxin see patents^ Wisconsin (H. Doc. 
No. 471). — The Secretary's letter of January 9, printed in the above 
document, gives in full the reasons for this proposed legislation, and 
it is necessary for the protection of the allottees. 

I have excluded carefully from this bill all appropriations and claims 
of every character, and have confined it to the legislation which I 
believe is necessary to the better administration of Indian affairs. I 
trust the bill may be given careful consideration and receive your 
approval. 

Very respectfully, F. E. Leupp, Commissioner. 





60th Congress, ) SENATE. ( Document 

lat Seaaion. ) j No. 400. 



MEMORIAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL TRADE 
AND LABOR UNIONS. 



MEDf OBIAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL TRADE 
AND LABOR UNIONS REMONSTRATING AGAINST THE INACTION 
OF CONGRESS IN THE MATTER OF LEGISLATION IN THE INTER- 
EST OF ORGANIZED LABOR AND URGING THE NECESSITY FOR 
IMMEDIATE ACTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE RESX7LTS TO COME 
FROM THE LITERAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE SHERMAN ANTI- 
TRUST LAW. 



March 20, 1908. — Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and ordered to be 

printed. 



labor's PROTEST TO CONGRESS. 

American Federation op Labor, 
Washington^ D. (7., March 19, 1908. 

We, the oflScial representatives of the national and international 
trade and labor unions and organization of farmers, in national con- 
ference assembled, in the District of Columbia, for the purpose of 
considering and taking action deemed necessary to meet the situation 
in which the working people of our country are placed by recent 
decisions of the courts, now appear before (k)ngress to voice the earnest 
and emphatic protest of the workers of the country against the indif- 
ference, if not actual hostility, which Congress has shown toward the 
reasonable and righteous measures proposed by the workers for the 
safeguarding of their rights and interests. 

In the name of labor we now urge upon Congress the necessity for 
immediate action for relief from the most gi*ave and momentous situa- 
tion which has ever confronted the working people of this country. 
This crisis has been brought about by the application by the Supreme 
Court of the United States of the Sherman antitrust law to the 
workers both organized and in their individual capacity. 

Labor and the people generallv look askance at the invasion of the 
court upon the prerogatives of the law-making and executive depart- 
ments of our Government. 

The workers feel that Congress itself must share our chagrin and 
sense of injustice when the courts exhibit an utter disregard for the 
real intent and purpose of laws enacted to safeguard and protect the 
workers in the exercise of their normal activities. There is something 



^ TRADE AND LABOB UNIONS. 

ominous in the ironic manner in which the courts guarantee to 

workers: 

The ^' right" to be maimed and killed without liability to the 
eniploj'er; 

The "right" to be discharged for belonging to a union; 

The "right" to work as many hours as employers please and under 
any conditions which they may impose. 

Labor is justly indignant at the bestowal or guaranteeing of these 
worthless and academic "rights" by the courts, which in the same 
breath deny and forbid to the workers the practical and necessary pro- 
tection of laws which define and safeguard their rights and liberties 
and the exercise of them individually or in association. 

The most recent perversion of the intent of a law by the judiciary 
has been the Supreme Court decision in the Hatters' case, by which the 
Sherman antitrust law has been made to apply to labor, although it 
was an accepted fact that Congi'ess did not intend the law to so apply 
and might even have specifically exempted labor but for the fear that 
the Supreme Court might construe such an affirmative provision to be 
unconstitutional. 

The workers earnestly urge Congress to cooperate with them in the 
upbuilding and educating of a public sentiment which will confine the 
judiciary to its proper function, which is certainly not that of placing 
a construction upon a law the very opposite of the plain intent of 
Congress, thus rendering worthless even the very moderate efforts 
which Congress has so far put forth to define the status of the most 
important, nun)erous, and patriotic of our people — the wage-workers, 
the producers of all wealth. 

We contend that equity, power, and jurisdiction, discretionary gov- 
ernment by the judiciary for well-defined purposes and within specific 
limitations, granted to the courts by the Constitution, has been so 
extended that it is invading the field of government by law and 
endangering individual liberty. 

As government by equity, personal government^ advances, repub- 
lican government, government by law, recedes. 

We favor enactment of laws which shall restrict the jurisdiction of 
courts of ecjuity to property and property rights and snail so define 
property and property rights that neither directl}^ nor indirectly 
shall there be held to be any property or property rights in the labor 
or labor power of any person or persons. 

The feeling of restless apprehension with which the workers view 
the apathy of Congress is accentuated by the recent decision of the 
Supreme Court. 

By the wrongful application of the injunction by the lower courts 
the workers have been forbidden the right of free press and free 
si)eech, and the Supreme Court in the Hatters' case, while not directly 

[)rohibiting the exercise of these rights, yet so applies the Sherman 
aw to labor that acts involving the use of free press and free speech, 
and hitherto assumed to be lawful, now become evidence upon which 
triple damages may be collected and fine and imprisonment added as a 
part of the penalty. 

Indeed, tiie decision goes so far as to hold the agreements of unions 
with employers, to maintain industrial peace, to be "conspiracies" 
and the evidence of unlawful combinations in restraint of ti*ade and 
commerce, thus effectually throttling labor by penalizing as criminal 
the exercise of its normal, peacetul rights and activities. The fact that 



TRADE AND LABOB UNIONS. 8 

these acts are in reality making for the uplift and the bottcrment of 
eivilization as a whole does not seem to be understood or appreciated 
by the courts. The workers hope for a broader and more intelligent 
appieciation from Congress. 

It is not necessary here to enter into a detailed review of this 
decision. 

The workers ask from Congress the relief which it alone can give 
from the injustice which will surely result from the litenil enforce- 
ment of the Sherman antitrust law as interpreted by this decision- 
The speedy enactment of labor's proposed aniendirient to the Slieniian 
antitrust law will do much to restore the rights from which the toilers 
have been shorn. 

We submit for consideration, and trust the same will be enacted, 
two provisions amendatory of the Sherman antitrust law, which 
originally were a part of the bill during the stages of its consideration 
by the Senate and before its final passjige, and which are substantially 
as follows: 

That nothing in said act (Sherman antitrust law) or in this act is 
intended nor shall any provision thereof hereafter be enforced so as 
to apply to organizations or associations not for profit and without 
capital stock, nor to the men)bcrs of such organizations or associations. 

That nothing in said act (Sherman antitrust law) or in this act is 
intended nor shall any provision thereof hereafter be enforced so as 
to apply to any arrangeinonts, agreements or combinations among 
persons engaged in agriculture, or horticulture made with a view of 
enhancing the j)rice of their own agricultural or horticultural products. 

It is clearly an unwarranted assumption on the part of the courts or 
others to place the voluntary associations of the workers in the same 
category as trusts and corporations owning stock and organized for 
profit. 

On the one hand, we have the trusts and corporations dealing with 
purely material things,and mostly with the inanimate products ol' labor. 
On the other hand, there are the woikers whose labor power is part 
of their very lives and beings, and which can not be diflerentiatcd from 
their ownership in and of themselves. 

The effort to categorically place the workers in the same position as 
those who deal in the products of labor of others is the failure to dis- 
cern between things and man. 

It is often flippantly averred that labor is a commodity, but modern 
civilization has clearly and sharply drawn the line between a bushel of 
coal, a side of pork and the soul of a human, breathing, living man. 

The enactment of the legislation which we ask will tend to so define 
and safeguard the rights of the workers of to-day and those who will 
come after them, that they may hope to continue to enjov the bless- 
ings of a free country as intended b}' the founders of our Government 

In the relief asked for in the proposed amendment to the Sherman 
antitrust law which we present to Congress, labor asks for no special 
privileges and no exemption from the treatment which any law-abiding 
citizen might hope to receive in a free countrv. 

Indeed, the present Parliament of Great l^ritain at its session in 
December, li»06, enacted into law what is known as the trades dispute 
act. It is brief, and we therefore quote its provisions in full: 

1. It phall be lawful for any person or per?»nn8 artinjr either on their own l>ehalf 
or on behalf of a tniHe union or other a^*80ciat ion of individuals, rejriHtere<l, or nnrejris- 
tered, in contemplation of or during tlie continuance of any trade dispute^ tA VAje:^^ 



4 TKADK AND LABOR UNIONS. 

for any of the following purposes at or near a house or place where a person resides 
or works, or carries on his busii.e.«8, or happens to be — 

(1) For the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information; 

(2) For the purpose of peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from 
working. 

2. An agreement or combination by two or more persons to do or procure to be 
done any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be ground 
for an action, if such act when committed by one peison would not be ground for 
an action. 

3. An action shall not be brought against a trade union or other association afore- 
said, for the recovery of damage nustained by an^ person or ] ersons by reason of the 
action of a member or members of such trade union or other association aforesaid. 

We submit that if such relief from the onerous conditions brought 
about by the Taff-Vale decision of the highest court of Great Britain 
can be enacted by a monarchical government, there ought to be no 
hesitancy in conceding it in our own Kepublic. 

The unions of labor aim to improve the standard of life; to uproot 
ignorance and foster education; to instill character, manhood, and an 
independent spirit among ourpeople; to bring about a recognition of the 
interdependence of man upon his fellow-man. We aim to establish a 
normal workday; to take the children from the factor}' and workshop 
and give them the opportunity of the schools, the home, and the play- 
ground. In a word, our unions strive to lighten toil, educate their 
members, make their homes more cheerful, and in every way con- 
tribute an earnest effort toward making life the better woilh living. 
To achieve these praiseworthy ends, we believe that all honorable and 
lawful means are justifiable and commendable and should receive the 
sympathetic support of every right-thinking American. 

Labor asks only for justice. It asks that it be not victimized and 
penalized under laws never intended to apply to it 

We hope for a prompt reco<jf!iition on the part of Congress of the 
wa<j:o-worlvors very reasonable and moderate insistence in this impor- 
tant niatler. 

In addition, the other most important measures which labor urges 
are: 

The bill to regulate and limit the issuance of injunctions — "Pearre 
bill.'' 

Employers' liabiiit}^ bill. 

The bill extending the application of the eight-hour law to all Gov- 
ernnxMit en)ployees and those eni})loved upon work for the Govern- 
ment, whether b\^ contractors or sui)contraet()rs. 

There arc other measures pending which we regard as important, 
but we feel especially justified in urging the passage of these ujcn- 
tioned, because they have been before Congress for several sessions, 
and upon which extended hearings have been had before committees, 
every interest conceiiied having had ample opportunity to present 
arguments, and there is no good reason why action should longer be 
deferred by Congiess. 

, We come to Congress hoping for a prompt and adequate remedy for 
thegrievancesof which we justly complain. The psychological moment 
has arrived for a total change of governmental policy toward the work- 
ers; to permit it to pass may be to invite disaster even to our national 
life. 

In this frank statement of its grievances the attitude of labor should 
not be misinterpreted, nor should it be held as wanting in respect for 
our highest law making body. 



TRADK AND LABOB UNIONS. 6 

That the workers, while smarting under a raost keen sense of injus- 
tice and neglect, turn fir&tto Con<^ress for a remedy, shows how greatly 
they still trust in the power and willingness of this branch of the Gov- 
ernment to restore, safeguard, and protect their rights. 

Labor proposes to aid in this work by exercising its utmost political 
and industrial activity, its moral and social influence, in order that the 
interests of the masses may be represented in Congress by those who 
are pledged to do justice to labor and to all our people, not to promote 
the special interests of those who would injure the whole body politic 
by crippling and enslaving the toilers. 

Labor is most hopeful that Congress will appreciate the gravitv of 
the situation which we have endeavored to present. The workera 
trust that Congress will shake off the apathy which has heretofore 
characterized it on this subject and perforny a beneficent social service 
for the whole people by enacting such legislation as will restore con- 
fidence among the workers that their needs as law-abiding citizens 
will be heeded. 

Only by such action will a crisis be averted. There must be some- 
thing more substantial than fair promisees. The present feeling of 
widespread apprehension among the workers of our country becomes 
more acute every day. The desire for decisive action becomes more 
intense. 

While it is true that there is no legal appeal from a Supreme Court 
decision, yet we believe Congress can and should enact such further 
legislation as will more clearly define the rights and liberties of the 
workers. 

Should labor's petition for the righting of the wrongs which have 
been imposed upon it and the remedving of injustice done to it pass 
unheeded by Congress and those w6o administer the affairs of our 
Government — then upon those who have failed to do their duty, and 
not upon the workers, will rest the responsibility. 

The labor union is a natural, rational, and inevitable outgrowth of 
our modern industrial conditions. To outlaw the union in the exer- 
cise of its normal activities for the protection and advancement of labor 
and the advancement of society in geneml is to do a tremendous injury 
to all people. 

The repression of right and natural activities is bound to finally 
break forth in violent form of protest, especially among the more 
ignorant of the people, who will feel great bitterness if denied the 
consideration they have a right to expect at the hands of Congress. 

As the authorized representatives of the organized wage-earners of 
our country, we present to you in the most conservative and earnest 
manner that protest against the wrongs which they have to endure 
and some of the rights and relief to which they are justly entitled. 
There is not a wrong for which we seek redress, or a right to which 
we aspire, which does not or will not be equally shared by all the 
workers— by all the people. 

While no Member of Congress or party can evade or avoid his or 
their own individual or party share of responsibility, we aver that the 
party in power must and will by labor and its sympathizers be held 
primarily responsible for the failure to give the prompt, full, and 
effective Congressional relief we know to be within its power. 

We come to you not as political partisans, whether Republican, 
Deuiocratic, or other, but as representatives of the wageworkers of 



8 TRADE AND LABOR UNIONS. 

C. A. Laflin, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineera. 
Wm. H. Frazier, International Seamen's Union. 

T. J. Duffy, Frank H. Uutchens, Ed. Menge, International Brother- 
hood of Operative Potters. 

V. A. Olander, International Seamen's Union. 

Fi-ank L. Konemus, Brotherhood of Railway Car Men of America. 

George C. Griffin, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners 
of America. 

Louis Kemper, A. J. Kugler, William Hellmuth, International 
Union of Brewery Workei-s of America. 

T. C. Parsons, George G. Seibold, International Typographical 
Union. 

D. A. Hayes, William Launer, James J. Dunn, F. H. Williams, 
Glass- Bottle Blowers' Association. 

James McHugh, Journeyman Stone Cutters' Association. 

Daniel J. Keefe, Thomas Gallagher, International Longshoremen's 
Association. 

T. A. Rickert, United Garment Workers of America. 

J. J. Flynn, P. J. Flannery, Interior Freight Handlers and Ware- 
housemen's Union. 

W. J. McSorley, R. V. Brandt, Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers' 
International Union. 

P. J. McArdle, John Williams, Amalgamated Association of Iron 
and Steel Workers. 

Jacob Fischer, Frank K. Noschang, Journeymen Barber's Inter- 
national Union. 

John Golden, Albert Hibbert, United Textile Workers of America. 

Daniel J. Tobin, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 

Matt Comerford, International Union of Steam Engineers. 

F. A. Didsbury, Pocketknife-Bliide Grinders and Finishers' National 
Union. 

Edward W. Potter, Homer D. Call, H. L. Eichelberger, A. L. Webb, 
Amalf^iunated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workers of North America. 

Fiank Gehring, Lithographers International Protective and Bene- 
ficial Association. 

J. F. Murphy, International Union of Elevator Constructoi*s. 

Frederick Benson, International Seamen's Union. 

John H. Brinkman, Carriage and Wao^on Workers' International 

nion. 

P. F. Richardson, International Car Workers. 

Joseph Keilly, United Brotherhood of CarpcMiters. 

I. B. Kuhn, Cigarniiikers' Intornational Tnion. 

Thomas McGilton, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paper- 
hangers. 

John Weber, Bakery and Confectionery Workers' International 
Union. 

James J. MrCracken. International Union of Steam Engineers. 

James H. Hatch, Upholsterers' International Union. 

J. F. McCarthy, Hotel and Restaurant Employees' International 
Alliance, 

O 



60th Congress, ) SENATE. j Document 

Ist Session. ) ) No. 401. 



THANKS OF KING OF PORTUGAL FOR SYMPATHETIC RESOLUTIONS 
IN VIEW OF ASSASSINATION OF LATE KING AND CROWN PRINCE. 



LETTER 



FROM 



THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE, 

TBAN8MITTINO 

A COPY OF A NOTE FBOH THE POBTUGTJESE MINISTEB OONVEY- 
ING TO THE SENATE THE SINCEBE THANKS OF HIS MAJESTY 
THE KING OF PORTUGAL FOR THE SYMPATHETIC RESOLU- 
TIONS OF THE SENATE, PASSED IN VIEW OF THE ASSASSINA- 
TION OF THE KING AND CROWN PRINCE OF PORTUGAL. 



Mabch 20, 1908. — Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered 

to be printed. 



Department of State, 

Washington^ March 19^ 1908. 
Sir: I have the honor to inclose, for the information of the Senate, 
a copy of a note from the Viscount de Alte, the Portuguese minister at 
this capital, in which, by instruction from the Portuguese ministry of 
foreign affairs, he requests that this Department may convey to the 
Senate the sincere thanks of His Majesty the King of Portugal and 
of the Portuguese Government for the sympathetic resolutions of that 
body passed in view of the assassination of the King and Crown 
Prince of Portugal. 
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, 

Robert Bacon, Acting Secretary. 
Hon. Charles W. Fairbanks, 

Vice-I^esident of the United States^ United States Senate. 



Portuguese Legation, 

Washington^ March 7, 1908, 
Sir: When Parliament meets at Lisbon next month a fitting response 
will no doubt be made to the motions voted by the Senate and the 
House of Representatives of the United States with refer^w^^^K^^Jcv^ 



8 THAHK6 OF KINO OF POBTUOAIi FOB SYMPATHETIO RE8aUli0Hik 

dastardly outrage which resulted in the deatii of my late kmraiited 
Soverei&rn^ His Maje^t;^ Dom Carlos I, and of His Koyal Highnese 
Crown Prince Dom Luiz Philipi)e. 

In the meantime I have received instructions from his excellency 
the minister for foreign affaiiis to present to those august assemblies 
the very sincere thanks of His Majesty the King, my f^i^cious Sover- 
eign, and of the Portuguese Government for their kindly action in 
connection with that sad event. 

In order to carry out these instructions, I venture, sir, to have 
recourse to your unfailing courtesy, in the hope that you will be good 
enough to convey to the benate and to the House of Elepresentatives 
of the United States this expression of His Majesty's and the Govern- 
ment's sentiments. 

I avail myself of this opportunity to tender to your excellency the 
renewed assurances of my nighest consideration. 

Hon. Eunu fioor, 
L SecretaaT/ of State^ etc. 



60th Congress, ) SENATE. J Document 

Jst Sexgion. ) ] No. 415. 



ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES FOR PAY, ETC., OF ARMY, 1909. 



LETTER 

FROM 

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, 

TRAN8MITTING 

A COPY OF A OOMKnTNIOATION FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAB 
SUBMITTING ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES OF APPROPRIATIONS 
UNDER THE HEAD OF PAY, ETC., OF THE ARMY FOR THE 
FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1909, AGGREGATING $67,000. 



April 2, 1908. — Referred to the Committee on Military Affairs and ordered to be 

printed. 



• Treasury Department, 

Office of the Secretabt, 

Washington^ Ajn*il 7, 190S» 
Sir: 1 have the honor to transmit herewith for the consideration of 
Congress copy of a communication from the Scicretary of War of the 
81st ultimo, submitting additional estimates of appropriations under 
the head of pay, etc., of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 
1909, aggregatinor *67,000. 

Respectfully, Geo. B. Cobtelyou, 

Secretary. 
The President of the Senate. 



War Department^ 
WoHhington^ March Sl^ 1908. 
Sib: I have the honor to forward herewith for transmission to Con- 
eresB an additional estimate of an appropriation of t^7,00() required 
for the service of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1909, $50,000 being 
fbr the payment of mileage to officers and contract surgeons when 
anthorized'by law, and $7,000 for extra pay to enlisted men of the line 
of the Army and to enlisted men of the Signal Corps employed in the 
Territory of Alaska on the Alaskan cable and telegraph system. 



2 ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES FOR PAY, ETC., OF ARMY, 1909. 

This amount is required in addition to that estimated for and included 
in the annual estimates of the War Department for the fiscal year end- 
ing June 30, 1909 (see Book of Estimates, fiscal year 1909, p. 189). 
Very respectfully, 

Wm. H. Taft, 

Secretary of War, 
The Secretary of the Treasury. 



Addiiumal estimates of approf/riations required for the service of the fiscal year ending 
June SO, 1909, by the Paymaster- General, U. S. Army, 

Wab Department. 

office of paymaster-general. 
Pay, etc., of the Army — 

laSCBLLANEOUS. 

Mileage to officers and contract surgeons when authorized by law (act of 

June 12, 1906, vol. 34, p. 246, sec. 1) 150,000 

Note.— This estimate is in addition to the item of $550,000 for this 
purpose included in the annual estimates of the War Department for the 
fiscal year ending June 30, 1909, under the heading '*Pay, etc., of the 
Army," miscellaneous (see Book of Estimates, fiscal year 1909, page 
189), and is deemed imperatively necessary in order to meet the require- 
ments of the service for the fiscal year 1909. 

The expenditure necessary for mileage has greatly increased in recent 
years, owing to the increased number of changes of stations among troops, 
due to emergencies which never arose before, such as changes of station 
in Alaska, the Philippines, Cuba, etc.; to the increased expenditure 
of mileage caused by redoubled efforts necessary in recruiting the 
Army; to the greater assistance now rendered to the National Guard in 
camps of instruction by sending army officers to help in the work; to 
the increased travel due to the excei>tlonal effort maae in recent years 
to increase interest in target practice throughoutthe Militia and National 
Rifle Association; to the great amount of travel necessitated by the law 
increasing and dividing the Artillery Corps into two brandies, and to 
other increases incident to the inauguration of measures tending toward 
greater etticiency in the service. 

The estimated expenditure of $600,000 for the fiscal year 1909 is based 
upon expenditures made for mileage during the fiscal year ended June- 
80, 1907, for which thesuniof $()00,nuO wasapi)ropriatedandall expended 
with the exception of about $1,(J00, and the expenditures lor the cur- 
rent vear for which $550, (iOO was appropriated, and to date of February 
29, 1908, $424,718.45 has been expended, leaving but $125,281.55 to 
cover expenditures for the remaining portion of the fiscal year 1908. 

From the foregoing figures it will he seen that not less than $600,000 
will be required for the ensuing fiscal year, and this estimate is submitted 
with a view to haviny: suflicicnt funds appro})rialed to meet the demands 
for the entire fiscal year and to avoid the necessity of submitting a defi- 
ciency estimate, which tjas been the case for the past two fiscal years. 
(C //. W'hqtple, Parmdxtrr-doiernl, U. S. Armfi.) 

For extra pay to enlisted men of the line of the Army and to enlisted 
men of the Signal Corps employed in the Territory of Alaska on 
the Alaskan ca^)le and telegraph system, for periods of not less than 
ten days, at the rate of 35 cents per day (submitted) 7, 000 

Total 57,000 

Note. — The Chief Sijxnal Ofiicer of the Army states that in addition to the item of 
129,000 for this purpose included in the estiinates submitted for '• Pay, etc., of the 
Army" for the fiscal year ending June 30, 190^) (see Book of Estimates, fiscal year 
1909, page 189), the above amount will be required, as since the time at which the 
38timate was prepared conditions have so changed in Alaska that additional men will 
be needed in connection with the work of the JSi^znal (.'orps on the Alaskan telegraph 
and cable system. (C. U, Whipple^ Pay master' Gtiiernl, U. S. Army.) 

o 



60th Congress, ) SENATE. t Documknt 

let Session. \ \ No. 422. 



LOCATION OF WATER-LINE ARMOR BELT UPON UNITED 
STATES BATTLE SHIPS. 



Mr. Hale presented the following 

EXTRACT FBOM BEAB-ADMIBAL EVANS'S BEPOET TO THE NAVY 
BEPABTMENT ON THE LOCATION OF WATEE-LINE AEMOB BELT 
UPON UNITED STATES BATTLE SHIPS. 



April 7, 1908. — Referred to the Committee on Naval AJEfairs and ordered to be 

printed. 



LOCATION OP WATER-LINE ARMOR BELT UPON UNITED STATES BATTLE 

SHIPS. 

[Extract from Rear- Admiral Erana*! report to the Navy Department, dated at sea, en rente to Magda- 

lena Bay, March 6, 1»08.] 

Judging from the figures contained in the several replies from com- 
' manding oflScers which relate to this subject, it would appear that 
better protection might have been afforded had these belts been origi- 
nally placed between 6 inches and 1 foot higher; this on the theory 
that the commanding officer would admit sufficient water before an 
action to sink the belt to within about 18 inches above the water line, 
but even this is open to question, for it has been noted that even when 
heavy laden and in the smooth to moderate seas which have thus far 
characterized this cruise the ships frequently expose their entire belt 
and the bottom plating beneata it. It must be remembered that even 
a 5 or a 6 inch shell (of which there would be a great number) could 
inflict a severe and dangerous injury if it struck below the belt, while 
otherwise the water line, even with the belt entirely submerged, is, on . 
account of the casement, armor, and coal, immune to all except the 
heaviest projectiles. The fact is that under the sea conditions in 
which battles may be fought a belt of 8 feet in width, if considered 
alone, is too narrow to afford the desired protection, wherever it may 
be placed; and the question becomes an academic discussion, witn 
certain arguments on each side. It is understood that on the latest 
ships this question is of little import, as the citadel armor is but 1 inch 
less in thickness than that on the water line, and for those ships 
already built it is believed that if bridges are removed and all weights 
which will be landed when war breaks out are taken into considera- 
tion the ship will rise the 6 or 12 inches, which is believed to be the 
maximum tnat it should be desired to raise them. 

O 



eOra Congress, ) SENATE. J Document 

Ist Session. ) ( No. 423. 



SPEECH BY HENKY CACOT LODGE ON IMMIGRATION. 



Mr. Flint presented the following 

SPEECH ON THE ST7BJECT OF IMMIGRATION BELIVEBED BY 
HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE, BEFOBE THE BOSTON CITY CLUB, 
BOSTON, MASS., ON MARCH 20, 1908. 



April 7, I908.--Ordered to be printed. 



There is nothing so dry as statistics, nothing which falls so dully 
on the listening ear as the recitation of many tigiires; not figures of 
speech, but of enumeration. It is also very difficult to grasp ihe iin- 
poitant statistics by merely hearing them read, and yet it is impossible 
to deal with tbe question of immigration without them. To compre- 
hend the subject at all, the very lirststep is to realize what the number 
of immigrants to this country has been, and, further, to trace b}' the 
figures the changes which have occurred in the character and origin 
of the immigration. I have here a table whieh shows the number of 
immigrants to this country during the past forty years — ihat is, since 
the close of the civil war — and I also have tables showing the countries 
from which the immigrants come and which reveal the changes of 
nationality, or rather the change in the proportion of the nationalities 
of which our inmiigration has been composed. I will not read to you 
these long lists of figures, because it would simply be confusing and 
they can really only be properly studied in detail when printed, as I 
hope they may bv*. I shall confine myself to an analysis of them by 
which you will be enabled to undersUmd what they signify. In the 
first place, the number of foreign immigrants to this country during 
the past forty years reaches the enormous total of 19,001,195. 

Since the formation of the Government 24,000.000 people, speaking 
in round numbers, have come into the United States as immigrants, 
and of that number, still speaking in round numbers, 22,000,000 have 
come from Europe. Of the 22,000,000 from Europe, 7,600,000 were 
from the United Kingdom, over 4,000,000 of these being from Ireland 
and nearlv 3,000,000 from England; over 6,000,000 were from Ger- 
many, and nearly 1,500,000 were from Norway and Sweden, 2,500,000 
each from Austria-Hungary and Italy, and 2,000,000 from liussia, 
including Poland. During the decade 1880-1S90 there was for the 
first time large immigration from Italy, Austria Hungar}^, ai d Russia. 
In the decade 1890-1900 there was a marked reduction in arrivals from 
Germany, Ireland, England, Scotland, and Norway and Sweden, and 
great increase from Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. Immigration 
from France, never large (average about 6,000 a year), decreased in 
the decade 1890-1900, but has since increased. 



4 8PEECB BIT DENBY OABO-r LODGE ON IMMIGfiATlOH. 

Sraodinavian imtnigmtion has diminished of late years and* roIntivRlj 
to til e other races which have recently bepjun to coiiie, has dimijiishcd 
verv greatly* Later than any of these was? the imniigi^tion of French* 
Canadians, l*iit wlifch has a'isiimed large pro|x>rLioii!Tt and has^ l>ei'ome 
a Htrong and most i^afuahle element of our population. But the 
French uf Canada scarcely conn? within the su^^ject we are consider- 
ing, Isecau^^e they are hardly to be elapsed as immigrants in the accepted 
sense. They repre.-sent one of the oldest settlements od thia continenL 
Tl*ey have been, in the hroud *5enJ5c, Amt*ncanH for ^fericnitiun?*, and 
their coming t<> the Unitt^d States is merely a movement of Americans 
aci O.K8 an imaginary line fmm one p;ut of Anjerica to another. 

VVitliin the lii!!!t twenty ycarti, however, tfien^ hsL% Imru a great 
change in the proportiuii of the varifnifi nationalities cmigniti ng 
from Europe to the United fetittes. The iinmignintJi from (ireat 
Britain and Ireland and from Gernnny and Sc^imlinavta Inu^e cmiio 
down in numbers aa eonnnued with inmvigrantsj from countricM which, 
until very reeent years, sent no immigrantM to America. We have 
nincr received* «n<l do not now recvivc, any immigration from S|min 
or any connideitible imniTgnLlion from France and lielgium. The 
gro;ii growth in rei^ent years in our immiifratiou ha^ been from Italy, 
from Foland, Htmgary, and Russia, from caslcrn Kunjpe, from sub* 



ectrt of ihe Sultan, and ia now extending to the inhabitants of Asia 

xcept 
been amaJ^^im^iteil witli or brought in conl^iet with the KriglLsh- 



jec 

Ali 



mtv. With the exception of the Italians, the;<e p^^ople have never 



spoakinj; pt^ople or with tlione uf t^ ranee, (jerniany, Holland^ and 
Scundinnvm, who have built up the United 8tate«. 1 exe«*pt the Jtalians, 
not merely bcciiitse tiicir noble literature and *ipU'ndid art are a imrl of 
our common inherit nnre^ but because the}' are conHpicuou.sly one of 
the coinitric.^ which behmg to vvhaE i-* kimwn as western civil iisation. 
They, like ourselves* are the heirs of the eivilizatiun uf ancient RomOf 
and iHitil one \m^ traveled in erntern Ktirnpe and htudit'd the people 
one does not realize how much this siirnifics. 

I am not concenuHl here with whether the civili/ation of Home was 
better thtin tliat of Byzantium, or of the Orient, or of ( hina. 1 
merely state tlic fact that tlie civilization oi Rome was a wi(h'ly (litfer- 
eiit civilization from the others, and that was the civilization whose 
ideas we iiave inherited. In eastern Kiirope- the j)e()ple fell heirs, not 
to the civilization of Rome, hut to that of Ryzantium, of the (ireeks 
of the lower empire. As an example of what 1 mean, the idea of 
pat I'iot ism — that is, of devotion to one\s country — is Roman, while 
the idea of devotion to the emperor, the head of the state, is lUzan- 
tine. 1 point out these ditfei'ences merely as conditions of the problem 
of assimilation w hich we have pre>enled to us. 

Let me now lay before you the till le which sliow\s on its face these 
chan^ea in the character and nationality of our iunni<^rants. 



SPEECH hY HENRY CABOT LODGE ON IMMIGRATION. 



Year. 


Total 
Immigra- 
tion. 


England. 


Scotland. 


Ireland. 


France. 


Germany. 


1868 


138,840 
3rv2. 7(>8 
387, 203 
3J1 . 3.>0 
40I.S06 
i'y.). K03 
31.>,3'.9 
227, 498 
169, 9>6 
111,><.'^7 

i;w.4«.9 

177,826 
457,257 
669, 431 
7.SH, 9<>2 
603, 322 
518,592 
395, 3 16 
3:i4,203 
490, 109 
546, &S9 
' 444,427 
4 V), 302 
560, 319 
62:^.084 
502, 917 
314,467 
279. 94^ 
343, 267 

2;^>, 8:?2 

2-29, 299 

311.715 

448,572 

487,918 

648, 743 

857,046 

812,870 

1,026,499 

1,100,735 

1,285,349 


24,127 
35. 673 
60. 257 
56,530 
69, 7(>4 
74,801 
50. i'05 
40.130 
24.373 
19, 161 
18,405 
24. 1S3 
59. 454 
65. 177 
82. 394 
63,140 
5f..918 
47. 332 
49, 767 
72. K.55 
82, 574 
68,503 
57, 020 
53,600 
49. 770 
46,501 
29, 579 
81,948 
19,492 
9,974 
9,877 
46,123 
9,961 
12,214 
13,575 
26.219 
38, (V26 
64,709 
49,491 
56, 637 

1,769,729 




32,068 
40, 786 
66, 996 
57. 439 
6S, 732 
77,:U4 
63, 707 
87, 957 
19, 575 
14,5<;9 
15.V32 
♦ 20,013 
71,603 
72. 342 
76, 432 
81,486 
63.344 
51,795 
49,619 
68,370 
73.513 
65,557 
53,024 
55.706 
55, 467 
49,283 
83.904 
47,972 
40,262 
28,421 
26,128 


1,989 
3.879 
4.01)9 
3, l.W 
9. SI 7 

1J,798 
9,64-1 
8, 321 
8.0 '4 
6, 856 
4, 159 
4,655 
4,814 
5, 227 
6, 004 
4,821 
3, 608 
3.495 
3,318 
5, 034 
6,4.54 
6,918 
6, .585 
6,770 
6, 521 
6,369 
3,662 
3,702 
2, 463 
2,107 
1,990 
1,694 
1,739 
8, 1.50 
8,117 
5.578 
9, 406 

10, HW 
9,3H6 
9,731 


65,831 
131,042 


l^6y 


7,751 
12. 521 
11,984 
13,916 
13, 841 
10, 429 
7,310 
4.. 582 

4.i:^5 

3,502 
6, 2-25 
12,640 
15,168 
18. 937 
11,859 
9,060 
9, 2-26 
12, 126 
18.699 
24,457 
18,296 
12,041 
12,r)57 
11,520 
12, 155 
7,254 
5,888 
3,483 
1,883 
1,797 


1870 


llM. 226 


1871 


82,564 
141, 109 


1872 


1873 


149, 671 


1874 


87,291 
47.769 
81,937 
29 298 


1875 


187(5 


1877 


1878 


29. 318 


1879 


84,602 


1880 


84,638 
210,485 
250,630 
194,786 


18SI 


18.H2 


18-3 


1884 


179,676 
124,448 
84,403 
106,865 


1885 


18S6 


1887 


1888 


109 717 


1889 


99,538 
92,427 
113, .554 
180 758 


1890 


1891 


1892 


1893 


96,361 
59,386 
86,361 

81,885 
22 533 


1894 


1895 


1896 


1897 


1898 


17,111 
17,476 
18, .')07 


1899 


1900 


1,792 
2,070 
2,560 
6,153 
11,092 
16. 977 
16, 806 
19, 740 

3'JO, 432 


86,780 
30,561 
29,138 
85,300 
86,142 
52,945 
84,995 
84,630 


1901 


21 651 


1902 


28,301 


1903 


40 086 


1«K)4 


46 :>80 


1905 


4(^ 674 


1906 


87 5»i4 


1907 


87,807 




Total 


19,001.195 


1,817,637 


219,090 


8,272,538 




Year. 


Norway. 


Sweden. 


Austria- 
Hungary. 


Italy. 


Poland. 


Russia. 


1868 . . 


11,166 

16,068 

13, 216 

9,418 

11,421 

16,247 

10,384 

6,093 

6,173 

4,588 

4,759 

7,345 

19,895 

22, 705 

29,101 

23, 398 

16, 974 

12, 356 

12, 759 

16. 269 

18, 264 

13. 31K) 

11,370 

12. 568 

14.462 

16. 079 

8,8(i7 

7,373 

8, 855 

5,812 

4,938 

6. 705 

9, 575 

12,248 

17, 48-1 

24,461 

23.808 

25,064 

21,730 

22,138 






891 

1,489 

2,891 

2,816 

4,190 

8, 757 

7, 666 

3,631 

3,015 

8.195 

4,344 

6,791 

12,a54 

16, 401 

82, 159 

31,792 

16, .510 

13.642 

21.315 

47, 622 

51,558 

25,307 

62,003 

76,055 

62,137 

72,316 

43.967 

36, 961 

68, 060 

59. 431 

58.613 

77,419 

100.136 

13.5, 'J96 

178, 375 

230. 622 

193,296 

221,479 

273, 120 

285,1^1 




141 


18<i9 


24,224 
13,443 
10.699 
13,464 
14,303 
5,712 
6,573 
6,603 
4,991 
6.390 
11,001 
39,186 
49,760 
61.607 
38,277 
26,552 
22,218 
27, 751 
42, 836 
54.698 
35.415 
29, fi32 
36,880 
43.247 
38,077 
18,608 
15.683 
21, 177 
13, 162 
12. 398 
12, 797 
18, (•■50 
23.331 
30.894 
46. 0-28 
27.763 
26,591 
28, 310 
20,689 


1,499 
4,425 
4,887 
4,410 
7,112 
8, 850 
7,6.58 
6, 276 
6, 396 

4.s:.0 

5,963 

17,267 

27,936 

29. 150 

27,6*25 

36,571 

27.309 

28,6S0 

40,265 

45,811 

84,174 

66,199 

71,012 

80,136 

59, 6:i3 

87.505 

88,462 

65,103 

83.081 

89,797 

62.491 

114.847 

113. 390 

171,889 

206,011 

177. 156 

275, 698 

265, i:« 

&38,462 


184 

223 

635 

1,647 

8.3.38 

1,795 

984 

925 

533 

547 

489 

2,177 

5,614 

4,672 

2,011 

4, .536 

8,0X6 

8.939 

6,1-28 

6, 826 

4,922 

11,073 

27,497 

33,299 

18,664 

1,552 

1,020 

691 

4, 16.5 

4,726 

60, 


843 


1870 


907 


1871 


673 


1872 


994 


1873 


1,560 
8,960 
7,982 
4,766 
6,579 
8,037 
4,434 
4,8M 
4,865 

16,321 
9,186 

ll,a54 


l^7^ 


1875 


1H76 


1877 


1878 


1879 


18S0 


1K81 


18K2 

1883 


1884 


18.H5 

18>^6 


16,603 
17,309 
28,944 


18.S7 


1888 


81,2.56 
81 889 


1889 


1890 


83,147 
42. 145 
79,294 
87 177 


1S1>1 


1K92 


18'3 


ISU 


85 694 


1895 


82.0.53 


1S96 


45 137 


1897 


22^ 7.50 


1.S9S 

181*9 


27,221 

982 


1900 


90, 787 


1901 


85. 257 


1902 


107, 347 


1903 


136. 093 


1904 


145, 141 


1905 


184,897 


1906 


215,»>66 


1907 


I *fi^,^i«& 


Tota^ 


554,556 


974,650 


^,571»08a 


\ ^,wa,^'i 


A v^ 


Jft,'^^ 



p-l—Vol32 22 



6 8PJCECH Br HENHY CABOT LODGE ON IMMIGRATION* 

IMMIORATION BY DF^AHES. 



P 



V 



Deca^o. i 


Totfll. 


Bugliuld, 


IrclALtiL 


SCQLlffltld 


il^oiDatiy^ 


law-iwo - - -... 






207. 8«l 
014 J L9 

4^>71 




152,154 

4iv4 iy^fi 


l«40-l»6iK,, ..,. 








iBfltvt«eo„ -._...^— 






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lJ«Kkl*r7i| , , ,„.,»-,,^..,.,., 


2,311. R-H 
*/^ .. 1 J 




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iH7(H»sn,.... .........,^....... , 


7lM JH2 


laao-iwo -,-.-, ,, -..,„,,..,.... 


m^&0 




laao^iftoo ,,* • • 






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ItAir* 




Jtti^4. 




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lKWV|fltlJ,..„,„, „,..„„ „,„„„,....,* 




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41,397 


lSfiO-iw70 ,__-.-.. _**-—,_*. .>.-.—. 




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IMVO-IHHti.,.,^,,,,,..^, ,,,,,.,, _.,.,,_» 




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123. am 


1««HS90,,.._. ., ., 




3SB,7L» 
537. &47 




IfSMMVOO , -„„,,.* „„„, 









I have now shown jroii, by this nnaljsis of the tables, how the char- 
acter of our ioituii^mtion hm changed with refercuoe to race atid 
DatioDaLitj, and the new probletiis of as^iniiktion whith nre pre.*!tt nU*d 
thereby, I wish next to call your attention to the nmuiier in which 
this question of imniignitioo has been dealt with by the .succesf^ive lavva 
passed by CorigTcsH, Let me hejjfin by making cltrirone point \shi('h 
I think Is sotnetinies overlDoked, Every iiid*"[>endciit iiiition Ii^ls, aitd 
must have, an absolute right to determine who shall come into the 
cou!itr3\ and, second!}", who shall become a part of its citizenship, and 
on what terms. We can not, in fact, conceive of an independent nation 
which does not possess this power, for if one nation can compel another 
to admit its people, the nation thus compelled is a subject and dej)endent 
nation. The power of the American people to determine who shall 
come into this country, and on what terms, is absolute, and l)y the 
American people, 1 mean its citizens at any given moiuent, whether 
native born or naturalized, whose votes control the Govermnent. I 
state this explicitly because there seems to be a hazy idea in some 
minds that the inhabitants of other countries have a right, an inalien- 
able right, to come into the United States. No one has a right to come 
into the United States, or become part of its citizenshij), except by 
permission of the people of the United States. The power, therefore, 
of Congress as representing all the people, is absolute, and they can 
make any laws they deem wise, from complete prohibition down, in 
regard to inunigration. 

The laws regulating immigration are of two kinds — restrictive and 
selective. The only restrii-tive legislation in regard to inunigration 
into the United States is that which is to be found in the Chin(\se- 
exclusion acts. All the rest of our immigration legislation, although 
it has a somewhat restrictive elTect very often, is purely selective in 
character. We have determined by law that the criminal and the 
diseased, that women imported for immoral purix)ses and laborers 
brought here under contract shall be excluded, ancf we also undertake 
to exclude what are known as "assisted immigrants," those whose 
expenses are paid for them by others, whether individuals, cor[)ora- 
tions, or governments, because it is believed that such immigrants are 
paupers and Jikely to become a public charge. 1 will give ^^ou the 



SPEECH BY HENRY CABOT LODGE ON IMMIGRATION. 



fiffures which show the results of these provisions of our statutes and 
which are as follows: 

Immigrants debarred. 



Year. 


Paupers. 


Contract 
laborers. 


Diseased 

and other 

causes. 


Total. 


1896 


2,010 
1,277 
2,261 
2,599 
2,974 
2,798 
3,944 
6,812 
4,798 
7,898 
7,069 
6,866 


776 

328 

417 

741 

833 

327 

275 

^ 1,086 

1,601 

1,164 

2,314 

1,434 


13 

12 

352 

458 

439 

391 

755 

1,871 

1,695 

2,418 

8,049 

4,764 


2,799 
1,617 


1897 


1898 


S U30 


1899 


8,798 


19(X} 


4.246 
8,616 
4,974 
8,769 
7,994 
11 480 


19iil 


11H)'2 


] (ju;< 


1 ^HVl 


1 9oo 


mxj 


12,432 
13,064 


1907 






60,306 


11,196 


16,217 


77,719 



In considering these statistics it must be remembered that these 
laws are largely preventive, and that the number of diseased, pauper, 
and criminal immigrants actually excluded and deported are only a 
very small part of these classes who would come if there were no such 
laws, but wno never leave Europe for the United States because these 
laws exist. 

Of the wisdom of all these measures which shut out the undesirable 
immigrants just described I do not think there is much question any- 
where, but there is great resistance to their enforcement, especially 
from interested parties like steamship companies and large employers 
who desire an unlimited supply of cheap labor. So far as the diseased ' 
immigrants go, the laws are pretty thoroughly enforced, although 
there is a continual pressure, for sentimental reasons, to set the law 
aside and admit the physically unfit in special cases which constantly 
recur. To those who resist our immigration laws and who strive to 
make political capital by opposing them, as well as to all law-abiding 
and liberty-loving Americans, 1 would in this connection point out 
some of the results of our still inadequate statutes and of our ineffi- 
cient enforcement of those which exist. Within the past few weeks 
we have seen a beloved priest, devoted to good works, brutally mur- 
dered while in the performance of his sacred functions by an alien 
immigrant. We have seen a murderous assault by an alien immi- 
grant upon the chief of police of a great city, not to avenge any per- 
sonal wrong, but because he represented law and order. Every day 
we read in the newspapers of savage murders by members of secret 
societies composed of alien immigrants. Can we doubt, in the presence 
of such horrible facts as these, the need of stringent laws and rigid 
enforcement, to exclude the criminals and the anarchists of foreign 
countries from the United Stated? The exclusion of criminals is now 
very imperfect and one of the efforts of the Immigration Commission 
is to get sufficient information to enable us to make laws on this all- 
important point which shall be effective. The laws against contract 
labor are constantly evaded, but the immigration act passed last year 
provided an annual appropriation of $50,000, which is to be used in 
the enforcement of the clause excluding contract laborers, the impor- 
tance of which can not be overestimated. The laws agaiueyt ^%^\Afc^ 
immigrants are also, I am sorry to say, in a gx^^A.ijcifc^^xix^SxNfc'&fe^^^^ 



.«?FEKOn Br HEJJfBT OABOT LODGE ON IKMIGHATIOH, 



owing ta the eape of evasion, and here agnin, we hope, by the inve^ti- 
gntioiis of thi' Iniiijii^'nition 6oityirii«*sioij, ta mn^nre Uifoniintirin which 
shall enable us to riiuke (I^ciHihI iiuprovomenb in thi^ direelion, 

The fnjo.sttori of inimigrarion in emphatically one of a pormant^nt 
cbanicU^r* 11i«.*rc am hts no linulily in onr le^i:<1ulioTi, \\i\M\ tnu^t in 
the nature ol' the t^u^*? be roiisUintly opi*n to iniprovemunt in iti* pro- 
viniun^ and in adiniruKi mtive snuntji^mpiit**, 'liiere is also a growing 
and con,Hhintly active dernuiMl for more re?strictive le^isflatiotu ^ Thia 
demand n^stHon two ijroundf*, both e«)ually importjiiit. (.)ne i« the 
ertV^ct upon lhi> «|nality of our ritizf-nship, eauftod by the rapid introduc- 
tion of ibis Viii^t rtnd pructindty nnrti-^i.rit^ted inirnicrnition, and the 
other theeifect of thig immigration upon rale;? of wages and the stand* 
a I'd of living among our workinir (Kcople, Thr* Jinst ground h U>o large 
and too complex to he discnsj^etl m a brief addre5i8. but th(? second is 
80obviou8 that it U ea,Hy to make it under**to(jd in a few wordt*. I have 
nlway^ n^garded hi^^b whj^**.s and high ntjindurdt; of Ii%'iu^' fiirour work- 
ing pBopIe as absolutely necessary to the success of our form of gov- 
ermnerit, which U a repn^«en(ative demot-racy. It is idle to guppone 
that tinjst* rates of waives can bt* niainfain^^i) :md those standardH of liv'- 
ing be held up to the point where they ou^ht to bo kept if we throw 
our labor marKPt open to countlt^HH bonier* of cheaper labor fn^m all 
parts of the gloho. Thi?* inconijjutiinlity between American f^tJindards 
of living and unrestricteil inimigralion became apparent to the great 
masg of our peo[>fe in the case of the Chineie, atru the result was the 
Chinese exclusion acts* 

But what applies to the Chincne applicj^ equally to all A?tiatic labor. 
We have heard a great deal lately about Japane.Ht^ immigration, but it 
ts not a fliiibject which ought to lead, or wlitffi will lead^ to any ill- 
feeling between the two countneSi Japan now, by Imperial edicts, 
exrbidt'^ wrirkin<jr TfK^n f^f nil ntiMotss exre|it urtrlrr strirf ME'^trtntjnris in 
a IVw of what arr known as trmty ])orts. and sho excludes th<'OiMM*>e 
altoLicthiM*. fbij^Jin does not ('X[)(vt, an<l no nation can cxjXM-t. lliar ^\\o 
should have thr riijfht to forcc^ her proj)le on anothci' nation, and liicir 
is no inoi'(^ cau^c for otlVnso in thr desire of our p('oj)le in the W'otci'n 
States to (^xehide fla])anese innni'^i'ants than tliere is in the Ja])an('-(' 
edicts wliich now exchuh' our working* p<'oph' from »Ia])an. Mor<M)\rr 
tlie sentinx'ut of our people is not peculiar to tlie Tnitcd States, it 
is, if anythiuLj-, more fcrxcnt in Uritish (Jolninl)ia than in Caliloiiiia. 
Th(^ people of Australia ex(du<le the ('hine>^e just u^ '^ve do. and it may 
as well be fratd^ly >tated that the white race will not admit A-«i itic 
labor to compel^' with their own in their own countries. Notiiin.:- is 
more fatal in this connection than to make trit<' economic arLiunicnts 
and talk about the survival of the tit test. The white rac(^ of wc-tein 
America, wliether in Canada or in the United Slates, will not ^iiiln* 
tlie introduction of Asiatic labor, and as for the sayin.LT "the sur\ i\;d 
of the litt(v-t.*' tlie people who trse th:it ])hrase never eom])lete it. 'l\\r 
wh(»le statement is 'Mla^ survi\'al of the fittest to survi\-e,'' which i^ 
.somethir)<r ^<u•v diffei'ent from the suT'vival of what is abstractly tiie 
best. If I may u^e an illustration employed by Mr. Speaker lu'ed 
I can make my point clear to your minds. The bull of Bashan is 
always spoken of as a sin^ridarly noi)le animal, and the little minnow, 
or shiner wliich you can see in shallow water anywhere on our coast, 
is a nuich lower form of life: but if you cast the hull of Ra^han and the 
minnow to<rether into the middle of the Atlantic Ocean the bull will 



SPEECH BY HENRY CAHOT LODGE ON IMMIGRATION. V 

drown and the minnow will survive in that environment. Yet is the 
bull of Bashan none the less the nobler animal? In the environment of 
Chinese labor our labor could not long survive as we desire it to exist 
and therefore, by an overmastering instinct our people of the West 
are determined not to admit Asiatic labor to this country, whether it 
is Chinese, Japanese, or Hindoo. I think that by and by our working 
people of the Eastern States will begin to question whether the}^ desire 
to have Arabs, who 1 see are planning to come in large numbers, and 
other people from Asia Minor and the west of Asia, pour into this 
country. 1 am not here to argue this question, but merely to call 
attention to some facts for your consideration, and this ominous fact 
which 1 have just mentioned is one. 

Many people believe that we should also go a step f uither in our 
general legislation and add ignorance to poverty, disease, and crimi- 
nality as a valid ground for exclusion. Congress passed a bill con- 
taining a provision of this sort, which was vetoed by Mr. Cleveland. 
The same provision has come up again and again and has passed the 
Senate more than once. Those w^ho advocate it maintain that it 
excludes in practice, ind with few exceptions, only undesirable immi- 
grants. Here, again. 1 shall not attempt to argue the question w^ith you, 
but will merely point out the number of persons who would have been 
excluded since 1896 if the illiterates over 14 years of age had been 
thrown out. During that period, as shown by the table which I shall 
give, the illiterates who, b}- their own admission, could neither read nor 
write in any language numbered J,S:^t),3!20. The figures in detail are 
as follows: 

189H 88,196 I 1903 189,008 

18^)7 44,580 I 1904 172,8.")0 

1898 44,473 ] 1905 239,091 

1899 01,488 . 190(i 209,823 

1907 343,402 



1900 •. ., 95,673 

1901 120,645 

1902 165,105 Total 1,829,320 

The only thing I desire to say on this point is that nothing is more 
unfounded than the statement that this exclusion is aimed at any race 
or any class. It is aimed at no one but the ignorant, just as the pro- 
vision in regard to the diseased immigrants is aimed only at the dis- 
eased, but it is unquestionably restrictive, and it therefore meets with 
the bitter resistance of the steamship companies from whom, directly 
or indirectly, come nine-tenths of all the agitation and opposition to 
laws affecting immigration. 

1 have tried in all I have said to lay before you the statistics, the 
conditions, the facts, and the past results involved in this great ques- 
tion. As I have already said more than once, I shall make no argu- 
ment and draw no conclusion. I leave it to you to make your own 
inferences and reach your own decisions. 1 say only this: That to 
every working man and to every citizen of the United States, whether 
native born or naturalized, to whom the qualit}^ of our citizenship and 
the future of our country are dear, there is no Question before the 
American people which can be compared with this in importance; 
none to which they should give such attention or upon which they 
should seek to express themselves and to guide their representatives 
more explicitly and more earnestly. 




> 



60th Congress, | SENATE. j Docusient 

M Session, f ( No. 426. 



TRANSMISSION THROUGH THE MAILS OF ANARCH- 
ISTIC PUBLICATIONS. 



MESSAGE 

FROM THE 



PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 

TRANSMITTING 

A COMMUNICATION TROM THE ATTORNEY- GENERAL RELATIVE 
TO THE TRANSMISSION THROUGH THE MAILS OF CERTAIN 
ANARCHISTIC PUBLICATIONS. 



April 9, 1908. — Read ; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and ordered 

to be printed. 



To the Senate and House of Representatives: 

I herewith submit a letter from the Department of Justice which 
explains itself. Under this opinion I hold that existing statutes 
give the President the power to prohibit the Postmaster-General 
irjm bein^ used as an instrument m the commission of crime; that 
is, to prohibit the use of the mails for the advocacy of murder, arson, 
and treason; and I shall act upon such construction. Unquestion- 
ably, however, there should be further legislation by Congress in this 
matter. When compared with the suppression of anarchy, every 
other question sinks into insignificance. The anarchist is the enemy 
of humanity, the enemy of allmankind, and his is a deeper degree of 
criminality than any other. No immigrant is allowed to come to 
our shores if he is an anarchist; and no paper published here or 
abroad should be permitted circulation in this country if it propa- 
gates anarchistic opinions. 

Theodore Roosevelt. 

The White House, April 9, W08. 



Department of Justice, 
Washington^ March 31^ 1908. 
Sir: On March 20, 1908, 1 received from you the following letter: 

The Department of Justice: 

Ry my direction the Postmnster-General is to exclude La Questloue S^ysSsX^^i^ 
of Paterson, N. J., from the mails, and it will not \>^ «i^\si\\X^ \ft \Xi<i \£N»\Sa 



8 



T^E OF THE MAII^ FOE ANABCHISTIC PUBLICATTOKS. 



unless by r>rder of the ooiirf, cpr nnJe^s ymj n<lvli?e me that It nmfit be Bftmltfed. 
PIf!riR3 see If it tfi not possilije to prosecute criminal I j under nay s«elltm of ihe 
law IMI is availabk^ the men that are In teres?! *?*i In sendhi^out liil;? anarchistic 
and mnr^Iuroua pubH<atkm, Tht-y are <)f course the enemies of manklntl, nad 
every ftfort phonhl he jstrahuyl to hold thfni Hr-rountahle for an offense far 
more InfamouH than lUat of an ordinary nninU^rerp 

This ftuittvr lias bwii hroiaiiiit to luy ullmUon by the mayor of tJie city of 
Pnter*w-in. I wish ev**ry elTtirt nmde to g^rt at th(* crhnirial^i imder the Federal 
law. It laay be found ImiHif^HLhle to do ihla I shall alsci, throuj^^h the Secre* 
tary of Htiili*, call th(» atteufUai nf ihv k'*ivi>rnor cif New Jersey to the etrciim- 
Ptanws, wj that lie may iifot^red ♦nvder tin* t^tate law. hia attenthm being fnrtber 
drawn tn tlie faet that the newttimin*r la eUwdat^jil fn other States. After 
you hnve rnnnhukHJ yonr Invest isjnj Ion I wl*«h a retnirt from yoo to serve 
as a basis for a r**conin^em.latlon by nie for action by Con^i'ess, Under 
section 3H!>3 of the 11i*vIk*^1 Statutes le-v^d. nh«^!ene» aud hiHtrJvlouH booka and 
letters, [mhtlrntionw for indofr-nt and inmioraJ ase* ttr of an Inijecent and 
Immoral na litre, and fmstal card« nptvn wlilch ImJecent and s^n^rrllons ei^Hhuts 
are wrlltcm or printtnl, are all i?xcltid'?d from the mall, und j>rtHiHlon is made 
for the tine nnd hnprlsonment of tho^c futility, Tbs ne\v*«fiajjer article in 
question advocates murder by dyiiauiHe, It «r*€*clfirnlly advorates* the murder 
of eollMed men of the I-nUed Slate** Army and othirers of the* (ndlee for*?*!, 
(ind the bundni? of lion sea of private cUlxpinis. The proiirbln^ of murder and 
arson Is certainly an Imnjoral as the ctrcnlathm of obficene aiul htJiiw.Hvloiis 
nteratnre. antl If the practice Is m>t ah*eitdy forhldd<?n by the law II whonld tie 
forbidden* Thi.» ininiijn^nilon law now prohihIU tho entry into the Ignited 
States of any pers'iu who eiitertalns or advocates the view 8 ejfpreKKt?d la tide 
newspaper article. It I» of cnnrj^e Ine^jcni^iiljle to permit Ihot^e already here 
to promnl^ate sncli viei;^'s. Thow? who write, ptihlish, and eirrnl^te those 
artii'k's sUmd on n U-vtA \\\\h tij<iSf^ wlm usf iln.- mails fur (IistrilHjih^L^ jiots-ins 
for the puri)ose of iiiurdcr; and convictions li.'uo Ikhmi ol>tainc(l when the mails 
have thus 1)C(M1 used f(»r the (list rii);it ion of poisons. No hiw sh(»nld rc<r.iire 
the Postniaster-Goneral to become an accessory to mnrdor by cireuhitin^ liicia- 
ture of this kind. 

There ^vas also a letter to you of ^Nlarch 10, lOOS. from Hon. .An- 
drew S. iMcBride, mayor of the city of Paterson. in the Stale of Xew 
Jersey, and certain newspaper ('lipj)in<is, two of wliirli contain wliat 
pui'port to be translations of an alie^fMl article in the ])ul)lication 
La Qiiestione Sociale mentioned in your letter, and which 1 under- 
stand to be j)rinted and circulated in Italian. I'he article t litis attrib- 
uted to La Questione S 
follows: 

We want everybody to be with ns. We invite everybody to ^^'t toirotlier and 
arm tlienisclvos. Seventy-live per cent have only a knife in the honse wliich 
will only cut onions. 

It will be a ^'ood thinj; for every]>ody to have a j;nn. When we are r;\i(ly the 
first thinj^ to do is to break into tlie armory and seize tlie ritles and atnmnnition. 
Then all the pei)ple will be with us as soon as they see this. The^ next thing 
to do is to get liokl of the police station, and when the poliee see that they 
are not strong enough tlie chief of ])olice will ask for soldiers. 

Even at that the dynamite is easy to get for us. Twenty-five cents' w«trth 
will l)lo\v a big iron <loor down. We don't want to forget that the dynamite 
will help us to win. Two or three of us cau defy a regiment of soldiers withotu 
fear. We will start when no one is thinking anything about it. Then we <'an 
beat them man for man. At that time show no symi)athy for any soldiers, even 
if they be sons of the peoj)le. As soon as we get hold of the j^olicv* station it 
is our victory. The thing is to kill the entire force. If not, they will kill us. 
After we have done this the first thing to do is to look out for ourselves (list, 
and then for the peoi)le who helped us. 

We must get into the armory; and in ca.*5e we can not, then we will blow it 

down with dynamite. Then, when we arr» ready, we must s<4 lire to imi.c or 

four houses in dilTerent locations (»n the outskirts, which will briiiL' ont the 

fire de|)artment and all the pr)Iice. Then we will start a tire in the center of 

t/je city. IViis will be an easy thing to do, as the i)olice and firemen will be 



Sociale, as traiwlated in the clip])inLi<. reads a- 



USE OF THE MAILS FOR ANARCHISTIC PUBLICATIONS. 3 

I have carefully examined the law relating to the subject-matter 
of your letter of March 20, and in accordance with your direction 
submit the following report thereon. I must premise, however, by 
saying I have not sought information as to the accuracy of the trans- 
lation of the article, nor yet as to the character of the publication 
itself, and tlie antecedents or purposes of its publishers, except in so 
far as these are indicated by the alleged passage in the same article 
hereinbefore set forth. If this publication does not come within the 
class of periodicals entitled to transportation in the mails as mailable 
matter of the second class, for reasons other than the sentiments it 
expresses, or the illegal or immoral character of its contents, the Post- 
Office Department has ample authority to deny it admission to the 
mails, and 1 am informed that in fact this has been done for reasons 
altogether independent of the peculiar characteristics of the alleged 
article called to your attention. Moreover, while it would be appro- 
priate, of course, to ascertain all the material facts respecting the 
periodical concerned, or the individuals responsible for its publication 
before instituting proceedings of any kind which might affect their 
rights or interests, I understand your instructions as directing a 
report upon the assumption that the alleged newspaper in question, 
and othere of a similar character habitually publish articles substan- 
tially similar to the one translated in the clipping sent me. Your 
letter asks in substance : 

First. Whether the publication of such articles constitutes a crimi- 
nal off'ense on the part of the publishers. 

Second. Whether this offense is punishable by the Federal courts. 

Third. Whether such publications are criminal or excluded from 
the mails by any existing statute of the United States. 

Fourth. Whether, if they are not, the Congress can constitutionally 
enact a law or laws providing for their exclusion and their treatment 
as crimes. 

Fifth. Whether, in the existing condition of the law, the Post- 
master-General can be compelled to admit such publications to the 
mails and transport and distribute them as mail matter. 

1. The article in question, supposing it to have been accurately 
translated, constitutes a seditious libel, and its publication, in my 
opinion, is undoubtedly a crime at common law. (See Russell on 
Criminal Law, vol. 1, sec. 1, chap. 28, p. 595.) 

In Rex V. Lovett (9 C. &. P., 4G2), Littledale, J., says: 

If the paper has a dinM't tendency to cause unlawful meetings or disturb- 
ances and to lead to a violation of the laws, it is a seditions libel. 

Referring to the above-mentioned offense. Professor Greenleaf 
says: 

This crime is committed by the publication of writings blaspheming the Su- 
preme Being, or turning the doctrines of the Christian religion hito contempt 
and ridicule, or tending by their immodesty to corrupt the mind and to destroy 
the sense of decency, morality, and good order ; or wantonly to defame or inde- 
corously to calumniate the economy, order, and constitution of things which 
make up the general system of law and government of the country ; to degrade 
the administration of government or of justice; or to cause animosities between 
our own and any other foreign government, by personal abuse of its sovereign, 
its ambassadors, or other public ministers: and by malicious defamations ex- 
pressed in printing or writing, or by signs or pictures, tending either to blacken 
the memory of one who is dead, or the reputation of one who is living, and 
thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. This descrip- 



4 USE OF THE MAILS FOE AI?ARCHISTIC PUBLICATIONS. 

tive catalogue embraces all tJie several species of this offense which ore indict- 
I able at common law; iiH of which It Ib heHeved are Indictable In the United 
States, eitliet at common inw or hj T?lrtiie of particolar statntes. (3 GreenL 
"v., JG4.) 

In Starkie on Libel (1st ed., ji. 525) the test of the criminality of 
such a publication is said to lie in the answer to the follnvving ques- 
tion : *^ Has the comniimication a plain tendency to produce public 
mischief hy perverting the mind of the subject arid ereating a general 
difisatisfac'fion toward government? *' In the publication you have 
called t^ my attention all j>ersons readin^r it are urgnl to procure 
firms, to seixe, or, if that be impoH^^ibJe, to destroy by dynamite certain 
public buildings; to re.si^t forcibly, and, if pfacticabln, kill police 
officers endeavoring lo discharge their duties as such, and also tbe 
mifltfiry force^j wliurb in\*j:hx ht* Kt*nt lo nid in thr^ restoration of on I en 
[It iH immaterial whether the writer refcrrtnl to the Iic;rular Army of 
the United Stiites i*r to the orgnnized militia of the 8late of New Jer- 
sey in this connection, Hnd the criminnl clmirtcter of his utterance is 
not affected by the fact that he failed to designate any pr^rticular po- 
liceman or any individitrd oHliTr or enlistt*d man of tlie Anny or 
militia aihong his intended, victims. 

A person delivered a tlf*k<?t np in the minister uftm' j*eni>ttT*, wherein lie de- 
Blrod htm to take notice that ofTenses passed now without cnritrol from the 
civtl mugistrfite, and to qnl(*ken the clvtl infiKlfitrate to rto hlR t1ut>% etc»; and 
this wiia held to lie ti Uh*?l. thdiij^li no niiii^tstrato In part ion hi r vvaa mentioned. 

(Bacou's Abrig., tit. Libel (A) 2; Kussell on Crimes, vol. 3, p. G23.) 

In this instance the publication not only su<rge.sts but urges arson, 
murder, riot, and treason against botb the State and the National 
governments. There can be hardly a clearer or stronger ("iX<r. of a 
seditious libel at common law. 

2. It is quite clear, however, that such a publication constitutos no 
offense against the United States, in the ab-encc of some Fefleral 
statute making it one. This was drterniincd in the eai'ly ciso of 
United States v. Hudson and Goodwin (7 Cr., 32), decided Fcbruarv 
13,1812. The report says: 

This was a case certifiPd from the circuit court for the district of r«»iinccti- 
cut, in wliicli, upon argument of a general demurrer to an indictnicnt for a 
libel on the I'resident and Tongress of the Tnited Stjites, contniiicd in the Con- 
necticut Courant of the 7tli day <»f May, ]^(>(;. charging them wiiii linNinir in 
secret vftted $2.000.oO() as a present to l'>onai)arte for lenve to n-.iko n trrnly 
with Spain. The judges of thnt r-ourt were divided in opinion uim.u the (jucstjon 
whether tlie circuit *^'ourt of the Tnited States had a common-law jnrisiliction 
in cases of libel. 

The court determined in this case that the courts of tlio I^nitiMl 
States have no common-law jurisdiction in criminal cases, jxunting 
out that no provision of the Constitution or statutes (Miacted under 
its powers had conferred such jiu'isdiction, nnd decided that i( cDuld 
not be implied from the mere necessity of protecting the Fedeijil 
(lovernment in the execnticm of its constitutional duties, 'idie court 
says in conclusion : 

Certain imi)lied powers must neresharilj- I'csult to our courts of justi<'e from 
the nature of their institution. Hut jurisdiction of crimes against the siate 
is not among those i)owers. To flue for contempt, imi»rison for contumacy, 
enforce the ol)servance of order, etc., are powers whicli can not be dis].ensed 
with in a court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others; and 
so far our courts no doubt possess jiowers not imnx-diately derived from siatnie: 
but nil exercise of criminal jurisdiction in common-law cases, we are of opinion. 



USE OF THE MAILS FOE ANAECHISTIC PUBLICATIONS. & 

From the foregoing considerations I conclude : 

(1) That the printing and circulation of the paper in question^ 
supposing it to be correctly translated, was clearly an offense at 
common law. 

(2) That of this offense the courts of the United States have no 
jurisdiction in the absence of any act of Congress declaring it a 
crime and authorizing its punishment. 

3. In compliance with your instructions, I have very carefully in- 
vestigated the statutes of the United States to see if they contain any 
provision making such a publication an offense against the United 
States or authorizing its exclusion from the mails. United States 
Revised Statutes, section 3893, as amended by the acts approved 
July 12, 1876 (19 Stat. L., 90), and September 26, 1888 (25 Stat. L., 
496), contain the following provision: 

Every obscene, lewd, lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing,, 
print or other publication of an indecent character, and every article or thing 
designed or intended for the prevention of conception or procuring of abortion^ 
and every article or thing intended or adapted for any indecent or immoral use, 
and every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertise- 
ment or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where or 
how, or of whom, or by what means any of the hereinbefore-mentioned matters,, 
articles, or things may be obtained or made, whether sealed as first-class mat- 
ter or not, are hereby declared to be nonnia liable matter, and shall not be con- 
veyed in the mails nor delivered from any post-office nor by any letter carrier; 
and any person who shall knowingly deposit, or cause to be deposited, for mail- 
ing or delivery, anything declared by this section to be nonmailable matter, and 
tiny person who shall knowingly take the same, or cause the same to be taken, 
from the mails for the purpose of circulating or disposing of, or of aiding in the 
circulation of or disposition of the same, shall, for each and every offence, be 
fined upon conviction thereof not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned 
at hard labor not more than five years, or both, at the discretion of the court. 

There can be, I think, no doubt that, in a sense, this article is a 
"publication of an indecent character;" but it is not, in my opinion, 
" indecent " in the sense in which the word is used in this section. It 
is also clearly an " article or thing intended * * * for ♦ * * 
immoral use," for its purpose is j)lainly to suggest several grave 
crimes, including treason, murder, and arson, and such a purpose is 
undoubtedly immoral; but the particular immoral purposes which the 
Congress intended to render matter unmailable under this provision 
of law are not such purposes as inspired the article in question. The 
language of the section shows clearly that it was intended to exclude 
matter either literally " obscene " in the sense generally attributed to 
the word, or of a nature ejusdem generis with obscenity. In this case 
the rule noscitur a sociis must be applied to such words as " indecent " 
and " immoral " in the construction of a highly penal statute, and I 
can not advise you that the section above quoted authorizes either the 
prosecution of the persons mailing the paper in question or its exclu- 
sion from the mails. 

The act of June 18, 1888 (25 Stat. L., 187), as amended by the act 
of September 26 of the same year (ibid., 496) is as follows: 

That all matters otherwise mailable by law, upon the envelope or outside 
cover or wrapper of which, or any postal card upon which any delineations, 
epithets, terms or languap:e of an indecent, lewd, lascivious, obscene, libelous, 
scurrilous, defamatory or threaten in?: character, or calculated by the terms or 
manner or style of display and obviously intended to reflect injuriously upon the 
character or conduct of another may be written or printed, or otherwise im- 
pressed or apparent, are hereby declared nonmailable matter, and shall not be 



USE OF THE MAILS FOB Alf ABCHlSTlO PUBLICATIONS, 

conv^M In tl>e mn1l**» nor dellvertiil from nny post-o91ee nor hy any letter ctLT- 
rter, uiwl HhnU he wtthilnt^n fr*/m lli*> mnliw tir*rtor sncU reir"Isitloni? fts tlie 
P€w*tTiifliit(>T-<;(TTUTnl shull firt'ScriUe : and wiiy pt^risoij who slrull knowingly de- 
fionJt, ur cauH«^ lo be dppmttedi for niJilllng or delivery, anything dt*f:lflrM by 
tJils si.!**tlcm to bt? uemrH/iliiible matter, aui] siuy [jlh'Sou wbo filial I Isuowhigly take 
tho same or cniiw* tbe same to be to km from tbc malfs, for the piiri^ose of dr- 
cuialhiir ot d(i4r»*^8ttig of. or of atJiiig In tbe cJrcnlatlon or disrH3sition of the 
jtnoie, jiiiml! for <?iiL*h and evers^ ofrv*ii*^t.s ni^m t^tnivictJou tiic'reut be fined not 
mare tlmn flie tliOiiKriTid dnHnrji* of ln*|jrl*^oTird «r tinrd Jj^l^or not more thiin 
five yefirn^ or holb, nt the f]LKi:retfoii of tlie t.'om-t 

I have noiloiibt thai the* piibHonli^iii in q\n*!*tmn would come within 
the toriiis of this statute, if thts article to which you Imve calli^d fijy 
attention were pt-inled on its cover or wrapper or it were so folded 
Ihiit this part of ita contents might be exposed to pnbUc view* Ita 
language is undoubtedly *' libelous,^^ ^* ficnrriloiis," " defamatory," and 
** threatening,^' and if deposited in the 01111] in such mamier that, 
without remonng the cover, this language might be read by olher 
I>ersOns than the one to whom it wis addre^ssed, it would unqtiostion- 
ubly come within the prohibition of the act I infer, however, since 
there is no statenient as to the niihire of \H inelo?m^, that this paper 
was iso wrapped and folded as not to di.seloiie the article in quest ion, 
or, at all eventn, that you wish my opinion as to Uh criminal char* 
acti^r and the propriety of its exclusion from tlie mails independently 
of the question 01 it^ incloi^ure, and in case its publishers should pro- 
vide a wrapper which would conceal its content^?, and if tluis inclosed, 
it would stem clearly not to come within the provisions of this statute, 

Thei'e are some other pro^HHioui^ of law, such as those relatin^^ to 
letters, circulars, etc., eormect^d with lotteries or spurious money and 
those prohibiting the transportation of noxious insects in tlie inaiLs, 
which declare certain classtas of matter unmailable, but they do not 
affect the case of an article of this character, and I am ohlisred to 
report that 1 can find no express provision of law directiiJ2: the ex- 
elusion of sncli matter from the niails, or renderinir its deposit in 
the mails an offense airainst the United States. 

4. There can be no doubt, however, that tlie C'onirress has full 
power under tlie Constitution to exclude surh publications from tlie 
mails. As is said by Mr. Justice Field, in ce parte Jack-^on (DO U. S., 
727, p. 73-2) : 

Tlie power possossed by C'onirress embraces Hie rciriilatinii of tlie entire 
postal syslcMi) of tbc countiy. The riixht to dcsiirnate what sliall be carried 
necessarily ii.Nolves the ri.L'ht to determine wiiat sliall be e\«-iiHl(Ml. 

In the ra<o of /// re Ivapier (113 U. S., 110), the present Chief 
Justice says, paire 134: 

It is not necessary that Congress slionld have the iiower to deal with 
crime or imnioi-aliiy within the Stat«'s in order to maintain that it possesses 
tlu^ power to forbitl the nse of the mails in aid of the jieiitetration of <-rime 
or immorality. 

Many other authorities mii/lit be cited to the same effect. It has 
been, it is true, sometimes contended that the ri^ht to use the nutils 
constitutes a fonu of property which i< protected from "confisca- 
tion '' under the fifth amendment, or that such use can not be denied 
to any citizen without an iufrin<renient of the rights secured by the 
first amendment: but the-e contentions have been reptidiated by hiirh 
authority and seem to me (dearly untenable in view of the decisions 
0/ the :^upivjne Court cited abo\e. 



USE OF THE MAILS FOE ANARCHISTIC PUBLICATIONS. J 

I have the honor therefore to advise you that it is clearly and 
fully within the power of the Cono:ress to exclude from tlte mails 
tlie "publications similar to the one set forth in the clippings inclosed 
with your letter, and to make the use, or attempted use, of the mails 
for the transmission of such writings a crime against the United 
States. 

5. There remains to be considered the interesting and important 
question whether, in the absence of any legislation by Congress either 
directing or prohibiting the transmission of such publications 
through the mails, tlie Postmaster-General, in the exercise of his au- 
thority as head of the Post-Office Department and acting under your 
instructions, has the right to exclude them, and this question is one 
of no little difficulty. It must be premised that the Postmaster-Gen- 
eral clearly has no power to close the mails to any class of persons, 
however reprehensible may be their practices or however detestable 
their reputation; if the question were whether the mails could be 
closed to all issues of a newspaper, otherwise entitled to admission, 
by reason of an article of this character in any particular issue, there 
could be no doubt that the question must be answered in the negative. 
Since, however, under the provisions of United States Revised 
Statutes, section 3882, and section 12 of the act approved March 3, 
1879 (20 Stat. L., 359), newspapers may be fully examined either at 
the office of mailing or at the office of delivering, if such examina- 
tion shall incidentally disclose the fact that a newspaper contains 
matter similar to the clippings sent with your letter, then, inasmuch 
as " all printed copies struck off from one common impression, 
though they constitute merely secondary evidence of the contents of 
the paper from which they are taken, are considered as primary 
evidence of each other's contents" (Taylor on Evidence, sec. 388; 
Rex V. Watson, 32 How. St. Tr., 82), this fact may be reasonably 
held to prove that the entire issue of the paper contains the same 
matter. Under such circumstances can the Postmaster- General 
exclude such issue from the mails. 

At first sight it may seem that his right to do this is denied by the 
decision in Teal v. Felton (12 How., 284). In that case the postmas- 
ter at Syracuse, N. Y., refused to deliver to the plaintiff a newspaper 
sent him by mail because there was a mark on the wrapper in addition 
to the address, and the Postmaster-General, by circular, had directed 
that newspapers having marks on their wrappers should not be de- 
livered, except upon the payment of full letter postage. The plaintiff 
brought a suit in trover for the value of the newspaper, and obtained 
a verdict and judgment for 6 cents. The case finally reached the 
Supreme Court, and it was determined by that tribunal, first, that 
the law did not justify the instructions of the Postmaster-General, 
and, secondly, that the person to whom a newspaper is addressed, 
being its owner, can sue the postmaster for its value, if he refuses to 
deliver it when this is duly demanded at the office of delivery. 

The court says (p. 292) : 

The United States undertakes, at fixed rates of postapre, to convey letters and 
newspaper^s for those to whom they are directed, and the postage may be prepaid 
by the sender, or he paid when either reach their destination, by tlie person to 
whom they are addressed. When tendered by the latter or by his ajjout, he has 
the right to the immediate possession of them, though he has not had before the 
actual possession. If then they be wrongfully withheld for a charge of unlaw* 
ful i)ostage, it is a conversion for which suit may be brought 



8 USE OF THE MAILS FOR ANARCHISTIC PUBLICATIONS* 

And so in the case of Commerford v, Thompson (1 Fei^ 415), in 
the United States cin-iiit court for the district of Kentuckjj the couit, 
Brown, J.^ siays (p. 419) - 

WbJIe there Is undonbtedly ] tower to prescribe what shall or what ehall not 
he carrJed by post {ex paHt^ Jackson, Siti U. S., 72T-I32), the ma Us nre prima 
fit Hi] intended fnr the service of every persfiu desirlag to use HieiiK and a 
n\onopoly of this 9r>*H^e« of cf^mmerce is secured to the Post -Office Dtimrtm<^it^ 
<IEev. Stat., sec. 34*82.) It is then scarcely n^essary to mj that the oIHcerB 
of the Deimrtment are the agents of the publie In tiie per form u nee af ihis isi Tr- 
ice, niid that no i>ostniastc'r, whf^her acting under ihe Instructions of the Portt- 
nmster^Genyri! I or not, cnn lawfully refnpe to deliver letters iiddressed to hta 
office^ ijnlcS4< Hteclnl unthority for mj doing ia found in some act of Congress. 

The.se aathontio^ und some other decisions and dicta which might 
be cited to the isame effect nm entitled to great respect^ but, after a 
very cureful coni^idcrjition of the snbject, I do not ihinlt they are 
decisive of the ques^tioii here involved. That question may be thus 
stult^d: Is it tlie intention of the Congre.sSj as expressed in the Federal 
statutes on this subjectj that the mails should be used t-o convey 
liljelous solicitatiotis for the perpnt ration of treason and felonies with 
knowledge on the part of the Postmaster-General and his subordi- 
nates that thej are used for this purpose? 

In the ar^rment of Mr. James C. Carter for the petitioner in the 
ease of in -re Itapier, he suppoge^s this question to be asked (143 U. S*, 
p. 117) : 

Is it true, then, that the Governnieut of the United States is placed in the 
singular attitude that it can not discharge its duty of maintaining a mail service 
without extending the facilities which that service affords to criminals of every 
description to aid them in the commission of crime? 

This question is no less material to the construction of the postal 
laws than to their constitutionality. The Congress undoubtedly has 
power to say what shall and what shall not be mailable; but, in the 
absence of compelling language, surely a construction of the statutes 
should not be adopted which would render officers of the Government 
accessories to grave crimes and convert the post-office into an agency 
destructive of the ends of all government. In several statutes re- 
lating to the postal service there has been an implied recognition that 
matter offered for delivery might be excluded from the mail, although 
no statute was in existence prohibiting its transportation, llius, 
United States Revised Statutes, section 3890, provides for the punish- 
ment of '' any postmaster who shall imlaivfulhj detain in his ofiice any 
letter or other mail matter the posting of which is not proliihited by 
law," and in United States Revised Statutes, section 5471, j)r()visi()n 
is made for the punishment of " any person employed in any dej)art- 
mcnt of the postal service who shall improperly detain, delay * * * 
any * * * newspaper." It is obvious that these words " unlaw- 
fully " and "improperly" are mere surplusage unless the detention 
might imder certain circumstances be Imvful and proper^ notwith- 
standing that the posting of the mail matter might not be " proliihitcd 
by law." So in section 15 of the act approved March 3, 181)7 ('10 
Stat. L., 359), it is said: " Nothing in this act shall be so construed as 
to allow the transmission through the mails of any publication wliich 
violates any copyright granted by the United States." Th(^re is, in 
point of fact, no statute expressly prohibiting the transportation 
through the mails of publications violating the copyright law. The 



USE OF THE MAILS FOR ANARCHISTIC PUBLICATIONS. 9 

proviso just quoted assumes that because such publications are unlaw- 
rul they will or may be excluded from the mails, and guards against 
any construction of the statute in which it is contained which might 
relieve them from this implied prohibition. 

In the consideration of this question it is important to bear in 
mind the relations of the United States to persons using the post- 
office. As is said in Teal v. Felton, above cited : " The United States 
undertakes to convey letters and newspapers for those to whom they 
are directed ; " that is to say, it undertakes the business of a messen- 
ger. In so far as it conveys sealed documents, its agents not only 
are not bound to know, but are expressly forbidden to ascertain what 
the purport of such messages may be; therefore, neither the Gov- 
ernment nor its officers can be held either legally or morally respon- 
sible for the nature of the letters to which they thus, in intentional 
ignorance, afford transportation. But in the case of printed mat- 
ter, intended for general circulation, and which, by virtue of the stat- 
utes above mentioned, and in consideration of the reduced rate at 
which it is transported, the officers of the Post-Office Department 
have the legal right to thoroughly inspect, it seems obvious that 
neither these officers nor the Government which employs them can 
escape responsi])ility for the consequences if they knowingly trans- 
port matter which becomes, and w^hich they must know might be 
reasonably expected to become^ a cause of crime. 

It is said by Mr. Justice Field in ex parte Jackson, supra, refer- 
ring to the postal laws (96 U. S., 733) : 

In their enforcement a distinction Is to be made between different Ijlnds of 
mail matter — between what is intended to be licpt free from inspection, such 
iis letters and sealed packages subject to letter postage, and what is open to 
Inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed mat- 
ter, purposely left in a condition to be examined. 

It seems clearly unreasonable to construe these laws without regard 
to this distinction, and no less unreasonable to give them a construc- 
tion which would make the Postmaster-General and his subordinates 
conscious, even if involuntary, agents in the solicitation of treason 
and felonies and the circulation of seditious libels. 

There is another aspect to this question. To determine whether 
those responsible for such publications have a legal ri^ht to their 
transportation in the mails, it may be material to determine whether 
they would have any adequate remedy if refused such transportation. 
In the case of Commerford v. Thompson, above cited, while the cou^ 
held that there was no right to exclude from the mails the ma' 
excluded in that case, it also held that the remedy by injunction 
not open to the plaintiff. The language of the court is as f " ' 
Fed., 422) : 

Conceding that the act of the defendant in detaining t' 
thorized, and that the complainant might maintain an 
ages, it does not necessarily follow that he is entitled ' 
of injunction does not issue as a matter of coi^' 
has made out a technical right to relief. ^ 
chancery for the exercise of its prohibiting pr 
come by the dictates of conscience, and be f 
of justice. The granting of an applicati 
and is addressed to the conscience of t' 
circumstances connected with the cp 



10 Vm OF THE MAJCLS FOB AHABCHISTIC PUBJJCATlONS. 

remedy miiKt ftirim into eourt with i^leim liiiiiiSBi and «UoW| uot only tliat Ills 
^Uzi Is viilvJ tiy the strJet letter of tbo law, btit tliut In Justlct; ami equity h^ 
Is aatitlLH] 10 til I a parttculnr iiiode ot n^Uet 

Aftor citing ninny authorities to sustain this position and examin- 
ing the faet^ of the case, in ^o far tis these were disclosed by the 
record, the court concluded (1 Fed., 425) : 

In any H^'Jit in wbicb this cas^e can he viowcHt. tt is inipc»sslble to avoid the 
ctrtK'Jut4U»n that Uk* court b f^ulre*i to Imid Uj^ nkl to ;i sflieuie condtniuied 
DltKo (>y Ci>iij:n:^ and by public opinion, CarnxdiiUmnt should be left to Mv 
rtMnLHly nt l»w. 

How tlie C^>ng^eS5 views the '* schemen ^* disclosed in the article from 
La Questione Sociale sufficiently a|*pt*arfi from the followmg pro- 
vi.siou in the act approved Marcii 7, 11)07 (34 Stat. L., Wd) : 

>"o [lerson who dlsbeliP.vea in or who (b 0i)i">8e<l to alt organ Isstnl t'ovemiu&nt, 
or who lis a tnt-mber of or amiiated wltii any orjtitul«atiou ajlertahilng ond 
teaching such dislidief So or opiwaitkm to all organJxed p>vernuiiint, or who 
ttdvo(mtes or teat^hi^R iht'? duty, iKVfiifeity* or iiropHt?ty of the Ufihiw'fnl aKgJtulthiff 
or Ulinn^ of wny ofRrcr or olttfri»rfi, clihor af «|H?cifte Indivldotils or of nrtlc^prt 
genera Hy, of the CJoverninent of the T*nMiHl 8tatf«» or of any other or^'frnlzinl 
K(ivenini4^nt. beoaaiie of hi» or thf*lr olturhil churaeter, ah ah be per mi tied to 
enter tLe United Stares or any ti^rrltory or i>larG suJjject to ttie Juii«dlctloii 
tlittreiot 

Tt is a miittor of notoriety, and thert^fore of judiciRl knowled^* Hint 
this measure was enacted in obedience to imperative demand of pub- 
lic opinion. 1 can not doubt, therid'ore, that any court of con-r-Knce 
would reacli the conchision with that announced in Connnerfoi-d /\ 
lliompson if asked to compel the dissemination tlii-ouirhout the 
country of the ])ul)lication inclosed with your letter. Such a court 
would nnr|ue-tiomil)ly leave the complaiiuint to liis remedy at law. 
What would be the value of that r(Mne«ly? 

It is well settled that at common law the owner of a libelous ])icture 
or ])lacar(l or document of any kind is entitl('(l to no daiiiai:<>s for its 
destiMiction in so far at l«'a-t as its value may dej)cnd on il^ unlawful 
siirnihcanc(\ Thus, in the case of Du 1)0-1 r, I^xu'c^ford {'2 Camp., 
oil), a suit was l)rounht for cuttiiiL'" a j^idurc of <,n-(^at value wiiidi 
the plaintitr had exhibited, and it is stat(Ml — 

It aitpeare<l tliat tlie plaintiff' is an artist of i-onsiUoralile einintMirc. hnt tliat 
tlio picture in (pu'Stioii, oiitititM] "La r.cil*^ et la r.i'tc," or '* i;«-;Mity and ilio 
I?east," was a scanUalons lihcl npon a L^entlcinan of fasliion and ]:i< i;nly. wtin 
was the sister of the defendant. It was (^xhilntcd in a lionse in I'aliMall P-r 
nioney, and ^'reat ci-owds went daily to see it, till the defendant one lii.-iiiini: 
1 d it in pieces. Some of the witnesses estimated it at se\ei-al Imndrcd poniids. 
:*^^''lie plaintiff's connsel insisted, on the one liand. that he was entiilc<l tn tlic 
IS mt.}ilne of the pictnre. toLretiier witli a conii>ensation for the Inss (d the .x- 
ment of .while it was contended on the other, tliat the exhii>ition was a piiMic 

J , « ♦hi«-i» e\('ryone iiad a I'i.irht to al»ate hy destioyinL' the jrictnit'. 
^. |i ^55 ^ {4 i-on-jh. "The only i>Iea ni»on the rcrord hfimr the l'*' mm-m 1 Nsiie 
inliy ana nn|,,,,,.j^.,.j^^,^,.y ^^^ consider whether the destiMiction of thi^ pi«inie 
might nnder certai.ave i)een justified. The material (piestion is, as t.. the 
standing: that the posti.'iiJ''*le tlestroyed. If it was a lihel nf.on the pri^ntis 
bv hnv So in sect ion ^"'^^^ ^^^ consider it valuahle as a pi<fnre. 1 |hmi an 
Cf i T * Q-n\ V •' * 1 u U^>J'' he would have ^'ranted an in.inncii<Mi aLrninst 
^tat. 1^., »io.i), It IS saul: i\^..,^ j,<^^ij civilly and crinnnally liahie fcr h.i. in- 
to allow the transmission thro in assessing the dama;:es. mnst not c.m^id.r 
violates any copyrinrht granted ^^''•i"«l the plaintiflf merely the valne (d" the 
point of fact, no statute expreifi'^^'"''''''^ ^'''''^^'^ 
through the mails of publications viv 



USB OP THE MAILS FOR ANARCHISTIC PUBLICATIONS. 11 

But for the error in the defendant's pleading there would have been 
no right of recovery at all in this case; for, in Fores v. Johnes (4 
Esp., 97), in which the plaintiff was a print seller in Piccadilly, and 
the action was brought to recover the value of a quantity of caricature 
prints, sold by him to the defendant, Lawrence, J., said : 

For prints, whose objects are general satire or ridicule of prevailing fashions 
or manners, I think the plaintiff may recover; but I can not permit him to do 
so for such whose tendency is immoral or obscene ; nor for such as are libels on 
individuals, and for which the plaintiflC might have been rendered criminally 
answerable for a libel. 

It may be safelj said that ex turpi causa non oritur actio is a well- 
recognized principle of law; a stronger case could hardly be pre- 
sented for its application than a claim for damages by a would-be 
murderer, incendiary, and promoter of rebellion against a public 
officer because the latter refuses to become a party to his crimes, or 
to use a great public service, supported in large part by the taxes 
and regulated by the laws of the nation, to aid in the subversion of 
orderly government and civil society. 

While, therefore, in the absence of any express provision of law 
or binding adjudication on this precise point, the q^uestion is cer- 
tainly one of doubt and difficulty, I advise you that, in my opinion, 
the Postmaster-General will be justified in excluding from the mails 
any issue of any periodical, otherwise entitled to the privileges of 
second-class mail matter, which shall contain any article constituting 
a seditious libel and counseling such crimes as m^urder, arson, riot, 
and treason. 

I am, sir, yours, very respectfully, 

Charles J. Bonaparte, 

AUoimey-General. 

The President, 



S D— 60-1— Vol 32 23 



60th Congress, ) SENATE. ( Document 

let Session. ) I No. 427. 



HEARINGS ON ALLEGED STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN 
UNITED STATES BATTLE SHIPS. 



Mr. Hale presented the following 

ABTIOLE FROM THE SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (APRIL 4, 1908) 
ON THE HEARINGS ON ALLEGED STRUCTTXRAL DEFECTS iK 
X7NITED STATES BATTLE SHIPS. 



April 9, 1908. — Referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs and ordered to be 

printed. 



THE SENATE HEARING ON THE ALLEGED DEFEC5TS OF OUR NAVY. 

The Senate hearing on the alleged defects in the vessels of our Navy 
was held with a view of ascertaining the exact facts regarding the 
free board, position of water-line armor, height of guns, and other 
features of our battle ships as compared with those of the leading 
foreign navies. The proceedings were very exhaustive, and resultea 
in the presentation of a vast amount of information, accompanied with 
detailed plans bearing upon these important points. The people of 
the United States will be gratified to learn that the evidence which has 
thus far transpired is not only a complete vindication of the excellence 
of the ships of our Navy, hut it prtwes them to he^ in some respects^ 
decidedly superior to foreign ships of the same date and type. 

It was evident from the testimony given by certain seagoing oflScers 
who have been active in criticism of our ships that they indorsed the 
allegations made in what is known as the Keuterdahl article. Now, 
the charge made in that article (and it is well to be perfectly clear on 
this point) was not so much that our ships could be made better than 
the}'^ are (a fact which everybody is prepared to admit), hut that our 
ships are inferior^ and greatly infeinor., to the ships of foreign navies. 
It is with this last statement in particular that we have always taken 
decided issue. The Scientific Amei^ican claims {and not a word of 
truth has heefi adduced to show the contrary) that our hattle shij)s of any 
given type and date are as efficient as foreign hattle ships of the same 
type ana date^ and in respect of their armament are greatly supei^ior. 

The oflBcial cross sections of a large number of typical foreign battle 
ships, which were presented in the recent Senate hearing, prove that 
this contention is absolutely correct. Compared with the British and 
Japanese ships, our armor belts are as thick, and sometimes thicker; 



2 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN UNITED ftTATES BATTLE 8HIP8. 



thc^y are in the same position with regard to the water line; our free 
iKmid is af? ffrf*at, mid in some ni-^os greati^r; our broad ■^idi? ^uns are 
carried ws high, and geiienilly hightM'; our rat*.' of amnHinitiuii supply 
18 a8 rapid, and in many Hhips more rapid; and {jL^'reiites^t t^urprise of 
all) the ofK*n animunitlon hoist to the turn^fs is not pru-uliar to our 
own Navi\ but i^ found in we vend of the t^raek battle .ships and cruis- 
ers 4>f other navieti. 

That the above eomimrison is a hi^rh tentirtiony to the quality of our 

ships will bo reeognissed when wc mtfntion that the cross M-i'tiunt* cited 

;re of such ^^hip?* as the Britisib litfyal ^'m-en-wn^ Majr^tfC^ iChig 

4ffmrd^ and Drmihmnijhf^ and the Janan*.**;** A%ahK MlMtj^tt^ luishima^ 
and J^vV and we may menlion jiint nere that even in the cane of 
the twr> rrack battle nhip, Mtkam at»d Ahf(/tj\ of the ►lapanese fleet, 
the broadside guns itre only about 12 feet above the water line^ as 
against from 14^ to 15i feet on our own whips* So also, in the eom* 
pari son witli conteniporaneouH French rtbips, it i** found that the 
thiekuess and iJO?<ition of our armor bell>* is ftdly iw sat is; factory^ 
that the armoring of the tojj sides is greatly superior, and thtit m 
respect nf the free board onl^' and the height!!* at wUwii the y:uns are 
carried have tlie French ^hip^^ anii i^o- called advantage. That If if ty 
guns and towering top sides have been adopted at the exiHinjie of sta- 
bility is shown b^* the fact that, with one exception, the French-typo 
Utis^ian battle ships which fought in the battle of the Sea of Japsin 
proved tbeir toi>beaviness by turning turtle and going to the l>ottom- 
Furthermore, tlie one French 4y pi* s*hip, the Orff^wlnvh was ciiptured 
Ijy the Jajmnese, was changed by them to tlie Anierican tyi>e by cutting 
down her decks and lowering &er gun po.^itions, a^* is clearly shown 
in the illusti'fttions on mge 241 of IhtJis issue. 

According to press diispatches^ Rear- Admiral Evans has sent to the 
Department a report u|h>q the behavior of our shi|»s during the Pacific 
cruise, in which certain ^suggestions are made with ri^f*'rf^Trce fo the 
questions of arinur belts, turn is, free) ma rd, etc., v\hirli are tj<»w in 
de])ate. The report contains tlie opinion of a iia\al coii.^tiiictoi" de- 
tailed especially to watch the i)ehavior of tiie vessels, and of \ariou8 
seagoing olHcers in charge of the ships. In due course, when this 
report becomes available, we hope to give a review of its snlicnt f«*;i- 
tures. According to press dispatches. Naval Constructor l\ol)inson 
noted that although, in the main, the voyage was inadc in (|uiet 
weathei- the ships at times rolled sutticiently to tirjto^e fhr \iii<i i'ii,i>r> d 
hoftom hrlov tJif^ belt, and henee the suggestion of some of the ollirers 
that the belt be mad(i wider /,s accoinpnu'ied xcillt ike f<t/pid(iti</)i tJiat 
the hofJnm of the Idt he left in its j/nsott J(nr ]><fi<iti(/i\. It is suggested 
that the additional weight due to wider belts be compensated for l)y 
the removal of ''what is termed superHuous weight." We believe that 
no small reduction of weight can be made in this way, for it is a noto- 
rious fart that our ships carry, in the w ay of comforts and convenieucrs 
for ollicers and men, much weight that is not to be found in foreign 
battleships. It is also stated that Rear- Admiral Evans '^ reconnnends 
taking otl the after bridges;" though wh}^ he should do this, wIkmi it 
was at his earnest insistence, and in opposition to the strong wish of 
the construction department, that an extra flying bridge was built aft 
on the Connecticut for his special use, we are at a loss to undc i'>tand. 
Commenting on the suggestion of some of the commanding ollicers 
that the belts might be raised from 6 inches to a foot higher (which, 



ALLEGED DEFECTS IN UNITED STATES BATTLE SHIPS. 8 

by the way, would bring them just where they were designed to be 
before extra weights were added during construction) Admiral Evans 
says: 

But even this is open to question, for it has been noted tJiat even when heavilj 
laden and in the smooth to moderate seas, which have thus far characterized this 
cruise, the ships frequently expose their entire belt and the bottom plating beneath. 

It must be remembered that even a 5 or a 6 inch shell, of which tnere would be a 
great number, could inflict a severe and dangerous injury if it struck below the belt, 
while otherwise the water line, even with the belt entirely submerged, is, on account 
of the casemate armor and coal, immune to all except the heaviest projectiles. 

The fact is that under the sea conditions in whicn battles may be fought a belt 8 
feet in width, if considered alone, is too narrow to afford the desired protection 
wherever it may be placed, and the question becomes an academic discussion, with 
certain arguments on each side. 

It is understood that on the latest ships this question is of little import, as the citadel 
armor is but 1 inch lees in thickness than on the water line, and for those ships 
already built it is believed that when the bridges are removed and all weights which 
would be Ilmded should war break out are taken into consideration, the ship will 
rise to the 6 to 12 inches, which is believed to be the maximum that it could be 
desired to raise them. 

If, as is reported, the admiral states that the broadside guns '*can 
only be used to advantage when the battle ships are not steaming more 
than 10 knots," we can only sajr that bad, indeed, must be the case of 
the battle ships of other navies, the majority of which carry these 
guns from 1 to 3 feet nearer the water than do our own ships. 

The country is to be congratulated on the fact that the recent wild and 
baseless criticism of our ships should have been made just when the 
fleet was starting for the Pacific. In spite of the fact that most of it 
was either false or grossly exaggerated, it has done an incalculable 
amount of good; for, as a result of the discussion and investigation 
which has followed, a large amount of information . has been made 
public regarding our ships, which scarcely could have become known 
m any other way. Not only have they now a more intelligent knowl- 
edge of our Navy, but the confidence of the people of the United 
States in the excellence of our ships has been greatly strengthened. 
As a further indorsement, there has come the briUiant success achieved 
by Admiral Evans and his officers and men, in bringing that fleet 
through its 14,000-mile trip, in perfect order and two days ahead of 
the schedule time. 



60th Congress, ) SENATE. J Document 

let Session. ) ( No. 435. 



REFUSAL OF NATIONAL BANKS IN NEW YORK CITY TO FURNISH 
CURRENCY IiOR NEEDS OF INTERIOR BANKS. 



LETTER 



FBOM 



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, 

TBANSMITTINO, 

IK BESPONSE TO A SENATE RESOLUTION OF FEBRUARY 18, 1908» 
COPIES OF ALL LETTERS AND TELEGRAMS RECEIVED BY THE 
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY AND THE TREASURER OF THE 
UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO THE REFUSAL OF THE NATIONAL 
BANKS IN NEW YORK CITY TO FURNISH CURRENCY FOR THE 
NTEEDS OF INTERIOR BANKS. 



Apbil 14, 1908. — ^Referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be 

printed. 



TREASURr Department, 

Office op the Secretary, 
Wasfdngtonj April IS, 1908. 
Sir: In response to Senate resolution dated February 18, 1908, 
reading as follows: 

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, directed 
to inform the Seuate if any national banks outside the city of New York com- 
plained by telegrams or lellers to the Treasury Department, the Secretary of 
the Treasury, the Treasurer of the I'nited States, or the Comptroller of the 
Currency between October first, nineteen hundred and seven, and November 
fifteenth, nineteen hundred and seven, of the refusal of national banks of New 
York City to pay in cash New York exchange or to respond to calls for reserves ; 
and if so, the Secretary is directed to send to the Senate copies of all such tele- 
grams and letters and answers thereto, 

I beg to inclose herewith, by direction of the President, copies of all 
letters and telegrams received by the Secretary of the Treasury and 
the Treasurer of the United States relative to the refusal of the 
national banks in New York City to furnish currency for the needs 
of interior banks. I also transmit copy of a letter from the Comp- 
troller of the Currency showing that his oflBce does not appear to 
have received any letters or telegrams making complaint of the na- 
ture stated against New York City banks. 

The copies of letters herewith inclosed are 51 in number and were 
received irom 43 different banks. Forty-one of the communicftt\ftxsa 



2 EEFUBAI- OF NATIONAL* BANKS TO FURNISH CURRENCY, 

were not answered in writing. Where the letters were so answered 

copies of such answers are transmitted. 

In this connection it may be said that the fact that many of the 
comphnnts received were not answered by letter should not be taken 
as an indication that no effort was made to relieve the diffieidties of 
those banks* To save time, banks in New York, Chicago, Philadel- 
phia, and other places were called over the telephone and requested 
to help out the mterior banks complainingj wherever possible* As 
pointed out in my annual report and in my response to the Senate 
resolution of December 12, 190T, the responses to the Department's 
requests were in most cases prompt and liberal. 

The Department, as far as the Government revenues were con- 
cerned, retrained in all case^s from pressing the banks for an imme- 
diate turning into the Treasury, in cash, of their receipts on account 
of revenues. On the 1st of December, however, a telegram waa sent 
to tlie chairmen of clearing-house banks in New York, Boston, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Cincinnati, St^ L#ouisj Chicago, New Or- 
leans, and San Francisco, calling upon the banks in those cities to 
resume, on December 4, 1907j payment into the Treasury, in cash, of 
the revenues as fast as tliey were collected. A copy of this telegram 
is transmitted herewith. The method pursued by the Department 
in dealing with the indii'idual depositary banks, together with the 
efl'orts made by the banks in the subtreasury cities, to supply cur* 
rency were so far effective as to prevent disastrous embarrassment to 
the banks in question* 

The issue of Panama Canal bonds and Z per cent certificates of 
indebtedness in due time gave further relief to the situation. Many 
of the bonds and certificates were subscribed for by banks in the 
central reserve cities for the exj^ress purpose of taking out additional 
circulation, to be shipped to their con^espondenta in interior cities* 

r also inclose a table prepared in tho nffico of the Comptrollpr of 
the Currency, sliowing tlie amount of reserve required to be lu^ld and 
the amount held on December 3, 1907, bv the brinks from which com- 
plaints were received. The amount of reserve held is stated, so as to 
show separately the amoimt with agents and the amount in the 
respective banks. Tlie tal)le shows that of the 43 hanks naniod in the 
table only 8 were below the legal requirement on the date mentioned, 
and that the percentage of deficiency was small. Nearly all of the 
others Avere in exceptionally strong condition. 

The ascertainment of the facts called for by this resolution has 
required the careful examination of a voluminous correspondence. 
Respectfully, 

Geo. B. Cortelyou, 

iSecretary. 

The PREsmENT or the Senate. 



1. 

[Telegram.] 

OwENSBORO, Ky., November 5, J007. 
Refusal of assistant treasurer at St. Ix>uis, New York, and other places to 
accept anything but cash Is very hurtful to business interests Jind affects 
seriously the national banks. We are asking speedy relief from this situation. 

C. C. W ATKINS. 

Cashier National Deposit Bank. 
Hon. Gex)rge B. Cortelyou, 

Washington, D. C. 



BEFUSAIi OF NATIONAL BANKS TO FURNISH CURRENCY. ft 

Tbeasubt Depabtment, 

Washington, December S, 1907. 
Deab Stb: Further referring to recent correspondence with you, regarding 
difficulties in the payment of internal-revenue taxes, and the embarrassment 
of banks in making deposits of their excess balances with the subtreasuries, 
you are advised that the Department has made such arrangements as will 
cause, it is hoped, a complete resumption of the methods of exchange formerly 
followed in connection with these matters. You are at liberty to communicate 
this information to those Interested. 

Very truly, yours, J. H. Edwabds, 

Assistant Secretary* 
Mr. C. C. Watkins, 

Cashier National Deposit Bank, Owenshoro, Ky. 



2. 

The Citizens National Bank, 

Louisville, Ky,, November 9, 1907. 

Deab Sib: On November 4, 1907, we sent to the assistant treasurer of the 
United States. New York City, this bank's check on the National Park Bank, 
New York, for $20,000, account transfer of funds. The check was made 
against an actual balance to this bank's credit with the National Park Bank, 
but was refused by it because the assistant treasurer insisted on its payment 
In currency only. An effort made November 6 to make transfer of $10,000 
through this bank's Philadelphia correspondent met a like fate. Our cor- 
respondents at New Orleans, St. I^uis, and Chicago are unable to deposit 
currency for us or to pay currency on checks made on them for transfers. 
Existing conditions make it Impossible for them to do it. 

The collectors' deix)sits are made up almost wholly of checks and our only 
means of remitting for excess balances is by check on one of the reserve cen- 
ters. We have readily accepted these checks, because to refuse them would be 
to block the Government business, and it is our eaniest desire to facilitate its 
transactions in every way we can. The collector deposits daily with one of 
the six depositary banks from $40,000 to $75,000, and even if this deposit were 
In currency I am persuaded the withdrawal of so much currency from Louis- 
ville would be seriously felt by its business interests. 

We give you these facts in order that you may remedy the trouble as may 
appear to you best. 

Yours, truly, H. C. Rodes, 

President. 

Hon. George B. Cobtelyou, 

Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D. 0. 

Treasubt Depabtment, 
Washington, December 2, 1907. 
Deab Sib: Further referring to recent correspondence with you regarding 
difficulties in the payment of internal revenue and other Government taxes, 
and the embarrassment of banks in making deposits of their excess balances 
with the subtreasuries, you are advised that the Department has made such 
arrangement as will cause, it is hoped, a complete resumi)tion of the methods 
of exchange formerly followed in connection with these matters. You are at 
liberty to communicate this information to those interested. 
Very truly, yours, 

J. H. E^DWABDS, 

Assistant Secretary. 
Mr. H. C. Rodes, 
President Citizens National Bank, Louisville, Ky. 



8. 

Southebn National Bank, 
Louisville, Ky,, November 9, 1907. 
Sib: On November 7 the collector of internal revenue deposited in this 
bank $55,401.42, and as our allotment of dei>OBit was complete, we issued our 
draft for the sam^ amount on the Hanover National Bank, New York, payable 



4 REFUSAL OF NATIONAL BANKS TO FURNISH CURRINCY. 

to the assistant treasurer of Oje Uolted States, aad forwarded It to blm tt- 
oe credited on our accoimt as a traosfer of Government fuuds, tJais being the 
usual course for these transactions. On this day we received from the Hanaver 
National Bank a telegram, reading as follows: 

*' Check 1852, order asslsant treasurer, presented* CurreDcy at 3 per cent 
premium. We can oaly pay providing yott remit correocy or instruct us pur- 
chase here. Auswer/* 

To which we replied by wire, as follows: 

** Have taken matter of trausfer up with Secretary of Treasury. Do not 
porchiise currency/' 

We wrmld respectfully state, Jn this connection* that the deposit received hf 
us contained but a few hundred doliar« In eaah, the majority being made up of 
ceHlHed checiiS on banks in this city, which bad beeu tendered in tiaymetit of 
tiix^m and the purchase of stamps. This Is in accordance with the cnstoia 
which ha? eiiated In this district for a long time. We have been In the hnbit 
In the fiast of making our transfer for dep^jslta. In excess of the amount 
allowed us, in the varkitis cities where subircaiauries are located. TheRe 
avenues have all heen closed daring the past two weeks by the tmwtninjcnesa 
of the banks located tlit*rein to dt*i*osit currency wltb the ftslisirant treasurer, 
as iins been the custom In the |j»st, with the eatcepllon of New York City, where 
we bare always made our lrnn»fei"s by our own draft on our correspondent, to 
th^ order of the ass^Btant treasurer. 

If this inetiKKi Is dlsc<mtiuu**fl, we see no way to make these transfers, as 
we are unable to ship llio large amounts In currency from I^juisvllle to cover 
the deiMjsita of the collector, which average Jn amount some v/ hat over $50,000 
per dny. Nor do we see b'»w It will be possible for the distillers ajjd tobacco 
uuinufftctnrers to obtain currency to mak(* their payments at the collector's 
o01c«* And even if they were so enabled to do we would be very loftth to see 
that amount shipped from our city dally to be locked up in subtreasury vaults; 

Thf* draft on the Hanover Xntional Bank, which was tenderer! to the assist- 
ant treasurer a( New York, represents actual funds to our credit In that baulc, 
ami l» the usual course for such transfers to be made. We consequently have 
left this mattt-r ojieu until we hear further from you. 
We rem a Id, respectfully, yours, 

Jauss S. Escorr. Pr€Mi4mL 

Hem. SccjyeT Aay or t he TuEAsuRr, 

^^^K Washinfftoti, D* a 



Southern National Bank, 
Louisville, Ky., 'Sovemhrr 11, J 007. 
Sir : Following up our letter of November 9 rcjrnrding the transfer of internal- 
revenue deposits, we beg leave to inclose a copy of a letter from our New York 
corresiK)ndent, the Hanover National Hauk, which gives additional information 
on the sni)ject, and explains the emi)arrassing position in which we are placed 
with this valued correspondent. 

Under existing rates this deposit of $r»r>.rHX) would entail upon us, should we 
be rtH]uired to furnish the currency, an expense of nearly $1,700, which we are 
satistitHl you will agree with us would be a burden which we ought not to he 
called up(m to assume. At the same time, should we decline to comply with 
the request of our corresi)ondent bank, it would leave them in a position which 
would also be manifestly unfair. 

We trust, therefore, that you can suggest a solution which would relieve this 
urgent case, in which not only ourselves but the other depositary banks of this 
city would be placed. 

We remain, very truly, yours, 

James S. Escott, President, 
Hon. Secretary of the Treasury, 

Washington, D, C. 



New Y'ork, November 9, 1907. 

Dear Sir: Referring to our telegraphic correspondence In regard to your 

check on us in favor of the Treasury Dei)artment, we have your disjiatch saying 

that you were taking the matter up with the Secretary and requesting us not 

to purchase currency. Your telegram did not come to hand until 2 o'clwk, and 



REFUSAL OF NATIONAL BANKS TO FURNISH OURBBNOY. 5 

In the meantime we had to pay your check with the actual cash, and under 
these circumstances we feel that you should cover such transfer by shlpjjing us 
currency for the purpose, or else have us buy the currency in the market here 
for your account. 

We, of course, want to be of all the service we can to you here, but all drafts 
through the subtreasury have to be met with cash. Since the 1st of the month 
we have paid out over $100,000 in currency for your account, and with the 
prevailing premium of 3 per cent on cash you will appreciate that this is 
manifestly unjust to us. 

Yours, truly, Eliceb E. Whittaker, 

Cashier Hanover National Bank* 
Hbnby Thiemann, Esq., 

Cashier Bouthem National Bank, Louisville, Ky. 



Treasury Department, 
Washington, December 2, 1907. 
Dear Sir: Further referring to recent correspondence with you regarding 
difficulties in the payment of internal-revenue and other Government taxes, 
and the embarrassment of banks in making deposits of their excess balances 
with the subtreasuries, you are advised that the Department has made such 
arrangements as will cause, it is hoped, a complete resumption of the methods 
of exchange formerly followed in connection with these matters. You are at 
liberty to communicate this information to those interested. 
Very truly, yours, 

J. H. Edwards, Assistant Secretary. 
Mr. James S. Esgott, 

President Southern National Bank, Louisville, Ky, 



United States Depository, 
National Bank of the Republic, 
Salt Lake City, Wednesday, November 6, 1907.-^ 
Sib: Both our New York correspondent, the National City Bank, and 
onr correspondent in San Francisco, the Anglo-Calif onila Bank (Limited), 
decline to accept our drafts on them and make deposit of funds in the sub- 
treasuries of those cities to cover our daily excess Government deposit. What 
shall we do? 

Nearly all the money we receive from the post-office and other Government 
officials here is in the form of checks, and we have no cash here at this time 
that we can remit to you. 

It is a hard struggle to keep enough cash in our vaults to keep business 
going. We can not ship away what little money we have and receive In its 
stead only checks. 

Would you accept from us temporarily as security for these funds deposited 
with us 100,000 United States twos, 1930, that we have on deposit at the 
National City Bank of New York, and 50.000 United States fours, 192.5? If 
yon would do this for the present and allow the deposit to remain here to the 
extent of our security, perhaps by the time we had accumulated that amount 
the situation will have cleared up so that we could remit funds to cover. 
Please wire answer. 

Very respectfully, Frank Knox. 

President. 
The Secretary of the Treasury, 

Washington, D. 0, 



Division op Public Moneys, 

Washington, November 11, 1907. 
National Bank of the Republic, 

Salt Lake City: 
Can not increase your authorized balance now. 

J. H. Edwards, 
Acting SccrelaiAj* 



6 REPUSAI. OF NATIONAL BAKKS TO FUfiNISH CimBENOY, 

Tge Old State National Ba^k. 

EvansviUc, Ind.t November II, imi* 
Deaii Stn: We Inclose letter from our correspondent, the National Park Bank« 
New York* advisinfc us that tliey will not take o«r cheek i ijnytibie to tho order 
of tlie assieruBt treasurer of the United States, drawn on account of transfer of 
fund& 

The cto(K>slts for wblcti these eheckis are drawn come to ua largely In checks 
and wlUi very little currency. We will confer with the local internnl-revenne 
coJlcctjkr and |ios<twmsfcr» and see If thes** deposHs can be made \n currency, 
whk'h wc ti'tw will be a hardship on onr iN?ople at thJs time. 

We are r^ady to remit for these anionids In Bocb Djanner as yoii mity direct 
and to f^uc'h I'lty as you will prefer. Kindly advise ns how we sball make the 
remUtnrifcs niid to which one of the cities wonld be your preference, wud oblige, 
Yours* respect fully, 

Heitst Reisi C^hier* 
aeCBSTAaY OF THl Tb^abv^t, 

Washington, D. 0, 

[iDclcwut-e.) 

The Katiohal Pa»k Baitk of N«w Xohe, 

November iK /SOT. 
6EirrcAH£iv: We notice that we bad to-day presented to uh check drawn on 
Of by yon to the ordfr of the fiselatant treasurer of the United Stales for $3^442, 
and that we frequently have inch Items f^resented. 

Ttmwmucb um these Hems at present have to be paid by ub In rash to the 
asfilsfnnt tn^ji surer, we must ask thnt^ for the present, you dli^continue dniw^lng 
such Ht^ms for transfer of funds, a a the agg^regate of same reaches a very large 
amonnt, 

TruHtln^ ymi will cooperate with us In thia matter, which will relieve the 
drain of currency from banks In this city, we are, 
Tours, very truly, 

M. H. Ew£tt, Canhi^, 
Qm State Natjohal Bait k. 

Treasury Department, 
Washington, IJccrmber 5, 1907. 
Dear Sir: Further referrinc: to recent corrcspniuionr-c with yon nvL'Mnling 
difficulties In the payment of internal-revenue taxes, and the emharrnssmeut 
of banks In niakiiiic deiK)sit8 of their excess balances with tlie subtrensuries, 
you are advised that the Department has made such arrangements as will 
canso, it is liojK'd. a complete resnini>tion of tlu' nietiiods of cxciiaiiLre formerly 
followed in ccmiiwtion with these matters. You are at liberty to communicate 
this informal ioii to tliose interested. 

Very truly, yours, J. H. Edwards, 

Assistant Secretary. 
Mr. Henry Ueis, 

Cashier Old State National Bank, 

Evansvillc, Ind. 



6. 



[Telegram.! 

Paterson, N. J., Novemhrr IS, 1907. 
The custom of assistant treasurer at Now York to require (M.i?i frnm \«\v Y<»rk 
banks in payment of transfer of funds from country points is working great 
hardships. We recounnend to your favorable consideration the certifying by 
New York banks of su'ii n'mittanees to be held l)y assistant treasurer i)endlng 
present unsettled currency conditions. 

£}dward T. Beale, President. 
The Secretary of the Treasury, 

Washitigton, D. C. 



BEPUSAL OP NATIONAL BANKS TO FURNISH OUBRENOY. 7 

Treasury Department, 
Washington, December 5, 1907. 
Dear Sir: Further referring to recent correspondence with you regarding 
difficulties in the payment of internal-revenue and other Government taxes, 
and the embarrassment of banks in making deposits of their excess balances 
with the subtreasuries, you are advised that the Department has made such 
arrangements as will cause, it is hoped, a complete resumption of the methods 
of exchange formerly followed in connection with these matters. You are at 
liberty to communicate this information to those Interested. 
Very truly, yours, v 

J. H. Edwards, 



Mr. Edward T. Beale, President, Paterson, N. J. 



Assistant Secretary. 



The United States National Bane, 

Portland, Oreg,, November 8, 1907. 
Dear Sir: As advised to you in our letter of the 2d instant, the San Fran- 
cisco banks having declined to make deposits with the assistant treasurer for 
our account, we have been remitting to the assistant treasurer at New York 
for excess of Government moneys on deposit in this bank. 

We are to-day in receipt of telegram from the National City Bank, requesting 
us not to draw any more drafts in favor of the assistant treasurer at New 
York. We will hold any further deposits that we may have in excess of the 
amount allowed us awaiting your further instructions. 
Very truly, yours, 

R. W. Schmeer, Cashier. 
The Secretary op the Treasury, 

Washington, D. 0. 



Treasury Department, 
Washington, December 2, 1907. 
Dear Sir: Further referring to recent corresiK)ndence with you regarding 
difficulties in the payment of internal-revenue and other Government taxes, 
and the embarrassment of banks in making deposits of their excess balances 
with the subtreasuries, yon are advised that the Department has made such 
arrangements as will cause, it is hoped, a complete resumption of the methods 
*of exchange formerly followed in connection with these matters. You are at 
liberty to communicate this information to those interested. 
Very truly, yours, 

J. H. Edwards, Assistant Secretary. 
Mr. B. W. Schmeer. 

Cashier United States National Bank, 

Portland, Oreg. 



The Bank op Mobile, N. B. A., 

Mobile, Ala., November 8, 1907. 
My Dear Sir: Inclosed we beg to hand you a telegram Just received from 
the National City Bank of New York ; we also beg to inclose you a letter from 
the Whitney-Central National Bank of New Orleans, both instructing us re- 
garding drafts which we have been accustomed to sending the assistant treas- 
urer at New York or New Orleans. 

Will you kindly suggest to us what action to take in the premises? Could 
we send our New York or New Orleans to the assistant treasurer of some 
other points? 

We regret complication has arisen, and trusting your instructions to us will 
not be embarrassing, and assuring you of our desire to serve you faithfully and 
latisfactorily, we beg to remain, with kind regards. 
Very respectfully, 

Michael J. McDermott, President. 
The Treasurer of the United States, 

Washington, D. C. 



8 EEFtrSAL OF HATIONAL. BANKS TO FUBNISH CUSBENCT, 

[IncloEure 1.1 

Whitnet<Centiial National 8ars» 

New Orieanft^ La., Noveniber €, W^. 
Gtntlrurti : We be^ to notlfjr yon tlmt we to-day ref tised pttjmeat to tlie 
aesistntit trousnrer, United States, of this city, of your cbeck an ua for ^.408,74, 
and In explanation beg to state that to i)iay tlifs check would bo equivalent to 
paying ont the easily which Is not perajisslble at present nnder tbe clearing- 
house ruling. 
Trnetlog that you will nnderstand our position, we are, 
Yotirfi, very truly, 

Ep H. KcEF, Assistant Cashier. 
Bank of MoBtt.Br. N. B, A^ 

MoUU, Ala. 

[IncIoQure 2— ^Telegram,] 

New ToiKf yovemftcf (I, I5i?7, 
Baite or Mobile, ifo&ffe: 

Please do not draw any more drafts favor of asatstant treasurer at New 
York, 

National Citt Baivk. 



Thk Bank of Mobh^e^ 
MobUe, AJa., November 1$, 1907, 
Sir: We wrote you on November S, en 11 lug your attention to the fact a boat 
our trouble In having our corre8j)onrlent9 In New York and New Orleans to 
Cftib our drafts for tbe aeststaut trea surer, and asking for instruct lona Up to 
the present time we have had no reply. Will you kindly let us bear from you 
promptly and ft'lly answerft^g onr letter? 

AKSurlnji you of our appreciation in advance, we heg to remain* with kind 
regards, 

Youre, reeiJectfuHy, M. J. McDe«mott, 

Th0 TnEABvmB of thx Untteo States, 



10. 
[Telegram.] 



Boise, Idaho, November IS. 



CriARLES H. Treat, 

Treasurer United states, Washington, D. C: 
Hanovor National, Now York, wires draft fa^or assistant treasnror, tliirty 
thousand; not paid: reason cash demand. Tliis draft our transfer exeess of 
deposit seventh. Advise how transfer can be made. 

Boise City National Bank. 



11. 

First National Bank, 
Dundee, III, November 8, J 907, 

Sir: Your favor of the 6th Instant returning our draft for $5,000 not Iionored 
by our New York correspondent received. 

Would be please<l if you would answer the following questions in regard to 
this attitude of a national bank: 

Can a national bank refuse to pay a draft against an existing deposit subject 
to ch(K"k? And if it refuses or can not or will not pay should not the Comi)- 
troller tal<c such bank in handV 

Will the CJovernment "wink at" and protect our bank If we refuse to pay 
money on deiM^sit with us (subject to check)? 



BEFUSAIi OP NATIONAL BANKS TO FURNISH CURBENCY. 9 

It seems to me this plan of holding up all the currency in the larger banks* 
apparently sanctioned by the Government, will, if continued, bring much mor» 
of a panic and the hoarding of cash than a free use of the currency the coun- 
try possesses could possibly do. I know that in this section the longer we con- 
tinue under the present restrictions the worse reaction will be, and I think it 
the height of folly for the Government to allow it for a minute. 

Very respectfully submitted. 

Robert Schultz, Cashier. 

Chables H. Tbeat, 

Treasurer of the United States, Washinffton, D. C. 



12. 

The Fabmebs* National Bank. 

Pekin, III,, Noveinher //, 1907. 

Dbab Sir: Under the date of November 2, 1907, and November 5, 1!M>7, re- 
spectively, this bank sent to the assistant treasurer In Chicago, 111., our draft* 
248177 for $48,160.36 and 248223 for $25,076.92 in payment of a deposit made by 
the local collector on account of Internal-revenue collections, for a dei)oslt for 
your account on account of ** transfer of funds." 

These drafts, as well as others that we have heretofore sent to him, were 
payable through the Chicago Clearing House, and that the assistant treasurer 
of Chicago, 111., withdrew from the clearing house was unknown to us, and when 
he returned both of these drafts to us and demanded currency payments for them 
we were dumfounded. Had we known of this ruling (and as a Government 
depository bank we think he should have apprised us of it) we certainly would 
not have accepted the checks from the local banks, but would have Insisted 
upon cash payment. 

Under date of November 8 we again returned these drafts to him, explaining^ 
the matter fully, and tried to get cash from our Chicago correspondent to take 
them up, but could not; also wired St. Louis and New York for currency or 
gold to do it with, but although our balances were large ones, still they abso- 
lutely refused to ship us a dollar. The assistant treasurer of Chicago, in re- 
turning these drafts the second time, wrote to us as follows : 

"Your letter of the 8th instant, inclosing drafts on First National Bank of 
this city for $48,160.36 and $25,076.92, Is received. 

" Drafts are returned to you herewith, as cash can not be had for the same. 

" No advance information was furnished this office when the local bank» 
decided to refuse to pay cash for drafts on them ; consequently no Information 
on the subject could be furnished by this office. As this office can not grant 
relief, It Is suggested that you take the matter up with the Treasurer of the 
United States at Washington. 

" Respectfully, Wm. Boldenweck." 

We do not like to lose this depository account; at the same time we do not 
know what more* we can do, and would respectfully ask If you could Instruct 
the Chicago office to accept these two drafts and we will be governed by their 
instructions to pay cash on future shipments, or until it can be arranged by our 
correspondents In Chicago and New York. 

Respectfully, A. A. Sipfle, 

Cashier. 
Tbeasubeb of the United States, 

Washington, D, C. 



13. 

The People's National Bank, 
Lawrenceburg, Ind,, November 2, 1907, 
Dear Sir : On October 25 last we requested the National City Bank, of New 
York City, to deposit with the assistant treasurer, for credit of the general 
account of the Treasurer of the United States as a transfer of funds from thia 
bank on account of deposits and to charge our account with the same, $18,- 
814.73. We also made the same request on the 30th ultimo to the extent of 
$2,000. 



10 KEFUSAL OF HATTONAi BAi4 KS TO FURNISH CLrRKENCy. 

W© are tn receipt of telegram from the National City Bnuk under date 
OetalMfr 30 a mi November 1. inform lii^ na of tUe iujfU'siL'tlcnblJity under 
presefit conditions to nmke Trenpnry dejiositB. We presnme thl*? Is on account 
of their inability to secure ciint-ney, lii wlilcli position we are algo at the present 
time. 

Regretting very much our inability to move the funrls ns orrlered on account 
of the ubove-ivaentloned rea&<iri, and in onler to proiect tbe Treasury Depart- 
ment we teJeffraphed the bomnnble S*?cretary of tiie Treasury on I be 1st in stunt 
for an addHioiiaJ depoaltary of $50,000, and which was refused In a teJe^^nun 
from the Assistant Secretary on the same date, we tlien made request by wir« 
that he permit tJie hi tenia I -re venue receipts to accmntilate in this bank (which 
won!*! also iuclude fiie amount now at the Notional City Rank and ori]i?red to 
the account of the Trea&nrer) to the extent of $50,000, and we would forward 
and cover the sanje wltii approved tjonds. This request wiia also refused 
telegram under date of the 2d, 

We are willing to do anythlnft In the matter in order to make the tran8f< 
and would pnrchaee the currency at n p rem him If this could be done, or If you 
will permit we will forward our drafts on the National City Bank direct to the 
assiitant treasurer at New York. 

Kindly advl^ us in the matter* 

Very respectfully, P, 0, Bbaitit, 

The TuEAauKCB of the TJnitkd States. 

Wttsi}irnffion, D. Cp 



4 U 



14 

I^EjriHOTOJc City Natioical Bawk, 

Lej^ington, Ky., Nnvrmhrr U, 1907. 

Deab Str: On Noveniher we issued our drafts aggi-e^atSng Jf1,808I»*J on the 
Seaboard National Bank, New York, tn favor of the assistant treasurer of the 
United gtate-s on accoimt of trnnsfer of (k^vernment deposits of that date. On 
November 7 we Iftsued oui- draft for $RJ37.8I1 in paynHnii of transfer of that 
date. Do November 8 we were ootids by the Seaboard National Bank that 
Inasmuch as the assistant treasurer at New York demanda currency for our 
checks fin them that they could not honor the dnifti^. ImoKMlinTf^ry upon re- 
ceipt nf fhii* iiifnnaatioii we wired the nFi^lslant treasurer, asi<ln^ r(*tuni uf 
our rtrafti^ and have sent tlie c'lrrency direct frc^nj here to !lie snM reinsurer at 
Cinelnimti t*^* |iny the trnnsfrri? nf tlj*'pie two days. We are writing tbis loth^r 
simply in jufstire to nnj8L0\*^s. Tbe buJam^e witb the f?f^a board Naili»nal Bank 
wnss lart^efy In our tnvnr nnd we hsKl no Intirnatinn wbatever that the Seaboard 
Nat lo! sal Hank would de^nint- payn^ent of drafis on tbein la favor of tht* 
assistant frf^isiin'n In fact we had iiom^ ht the trouble of wrHinj* tbo Sea- 
boa nl Xalionnl Bank snine fftur or five day*^ previous to the drawlTjj^ nf tbese 
drafli*, nskins: tbeni whf^her or not there would be nny fkbjt.H'l i^^n to onr drawing 
In favor uf the nssisrant treasurer. Havinj? re<^eived no reply, we nfirrTnilly 
Iirewimied tbnt there was no nbje('t;i»n. sind mi thi^ dtb lastaut we drew tlie 
drafts refnrnil to abnvf, and otj tlh' Ttb I lie In Iter ilraft. 

We have rrfjncMpd the Rralmard NatUaial Bsmk to expliiln to tbo subfToas^ 
urer the rntidlllim nfi It s^tan^ls, hi tbiil the sirbhejisuror will know tbat we wi-re 
In no wise to blante for tbeSr refiii^ol to pny the drnft?^. We wrUe this ex pi a* 
nafioTi to you now so tlint voti vvi/f utuU-iSyumi Uai o.:r tiiurr^e was entirely 
honornhle. If tlio Soal>(>jinl National Bank had given us any intimation that 
they objected to our drawing in favor of the assistant treasurer wo woiild 
most rortninly not have drawn, but inasiiincli as the neighboring depositories 
throughout this section were making their transfers by drawing on tlieir New 
York correspondents in favor of the assistant treasurer, we saw no reason why 
we should not do tlie same. We have sent the assistant treasurer at Cincin- 
nati $10,540.82 in currency in payment of these two transfers. 
Very truly, 

J. W. Stoll, Cashier. 

The Tbeasubeb of the United States, 

New Yof% N, r. 



BEFUSAL OF ilATIONAL BANKS TO FUBNISH CUBBENCY. 11 

15. 

The National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 

Baltimore, Md., October SI, li)07. 

Sib: This bank has been favored by being one of the reisnilar Government 
dei>ositories of this city for many years, and, as such, we receive on Monday, 
Wednesday, and Friday of each week deposits from the internal-revenue col- 
lator of this district, for which we make deposits of like amount on the suc- 
ceeding day with any subtreasurer of the United States. As almost the entire 
amount of such deposits consists of checks, and as the Baltimore Clearing- 
House Association is upon a clearing-house certificate basis, we are unable to 
procure any cash for such deposits. We have been accustomed In the past, 
when our balance accumulated in any other subtreasury city, to request our 
correspondents at such points to make such deposits for our account. We now 
find that our correspondents in New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Chicago, 
and St. Louis will not make such deposits for us until normal conditions once 
more prevail. We are to-day making a deposit of $25,000 odd that we re- 
ceived from the internal- revenue department on the 30th, but by making said 
deposit we are taking cash that we may urgently need on Saturday for pay- 
roll purposes. We would, therefore, appreciate your kind consideration dur- 
ing the present trying times, and would suggest that you wire P. L. Golds- 
borough, internal-revenue collector of this district, suggesting that for the 
present his office only accept currency for internal-revenue payments. 

We are sure that you will be glad to ease the situation In every way. 
Respectfully, yours, 

R. Vinton Lansdale, Cashier. 

Hon. Charles H. Treat, 

Treasurer of the United States, Washington, D, C. 



10. 

The People's National Bank, 
Winston-Salem, N, C, November 2, 1907. 
Sir: Our bank friends and correspondent, the Drovers and Mechanics' Na- 
tional Bank, Baltimore, agreed to make a deposit with the assistant treasurer 
for our revenue funds, and we sent them a check for that purpose. They write 
us to-day that owing to the extreme scarcity of legal tender, the' only thing the 
assistant treasurer will receive, they have been unable to make a satisfactory 
settlement with him ; that they tried to get a supply from New York and Phil- 
adelphia and failed, and that that was the cause of their delaj'. We are having 
that check sent forward to the assistant treasurer In New York to see if we can 
work it there. Please bear in mind that we are doing our best to have these 
tilings transferred promptly. 

Very respectfully, yours, W. A. Blair, 

Vice-President and Cashier. 
Treasurer of the United States, 

Washington, D, C. 

[Inclosure.] 

Drovers and Mechanics' National Bank, 

Baltimore, Md., October 3L 1007. 
Dear Sir: Your two favors of the 30th instant addressed to Mr. James 
Clark, president, and the writer, respectively, received to-day and contents 
noted, and note the receipt of note of Winston-Salem Building nnd Loan Asso- 
ciation for $5,000, which we have discounted in compliance with your request, 
advice of which we are sending under another cover, and have charged to your 
account the note for $5,000, falling due to-day, which we have forwarded you 
for collection. Owing to the extreme scarcity of currency, and which is the 
only thing the assistant treasurer will receive on account of transfer of funds, 
we have been unable to fill your order to deposit $4,143, the amount of check 
sent us in yours of the 2Sth instant, and which we return herein unused. We 
made a desperate effort to-day to secure a supply of currency from New York 
S D— 60-1— Vol 32 24 



12 



REFUSAl. OF KATIOKAL BA^' KS TO FCHNISH CUEBENCl* 



and Plilludelphia, but in botli cases we were disnppointeil and infomied that 
there wtia uc* citrrei^<-y in the batitSs of any of the NVw York luink? at tdia time. 
We regret our hittbility to serve ytni, Uut trust that you will understmid the 
situiifioni as It iB one thji>t we are nnahle to eontroU 
Tours, very truly, 

tie AS. S. Mil LEA, Cashier, 

We wired to forward to osslstaut treasurer, New York. 

W» A. Blatb, Esq., 

Fte€-Pr£^^'idC7if F£f£?p7£?'« National Bank^ WiJif^ton-Salefn, 7^^ 0- 



17, 

People's N